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THE  UNIVERSITY 

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FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


1864  to  1917 


By  JAMES  BLAINE  WALKER 


Illustrated 
MANFRED    K.    TOEPPEN 

Z303  DIME  BANK  BUDG. 
DETROIT 


Copyright  by  Author  1918 


From  the  Press  of 

THE  LAW  PRINTING  COMPANY 

6  Church  Street,  New  York  City 

1918 


CONTENTS 

Chapter  Page 

I.     First  Suggestions  of  Rapid  Transit 1 

II.     The  First  Rapid  Transit  Bill 9 

III.  Pioneer  Plans  for  a  Subway 15 

IV.  First  Rapid  Transit  Bill  Vetoed 30 

V.     Legislative  Commission  on  Rapid  Transit 40 

VI.     Work  of  Senate  Committee  of  1866 60 

VII.     Inception  of  the   Elevated   Railroads 71 

VIII.     First  Tunnel  Built  Under  Broadway 87 

IX.  Gilbert  Elevated  Railroad  and  Rapid  Transit  Commis- 
sion of  1875 105 

X.     Era  of  Public  Ownership  Opens 123 

XI.     Rapid  Transit  Act  and  Commission  of  1894 139 

XII.  Contract  for  Construction  of  First  Subway  Awarded...    162 

XIII.  First  Subway  Completed  and  Placed  in  Operation 176 

XIV.  Metropolitan  Company  Compels  Merger  with  Subway. .    192 

XV.  Rapid    Transit    Commission    Abolished    and    Succeeded    by 

Public  Service  Commission 207 

XVI.     Dual  System  of  Rapid  Transit  Adopted 224 

XVII.     Extent,  Importance  and  Cost  of  Dual  System 24.^ 

XVIII.     Decked   Roadway   Method   of   Construction 263 

XIX.      Rapid  Transit  in  Brooklyn 274 

XX.     The  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Tunnels 284 


PREFACE 

^'DAPID  TRANSIT"  in  New  York  City  means  the 
"'■^  transportation  of  passengers  from  one  part  of  the 
City  to  another  by  trains  of  cars,  as  disthi^mshed  from 
transportation  by  sing:ie_cars  or  '  ^  street_cars. ' '  It  is  dis- 
cinctly  a  modern  development  covering  roughly  a  half 
century,  although  practical,  rapid  transit  operation  dates 
back  only  to  1871. 

Located  on  a  narrow  island  between  the  Hudson  and 
East  rivers,  New  York  City  presents  probably  the  most 
diliicult  situation  in  regard  to  internal  traffic  of  any  city 
in  the  country.  Bounded  on  West,  South  and  East  by 
water,  the  only  outlet  for  growth  was  toward  the  North, 
with  the  result  that  early  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  it 
became  a  long,  narrow  city,  with  its  business  section  at 
the  southern  end  and  its  homes  at  the  northern  extremity 
— an  extremity  that  has  always  receded  as  the  business 
section  grew  and  pushed  it  further  away. 

When  Wall  street  was  the  northern  limit  the  traffic 
problem  was  simple,  but  when  that  limit  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  Twenty-third  street  the  population  had  grown 
to  such  an  extent  that  it  was  a  difficult  matter  to  provide 
facilities  to  take  its  business  men  down  town  in  the  morn- 
ing and  up  town  at  night.  Omnibuses  were  the  first  public 
cdnveyances  following  the  stage  coach  days.  Then  came 
horse  cars,  then  elevated  railroads,  then  electric  trolley 
cars  and  finally  subways.  Each  class  in  its  day  was  over- 
crowded. This  was  due  principally  to  the  phenomenal 
ficrowth  of  the  city,  which  added  to  the  traveling  popula- 
tion faster  than  transportation  facilities  could  be  pro- 
vided. A  secondary  cause  was  the  policy  of  traction 
corporations,  which  have  always  found  '' dividends  in 
the  straps"  and  have  postponed  extensions  of  their  lines 


to  the  last  minute  in  order  to  enjoy  as  long  as  possible 
the  swollen  revenue  which  came  from  overcrowded  trains 
and  cars. 

In  the  year  1870,  when  the  first  dummy  engine  trains 
ran  on  the  first  elevated  railroad,  the  entire  street  rail- 
way travel  of  the  city  w^as  about  115,000,000  passengers. 
In  1880  this  had  grown  to  288,000,000— more  than  doub- 
ling in  ten  years.  Each  succeeding  decade  has  seen  a 
corresponding  increase  until  at  the  present  time  (1917) 
the  passenger  traffic  in  the  greater  city  is  upwards  of 
1,900,000,000  a  year.  This  growth  is  out  of  all  propor- 
tion to  the  increase  in  population,  for  while  in  1870  the 
average  citizen  took  100  street  car  rides  in  a  year  he  now 
takes  upwards  of  350.  In  other  words  the  more  traveling 
facilities  provided  the  more  people  make  use  of  them. 

This  enormous  traffic  is  now  handled  by  electric  sur- 
face or  trolley  cars,  trains  on  elevated  railroads  and 
trains  in  the  subways  or  underground  railroads.  It 
demands  the  use  every  day  of  about  13,000  passenger  cars 
operated  over  2,300  miles  of  track.  If  laid  in  a  straight 
line  these  tracks  would  stretch  from  New  York  to  Salt 
Lake  City.  The  capital  invested  in  these  enterprises  is 
enormous.  The  outstanding  stocks  and  bonds  of  the 
several  companies  now  aggregate  $1,121,296,001.  The 
universal  fare  is  five  cents  and  one  may  ride  twenty  miles 
for  one  fare.  The  total  amount  of  fares  collected  during 
the  last  fiscal  year  was  $94,547,916. 

About  one  half  of  this  traffic  is  rapid  transit  traffic — 
that  is  traffic  bandied  by  trains  of  cars  on  elevated  or 
underground  roads.  The  other  half  is  carried  by  single 
cars  operated  on  surface  tracks.  Electricity  is  the  uni- 
versal motive  power — the  third  rail  on  elevated  roads 
and  subways  and  the  underground  or  overhead  trolley 
on  the  surface  lines.  A  few  of  the  latter  use  storage 
battery  cars. 

The  pursuit  of  a  suitable  and  adequate  system  of 
rapid  transit  has  been  constant.     The  sought  for  ideal 


has  been  at  times  almost  in  sight;  again  it  has  disap- 
peared, only  to  be  revived  as  the  struggle  for  it  grew 
in  strength.  Romance  and  tragedy,  few  successes  and 
many  failures  marked  the  quest.  In  its  service  men 
whose  ideas  made  possible  the  successes,  like  the  tradi- 
tional poor  inventor,  have  lived  to  see  those  ideas  turned 
to  profit  by  others;  have  sunk  their  all  in  vain  attempts 
to  materialize  their  dreams  only  to  retire  bankrupt  and 
see  other  men  reap  golden  harvests  from  their  crops. 

The  history  of  rapid  transit  is  replete  with  flashes 
of  genius  and  the  sordid  spirit  of  greed.  It  tells  of  bat- 
tles, of  schemes,  of  great  ambitions.  The  struggle  for 
public  franchises  alone,  staged  in  the  Legislature  and 
the  City  government,  provides  material  for  a  thrilling 
drama.  Most  of  the  actors  in  the  earlier  scenes  have 
gone  from  this  world,  but  a  few  remain,  and  with  their 
recollections  and  documentary  relics  it  is  still  possible  to 
recast  the  forgotten  parts.  The  writer  has  endeavored 
to  do  this  in  the  following  pages,  which  embrace  the  most 
interesting  phases  of  an  interesting  research. 

James  Blaine  Walkee. 
Pelham  Manor,  N.  Y. 
November  1, 1917. 


Ill 


CHAPTER  I 

First  Suggestions  of  Rapid  Transit. 

T  IKE  other  great  conceptions  the  rapid  transit  idea  was 
born  during  the  Civil  War,  but  it  is  impossible  to 
account  for  it  on  any  theory  that  it  served  a  war  purpose. 
The  trans-continental  railroad  and  telegraph  grew  di- 
rectly out  of  the  demand  for  better  communication  cre- 
ated by  that  great  struggle.  The  demand  for  rapid  tran- 
sit came  from  the  development  of  New  York  City  and 
its  growth  northward,  just  as  the  demand  for  elevators 
came  from  the  development  of  buildings  and  their  growth 
skyward.  The  elevator  also  was  a  production  of  the 
Civil  War  period.  Both  were  incidental,  however,  and 
in  no  way  related  except  by  time  to  the  conflict  of  arms. 
By  the  year  1860  buildings  had  gro\\Ti  to  so  many  stories 
that  stairways  became  inadequate,  and  the  city  had 
pushed  so  far  to  the  North  that  the  busy  New  Yorker 
demanded  some  quicker  mode  of  conveyance  from  his 
home  to  his  office  than  was  supplied  by  the  horse-drawn 
vehicles  of  the  period. 

It  is  really  remarkable  how  many  great  things  were 
either  accomplished  or  initiated  during  the  Civil  War, 
when  one  might  suppose  that  the  energies  of  the  whole 
people  would  have  been  so  absorbed  in  the  mighty  strug- 
gle that  there  would  have  been  little  opportunity  for  the 
conception  of  new  projects.  Yet  one  finds  the  period 
singularly  prolific  of  notable  advances  in  art,  science  and 
material  progress.  This  development  was  so  marked 
that  it  attracted  attention  even  at  the  time.  For  instance, 
in  an  editorial  on  the  revival  of  the  Atlantic  cable  project, 
the  New  York  Herald  of  June  11,  1864,  remarked: 

"Whoever  shall  undertake  hereafter  to  present  a 
philosophic  history  of  these  times  will  be  compelled 


FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 


to  linger  over  and  to  emphasize  the  fact  that,  during 
the  bloodiest  epoch  in  their  national  career,  the 
progress  of  the  American  people  in  social  and  polit- 
ical enterprise  outstripped  that  of  any  previous 
period  from  the  founding  of  the  Commonwealth." 

The  writer  then  cites  the  electric  telegraph  completed 
across  the  continent,  the  new  railroad  to  the  West,  the 
generous  contributions  to  the  starving  in  Ireland  and  to 
the  suffering  operatives  in  England,  the  revival  of  ocean 
subsidies  and  the  establishment  of  the  postal  money  order 
system. 

Rapid  Transit  in  New  York  had  its  birth  in  the  year 
1864,  when  the  armies  of  Grant  and  Lee  were  contending 
for  the  final  mastery.  The  city  then  lay  mostly  below 
Twenty-third  street.  Harlem  had  been  ' '  discovered ' '  and 
a  few,  venturesome  pioneers  had  built  homes  there.  The 
great  majority  of  the  citizens,  however,  dwelt  south  of 
Forty-second  street.  Some  of  the  north  and  south  ave- 
nues were  not  even  opened  north  of  that  street.  Many 
of  the  streets  were  unpaved,  and  citizens  ploughed 
through  mud  and  dust  to  reach  the  crude  horse  car  or 
the  crowded  omnibus.  A  six-story  building  was  a  ''sky- 
scraper", a  trip  to  Albany  on  the  steam  trains  took  a 
whole  day;  national  banks  were  a  novelty;  the  Brooklyn 
Bridge  was  unborn;  electric  lighting  was  only  a  dream 
and  the  Government  was  just  establishing  the  money 
order  system. 

To  the  present  generation  the  New  York  of  those  days 
seems  much  more  remote  than  the  time  would  suggest, 
so  rapid  has  been  its  growth  and  so  many  have  been  its 
achievements.  The  city  has  been  practically  rebuilt  in 
the  meantime,  and  the  "sights"  of  that  era  have  been 
well  nigh  forgotten.  Then  the  Fifth  Avenue  hotel,  at 
Twenty-third  street  and  Fifth  Avenue,  was  the  new  up- 
town rival  of  the  Astor  House,  down  at  Broadway  and 
Vesey  street.    Both  now  have  been  destroyed,  the  former 


FIRST  SUGGESTIONS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


to  make  room  for  a  modern  office  building,  the  latter  to 
permit  the  building  of  the  Broadway  subway. 

It  was  a  time  when  women  wore  hoop-skirts;  when 
Barnum's  American  Museum  and  Niblo's  Garden  flour- 
ished; when  Maggie  Mitchell  was  making  herself  famous 
in  **Fanchon"  and  negro  minstrelsy  was  in  its  glory; 
when  the  Academy  of  Music  was  the  home  of  grand  opera, 
and  Brignoli,  Zucchi  and  Massimiliani  sang  in  "II  Trova- 
tore"  and  other  early  Verdi  operas;  when  Theodore 
Thomas  was  building  up  his  famous  orchestra  and  giving 
"symphony  soirees"  at  Irving  Hall.  It  was  the  year 
v%'hich  saw  the  re-election  of  Abraham  Lincoln  as  Presi- 
dent and  the  admission  of  Nevada  as  a  State  of  the  Union. 
The  city  had  become  a  metropolis,  but  its  metropolitan 
life  was  just  beginning.  In  spite  of  war  prices  its  people 
had  plenty  of  money  and  lavished  it  on  all  kinds  of  pleas- 
ures. The  newspapers  commented  on  the  gaiety  of  the 
winter  season,  the  extravagance  of  the  women  and  the 
expensive  restaurants,  of  which  Delmonico's  set  the  pace. 
In  one  editorial  it  was  stated  that  women  of  fashion 
thought  nothing  of  paying  $100  for  a  bonnet;  yet  the 
paper  criticized  the  omnibus  companies  for  raising 
their  fares  from  six  to  ten  cents  and  the  theaters  for 
preparing  to  increase  the  price  of  admission  beyond  fifty 
cents.  It  was  the  day  of  fractional  currency,  or  "shin- 
plasters",  when  a  man  had  to  look  twice  to  tell  the  dif- 
ference between  a  bill  for  three  cents  and  one  for  a  half 
dollar. 

A  picture  of  the  city  at  that  time  is  drawn  by 
James  Grant  Wilson  in  his  History  of  New  York,  a  pic- 
ture worth  reproducing  here  to  glimpse  the  condition  of 
the  community  when  rapid  transit  was  first  projected: 

"The  City  stretched  her  limbs  anew  and  began 
that  progress  which  in  a  quarter  of  a  century  more 
transformed  her  from  a  struggling,  provincial  town 
into   a  metropolis.     Three   potent  factors   in   that 


FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TEAXSIT 


transformation  were  the  introduction  of  the  electric 
light,  the  use  of  elevators  and  the  achievement  of 
rapid  transit,  or  rather  the  continued  struggles 
toward  rapid  transit,  the  desired  end  receding 
as  the  means  for  attaining  it  proved  successively 
inadequate. 

'*In  order  fully  to  appreciate  the  power  of  these 
factors,  *  *  *  w^e  have  first  to  remember  what 
the  New  York  of  1865  was.  Above  Forty-second 
street  it  could  scarcely  be  said  to  exist,  being  only  a 
dreary  waste  of  unpaved  and  ungraded  streets  di- 
versified by  rocky  eminences  crowned  with  squat- 
ters' shanties.  Kailway  passengers  from  the  North 
still  left  their  trains  at  Twenty-seventh  and  Thir- 
tieth streets.  Street  railways  were  comparatively 
few,  and  there  was  no  speedy  and  comfortable  way 
of  getting  from  one  end  of  the  city  to  the  other. 
Below  Eighty-sixth  street  there  were  in  1865  25,261 
vacant  lots.  The  grading  of  Madison  avenue  was 
still  in  progress,  and  the  state  of  the  city  as  regards 
transit  facilities  is  set  forth  in  a  striking  way  by  the 
hopeful  language  in  which  a  pamphlet  of  that  day 
speaks  of  the  new  street  as  likely  to  'prepare  the  way 
for  an  extension  of  the  Fourth  Avenue  Railroad'  and 
thus  give  new  access  to  the  Park.  Unable  to  get 
anywhere  on  Manhattan  Island,  people  sought  the 
suburbs  and  rapidly  built  up  Southern  Connecticut 
and  Eastern  New  Jersey,  with  Long  Island  and  Sta- 
ten  Island." 

And  here  it  may  be  well  to  state  that  'rapid  transit', 
as  used  in  these  pages,  applies  to  transportation  by 
trains  inside  of  the  city,  as  distinguished  from  the  steam 
railroads  which  supplied  rapid  transit  from  and  to  dis- 
\  tant  points.  In  1864  the  steam  roads  offered  the  only 
quick  mode  of  traveling,  and  to  them,  as  the  historian 
notes,  was  due  the  building  up  of  the  suburbs  in  West- 


FIRST  SUGGESTIONS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


Chester  county,  N.  Y.,  in  Connecticut,  in  New  Jersey, 
Staten  Island  and  Long  Island.  In  1864  there  were  three 
of  these  roads  running  into  New  York  City — the  Hudson 
River  Railroad,  the  New  York  and  Harlem  Railroad  and 
the  New  Haven  Railroad.  The  former  two  are  now  parts 
of  the  New  York  Central  system,  while  the  latter  still 
retains  its  individuality  and  name.  In  New  Jersey  there 
were  the  beginnings  of  the  Erie,  the  Pennsylvania  and 
the  Northern  Railway.  On  Long  Island  the  Long  Island 
Railroad  ran  to  Islip,  Oyster  Bay,  etc.,  and  the  New  York 
and  Flushing,  the  Brooklyn,  Bath  Beach  and  Coney  Isl- 
and and  the  Brooklyn  Central  and  Jamaica  railroads  to 
the  places  named  in  their  titles. 

Street  cars  of  the  kind  drawn  by  horses  had  been  in 
use  for  many  years.  They  were  introduced  in  1832,  when 
the  first  car  in  the  world  to  run  on  tracks  was  operated 
in  Fourth  Avenue  between  Prince  street  and  Fourteenth 
street  on  the  route  of  the  New  York  and  Harlem  road. 
Originally  a  horse  railroad,  this  line  was  changed  to 
steam  operation  a  few  years  later.  About  1852  the  horse 
car  movement,  which  had  languished  owing  to  the  bulky 
and  unwieldy  style  of  cars  used,  took  on  new  life  by 
reason  of  the  improvement  in  the  type,  and  by  1855  lines 
were  in  operation  in  Fourth,  Sixth,  Third  and  Eighth 
avenues.  By  1864  the  number  of  such  lines  had  increased 
to  twelve,  and  in  that  year  they  carried  about  61,000,000 
passengers.  The  population  of  the  city  then  was  about 
700,000.  Today  (1917)  in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx  (ap- 
proximately covered  by  the  old  city)  with  four  times  the 
population,  the  street  railroads  carry  in  a  year  about 
1,000,000,000  passengers,  sixteen  times  as  many  as  in  1864. 
In  other  words,  while  in  1864  every  citizen  on  the  average 
took  about  eighty-seven  street  car  rides  in  a  year,  he  now 
takes  about  357.  The  age  of  rapid  transit  has  not  only 
multiplied  the  traveling  facilities  but  enormously  in- 
creased the  usefulness  of  street  car  travel  to  the  citizen. 

Tradition  has  it  that  an  ox  cart  was  the  first  form  of 


6  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

street  transportation  used  in  New  York.  In  1746,  it  is 
said,  a  line  of  such  carts  ran  from  the  Battery  up  Broad- 
way to  Houston  street.  This  form  of  transit,  if  it  ever 
existed,  proved  too  slow  for  the  New  Yorker,  and  early 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century  omnibuses  were  introduced. 
By  1850  Broadway  was  so  crowded  with  these  vehicles, 
operated  by  several  rival  companies,  that  the  later  no- 
torious Jacob  Sharp  began  his  fight  for  a  surface  rail- 
road in  that  thoroughfare.  It  took  him  thirty-five  years 
to  get  it,  the  franchise  having  been  granted  in  August 
1884  by  the  *' boodle"  aldermen.  According  to  figures 
compiled  by  Sharp  in  one  of  his  campaigns  for  a  fran- 
chise, about  230  omnibuses  passed  Chambers  street  going 
up  Broadway  and  240  down  each  hour.  For  thirteen 
hours  his  count,  taken  in  August  1852,  showed  that  3,035 
omnibuses  and  4,719  other  vehicles  passed  up,  and  3,162 
omnibuses  and  4,723  other  vehicles  passed  down  Broad- 
way at  this  point.  This  meant  an  omnibus  service  at 
thirteen  seconds'  headway. 

By  the  year  1864  conditions  had  become  intolerable. 
Broadway  became  unsafe  for  pedestrians,  and  we  are 
told  that  the  rivalry  between  omnibus  drivers  was  so 
great  that  they  recklessly  drove  over  men,  women  and 
children  in  their  haste  to  beat  their  nearest  competitors 
to  waiting  passengers.  In  the  rush  hours  the  omnibuses 
were  so  crowded  that  passengers  had  to  hang  on  to  straps, 
as  they  were  forced  to  do  in  the  more  crowded  street  cars. 
As  omnibus  fares  were  ten  and  the  street  car  fares  six 
cents,  the  latter  carried  by  far  the  greater  number  of 
passengers.  The  newspapers  of  the  period  denounced  the 
conditions  and  scored  omnibus  and  car  companies.  Reck- 
less driving,  and  crowded  omnibuses  were  not  the  only 
grievances.  The  drivers  were  accused  of  swearing  at 
passengers  and  giving  them  bad  money  or  tickets  in 
change.  In  its  issue  of  October  2,  1864  the  New  York 
Herald  savagely  attacked  the  omnibus  nuisance,  and 
called  upon  the  capitalists  of  the  city  to  establish  cab  lines 


PIBST  SUGGESTIONS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


to  relieve  the  suffering  citizens.    Here  is  a  quotation  from 

that  editorial: 

"Modern  martyrdom  may  be  succinctly  defined 
as  riding  in  a  New  York  omnibus.  The  discomforts, 
inconveniences  and  annoyances  of  a  trip  in  one  of 
these  vehicles  are  almost  intolerable.  From  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end  of  the  journey  a  constant  quarrel 
is  progressing.  The  driver  quarrels  with  the  pas- 
sengers, and  the  passengers  quarrel  with  the  driver. 
There  are  quarrels  about  getting  out  and  quarrels 
about  getting  in.  There  are  quarrels  about  change 
and  quarrels  about  the  ticket  swindle.  The  driver 
swears  at  the  passengers  and  the  passengers  har- 
angue the  driver  through  the  strap-hole — a  position 
in  which  even  Demosthenes  could  not  be  eloquent. 
Respectable  clergymen  in  white  chokers  are  obliged 
to  listen  to  loud  oaths.  Ladies  are  disgusted,  fright- 
ened and  insulted.  Children  are  alarmed  and  lift  up 
their  voices  and  weep.  Indignant  gentlemen  rise  to 
remonstrate  with  the  irate  Jehu  and  are  suddenly 
bumped  back  into  their  seats,  twice  as  indignant  as 
before,  besides  being  involved  in  supplementary 
quarrels  with  those  other  passengers  upon  whose 
corns  they  have  accidentally  trodden.  Thus  the  om- 
nibus rolls  along,  a  perfect  Bedlam  on  wheels. 

'*It  is  in  vain  those  who  are  obliged  to  ride  seek 
for  relief  in  a  city  railway  car.  The  cars  are  quieter 
than  the  omnibuses,  but  much  more  crowded.  People 
are  packed  into  them  like  sardines  in  a  box,  with 
perspiration  for  oil.  The  seats  being  more  than 
filled,  the  passengers  are  placed  in  rows  down  the 
middle,  where  they  hang  on  by  the  straps,  like 
smoked  hams  in  a  corner  grocery.  To  enter  or  exit 
is  exceedingly  difficult.  Silks  and  broadcloth  are 
ruined  in  the  attempt.  As  in  the  omnibuses  pick- 
pockets take  advantage  of  the  confusion  to  ply  their 
vocation.    Handkerchiefs,  pocketbooks,  watches  and 


FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 


breastpins  disappear  most  mj'steriously.  The  foul, 
close,  heated  air  is  poisonous.  A  healthy  person 
cannot  ride  a  dozen  blocks  without  a  headache.  For 
these  reasons  most  ladies  and  gentlemen  prefer  to 
ride  in  the  stages,  which  cannot  be  crowded  so  out- 
rageously, and  which  are  pretty  decently  ventilated 
by  the  cracks  in  the  window  frames.  The  omnibus 
fare  is  nearly  double  the  car  fare,  however,  and  so 
the  majority  of  the  people  are  compelled  to  ride  in 
the  cars,  although  they  lose  in  health  what  they  save 
in  money.  But  it  must  be  evident  to  everybody  that 
neither  the  cars  nor  the  stages  supply  accomodations 
enough  for  the  public,  and  that  such  accommodations 
as  they  do  supply  are  not  of  the  right  sort.  Both  the 
cars  and  the  omnibuses  might  be  very  comfortable 
and  convenient  if  they  were  better  managed,  but 
something  more  is  needed  to  supply  the  popular  and 
increasing  demand  for  city  conveyances." 

A  very  convincing  argument  for  rapid  transit,  but  the 
writer  concludes  his  editorial  by  urging  the  establish- 
ment of  a  cheap  cab  system.  This  is  proof  that  the  rapid 
transit  issue  was  not  a  burning  one  in  October,  1864. 
Forty  years  later  the  papers  were  writing  the  same  kind 
of  editorials,  but  in  place  of  calling  for  a  cab  system  they 
were  hammering  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  for  not 
providing  more  subways. 

The  disgraceful  conditions  on  the  omnibus  lines  above 
described,  it  seems  evident,  were  promoted  rather  than 
alleviated  by  competition,  for  in  those  days  Broadway 
vras  filled  with  rival  omnibus  lines.  Is  there  not  a  lesson 
in  this  now  for  city  authorities  in  considering  the  grant  of 
motor  'bus  franchises  to  several  competing  companies? 


CHAPTER  II 

The  First  Rapid  Transit  Bill. 

AAyHILE  tlie  transit  conditions  existing  at  the  opening 
of  the  year  1864  demanded  relief,  the  public  authori- 
ties did  little  or  nothing  to  provide  it.  As  indicating  the 
complete  absence  of  anything  like  a  rapid  transit  pro- 
granune  at  that  time,  I  quote  the  following,  which  is  the 
only  mention  of  the  transportation  question  in  the  in- 
augural message  of  Mayor  Charles  G.  Gunther,  delivered 
January  4,  1864  : 

''The  proper  regulation  of  the  city  railroads  is 
a  matter  of  public  interest  in  a  city  like  New  York, 
where  a  large  portion  of  the  population  is  compelled 
to  use  this  means  of  conveyance  to  and  from  their 
places  of  daily  avocation.  These  companies,  enjoy- 
ing a  valuable  franchise  and  paying  little  for  the  use 
of  the  streets  in  comparison  with  the  revenue  de- 
rived therefrom,  while  they  increase  so  materially 
the  expense  of  cleaning  and  repairing,  should  be 
compelled  at  least  to  extend  their  tracks  as  far  as 
the  avenues  they  occupy  are  graded,  and  also  to  run 
cars  as  often  as  the  local  population  reasonably  de- 
mand; nor  should  they  be  permitted  to  use  a  rail 
endangering  either  life  or  property." 

It  may  be  inferred  from  this  that  rapid  transit  was 
not  a  question  of  vital  import  in  January,  1864.  The  only 
relief  which  the  Mayor  points  out  in  his  message  is  the 
extension  of  the  tracks  of  the  existing  surface  railroads 
and  the  prohibition  of  the  T  rail.  He  ignores  the  conges- 
tion of  traffic  and  the  crowding  of  cars  and  omnibuses. 

The  railroad  companies,  however,  were  quick  to  act 
on  the  Mayor's  suggestion.  In  February  the  New  York 
and  Harlem  Railroad  Company  had  a  bill  introduced  in 
the  Legislature  to  give  it  the  right  to  extend  its  line  dowm 


10  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Fourth  Avenue  and  Broadway  to  Whitehall  street,  in 
accordance  with  a  resolution  passed  by  the  previous  city 
administration  in  1863.  This  bill  also  provided  that  the 
railroad  company  should  buy  out  the  Broadway  'bus 
lines,  the  idea  apparently  being  to  substitute  a  street 
railroad  for  the  latter  in  Broadway  south  of  Union 
Square.  Similar  rights  for  a  railroad  in  Broadway  had 
been  sought  for  years  by  Jacob  Sharp,  and  the  property 
owners  were  generally  opposed  to  it.  They  and  the  news- 
papers opposed  the  New  York  and  Harlem  bill,  and  it 
was  killed  by  an  adverse  report  in  the  Senate  on  March 
25, 1864.  That  not  all  the  property  owners  were  opposed 
to  a  Broadway  railroad,  however,  is  showTi  by  the  fact 
that  D.  Appleton  and  Co.  and  Lord  and  Taylor  were 
among  the  signers  of  a  petition  sent  to  the  Senate  asking 
for  the  passage  of  the  New  York  and  Harlem  bill. 

It  was  at  this  session  of  the  Legislature  that  the  first 
rapid  transit  bill  appeared.  On  March  21,  1864,  articles 
of  incorporation  of  the  Metropolitan  Eailway  Company 
were  filed  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  a  few  days 
later  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  to  give  this 
company  the  rights  to  build — an  underground  rail- 
road in  Broadway  from  the  Battery  to  Thirty-fourth 
street  and  then  under  Sixth  Avenue  to  Central  Park! 
This  will  be  a  surprise  to  the  present  generation, 
many  of  whom  think  that  the  existing  subway,  opened  in 
1904,  was  the  first  underground  transportation  project 
of  the  city.  It  is  a  historical  fact,  however,  that  the  first 
project  for  a  rapid  transit  railroad,  conceived  in  1864, 
was  a  subway  project.  The  elevated  railroad  was  a  later 
conception  and  grew  out  of  the  subway  proposal,  as  will 
be  told  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

The  father  of  the  subway  idea  and  the  promoter  of 
the  Metropolitan  Eailway  Company  of  1864  was  Hugh 
B.  Willson,  a  Michigan  railroad  man,  who  had  been  in 
London  during  the  construction  of  the  London  Under- 
ground railroad  and  was  present  at  its  opening  in  Jan- 


THE   FIEST   RAPID   TRANSIT   BILL  11 

uary,  1863,  when  the  first  three  and  three-quarters  miles 
was  placed  in  operation.  Willson  examined  the  new 
railroad  carefully  and  traveled  on  it  frequently.  He  was 
so  impressed  with  its  merits  that  he  conceived  the  idea 
of  building  the  same  kind  of  a  road  in  New  York,  and  on 
his  return  to  that  city,  in  June,  1863,  he,  in  his  own  words 
''set  to  work  to  secure  the  aid  of  prominent  men  to  enable 
me  to  present  to  the  public  a  plan  similar  to  that  of  Lon- 
don. At  first  my  efforts  were  not  successful.  All  were 
deeply  engrossed  in  the  War,  and  it  was  not  till  the 
autumn  that  I  made  any  substantial  progress." 

It  was  not  until  January,  1864,  however,  that  Willson 's 
work  began  to  take  form.  He  then  obtained  the  cooperation 
of  Henry  V.  Poor.  Poor  interested  others,  and  the  two 
succeeded  in  getting  enough  support  to  justify  the  in- 
corporation of  a  company  with  a  capital  stock  of 
$5,000,000 — a  large  amount  for  those  days.  This  was  the 
Metropolitan  Railway  Company  alluded  to  above.  The 
list  of  incorporators  includes  many  well  known  names. 
Here  it  is : 

Jonathan  Sturges  Charles  H.  Russell 

Simon  B.  Chittenden  bheppard  Gandy 

Danford  N.  Barney  William  R.  Kirkland 

John  J.  Cisco  Edmund  T.  H.  Gibson 

William  H.  Osborn  John  J.  Phelps 

Luther  C.  Clark  Sidney  Webster 

John  T.  Agnew  Henry  V.  Poor 

Uriel  A.  Murdock  James  Bryce 

Samuel  Marsh  Hugh  B.  Willson 

Francis  Skiddy  John  Lowery 

John  Taylor  Johnston  George  A.  Townsend 

Wehrmit  Keight  William  Butler  Duncan 

Edwards  Pierrepont  John  H.  Wainwright 

David  Dows  Edward  S.  Jaffrey 

Abiel  A.  Low  James  T.  Sanford 

Nathaniel  Marsh  William  E.  Dodge,  Jr. 

James  B.  Johnston  Charles  Lanier 

Samuel  Sloan  James  F.  D.  Lanier 


12  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Edward  Jones  Edward  C.  Brodliead 

William  Kelly  George  Bliss 

John  J.  Astor,  Jr.  Wyllis  Blackstone 

Moses  Taylor  Wilson  G.  Hunt 

Isaac  Bell  Courtlandt  Palmer 

Robert  S.  Hone  Elisha  Eiggs 

Henry  F.  Vail  Thomas  Slocomb 

The  company  was  incorporated  under  the  general  rail- 
road law  of  1850,  and  the  life  of  the  corporation  was  100 
years.  The  $5,000,000  capital  stock  was  divided  into 
$50  shares. 

Vv^ith  such  backing,  the  new  project  received  the  atten- 
tion of  press  and  public.  Everybody  began  to  talk  about 
riding  underground,  and  there  was  a  great  demand  for 
information  as  to  the  operation  of  the  London  road. 
This  was  operated  by  steam  locomotives,  and  the  same 
power  was  to  be  used  in  the  Metropolitan  line  in  New 
York.  Such  operation  was  taken  as  a  matter  of  course, 
as  electricity  as  a  power  was  then  unknown.  There  were 
some  timid  souls  who  expressed  fear  of  catching  cold  by 
suddenly  going  into  a  tunnel  on  a  hot  day,  but  there  was 
no  serious  objection  to  steam  as  a  motive  power  at  first. 
Later  its  use  was  deprecated  by  a  few  engineers  who 
favored  propulsion  by  pneumatic  power,  but  in  the  scram- 
ble for  rapid  transit  rights  which  Willson's  project  start- 
ed all  promoters  of  subways  contemplated  the  use  of 
steam  locomotives  burning  coke  to  reduce  the  smoke  nui- 
sance to  a  minimum. 

In  the  Legislature,  however,  the  Willson  project  was 
not  received  with  enthusiasm.  The  corporations  of  those 
days  had  great  influence  with  the  Legislators,  and  as  no 
corporation  already  operating  favored  the  new  scheme 
it  got  short  shrift  in  the  Railroad  Committee  of  the  Sen- 
ate, to  whom  it  had  been  referred.  In  two  weeks  after 
the  bill  had  been  introduced  it  was  reported  adversely 
bv  "Senators  Beach,  Williams  and  Woodruff,  from  the 


THE   FIEST   RAPID   TRANSIT   BILL  13 

Committee  on  Railroads."  The  majority  of  the  Com- 
mittee gave  as  their  reason  that  there  would  be  another 
bill  for  a  Broadway  underground  railroad  at  the  next 
session,  "and  this  would  prove  an  obstacle  in  the  way 
unless  disposed  of  now."  The  obliging  Senate  adopted 
the  report  on  the  day  it  was  made,  April  8,  1864. 

News  of  this  summary  action  on  a  project  in  which 
New  York  City  was  so  vitally  interested  aroused  general 
indignation.  Petitions  were  circulated  asking  for  a  re- 
consideration of  the  bill,  and  the  press  denounced  the 
action  of  the  Legislature  in  unmeasured  terms.  On  April 
11  the  New  York  Times  said  editorially: 

' '  The  defeat  of  the  Underground  Railroad  in  the 
Legislature,  coupled  as  it  was  with  the  rejection  of 
Mayor  Gunther's  proposition  to  compel  the  street 
railroads  to  pay  10  percent,  of  their  receipts  to  the 
City  treasury,  is  a  fresh  and  alarming  illustration 
of  the  enormous  power  over  our  property  and  com- 
fort which  is  now  wielded  by  the  omnibus  proprie- 
tors, railroad  corporations  and  political  jobbers. 
The  Legislature  on  which  we  have  been  in  the  habit 
of  relying  seems  to  have  surrendered  itself  com- 
pletely to  their  hands. 

*'The  Underground  Railroad  promised  to  be  an 
immense  boon  to  the  city.  It  was  perfectly  feasible ; 
a  similar  road  has  been  in  successful  operation  in 
London  for  one  year;  it  encroaches  on  no  vested 
interest;  takes  no  one's  land  or  house;  interferes 
with  no  traffic  or  thoroughfare ;  offers  cheap,  comfort- 
able and  speedy  transit  from  one  end  of  the  island 
to  the  other;  requires  no  money  from  the  public,  will 
add  nothing  to  municipal  taxation  and  is  undertaken 
by  men  of  the  highest  character  and  standing  both 
social  and  commercial.  In  short,  there  is  not  a  single 
objection  to  be  made  to  it  on  the  part  of  the  public 
or  the  Government,  and  yet  the  Committee  of  the 


14  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Senate  has  reported  against  it,  under  the  lead  of  a 
Senator  from  this  city,  and  it  has  been  laid  on  the 
table,  for  what  reason  is  not  stated.  We  wonder  how 
much  longer  the  people  of  this  city  will  permit  them- 
selves to  be  thus  plundered  by  men  who  are  ostensi- 
bly their  servants  and  dependents." 

The  outburst  of  popular  indignation  had  its  effect  on 
the  Legislature.  On  the  day  on  which  the  above  editorial 
was  published,  namely  April  11,  Senator  Angell,  chairman 
of  the  Railroad  Committee  of  the  Senate,  asked  that  the 
Underground  Eailroad  bill  be  taken  from  the  table  and 
referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  Senate.  He  said 
he  considered  the  matter  one  of  grave  importance  in  which 
New  York  city  was  vitally  interested.  He  presented  a 
petition  signed  by  Brown  Bros,  and  Co.  and  1,600  citizens 
of  New  York,  asking  a  reconsideration  of  the  bill.  The 
motion  prevailed,  and  the  bill  was  taken  from  the  table 
and  referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  The  spasm 
of  reform,  however,  was  short  lived,  and  nothing  came 
of  it.  The  Legislature  adjourned  on  April  26  without  any 
consideration  having  been  given  to  the  measure  by  the 
Committee  of  the  Whole.  This  ended  the  matter  for  the 
time,  but  the  fight  for  rapid  transit  was  on  and  it  was 
waged  from  that  time  forward  with  increasing  interest 
and  fierceness. 


CHAPTER  III 

Pioneer  Plans  for  a  Subway. 

\\/'HILE  the  first  subway  operated  in  New  York  City  is 
justly  regarded  as  one  of  the  engineering  wonders  of 
the  world,  the  fact  that  its  construction  was  not  under- 
taken until  1901  is  equally  marvelous,  considering  that  its 
prototype  was  conceived  and  i3lanned  in  1864.  The  plans 
made  in  that  year  for  the  Broadway  Underground  pro- 
posed by  the  Metropolitan  Railway  Company,  organized 
by  Hugh  B.  Wilson,  covered  almost  the  identical  route 
of  the  present  subway  from  the  Battery  to  Central  Park, 
called  for  the  construction  of  twelve  miles  of  railroad 
under  the  streets  and  a  tunnel  similar  to  that  of  the  first 
subway,  built  nearly  a  half  century  later.  The  chief 
points  of  difference  were  that  the  1864  subway  was  to 
be  only  a  two-track  line  and  the  tunnel  was  to  be  of  brick 
and  stone  masonry  instead  of  steel  and  concrete  and  was 
to  be  operated  by  steam  locomotives  instead  of  by  electric 
motors. 

Mr.  William  Barclay  Parsons,  who  made  the  plans  for 
the  existing  subway,  Mr.  August  Belmont,  who  financed 
its  construction  and  others  connected  with  its  develop- 
ment, hold  the  opinion  that  only  the  application 
of  electricity  to  traction  power  purposes  permitted 
the  building  of  the  first  subway,  and  that  it  was 
because  of  the  objections  to  steam  power  for  use 
under  ground  that  the  early  day  plans  for  subways  were 
discarded  in  favor  of  elevated  railroads,  which,  as  every- 
one knows,  were  the  first  rapid  transit  roads  to  be  placed 
in  operation.  Research  indicates,  however,  that  it  was 
not  power  but  politics  and  the  war  for  franchise 
rights  which  postponed  the  building  of  the  first  under- 
ground road.  Steam  had  been  successfully  used  in  Lon- 
don's underground  railroad  as  early  as  1863,  and  if  Hugh 
B.  Willson  and  his  backers  had  been  able  to  obtain  the 


16  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

necessary  rights  from  tlie  Legislature,  it  is  clear  from  the 
historical  review  of  the  period  that  the  first  rapid  transit 
road  in  New  York  would  have  been  a  subway  and  that  it 
would  have  been  in  operation  by  1870,  or  about  the  time 
the  first  elevated  road  began  actual  business.  The  engi- 
neer who  planned  the  Willson  road  has  left  behind  a  com- 
plete and  exhaustive  study  of  a  steam  subway.  In  fact, 
aside  from  the  question  of  power,  the  builders  of  the  first 
subway  might  have  constructed  their  road  from  the  plans 
made  by  that  engineer.  His  name  was  A.  P.  Robinson,  and 
he  deserves  everlasting  honor  as  an  American  engineer 
who  was  far  ahead  of  the  times.  It  is  not  desired 
to  belittle  the  work  of  the  men  who  planned 
and  built  the  existing  subway,  but  if  they  did  ''pioneer" 
work,  what  shall  be  said  of  Robinson,  who  about  fifty 
years  ago  saw,  and  projected  on  paper  and  justified  by 
cogent  argument  an  underground  road  having  all  the  im- 
portant features  of  the  present  line  I 

After  his  defeat  in  the  Legislature  of  1864,  Willson 
perfected  his  scheme  and  made  preparations  to  go  back 
to  the  next  Legislature  for  the  franchise  which  had  been 
denied  the  Metropolitan  Railway  Company  by  the  pre- 
vious session.  AVith  his  associates  he  had  ample 
financial  backing  and  was  enabled  to  retain  first 
class  engineering  talent.  Poor  was  the  Secretary  of  the 
company,  of  which  Danford  N.  Barney  was  president 
and  Uriel  A.  Murdock  treasurer.  The  directors  included 
ten  of  the  most  influential  of  those  named  as  stockholders. 
Willson  was  one  of  the  directors.  In  the  fall  of  1864  they 
retained  Mr.  Robinson  to  "prepare  for  the  company  a 
statement  of  the  character  and  cost  of  the  proposed 
work."  This  modest  statement  of  his  task  was  made  by 
Mr.  Robinson  himself  in  the  introduction  to  his  report. 
This  report,  which  was  dated  January  1,  1865,  was 
printed  in  New  York  by  Clayton  and  Medole,  book  and 
job  printers  in  the  Trinity  Building,  No.  4  Thames  Street. 
It  is  a  pamphlet  of  forty-one  pages,  illustrated  with  maps 


^^^E^^ffl3 


PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY 


of  the  route,  drawings  of  cross-sections  of  the  proposed 
subway  and  colored  prints  of  the  proposed  stations.  It 
is  w^ritten  in  argumentative  style,  the  author  evidently 
feeling  that  he  was  proposing  a  daring  innovation  and 
needed  to  justify  it. 

Robinson  first  compared  the  physical  conditions  in 
New  York  with  those  of  London,  and  pointed  out  the 
great  differences  existing.  He  then  went  into  an  analysis 
of  traffic  conditions  in  the  American  metropolis,  showing 
that  every  north  and  south  avenue  except  one  was  occu- 
pied by  a  horse  car  line  at  that  time,  and  that  even  with 
the  numerous  omnibus  lines  the  facilities  were  utterly 
inadequate.  At  the  rate  of  increase  he  showed  that  a 
rapid  transit  line  was  a  necessity.  But  read  a  few  para- 
graphs from  his  report  on  this  subject  and  marvel  that 
the  future  was  so  clear  to  him  in  1864: 

"The  average  increase  for  the  w^hole  period  of 
sixty  years,"  he  writes  after  tracing  the  growth  of 
traffic  for  that  length  of  time,  "is  nearly  twenty-five 
per  cent,  for  each  period  of  five  years,  and  if  w^e 
apply  this  ratio  we  shall  find  that  in  the  year  1870 
we  may  reasonably  calculate  upon  a  population  of 
not  less  than  1,272,000,  and  in  1880  of  not  less  than 
2,000,000  (the  actual  figures  for  those  two  years 
were  942,292  in  1870,  and  1,206,590  in  1880),  or  about 
double  the  present  number.  This  will  cover  the  en- 
tire island.  If  at  the  same  time  the  proportion  of 
passengers  to  population  increases  in  anything  like 
the  same  ratio  as  has  been  shown  for  the  past  ten 
years,  we  shall  not  be  beyond  bounds  in  estimating 
that  in  1870  we  shall  have  at  least  100,000,000  pas- 
sengers requiring  transportation  through  our  streets 
on  the  railways,  and  in  1880  200,000,000.  (The  actual 
figures  were  115,139,553  in  1870  and  288,000,000  in 
1880.) 

"When  we  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that 
the  increase   of  population  must  take   place   prin- 


18  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

cipally  in  the  upper  part  of  the  city,  and  that  in  con- 
sequence of  the  large  area  occupied  by  the  Central 
Park  the  extension  northward  must  be  more  rapid 
for  the  same  increase  than  in  past  years,  and  that 
the  distance  traveled  by  each  passenger  must  be 
correspondingly  lengthened,  we  can  then  begin  to 
aijpreciate  how  totally  impossible  it  is  that  the  neces- 
sities of  this  population  in  the  means  of  transit  can 
be  satisfied  by  any  system  of  horse  railways  that  can 
be  devised.  The  streets  would  be  absolutely  blocked, 
and  the  time  occupied  by  the  trip  would  be  a  loss 
from  the  occupations  of  the  day  which  would  be  un- 
endurable. Speed  must  come  in  to  fill  up  the  defici- 
ency, and  this  is  inadmissible  unless  the  vehicles, 
of  whatsoever  description  they  may  be,  are  entirely 
separated  from  the  ordinary  traffic  of  the  streets. 
Steam  must  necessarily  be  used,  for  the  want  of  some 
other  available  power.  Compressed  air  has  been  sug- 
gested, but  experiments  have  not  yet  demonstrated 
the  practicability  of  its  use  for  considerable  dis- 
tances." 

No  better  grasp  of  the  traffic  problem  of  New  York 
City  has  been  shown  by  our  modem  experts.  Robinson, 
after  carefully  surveying  the  field  and  calculating  the 
increase  of  traffic,  accurately  guaged  the  coming  develop- 
ments and  foresaw  the  time  when  a  horse  railroad  in 
every  street  would  be  insufficient  to  move  the  throngs  de- 
manding transportation.  He  did  not  use  the  words, 
"rapid  transit,"  but  he  did  say  that  ''speed  must  come 
in  to  fill  up  the  deficiency."  And  he  proposed  to  provide 
it  by  building  what  we  would  now  call  a  rapid  transit 
line  beneath  the  surface — namely  a  subway.  It  was  only 
the  necessity  of  the  times  that  made  him  advocate  steam 
as  a  motive  power.  He  realized  its  weak  points,  but  it 
was  the  best  available.  He  noted  the  experiments  made 
with  air  as  a  motive  power  in  the  tunnel  near  Sydenham 
Palace  in  England,  but  concluded:    *'A11  these  plans  are 


PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY  19 

yet  experiments,  and  until  they  are  more  fully  developed 
we  must  confine  our  attention  to  steam,  and  the  alter- 
native must  be  its  use  either  upon  railways  elevated  above 
the  streets  or  placed  in  excavations  or  tunnels  below 
them."  He  then  proceeded  to  show  why  subways  are 
better  than  elevated  roads,  concluding  the  argument  as 
follows: 

"The  statistics  I  have  indulged  in  convince  me 
that  it  is  only  necessary  to  look  to  the  local  travel 
(unless  it  be  to  the  transportation  of  freight  at  such 
hours  of  the  night  as  would  not  interfere  with  the 
passenger  business)  for  such  amount  of  traffic  as  will 
work  the  capacity  of  your  road  to  the  utmost;  and  I 
am  satisfied  that  every  consideration  of  economy, 
safety  and  convenience  justifies  the  adoption  of  the 
plan  you  propose,  viz.  an  underground  railway.  In 
no  other  way  can  the  public  exigency  be  met." 

Robinson  recommended  that  for  economy  and  conve- 
nience of  operation  the  road  be  built  "as  near  the  sur- 
face of  the  street  as  possible,"  and  to  accomplish  this 
he  discussed  the  question  of  routes  and  their  relation  to 
the  sewer  system,  which  he  wished  to  disarrange  as 
little  as  possible.  He  pointed  out  that  Broadway  follows 
the  ridge  of  the  island  and  that  sewers  in  the  cross  streets 
generally  can  flow  both  ways  from  it.  For  this  reason 
he  recommended  a  route  up  Broadway  from  the  Battery 
to  Fourteenth  Street;  thence  under  Union  Square  and 
through  Broadway  to  Twenty-third  Street;  thence  under 
Madison  Square  to  Fifth  Avenue  and  through  Fifth 
Avenue  to  Fifty-ninth  Street  at  the  southern  end  of 
Central  Park.  This  was  a  slight  variation  from  the 
route  set  forth  in  the  articles  of  incorporation  of  the 
Metropolitan  Railway  Company,  adopted  before  Robin- 
son had  been  retained.  This  route  was  described  as  fol- 
lows: 

"The  road  is  to  be  constructed  in  a  tunnel  under- 


20  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

ground  from  a  place  at  or  near  the  Battery  in  the 
City  of  New  York,  following  a  line  under  or  near 
Broadway  to  Thirty-fourth  Street,  and  then  follow- 
ing a  line  under  or  near  the  Sixth  Avenue  to  or  near 
the  Central  Park;  with  two  branches  from  the  last 
mentioned  place,  one  branch  running  to  a  place  at 
or  near  the  Harlem  Railroad,  and  the  other  branch 
running  to  a  place  at  or  near  the  Hudson  River  Rail- 
road all  in  the  County  of  New  York.  The  whole 
length  of  such  road,  as  near  as  may  be,  is  to  be 
twelve  miles." 

Here  we  have  the  main  outlines  of  the  present  subway 
— a  trunk  line  running  from  the  Battery  to  Fifty-ninth 
street,  with  two  branches,  one  going  up  the  East  Side  and 
the  other  the  West  Side.  The  main  difference  is  that 
in  today's  subway  the  dividing  line  is  at  Ninety-sixth 
Street  instead  of  at  Fifty-ninth  Street — a  difference  due 
to  the  northward  growth  of  the  city  in  the  meantime. 

A  novel  treatment  for  the  Battery  end  of  the  line 
was  proposed.  In  his  plan  Robinson  advocated  starting 
the  road  on  the  surface  at  a  connection  with  the  South 
Ferry,  where  the  ''immense  travel  from  this  point  to 
Hamilton  and  Atlantic  Avenues  in  Brooklyn  and  also 
to  Staten  Island"  was  to  be  considered.  His  line  began 
at  the  Battery  "with  a  circle  for  the  turning  of  trains" 
(exactly  what  we  have  today  in  the  subway)  and  skirt- 
ing the  inner  edge  of  the  Battery  ran  in  an  ever-deepening 
cut  to  Bowling  Green,  where  it  entered  the  tunnel  under 
Broadway.  He  proposed  to  span  this  cut  with  on  orna- 
mental iron  bridge  to  carry  the  travel  through  Battery 
and  Whitehall  streets. 

The  existing  subway  has  an  inside  height  of  about  13 
feet  two  inches;  some  of  the  new  subways  under  con- 
struction will  have  a  height  of  15  feet.  In  1864  Mr.  Rob- 
inson proposed  to  make  his  tunnel  16  feet  high  in  the 
center  and  25 V2  feet  wide  (for  two  tracks)  at  the  widest 


PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY  21 

part,  which  was  at  the  level  of  the  platforms  of  the  cars. 
This  width,  he  says,  would  be  ample  for  two  tracks  carry- 
ing cars  nine  feet  wide  and  would  allow  2i/2  feet  in  the 
center  and  on  each  side.  The  tunnel  was  to  be  arched, 
with  an  oval-shaped  roof  and  sides  sloping  slightly  in- 
ward. At  present  a  w^idth  of  15  feet  for  each  track  is 
allowed. 

EmplojTnent  of  concrete  for  floor  material  and  of 
asphalt  for  water-jDroofing  in  the  existing  subway  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  a  modern  and  up-to-date  method. 
Robinson  specified  both  in  the  following  description  of 
his  tunnel: 

' '  The  foundations  should  be  of  granite  blocks  cut 
to  the  required  form,  as  skewbacks  for  the  invert ;  un- 
derneath which  should  be  a  base  of  concrete.  The 
spandrils  should  be  well  loaded  with  concrete,  and 
the  whole  well  covered  with  asphalt.  A  center  drain 
is  provided,  emptying  into  cisterns  at  all  the  depres- 
sions, from  which  drain  pipes  should  be  provided  to 
carry  the  water  to  the  sewers.  As  these  cisterns 
would  necessarily  be  below  the  level  of  any  sewers 
in  their  immediate  vicinity,  in  some  cases  it  will  be 
necessary  to  construct  these  drains  for  some  distance 
before  finding  outlets  for  them.  But  in  one  case, 
namely  at  Canal  Street,  it  will  be  necessary  to  pump 
the  drainage  which  may  collect  there  for  a  short  dis- 
tance in  each  direction.  This,  however,  would  be  but 
a  slight  matter,  as  there  would  seem  to  be  no  cause  for 
any  serious  accumulation  of  water  if  the  tunnel  is 
properly  constructed.  Even  the  Thames  tunnel  is 
kept  dry  without  difficulty." 

In  the  matter  of  stations  Robinson  planned  better  than 
the  designers  of  the  present  subway.  Instead  of  kiosks 
occupying  valuable  space  on  the  sidewalks,  he  proposed 
the  purchase  and  use  of  appropriate  buildings  on  each 
side  of  the  street,  except  in  parks  etc.,  where  he  suggested 


22  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

the  erection  of  suitable  structures  on  city  property.  For 
convenience  of  train  operation,  he  placed  the  stations  at 
intervals  of  a  half  mile  apart.  Terminal  stations  were 
to  be  erected  at  Bowling  Green  and  Fifty-ninth  Street, 
with  eight  intermediate  stations  and  a  special  station  at 
South  i'erry.  At  stations  the  tunnel  was  to  be  widened 
so  as  to  give  station  platforms,  which  were  to  be  on  a 
level  with  the  platforms  of  the  cars,  12%,  feet  wide  and 
150  feet  long. 

For  the  terminal  and  other  stations  to  be  built  on  pub- 
lic property  Robinson  proposed  to  erect  structures  of 
iron  and  glass,  with  glass  floors,  directly  over  the  tunnel, 
and  to  dispense  with  the  roof  of  the  tunnel  under  them,  so 
that  the  daylight  would  pass  through  the  glass  structure 
and  illuminate  the  station  platforms  beneath.  This  was 
to  save  artificial  lighting  of  stations  during  the  day.  His 
drawings  of  these  unique  structures  (Plates  3  and  4)  are 
reproduced  on  other  pages.  All  stations  were  to  be 
equipped  with  everything  needful,  including  telegraph 
offices.  Robinson  figured  that  the  cost  of  stations  built  on 
purchased  property  would  be  about  $125,000  each,  and 
he  proposed  to  rent  part  of  the  buildings  for  enough  to 
(iarn  interest  on  the  cost. 

The  problem  of  ventilation,  which  bothered  the  de- 
signers of  the  existing  subway  not  a  little  and  was  con- 
fessedly only  partially  solved  when  operation  began,  was 
handled  by  Robinson  in  an  ingenious  manner.  Whether 
his  plan  would  have  been  effective  is  a  question.  He  gave 
the  credit  for  the  invention  of  it  to  Hugh  B.  Willson,  the 
]»romoter  of  the  company  in  whose  interest  Robinson  was 
working.  The  plan  was  to  get  ventilation  through  pipes 
• '  running  laterally  to  convenient  openings  ",  and  connected 
with  hollow  iron  gas  lamp  posts  about  15  inches  in  diam- 
eter, erected  on  the  surface  of  the  street  at  the  edge  of 
the  sidewalks.  These  were  to  be  placed  100  feet  apart  on 
each  side  of  the  street. 

Robinson's  plan  for  the  operation  of  his  subway  is 


PIONEEE  PLANS  FOE  A  SUBWAY  23 

interesting  enough  to  give  in  its  entirety.    Here  it  is : 

''The  true  theory  in  all  public  conveyances  is  that 
the  oftener  the  vehicles  run  the  greater  is  the  public 
convenience,  and  the  greater  the  number  who  w^iil 
ride.  If  a  car  with  a  capacity  of  80  passengers  can 
be  filled  every  four  minutes,  it  will  be  fair  to  assume 
that  one  with  capacity  for  at  least  fifty  can  be  filled 
every  two  minutes.  Hence  a  system  should  be  adopt- 
ed by  which  trains  can  be  run  at  the  shortest  inter- 
vals consistent  with  safety,  provided  the  capacity 
required  for  each  train  is  not  too  small  to  enable  it 
to  be  run  with  economy  proportional  to  the  larger 
train. 

"In  my  estimate  of  the  total  amount  of  local 
travel  to  be  expected  in  this  city  for  the  horse  rail- 
roads in  1870,  I  have  placed  it  at  100,000,000.  Mak- 
ing due  allowance  for  the  number  which  would  be 
carried  in  stages,  the  entire  movement  will  probably 
be  150,000,000.  It  has  not  probably  been  less  than 
100,000,000  during  the  past  year. 

"This  would  amount  to  410,000  per  day.  If  we 
assume  that  but  one  eighth  of  this  number  would 
prefer  the  speedy  and  comfortable  cars  of  the  tun- 
nel, we  should  have  to  provide  for  51,250  passengers, 
or  25,625  each  way.  As  a  question  of  safety  it  is 
important  that  there  should  never  be  more  than  one 
train  between  two  adjacent  stations  at  a  time.  If  we 
calculate  upon  a  running  speed  of  twenty  miles  per 
hour,  the  distance  between  stations  being  one  half 
of  a  mile,  the  time  would  be  one  and  a  half  minutes. 
Allowing  one  half  minute  for  stopping  and  the  av- 
erage time  from  station  to  station  would  be  two  min- 
utes, the  trip  from  Bowling  Green  to  Central  Park 
(4  3-5  miles)  occupying  less  than  twenty  minutes.  (*) 

♦It  now  takes  just  about  twenty  minutes  for  an  express  train  in  the 
present  subway  to  make  this  run. 


24  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TEANSIT 


Without  violating  the  condition  that  there  shall  be 
but  one  train  at  a  time  between  two  adjacent  stations, 
we  should  then  be  able  to  dispatch  a  train  every  tw^o 
minutes,  or  thirty  per  hour.  (@)  This  is  probably  as 
often  as  the  trains  could  be  dispatched  or  run  with 
safety.  If  w^e  assume  that  the  51,250  passengers  are 
distributed  through  18  hours,  or  from  six  o'clock  in 
the  morning  until  twelve  at  night,  we  have  to  trans- 
port each  way  every  hour  1,423  passengers,  or  47 
in  each  train.  This  is  the  average  for  the  day,  but 
when  it  is  considered  that  the  great  proportion  of 
the  travel  is  in  one  direction  in  one  portion  of  the 
day,  and  in  the  opposite  direction  in  another,  it  will 
be  found  necessary  to  provide  accommodations  for 
a  considerable  greater  number  in  order  to  carry  the 
average  and  seat  every  passenger. 

"From  an  inspection  of  the  table  giving  the  sta- 
tistics of  the  operation  of  the  horse  railways  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  average  number  carried  per  trip 
each  way,  in  1864,  was  34.  It  is  not  probable  that  the 
trip  in  one  direction  will  average  15.  In  order, 
therefore,  to  make  an  average  of  34  each  w^ay,  they 
must  have  carried  at  least  53  in  the  other  direction. 
Making  allowance  for  changes  on  the  route  and  it 
is  probable  that  the  average  load  was  not  less  than 
40.  To  have  averaged  34  passengers  per  trip  each 
way  and  to  have  given  each  passenger  a  seat,  they 
should,  therefore,  have  had  capacity  for  40,  while  in 
fact  they  had  but  seats  for  20.  In  estimating  ac- 
cordingly for  a  travel  of  51,250  passengers  daily 
through  the  tunnel,  with  a  train  every  two  minutes, 
I  assume  that  we  should  require  seats  for  at  least  80. 

**I  submit  herewith  two  drawings  of  steam  cars 
suitable  for  such  a  traffic.     I  propose  a  car  40  feet 


@  The  quickest  movement  in  the  present  subway  is  33  trains  per  hour, 
but  these  are  ten  car  trains  carrying  more  than  100  per  car. 


PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY  25 

long,  exclusive  of  engine  apartment,  divided  into  eight 
compartments  running  cross-wise,  with  a  door  to 
each  compartment  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  car. 
Each  compartment  would  be  five  feet  wide,  with 
seats  vis-a-vis.  The  width  of  the  cars  being  nine 
feet,  from  out  to  out,  or  about  eight  feet  inside,  there 
would  be  comfortable  and  abundant  room  for  seating 
ten  passengers  in  each  compartment,  or  eighty  in  the 
car.  The  compartments  need  not  be  separated  above 
the  backs  of  the  seats.  The  doors  should  be  arranged 
to  slide,  all  being  connected  and  moved  simultan- 
eously by  an  apparatus  operated  by  the  brakeman 
at  the  rear  of  the  car.  Each  car  should  have  its  gas 
holder  and  burners,  or  other  suitable  lighting  appar- 
atus." 

In  Plates  6  and  7,  reproduced  on  another  page,  Mr. 
Robinson  shows  two  types  of  cars,  one  having  the  en- 
gine in  it  and  the  other  having  it  in  a  separate  car.  He 
figured  that  either  car  would  perform  the  service  re- 
quired and  haul  another  car  of  equal  capacity  if  neces- 
sary for  an  expenditure  of  12  pounds  of  coal  per  mile. 
With  two  cars  to  a  train  the  capacity  of  the  subway  would 
be  more  than  100,000  passengers  per  day  allowing  a  seat 
for  every  passenger.  He  advocated  the  use  of  coke  in  the 
engines,  which  could  be  made  to  condense  their  own  steam 
and  thus  render  the  exhaust  scarcely  perceptible. 

Nor  was  the  proposed  system  of  ticket  selling  behind 
modern  practice,  for  Mr.  Robinson  eliminated  ticket  col- 
lectors altogether  and  would  have  had  passengers  pay 
at  the  stations  before  entering.  He  was  also  up  to  date 
in  planning  for  electric  signals,  but  in  using  electricity 
to  start  his  trains  he  was  guilty  of  a  serious  lapse,  for 
he  actually  proposed  to  have  every  train  at  eveiy  station 
at  exactly  the  same  moment.  He  wanted  to  have  electric 
clocks  in  each  station,  all  on  the  same  circuit  and  ticking 
together,  and  an  electric  starter,  which  would  give  the 


26  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

signal  to  move  to  all  stations  at  the  same  instant.    How 

this  would  work  he  tells  as  follows : 

"There  would  be  a  car  at  every  station  at  the 
same  time.  At  a  common  signal  all  would  leave. 
There  being  no  train  on  the  track  between  stations, 
every  engine  driver  would  move  with  confidence  and 
know  that  he  has  only  to  run  his  half  mile  in  one  and 
a  half  minutes.  The  platform  operator  at  each  station 
would  know  the  second  when  a  train  was  due.  If  not 
arrived,  or  if  so  far  behind  as  to  render  it  impossible 
to  start  from  the  station  at  its  proper  time,  or  if 
stopped  by  accident,  he  would  send  the  proper  sigjial 
to  the  starter  so  that  he  would  not  give  the  next 
starting  signal,  or  the  circuit  controlling  this  might 
be  so  arranged  that  any  station  operator  could  dis- 
connect it  in  an  emergency  so  that  it  could  not  be 
operated." 

In  presenting  his  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the  road, 
Eobinson  is  careful  to  state  that  it  corresponds  with  the 
currency  then  circulating,  namely  the  money  of  war 
times,  when  gold  w^as  at  a  big  premium.  The  figures  are 
interesting  in  comparison  with  present  prices.  He  esti- 
mated that  the  w^ork  would  cost  $8,487,006,  divided  as  fol- 
lows: 

Estimate  of  Cost. 

Taking  out  and  relaying  60,000  square  yards  of  Russ 

pavement  from  Battery  Place  to  Union  Sq.  at  $3.  $180,000 
Taking  up  and  relaying  37,000  square  yards  Belgian 

pavement  from  14th  to  59th  Street  at  $2 74,000 

692,000  cubic  yards  earth  excavation  at  50  cents 486,000 

560,000  cubic  yards  earth  carted  away  at  50  cents 280,000 

372,000  cubic  yards  earth  refilled  at  20  cents 74,400 

101,000  cubic  yards  rock  excavation  at  $10 1,010,000 

92,000  cubic  yards  rock  carted  away  at  25  cents 23,000 

9,000  cubic  yards  rock  refilled  at  25  cents 2,250 


PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY  27 

66,114  Ms.  brick  masonry  at  $20 1,322,280 

54,100  cubic  yards  rubble  stone  masonry  at  $6 324,000 

21,022  cubic  yards  granite  masonry  at  $25 525,550 

35,000  cubic  yards  concrete  at  $7 245,000 

52,200  cubic  yards  ballast  at  $1 52,200 

885,000  square  feet  asphalt  covering  at  6  cents 53,100 

500,000  square  feet  cobble  paving  at  121/4  cents 62,500 

25,000  lineal  feet  center  drain  at  50  cents 12,500 

1,700  lineal  feet  side  drain,  12  in 1,700 

500  lineal  feet  pile  foundation  at  Canal  St.  at  $40. . . .  20,000 

25,000  lineal  feet  18  in.  sewer  pipe  at  $1.50 37,500 

2,880  lineal  feet  48  and  54  in.  brick  sewer  in  Canal 

Street    at  $10   28,880 

250  man  holes  at  $60 15,000 

50  street  basins  at  $200 10,000 

House  connections 10,000 

1,000  lineal  feet  20  in.  water  mains 

6,500,000  lbs. 

at  5c.         $325,000 

1-3  off  for 

old  pipes      97,500 

$227,500 

500  lamp  post  ventilators,  1,000  lbs.  each  at  5c 25,000 

12,500  lineal  feet  15  in.  pipe 12,500 

500  lineal  feet  lamp  and  gas  pipe,  labor  etc 25,000 

Bridge  at  Bowling  Green 50,000 

11  miles  track  complete  at  $25,000  per  mile 275,000 

40  engines  and  cars  combined  at  $8,000 320,000 

20  cars  (80  passengers  each)  at  $4,000 80,000 

40  cars  (50  passengers  each)  at  $2,500 100,000 

Station  grounds  at  northern  terminus 350,000 

Terminal  and  way  stations 1,400,000 


2,600  '' 

a    24  '* 

14,500  '' 

''    30  " 

4,100  '' 

"  36  '' 

$7,715,460 
Add  10  per  cent,  for  contingencies,  engineering,  super- 
intendence, etc 771,546 

$8,487,006 


28  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

In  a  foot  note  Mr.  Robinson  pointed  out  how  certain 
savings  might  reduce  this  cost,  but  he  figured  the  total 
average  cost,  including  the  equipment,  at  $1,550,000  per 
mile.  This,  he  said,  is  less  than  the  cost  of  the  London 
Underground,  which  up  to  January  1, 1864  was  $1,670,000 
per  mile.  This  he  held  is  a  good  showing,  considering 
^'the  extraordinarily  high  prices  now  prevailing".  Upon 
a  gold  standard,  he  said,  the  cost  of  the  New  York  road 
probably  would  not  exceed  one-half  that  of  the  London 
Underground. 

Robinson  estimated  that  the  tunnel  road  in  its  first 
year  would  carry  20,000,000  passengers  and  that  the  av- 
erage fare  paid  would  be  7  cents,  yielding  a  gross  revenue 
of  $1,400,000,  and  that  rents  from  station  buildings  would 
yield  $100,000  more— a  total  of  $1,500,000.  The  expense 
of  operation,  excluding  interest  on  cost,  he  estimated  at 
$541,200,  leaving  a  profit  of  $958,750,  equal  to  about  12 
per  cent,  on  the  cost.  An  interesting  item  in  his  expense 
allowance  due  to  the  war  is  $35,000  for  the  '' Government 
tax  on  gross  receipts." 

Summing  up  the  advantages  of  a  subway  at  the  end  of 
his  report,  Robinson  wrote : 

'  *  I  can  conceive  nothing  so  completely  fulfilling  in 
every  respect  the  requirements  of  our  population  as 
such  a  road  with  such  an  equipment  and  worked  in 
the  manner  suggested.  There  would  be  no  dust. 
There  would  be  no  mud.  Passengers  would  not  be 
obliged  to  go  into  the  middle  of  the  street  to  take  a 
car.  They  have  simply  to  enter  a  station  from  the 
sidewalk  and  pass  down  a  spacious  and  well  lighted 
staircase  to  a  dry  and  roomy  platform.  The  tem- 
perature would  be  cool  in  summer  and  warm  in  win- 
ter. There  would  be  no  delays  from  snow  or  ice. 
The  cars  would  not  be  obliged  to  wait  for  a  lazy  or 
obstinate  truckman.  The  passenger  would  be  sure 
of  a  luxurious  seat  in  a  well  lighted  car,  and  would 


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PIONEER  PLANS  FOR  A  SUBWAY  29 

be  carried  to  his  destination  in  one-third  the  time  he 
could  be  carried  by  any  other  conveyance.  These 
would  be  the  advantages  to  those  who  ride,  and  for 
the  other  great  public  in  the  streets  there  would  be 
no  collisions,  no  broken  wheels  or  fractured  axles, 
no  frightened  horses  or  run-over  pedestrians.  Everj-- 
thing  would  be  out  of  sight  and  hearing,  and  nothing 
would  indicate  the  great  thoroughfare  below." 

To  us  who  enjoy  the  advantages  of  underground  travel 
there  is  nothing  new  in  the  above  statement,  but  how  must 
it  have  sounded  in  the  ears  of  our  fathers  in  the  last  year 
of  the  Civil  War?  No  doubt  the  scheme  was  looked  upon 
by  many  as  an  idle  dream,  but  that  there  were  a  few  brave 
men  who  believed  in  it  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  Henry  V. 
Poor  and  his  associates  were  ready  to  put  $5,000,000  into 
the  enterprise.  But  Robinson  and  his  backers  shared  the 
fate  of  those  advanced  thinkers  who  are  ahead  of  their 
times  1 


CHAPTER  IV 

FiEST  Rapid  Transit  Bill  Passed  by  the  Legislatube 

AND  Vetoed. 

TN  November,  1864,  one  of  the  most  momentous  gen- 
eral elections  ever  held  in  the  United  States  took  place. 
At  it  Abraham  Lincoln,  after  a  campaign  in  which  he  was 
villified  and  ridiculed  shamelessly  not  only  by  the  oppo- 
sition press  but  by  papers  which  called  themselves  loyal 
to  the  Union,  was  triumphantly  re-elected  to  the  Presi- 
dency. New  York  State  had  given  him  its  electoral  vote 
and  with  it  had  elected  a  Legislature  strongly  Union  in 
both  branches  and  a  Governor,  Reuben  E.  Fenton,  also  a 
strong  Unionist.  The  majority  in  the  Legislature  was 
composed  of  Republicans  and  Union  Democrats,  all  of 
whom  were  known  and  spoken  of  as  Unionists.  The  oppo- 
sition was  composed  of  Democrats  entirely. 

Hugh  B.  Willson's  first  bill  for  a  charter  for  the 
Metropolitan  Railway  Company  to  build  an  underground 
railroad  in  Broadway,  as  we  have  seen,  was  defeated  in 
the  Senate  of  1864.  It  w^as  not  introduced  until  towards 
the  close  of  the  session,  and  Mr.  Willson  made  no  great 
effort  to  press  it.  "It  was,  however,  too  late  in  the  ses- 
sion", he  wrote  later,  *'to  hope  to  get  it  passed  through 
both  houses,  and  I  did  not  attempt  to  press  it  at  that 
session."  It  is  probable,  too,  that  he  foresaw  the  election 
of  a  new  set  of  Legislators  and  felt  that  nothing  he  could 
do  at  the  session  of  1864  would  help  him  with  the  session 
of  1865.  So  he  made  up  his  mind  to  lay  the  project  be- 
for  the  new  Legislature,  and  meanwhile  devoted  himself 
to  laying  the  foundations  for  a  successful  appeal  to  that 
body. 

''During  the  recess  of  the  Legislature  of  1864,"  he 
wrote,  "I  devoted  myself  with  untiring  energy  to  the 
popularizing  the  subject  of  an  underground  system  of 
railways,  and  frequently  discussed  with  Mr.  Robinson 


FIRST    RAPID    TRANSIT    BILL    VETOED  31 

(A.  P.  Robinson,  the  engineer)  the  engineering  and  other 
features  of  the  project.  He  became  convinced  of  its 
feasibility  and  regarded  it  as  superior  to  any  other  sys- 
tem that  had  yet  been  presented  to  the  world  for  city 
traffic.  In  the  autumn  he  was  engaged  to  investigate  the 
various  routes  and  make  a  report  on  the  undertaking.  I 
gave  him  all  the  aid  in  my  power,  and  the  result  was  the 
production  of  a  report  almost  exhaustive  of  the  subject." 

This  report  Willson  had  printed  and  circulated,  and 
with  it  he  went  to  Albany  and  had  introduced  a  bill  to 
give  the  Metropolitan  Railway  company  the  legal  right 
to  build  and  operate  a  subway  as  therein  planned.  The 
bill  was  carefully  drawn  so  that  it  infringed  no  private 
rights.  It  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  on  February 
7,  1865,  by  Senator  Laimbeer,  a  Union  Senator  from 
New  York  City.  At  the  same  time  Senator  Laimbeer  in- 
troduced another  bill  for  a  pneumatic  tube  line  for  freight 
traffic,  to  run  underground  in  Nassau,  the  Bowery  and 
other  streets.  Thereafter  both  bills  were  considered  to- 
gether. 

On  February  15  the  Senate  Committee  on  Railroads 
held  a  hearing  on  both  bills.  This  committee  was  com- 
posed of  Senators  Angell,  Williams  and  Beach,  Unionists, 
and  Hobbs  and  Woodruff,  Democrats.  There  was  no 
opposition,  everyone  appearing  being  in  favor  of  the  bills. 
On  March  15  friends  of  the  bill  had  a  hearing  before  the 
Assembly  Committee  on  Railroads.  At  this  time  the 
Albany  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times  wrote  as 
follows  to  his  paper: 

''This  proposition  to  construct  an  underground 
railroad  is  ably  advocated  before  the  committees  of 
the  two  houses  and  has  thus  far  met  with  no  oppo- 
sition. The  Senate  committee  reported  the  bill  for 
the  consideration  of  the  Senate  last  week,  and  the 
Assembly  committee  express  themselves  as  favor- 
ably impressed  w^ith  the  arguments  advanced  in  favor 


32  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

of  the  project,  although  they  have  not  yet  taken  any 
action  in  regard  to  their  report." 

Within  a  few  days,  however,  opposition  appeared. 
Stories  were  circulated  to  the  effect  that  the  scheme  was 
impracticable  and  that  the  men  who  put  any  money  into 
it  would  lose;  also  that  the  new  line  was  not  needed  and 
could  not  get  traffic  enough  to  make  it  pay.  On  March 
20  the  New  York  Times  in  an  editorial  attacked  the  shal- 
lowness of  such  arguments.  "The  only  persons  to  whose 
interests  it  can  prove  in  the  slightest  degree  prejudicial," 
said  the  Times,  ''are  the  street  railway  companies  and 
the  omnibus  proprietors."  The  writer  then  pointed  out 
that  these  interests  were  always  complaining  that  they 
did  not  have  conveyances  enough  for  their  traffic,  yet 
when  any  effort  like  the  underground  project  was  made 
to  relieve  them  of  a  portion  of  their  burden,  they  rushed 
up  to  Albany  and  used  every  means,  fair  and  foul,  to  de- 
feat it.  ''The  one  point  for  the  Government  to  satisfy 
itself  about",  said  the  Times,  "is  whether  the  proposed 
excavation  will  affect  the  houses,  sewerage  or  streets  of 
the  city  injuriously;  whether  the  line  is  needed  and 
whether  it  will  pay  are  not  matters  for  the  consideration 
of  the  Legislature.  It  is  no  part  of  its  business  to  pre- 
vent speculators  from  sinking  their  money  in  unprofitable 
enterprises.  It  may  be  satisfied  that  people  who  propose 
to  invest  their  money  in  digging  a  tunnel  seven  miles  long 
have  good  reason  for  believing  they  will  get  it  back  again ; 
and  if  they  are  disappointed,  nobody  else  will  suffer." 

The  bill  came  up  in  the  Senate  for  passage  on  March 
24th.  Seventeen  votes  were  required  for  passage.  The 
vote  was  14  to  12,  and  although  the  affirmative  scored  the 
14,  the  bill  failed  for  lack  of  the  required  number.  Senator 
Laimbeer,  who  voted  for  the  bill,  moved  to  reconsider 
and  to  lay  that  motion  on  the  table,  which  was  carried. 
Friends  of  the  measure  at  once  exerted  themselves  to  save 
it.    Some  of  the  negative  votes,  it  was  said,  came  from 


FIRST    RAPID    TRANSIT    BILL    VETOED  33 

Senators  who  resented  the  previous  turning  down  of  a 
bill  to  give  the  New  York  &  Harlem  rights  to  build  a  rail- 
road in  Broadway.  These  differences  were  smoothed  out, 
petitions  for  the  bill  were  received  from  New  York  City, 
and  on  April  3  it  was  reconsidered  and  four  days  later 
came  up  again  for  passage.  This  time  it  was  passed  by 
a  vote  of  19  to  7.  It  came  up  in  the  Assembly  on  April  27 
and  was  passed  by  that  body  by  a  vote  of  89  in  the 
affirmative.  In  the  debate  preceding  its  passage  by  the 
Assembly  the  opposition  was  led  by  Assemblyman  Brand- 
reth,  of  Westchester  county,  who  expressed  the  fear  that 
the  construction  of  the  underground  would  ''disturb"  the 
surface  of  Broadway.  Even  in  those  days  the  country 
member  was  solicitous  for  the  streets  of  the  metropolis ! 
Assemblyman  Creamer,  of  New^  York,  also  spoke  against 
the  bill,  while  it  was  championed  by  Assemblyman  Van 
Buren,  of  New  York,  and  Assemblyman  Veoder,  of  Kings 
County. 

Friends  of  the  underground  railroad  were  naturally 
jubilant,  and  the  prospects  for  a  subway  seemed  bright. 
But  they  reckoned  without  the  Governor,  Reuben  E.  Fen- 
ton,  who  astounded  the  community  by  vetoing  the  bill. 
On  May  20  some  weeks  after  the  Legislature  had  ad- 
journed, he  sent  it  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Chauncey  M. 
Depew,  without  his  signature  and  with  a  note  of  dis- 
approval. His  reasons  for  withholding  his  approval  were 
set  forth  in  his  veto  message,  which  was  included  in  a 
general  letter  transmitting  other  vetoes  and  was  as  fol- 
low^s : 

''Neither  can  I  approve  the  'Act  to  authorize  the 
Metropolitan  Railway  company  of  the  City  of  New 
York  to  construct  a  tunnel  under  Broadway,  and  for 
other  Purposes.'  This  bill  appears  to  have  been 
elaborately  drawn  and  seems  to  have  provided 
against  any  improper  infringement  of  private  rights. 
I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  structure  contemplat- 
ed,  or   something   occupying   the    same    prominent 


34  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRAXSIT 

route  from  the  foot  of  Broadway  to  the  upper  part 
of  the  city,  may  be  made  practicable  and  may  be 
deemed  necessary.  Rapid  access  to  and  from  the 
business  center  of  New  York  is  of  vital  importance, 
and  it  is  not  improbable  that  some  more  systematic, 
direct  and  well-guarded  measure  will  finally  be  in- 
augurated. My  objections  to  this  bill  are  that,  al- 
though a  specified  route  is  laid  down,  there  is  no  re- 
quirement that  the  road  thus  authorized  shall  be 
speedily  completed.  There  being  no  obligation  that 
it  shall  be  constructed  with  reasonable  rapidity  (the 
General  Railroad  Act  allowing  five  years  for  the 
construction  of  the  road  from  the  date  of  commence- 
ment) it  might  be  possible  that,  through  financial 
disasters  or  other  causes,  the  central  thoroughfare 
of  our  commercial  metropolis  would  be  obstructed  or 
unsettled  for  a  vexatious  period.  Even  should  the 
work  be  vigorously  prosecuted,  Broadway  must  be 
rendered,  at  intervals  and  for  short  distances,  for  a 
short  time,  unpleasant  and  uncomfortable  to  travel 
and  business,  and  it  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  the 
Legislature  should  have  provided  against  the  con- 
tingency of  prolonging  the  inconvenience  through 
the  financial  vicissitudes  to  which  such  enterprises 
are  too  often  subjected. 

"But  a  controlling  objection  to  the  approval  of 
this  bill  is  found  in  Section  4,  which  authorizes  the 
trainsfer  of  State  and  City  property  for  the  use  of 
this  company.    It  reads  as  follows : 

'*  'The  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  New  York  are  hereby  authorized  to  per- 
mit the  use  by  said  Metropolitan  Railway  company 
of  such  portion  of  any  lands  heretofore  granted  by 
the  people  of  the  State  of  New  York  to  the  said 
^Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty,  or  of  such  other 
public  lands  or  places  in  the  said  city,  as  they  may 
deem  proper,  to  allow  the  said  company  to  occupy 


FIRST    RAPID    TRANSIT    BILL    VETOED  35 

either  temporarily  or  permanently  for  the  public 
convenience,  in  the  construction,  operation  and  use 
of  the  said  railroad  and  tunnel,  and  upon  such  terms 
and  under  such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by 
the  said  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty.' 

"By  the  provision  of  that  part  of  the  section 
cited  it  will  be  perceived  that  the  whole  of  the  Bat- 
tery, if  so  much  shall  be  deemed  necessary,  which 
is  in  one  sense  the  property  of  the  State,  may  be 
converted  into  a  passenger  and  freight  depot.  The 
same  use  might  be  made  of  the  other  public  parks 
and  places  of  the  city  along  or  near  the  contemplated 
route.  I  can  see  grave  objections  to  such  a  diver- 
sion of  the  parks  or  public  grounds,  which  are  de- 
signed for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  and  which  are 
essential  to  their  health  and  conducive  to  their 
pleasure.  I  cannot  consent,  on  my  part,  to  such  use 
of  these  grounds,  without  feeling  that  I  had  violated 
the  trust  reposed  in  me  by  the  people." 

For  similar  reasons  the  Governor  also  vetoed  the  bill 
for  a  pneumatic  tube  underground  express  line,  which  had 
passed  the  Legislature  with  the  Metropolitan  bill. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  Governor  in  these  days 
vetoing  a  subway  bill  on  any  such  grounds.  The  Battery 
park,  for  which  Fenton  displayed  such  solicitude,  was 
later  turned  over  to  the  elevated  railroad,  which  now 
maintains  there  a  structure  infinitely  more  unsightly 
than  the  station  and  bridge  which  the  Metropolitan  Rail- 
way Company  of  1865  planned  to  build  there.  In  those 
days,  however,  criticism  of  the  Chief  Executive  was  not 
as  common  as  it  is  now,  and  the  newspapers,  with  one 
exception,  were  silent  as  to  this  veto.  That  exception  was 
the  New  York  Times,  which  on  May  22,  the  day  the  veto 
message  was  published,  contained  the  following  editorial: 

*'The  Underground  Railroad — We  are  sorrv^  that 


36  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Governor  Fenton  has  refused  his  signature  to  the  bill 
authorizing  an  underground  railroad  in  this  city. 
We  have  ahvays  regarded  such  a  road  as  the  only 
measure  which  would  afford  substantial  relief  to  our 
over-crowded  streets  and  facilitate  transit  from  one 
part  of  the  city  to  another.  It  is  perfectly  certain 
that  there  is  not  room  on  the  surface  of  the  city  to 
accommodate  the  traffic  which  its  business  requires. 
Being  situated  on  a  long  and  narrow  island,  its  sur- 
face is  restricted  and  its  streets  are  narrow.  A  care- 
ful calculation  shows  that,  even  with  its  present 
population,  enough  railroads  cannot  be  placed  in  its 
streets  to  accommodate  all  who  wish  to  ride,  without 
stopping  its  business  traffic.  This  evil,  of  neces- 
sity, increases  from  year  to  year,  and  will  abso- 
lutely compel,  sooner  or  later,  resort  to  such  a 
road  as  that  which  the  Governor  has  just  refused  to 
permit.  We  think  his  action  ivill  he  regretted  by  all 
classes  of  people  in  this  city,  except  those  ivho  are 
interested  in  existing  and  prospective  street  rail- 
roads.^' 

The  writer  has  italicized  the  last  sentence,  which  is  the 
only  one  casting  any  reflection,  and  that  by  implication, 
upon  the  Governor,  The  sting,  however,  was  there,  and 
it  immediately  brought  forth  a  defence  of  the  Governor 
in  the  New  York  Tribune,  then  edited  by  Horace  Greeley 
and  as  pro-Fenton  in  State  politics  as  it  was  pro-Union  in 
national  affairs.  In  an  editorial  published  the  next  day. 
May  23,  Horace  rebuked  the  Times  and  asked  if  such 
criticism  was  fair  in  view  of  the  Governor's  reasons  for 
vetoing  the  bill.  **Now,  we  favor  an  underground  rail- 
road," continued  the  Tribune,  ''and  hope  to  see  it  con- 
structed under  Legislative  charter  and  by  the  company 
which  procured  the  passage  of  the  bill  just  vetoed."  It 
defended  all  the  Governor's  vetoes  and  suggested  that 
they  be  published  and  generally  circulated  in  pamphlet 


FIRST    RAPID    TRANSIT    BILL    VETOED  37 

form.  It  also  criticised  the  Legislators  as  corrupt  and 
impugned  the  motives  of  those  who  voted  for  the  meas- 
ures vetoed  by  the  Governor. 

There  was  some  truth  in  the  Tribune's  remarks.  Its 
fault  lay  in  failing  to  distinguish  between  good  and  bad 
bills.  Many,  perhaps  most,  of  Fenton's  vetoes  were  justi- 
fied, notably  that  of  the  bill  to  allow^  the  New  York  Central 
to  increase  its  rates  from  two  cents  to  two  and  one-half 
cents  a  mile,  but  a  study  of  the  Metropolitan  underground 
railroad  bill  reveals  nothing  to  warrant  its  disapproval. 

The  Times  did  not  reply  to  the  Tribune,  further  than 
to  repeat  its  previous  expression  of  regret  at  the  defeat 
of  the  underground  project.  Both  papers,  like  all  their 
contemporaries,  w^ere  absorbed  with  the  closing  scenes 
of  the  Civil  War,  reporting  the  Mrs.  Surratt  trial  and 
discussing  the  appropriate  punishment  for  Jefferson 
Davis,  the  recently  captured  President  of  the  Confeder- 
ate States.  Possibly  in  more  normal  times  the  under- 
ground railroad  promoters  would  have  been  given  more 
consideration.  Certainly  the  veto  of  Governor  Fenton 
caused  much  less  stir  then  than  a  similar  step  would  now. 

There  was  one  man  in  New  York  City,  however,  who 
resented  the  Tribune's  harsh  criticism  of  the  men  who 
voted  for  the  underground  bill,  and  that  was  Thomas  B. 
Van  Buren,  Assemblyman  from  the  Fifteenth  district, 
New  York  City,  who  not  only  voted  but  spoke  for  the 
bill.  He  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Tribune,  which  gave  it  space 
without  comment  in  its  issue  of  May  27.  After  a  general 
introduction  Van  Buren  wrote : 

''Now,  sir,  although  under  the  ban  of  so  severe  a 
punishment  as  never  being  returned  to  the  Assembly, 
and  fearing  that  the  present  city  railroads,  having 
succeeded  in  their  opposition  to  the  underground 
road,  may  not  see  fit  to  invest  in  the  pamphlet  you 
propose,  I  wish  to  state  through  your  columns  that 
I  am  one  of  those  who  voted  not  only  but  labored 


38  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

zealously  to  pass  the  bills  creating  an  underground 
railroad  and  a  pneumatic  express. 

''The  opposition  to  these  measures  came  from' 
these  representing  the  interests  of  the  existing  city 
railways,  and  I  venture  the  assertion  that  no  bill 
creating  a  corporation  has  for  years  been  presented 
or  passed,  which  so  thoroughly  guarded  public  and 
private  rights  as  the  bill  creating  the  Metropolitan 
or  Underground  Railway.    *     *     * 

"I  believe  that  no  projects  have  been  before  the 
Legislature  for  years  which  would  have  proved  of 
such  benefit  and  advantage  to  the  public  as  these 
two  railways.  They  were  to  interfere  with  no  vested 
rights,  obstruct  no  streets,  violate  no  contracts. 
They  would  have  provided  cheap,  clean,  rapid  and 
safe  means  for  carrying  passengers  and  freight,  and 
would  have  made  the  upper  portion  of  our  city  the 
most  delightful  residence  in  the  world. 

''For  Governor  Fenton  personally  and  for  his 
motives  and  independence  I  have  the  very  highest 
regard,  but  I  claim  for  myself  the  same  purity  of 
motive  and  the  same  right  of  independent  action. 
The  grounds  upon  which  the  veto  of  the  underground 
road  are  based  do  not  seem  to  me  sound.  The  right 
given  to  the  Mayor  and  Common  Council  to  allow 
the  said  company  to  use  'either  temporarily  or  per- 
manently, for  the  PUBLIC  coNVENiEisrcE,  such  por- 
tions of  the  public  lands  in  the  city  as  they  may 
deem  proper  and  under  such  regulations  as  they  may 
prescribe',  does  not  seem  to  me  fraught  with  such 
dread  consequences  as  to  demand  the  exercise  of  the 
veto  power;  and  I  do  not  believe  that  the  public  of 
New  York  entertain  such  a  holy  reverence  for  the 
Battery  as  to  regret  its  being  used,  or  a  part  of  it, 
for  such  purposes." 

To  the  unprejudiced  reader  of  this  chapter  of  Legis- 


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FIRST    RAPID    TRANSIT    BILL    \TETOED  39 

lative  history  it  would  appear  that  the  first  underground 
railroad  bill  was  defeated  by  the  corporations  then  own- 
ing the  street  railroads,  who  did  not  want  the  competi- 
tion of  a  subway.  Fenton's  action  gave  the  opponents  of 
the  scheme  time  to  organize  rival  projects  and  ultimately 
to  defeat  it.  He  thereby  deferred  underground  transit 
in  New  York  City  for  almost  half  a  century. 


CHAPTER  V 

Legislative  Commission  on  Rapid  Transit. 

A  X  rHILE  Wilison  and  his  associates  naturally  felt  ag- 
grieved at  the  action  of  Governor  Fenton,  who  had 
deprived  them  by  a  pen  stroke  of  the  fruits  of  two  years 
of  labor,  they  accepted  the  Executive's  interference  with 
the  best  grace  possible,  and  set  to  work  to  remove  the  cause 
of  his  objection.  With  their  counsel  they  went  over  the 
terms  of  the  bill  and  addressed  a  communication  to  the 
Executive,  in  which  they  bound  themselves  and  their  com- 
pany to  waive  all  rights  to  which  the  Governor  had  taken 
exception.  The  Governor,  however,  refused  to  sign  the 
bill,  even  with  this  waiver. 

Wilison 's  project  and  the  publicity  it  obtained  during 
the  Legislative  session  of  1865  started  a  perfect  avalanche 
of  rapid  transit  schemes,  and  the  newspapers  of  that  year 
are  filled  with  a  variety  of  plans  for  providing  better 
transportation  facilities.  Subways,  depressed  railroads, 
elevated  railroads  and  railroads  built  through  blocks, 
were  proposed,  some  practical  and  others  fanciful  in  the 
extreme.  Many  of  them,  no  doubt,  originated  with  the 
companies  owning  the  existing  street  car  and  omnibus 
lines,  who  had  fought  the  Wilison  project  in  the  Legisla- 
ture and  before  the  Governor.  Anticipating  that  the 
Metropolitan  company  would  apply  to  the  next  Legisla- 
ture for  the  rights  they  sought,  these  interests  devised  a 
number  of  rival  schemes  and  companies  to  contest  for 
the  Broadway  underground  franchise.  On  the  other  hand 
many  men  of  inventive  turn  took  advantage  of  the  public 
interest  in  the  matter  to  bring  forward  their  ideas  of 
providing  rapid  transit. 

It  would  be  useless  to  describe  or  even  name  these 
different  projects.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  among  them 
were  several  proposals  for  elevated  railroads  which  cora- 
niandod  respectful  attention  from  the  press.    One  of  these 


LEGISLATUIVE  COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  41 

was  the  Harvey  and  another  the  Montgomery  plan.  The 
former,  brought  forward  by  Charles  T.  Harvey,  contem- 
plated a  railroad  elevated  on  pillars  erected  at  the  side- 
walk line  and  operated  by  cars  propelled  by  cables  driven 
by  power  from  stationary  steam  engines.  The  other, 
advanced  by  Richard  Montgomery,  consisted  of  a  similar 
elevated  structure  operated  by  cars  drawn  by  steam  loco- 
motives, the  structure  to  be  built  of  corrugated  steel 
bars,  invented  by  Montgomery,  and  for  which  great 
strength  and  lightness  were  claimed.  The  latter  never 
got  beyond  the  stage  of  newspaper  plans,  but  the  Harvey 
scheme  we  shall  hear  more  of  later,  as  it  was  the  progen- 
itor of  the  present  elevated  railroad  system. 

In  November  1865  another  election  was  held  for  all 
State  officers  except  the  Governor  and  for  members  of 
the  Legislature.  The  Republicans  were  again  successful, 
electing  General  Barlow  Secretary  of  State  and  a  ma- 
jority of  both  branches  of  the  Legislature.  The  Union- 
ists had  28  Senators  to  four  for  the  Democrats,  and  the 
Assembly  stood  94  Unionists  to  34  Democrats.  At  the 
same  time  the  Democrats  elected  John  T.  Hoffman  as 
Mayor  of  New  York  City,  a  man  who  subsequently  be- 
came Governor  and  played  a  prominent  part  in  the  rapid 
transit  game. 

Before  the  new  Legislature  met  Willson  made  another 
attempt  to  get  Governor  Fenton  to  sign  the  bill  passed 
by  the  previous  session,  subject  to  the  waiver  by  the  com- 
pany of  all  privileges  to  which  he  objected.  This  effort 
was  backed  by  more  or  less  newspaper  support.  The 
New  York  Times  in  an  editorial  in  its  issue  of  December 
14,1865  said: 

''Why  does  the  Governor  still  refuse  his  signa- 
ture to  the  Underground  Railroad  bill?  The  bill 
was  passed  by  the  last  Legislature,  if  we  remember 
rightly,  by  twenty-two  votes  in  the  Senate  and  up- 
wards  of  ninety  in  the   Assembly — a  vote  which 


42  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

would  have  passed  it  over  a  veto  if  it  had  been  pre- 
viously passed  and  vetoed  by  the  Governor.  It  has, 
therefore,  received  the  constitutional  vote,  though 
not  upon  the  constitutional  condition,  to  become  a 
law  ivithout  the  Governor's  signature.  For  some 
unexplained  reason  Mr.  Fenton  withholds  his  signa- 
ture. 

''The  measure  is  one  of  very  grave  importance 
to  the  people  of  New  York.  Its  feasibility  and  util- 
ity are  no  longer  matters  of  experiment." 

After  aUuding  to  the  success  of  the  underground  road 
in  London  the  writer  continues: 

"The  names  of  the  gentlemen  who  compose  the 
company  which  offers  to  undertake  this  enterprise 
constitute  a  sufficient  guaranty  that  the  work  will  be 
promptly  undertaken  and  carried  forward  to  com- 
pletion ;  and  as  the  law  limits  them  to  five  years  from 
their  organization,  nearly  two  of  which  have  already 
elapsed,  they  have  certainly  not  any  too  much  time. 
We  trust  the  bill  will  without  further  delay  be 
signed ;  and  as  the  company  has  with  great  liberality 
come  forward  and  under  the  advice  of  able  counsel 
tendered  to  the  Governor  a  relinquishment  of  any 
portion  of  the  franchise  which  he  may  require,  there 
ought  to  be  no  reason  to  apprehend  that  we  shall  not 
soon  have  the  privilege  of  seeing  this  much-needed 
enterprise  actually  begun.  The  question  is  one  which 
will  not  bear  further  trifling  with.  Every  month's 
delay  is  an  immeasurable  loss  to  the  city  in  a  busi- 
ness point  of  view  and  an  incalculable  sacrifice  of  the 
comfort  and  convenience  of  residents." 

The  Governor  again  refused  to  yield,  and  Willson  and 
his  associates  prepared  to  resort  to  the  new  Legislature 
to  obtain  the  passage  of  another  bill.  The  measure  they 
submitted  was  identical  with  the  bill  which  the  Governor 


LEGISLATIVE   COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  43 

had  vetoed,  the  promoters  holding  that  it  was  the  prov- 
ince of  the  Legislature,  if  it  deemed  it  wise,  to  amend  it 
to  conform  to  the  Governor's  suggestions.  They  should 
have  made  the  amendments  themselves,  for  later  in  the 
session  the  fact  that  their  bill  contained  the  objectionable 
features  was  used  to  advantage  by  their  opponents. 
Chief  among  these  was  a  deserter  from  their  own  camp, 
one  Origen  Vandenburgh,  who  had  been  employed  by 
Willson  during  the  previous  session  as  a  lobbyist  at 
Albany.  This  man  now  appeared  with  a  bill  of  his  own 
for  the  same  rights  to  build  a  subway  under  Broadway 
for  which  the  Metropolitan  company  was  an  applicant. 
He  sought  to  justify  himself  in  this  course  by  making  the 
statement  that  the  president  of  the  Metropolitan  company 
had  told  him  that  that  company  would  not  make  another 
effort  to  get  the  franchise.  In  this,  however,  he  was  flatly 
contradicted  by  Willson. 

The  fight  in  the  Legislature  opened  early.  Before  the 
session  was  ten  days  old,  namely  on  January  10,  1866, 
the  following  resolution  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  by 
Seator  Lent: 

''Resolved  that  the  engineer  of  the  Croton  Aque- 
duct Board  be  requested  to  report  his  opinion  as  to 
the  practicability  of  constructing  a  railroad  under 
Broadway  in  the  city  of  New  York,  and  especially  as 
to  the  effect  of  the  attempt  to  construct  the  same 
upon  the  Croton  and  other  pipes  and  the  sewers,  and 
the  damage  if  any  which  may  be  caused  to  the  city 
and  to  the  individual  property  owners  thereby,  and 
what  precaution  ought  to  be  taken  to  guard  against 
the  same,  and  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  damages, 
and  what  legislation  is  necessary  in  reference  to  that 
object." 

After  lying  on  the  table  for  a  day,  this  resolution  was 
adopted.  The  engineer  of  the  Croton  Aqueduct,  to  whom 
it  was  addressed,  at  that  time  was  Alfred  W.  Craven,  one 


44  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

of  the  leading  engineers  of  the  day  and  an  uncle  of  Alfred 
Craven,  who  from  1910  to  1916  was  chief  engineer  of  the 
Public  Service  Commission  in  charge  of  the  building  of 
the  new  Dual  System  subways.  In  response  to  a  request 
from  A.  P.  Eobinson,  when  the  latter  was  preparing  his 
report  for  the  Metropolitan  company,  Alfred  W.  Craven 
had  stated  that  with  proper  precautions  the  underground 
road  could  be  built  without  seriously  damaging  the  v>^ater 
system. 

But  what  Alfred  W.  Craven  found  unobjectionable  in 
1865  he  declared  highly  objectionable  in  1866  in  his  re- 
sponse to  the  Senate  resolution.  On  February  2,  1866, 
the  president  of  the  Senate  laid  before  that  body  Mr. 
Craven's  report,  in  which  the  Engineer  of  the  Croton 
Board  said: 

"I  assume  that  the  inquiry  refers  to  a  road  con- 
structed upon  the  same  general  plan  as  that  vetoed 
by  the  Governor  last  year.  Also  that  the  grade,  loca- 
tion, plan  of  the  tunnel  etc.  are  the  same  as  proposed 
in  the  report  of  A.  P.  Eobinson  Esq.,  ci\dl  engineer. 
In  reply  I  beg  leave  to  state  that  to  set  forth  in  spe- 
cific detail  the  extent  and  cost  of  the  work  of  remov- 
ing and  relaying  pipes,  and  the  reconstruction  of 
sewers  necessarily  resulting  from  the  building  of 
such  a  road  would  require  more  time  than  appears  to 
have  been  anticipated  by  your  honorable  body.  I 
have  been  compelled,  therefore,  to  confine  myself  in 
general  terms  to  the  principal  points  involved; 
which,  together  with  the  aid  of  the  accompanying 
maps  and  profiles,  will  enable  you  to  form  at  least  an 
approximate  estimate  of  the  complicated  difficulties 
to  be  encountered  so  far  as  the  water  pipes  and 
sewers  are  involved;  the  damages  to  the  inhabitants 
whose  daily  comforts  and  daily  absolute  necessities 
are  dependent  upon  the  uninterrupted  use  of  these 
public  works ;  the  losses  of  manufactories  suspended ; 


LEGISLATIVE   COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  45 

the  risk  of  destruction  of  property  by  fires  during 
the  total  or  partial  interruption  of  the  water  supply, 
and  other  interests  affected. 

'^ First,  the  Water  Supply:  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  the  chief  supply  of  the  whole  city  is  drawn 
from  the  large  main  pipes  through  Fifth  Avenue 
and  Broadway,  directly  on  the  site  of  the  proposed 
railway.  From  these  main  pipes  the  water  is  dis- 
tributed east  and  west  to  the  river  limits.  At  what- 
ever point  the  work  on  the  railroad  should  be  in 
operation,  it  would  at  once  involve  the  necessity  of 
the  removal  of  these  main  pipes  from  the  section 
where  the  work  might  be  in  progress.  During  the 
time  taken  for  this  removal  and  the  reconstruction 
of  the  numerous  lateral  branches,  the  inhabitants 
in  the  intersecting  streets  would  be  cut  off  from 
water  entirely,  while  the  rest  of  the  city,  from  river 
to  river,  south  of  the  point  of  work,  would  be  de- 
pendent solely  on  the  utterly  inadequate  supply 
coming  through  the  small  cross-mains,  reaching  dis- 
tricts for  which  they  were  not  intended  by  the  way 
of  lateral  connections  with  the  remote  parts  of  the 
general  system  or  net  work  of  pipe  distribution. 

"When  it  is  considered  that  even  now,  when  all 
the  mains  are  in  operation,  complaints  of  an  in- 
sufficient head  of  water  throughout  the  lower  part 
of  the  city  are  constant  and  urgent,  you  will  more 
readily  understand  the  condition  to  which  the  in- 
habitants might  be  reduced  if  that  head  were  ma- 
terially diminished,  as  it  most  certainly  would  be, 
by  the  construction  of  the  proposed  railway,  how- 
ever well  devised  or  skillfully  conducted  might  be 
the  operations. 

''The  above  statement  implies  the  possibility  of 
prosecuting  the  work  on  the  road  in  the  most  careful 
and  deliberate  manner,  commencing  at  the  Batterv' 


46  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

and  working  in  regular  sections.  But  it  is  undeni- 
able that  if  the  road  were  to  be  finished  in  any  rea- 
sonable time  it  would  be  necessary  to  work  it  in 
many  points  simultaneously.  This,  while  it  would 
decrease  the  number  of  persons  deprived  of  water, 
would  also  diminish  the  supply  through  the  laterals 
to  the  rest  of  the  city. 

'*The  extent  of  damages  to  individuals  and  to 
companies  growing  out  of  the  construction  of  the 
suggested  railroad  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  with 
even  approximate  correctness.  The  area  of  popu- 
lation covered,  the  extent  and  variety  of  interests 
involved  and  the  different  degree  of  inconvenience 
and  loss  sustained  by  each  class  of  sufferers,  all 
make  up  a  whole  so  complicated  that  the  actual  ex- 
perience alone  of  proved  results  could  warrant  any 
summing  up  of  the  total  loss  or  damage.  That  the 
municipal  government,  which  has  guaranteed  to  con- 
sumers the  use  of  this  w^ater,  would  be  obliged  to 
make  good  the  losses  growing  out  of  the  interruption 
seems  probable.  I  do  not  advert  to  the  cost  to  the 
city  of  making  all  these  changes  in  the  mains,  be- 
cause the  cost  of  removal  and  reconstruction  would 
depend  on  so  many  contingencies  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  arrive  at  any  degree  of  accuracy,  and  be- 
cause also  it  is  proposed  the  railway  pay  this." 

When  the  above  report  had  been  presented  to  the 
Senate  and  published,  there  was  consternation  in  the 
camp  of  the  advocates  of  an  underground  railroad  and 
corresponding  rejoicing  in  the  ranks  of  the  surface  rail- 
road companies  and  in  the  Jacob  Sharp  lobby.  This 
lobby  had  been  at  work  for  years  trying  at  each  session 
to  get  passed  a  bill  giving  Sharp  and  his  associates  the 
rights  for  a  surface  railroad  in  Broadway.  These  lobby- 
ists were  no  amateurs  like  Willson  and  his  friends,  but 
seasoned  Albany  operators  who  worked  intelligently  if 


LEGISLATIVE  COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  47 

not  always  legitimately.  There  is  little  doubt  that  to 
them  was  due  the  failure  of  the  Willson  subway  scheme. 
Opposition  by  such  a  prominent  engineer  as  Craven, 
occupying  probably  the  greatest  engineering  position  in 
the  public  service  at  the  time,  was,  of  course,  a  powerful 
argument  against  it.  The  press  so  regarded  it,  and  at 
first  it  was  heralded  as  the  death  knell  of  the  under- 
ground. 

But  the  friends  of  the  latter  were  not  vanquished  yet. 
They  rallied  presently  and  began  to  pour  into  the  Legis- 
lature petitions  and  documents  calculated  to  offset  the 
Craven  report.  One  of  the  strongest  shafts  hurled  in 
this  way  was  a  letter  from  A.  P.  Robinson,  the  engineer 
of  the  Metropolitan  Railway  company,  who  had  planned 
the  Willson  subway.  Mr.  Robinson  not  only  defended 
his  plans  and  asserted  that  the  road  could  be  built  with- 
out damaging  the  water  system,  but  he  produced  a  letter 
written  by  Craven  a  year  before  in  which  Craven  had 
made  practically  the  same  assertion. 

Mr.  Robinson  quoted  in  full  the  following  letter : 

CHIEF  ENGINEER'S  OFFICE 

Croton  Aqueduct  Department,  February         ,  1865. 

H.  B.  Willson  Esq. 

Care  Senator  Angell,  Albany,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Sir :  I  beg  leave  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  Mr.  A.  P.  Robinson's  report  upon  the  contem- 
plated Metropolitan  Railway  in  this  city,  and  also 
his  report  on  the  contemplated  Pneumatic  Railway, 
together  with  a  note  from  you,  asking  whether  in  my 
opinion  the  proposed  works  would  injuriously  affect 
any  of  the  sewers  or  other  interests  committed  to 
our  charge.  In  reply  I  beg  leave  to  say  that  the 
works  proposed  would,  of  course,  involve  the  neces- 
sity of  very  considerable  changes  in  the  position  of 
water  mains,  sewers  and  appurtenant  constructions 


48  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

now  occupying  space  below  our  street  surfaces ;  and 
that  during  the  time  required  for  such  alteration 
there  will  be  unavoidably  much  inconvenience  felt 
in  the  immediate  locality  of  the  work.  The  incon- 
venience or  damage  will  extend  beyond  the  imme- 
diate locality  just  so  far  as  the  water  supply  and 
sewerage  may  depend  upon  the  water  mains  and 
sewers,  the  operations  of  which  by  reason  of  the  pros- 
ecution of  your  work  are  suspended.  The  extent 
of  this  damage  or  inconvenience  would  of  course  be 
lessened  or  increased  according  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  work  would  be  carried  on. 

I  have  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  works  you 
contemplate  can  be  so  constructed,  and  the  necessary 
removals  and  changes  in  the  water  mains,  sewers, 
etc.  be  made  in  such  a  manner  that,  after  the  whole 
work  is  completed,  the  public  works  will  not  be 
found  to  have  been  permanently  injured,  either  in 
regard  to  their  condition  or  efficiency  in  operation. 
As  the  professional  member  of  the  Board,  responsi- 
ble for  the  good  condition  of  the  public  works  re- 
ferred to,  and  also  for  the  maintenance  of  and  unin- 
terrupted enjoyment  of  their  use  by  the  inhabitants, 
I  feel  obliged  to  add  that  the  bill  authorizing  your 
railway  should  make  provisions: 

1st,  That  the  Department  charged  with  the  proper 
maintenance  of  the  water  mains,  sewers  and  pave- 
ments should  have  such  supervision  and  control  over 
your  operations  as  the  public  interests  might  re- 
quire ; 

2d,  That  the  city  shall  be  secured  against  all 
liabilities  for  damages  sustained  in  the  prosecution 
of  this  work.  What  I  mean  by  this  is  not  only  the 
damage  resulting  from  the  carelessness  or  ineffi- 
ciency of  workmen,  but  all  the  damage,  including 
that  which  is  inseparable  from  the  nature  of  your 
proposed  ■work. 


LEGISLATIVE   COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  49 

As  the  contemplated  operations  involve  the  neces- 
sity of  the  entire  reconstruction  of  long  lines  of 
sewers,  with  alterations  in  the  grade  and  direction 
of  many  of  them,  and  also  make  necessary  a  very 
considerable  change  in  the  position  of  some  of  our 
large  water  mains,  you  will,  I  know,  readily  concede 
that  temporary  inconvenience  and  damage  will  be 
unavoidable  under  the  most  favorable  fortune,  while 
any  negligence  or  failure  might  very  greatly  increase 
that  which,  under  the  best  circumstances,  will  be  a 
very  great  annoyance.  You  will,  therefore,  see  that 
in  calling  your  attention  to  these  points,  and  begging 
you  to  make  proper  provision  for  thera  in  any  bill 
you  may  ask  of  the  Legislature,  I  am  only  doing 
what  is  made  imperative  by  my  official  responsi- 
bility. 

I  am  etc. 

A.  W.  Craven,  C.  E. 

Mr.  Robinson  then  added: 

"Mr.  Craven  here  requires  very  reasonable,  prop- 
er safeguards  and  guarantees  for  the  public;  and  in 
accordance  with  his  suggestions  the  clauses  in  the 
bill  passed  last  winter  referring  to  these  points  were 
prepared  after  full  consultation  with  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Croton  Board,  as  well  as  with  the  Cor- 
poration Counsel. 

"I  believe  that  the  public  works  to  be  affected 
remain  in  about  the  same  state  now  as  then.  No 
extensive  sewers  have  been  constructed,  nor  have 
any  new  water  mains  been  laid  down. 

"A  work  which  then  presented  no  serious  diffi- 
culties to  the  mind  of  Mr.  Craven  becomes  now  im- 
practicable; and  because  we  have  a  water  pipe  three 
feet  in  diameter,  lying  eight  feet  below  the  pave- 
ments, and  a  few  petty  brick  sewers  three  feet  wide 
by  four  feet  high  in  the  route  proposed,  there  is  not 


50  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

in  his  opinion  engineering  skill  enough  in  this  coun- 
try to  construct  this  railway.  This  is  the  standard 
as  to  the  ability  of  the  profession  in  the  United  States 
gravely  put  forth  by  a  representative  member.  I 
have  entertained  a  pardonable  pride  in  my  profes- 
sion, and  a  still  higher  pride  that  I  am  an  American 
engineer;  for  although  we  cannot  point  to  works  of 
the  magnitude  and  extent  of  many  in  the  old  coun- 
try, we  can  show  as  brilliant  conceptions  and  as  bold 
achievements  as  any  that  the  world  can  boast;  and 
I  should  indeed  feel  humiliated  if  I  could  for  a  mo- 
ment believe  that  you  would  indorse  the  meagre 
standard  here  given  us  by  a  refusal  to  report  a  bill 
for  the  construction  of  this  work  for  any  of  the 
reasons  set  forth  in  the  communication  of  Mr. 
Craven. ' ' 

This  spirited  rejoinder  to  Mr.  Craven's  change  of 
front  no  doubt  helped  to  soften  the  blow  which  the  lat- 
ter's  unfavorable  report  dealt  the  Willson  underground 
project,  but  it  did  not  prevent  the  defeat  of  that  project 
in  the  Assembly. 

It  would  be  useless  to  recount  the  several  attempts 
made  at  this  session  of  the  Legislature  (1866)  to  get 
charters  for  an  underground  railroad.  Three  or  more 
bills  for  this  purpose  were  introduced,  and  as  many  more 
for  rights  to  build  elevated  railroads  of  one  kind  or  an- 
other. Broadv/ay  was  the  route  most  desired,  and  the 
fight  for  the  underground  rights  was  waged  over  this 
thoroughfare.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  Broadway 
was  then  as  now  the  main  business  artery  of  the  city,  and 
the  traffic  on  its  surface  was  greater  than  that  of  any 
other  street,  so  that  the  great  need  for  relief  of  conges- 
tion was  a  new  road  of  some  kind  along  Broadway. 

As  before  stated,  the  horse  railroad  interests  looked 
with  hungry  eyes  on  this  thoroughfare  and  for  years  had 
sought  the  priceless  franchise   for  the   surface  rights. 


LEGISLATIVE    COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  51 

Property  owners  had  resisted  their  efforts  successfully, 
and  when  the  Legislature  of  1866  met  were  prepared 
to  continue  their  resistance.  Owners  of  the  horse  rail- 
roads, too,  argued  that  if  Broadway  underground  rights 
were  granted  to  rivals  the  construction  and  operation  of 
a  subway  would  delay,  perhaps  for  all  time,  the  building 
of  a  surface  road  in  that  street.  As  they  were  still  fight- 
ing for  the  surface  rights,  they  naturally  opposed  the 
grant  of  the  sub-surface  rights  sought  by  Willson. 

The  main  fight  in  the  Legislature  of  1866,  therefore, 
was  between  Willson  and  Vandenburgh.  Both  had  bills 
introduced,  and  soon  the  Committees  on  Railroads  of  the 
two  houses  had  a  lively  time  with  the  clashing  interests. 
Efforts  were  made  to  bring  the  rivals  together,  and  a  bill 
was  introduced  to  embrace  both  interests,  but  "Willson 
and  his  friends  would  not  accept  the  compromise  plan, 
and  it  came  to  naught.  Vandenburgh,  who  undeniably 
had  great  influence  with  the  Legislators,  finally  pre- 
vailed, and  his  bill  was  favorably  reported  in  the  Assem- 
bly. 

Willson  made  one  last  appeal  to  the  Senate  for  jus- 
tice. He  was  desperate  at  the  prospect  of  losing  every- 
thing which  the  success  of  Vandenburgh  in  the  Assembly 
made  imminent,  and  prepared  a  memorial  which  he  sub- 
mitted to  the  Senate  and  had  published.    Here  it  is : 

**To  the  Honorable,  the  Senate  of  the  State  of 
New  York: — 

''The  petition  of  Hugh  B.  Willson,  of  the  city  of 
New  York,  a  loyal  citizen  of  the  United  States,  re- 
spectfully showeth: 

"That  he  was  the  originator  of  the  undertaking 
known  as  the  Underground  Railway  in  this  city. 
Having  been  in  London  several  times  during  tht? 
construction  of  the  Metropolitan  Tunnel  Railway  of 
that  city,  and  for  some  months  after  it  was  opened 
for  traffic  in  January,  1863,  he  had  great  oppor- 
tunities for  obtaining  practical  information  as  to  the 


52  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

engineering  difficulties  to  be  overcome.  Those  few 
months,  during  which  he  traveled  almost  daily 
through  the  tunnel,  sufficed  to  convince  him  that 
the  undertaking  was  a  great  success,  and  that 
a  similar  line  in  New  York  would  not  only  be  equally 
successful,  but  would  in  fact  afford  the  most  econ- 
omical and  effectual  method  of  relieving  our  crowd- 
ed thoroughfares.  Hence  on  his  return  to  this  city 
in  the  summer  of  that  year  your  petitioner  deter- 
mined to  present  the  project  to  such  influential  par- 
ties as  he  might  be  able  to  convince  of  its  adapta- 
tion to  the  wants  of  the  community. 

"This  task  your  petitioner  at  first  found  difficult 
of  accomplishment,  owing  mainly  to  the  absorbing 
interest  of  the  war,  but  he  finally  succeeded  after 
several  months  of  earnest  labor  in  effecting  through 
the  instrumentality  of  friends  a  powerful  organiza- 
tion of  capitalists,  under  the  name  of  the  Metropoli- 
tan Railway  Company,  whose  articles  of  association 
were  filed  March  22,  1864.  Prior  to  that  organiza- 
tion, and  in  order  to  demonstrate  to  the  gentlemen 
in  question  the  practicability  of  the  undertaking, 
your  petitioner  and  one  of  his  friends  employed  Mr. 
R.  T.  Bailey,  an  experienced  civil  engineer,  to  ex- 
amine and  report  on  the  same,  and  the  company  so 
formed,  in  the  autumn  of  the  same  year,  had  a  still 
more  careful  survey  and  detailed  report  on  the  pro- 
posed work  made  by  Mr.  A.  P.  Robinson,  another 
distinguished  civil  engineer,  and  no  other  scientific 
reports  or  practical  information  have  ever  been  pro- 
cured to  be  made  and  published  by  any  other  parties. 
These  reports  were  in  fact  demonstrative  of  the 
whole  question  involved  as  to  the  possibility  of  con- 
structing so  vast  a  public  work  in  the  heart  of  a 
great  city  without  damage  to  property  of  any  kind 
whatever  and  without  embarrassing  the  traffic. 

"Your  petitioner  begs  further  to  represent  that 


LEGISLATIVE  COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  53 


the  said  company,  in  which  he  was  a  director,  and 
which  he  has  labored  ever  since  most  assiduously 
to  promote,  had  a  bill  introduced  into  the  Legisla- 
ture to  authorize  the  construction  of  the  proposed 
tunnel  and  railway,  the  day  after  the  articles  of 
association  were  filed  (March  23,  1864)  and  your 
petitioner  attended  for  several  weeks  at  Albany  to 
endeavor  to  obtain  its  passage,  but  found  the  session 
too  far  advanced  to  secure  that  object,  although  it 
received  a  favorable  consideration  in  the  Senate  on 
a  vote  of  19  to  7. 

''The  following  session  (1865)  the  same  bill  was 
again  introduced,  and  your  petitioner  spent  nearly 
three  months  at  Albany  as  the  chief  agent  of  the 
company,  and  with  the  assistance  of  others  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  it  through  the  two  branches  of 
the  Legislature  when  it  failed  to  receive  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Governor  for  reasons  which  your  peti- 
tioner fully  appreciated  and  regrets  could  not  have 
been  made  known  in  time  to  have  enabled  the  com- 
pany to  amend  their  bill  in  respect  to  the  objections 
stated  by  His  Excellency.  This  unfortunate  circum- 
stance rendered  it  necessary  for  the  Metropolitan 
Eailway  Company  to  renew  their  application  for  a 
new  bill  at  the  present  session,  when  they  found 
themselves  opposed  by  two  other  parties,  who,  with- 
out any  just  claims  to  the  franchise,  are  using  the 
most  strenuous  efforts  to  obtain  it. 

''Your  petitioner  begs  further  to  represent  that 
these  two  parties  have  combined  and  made  enormous 
demands  upon  the  Metropolitan  Company,  which  the 
gentlemen  in  its  direction  refused  to  accede  to,  and  he 
is  apprehensive  that  the  undertaking  will  be  wrested 
out  of  their  hands  by  a  bold  act  of  piracy.  Your  peti- 
tioner in  such  an  event  will  be  left  without  any  legal 
means  of  obtaining  justice  or  indemnity  for  nearly 
three  years  of  arduous  labor  and  anxiety  and  an 


54  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

expenditure  so  large  as  to  prove  ruinous  to  himself 
and  family. 

''Your  petitioner  under  all  these  circumstances 
feels  that  he  may  with  propriety  appeal  to  the  sense 
of  justice  of  your  honorable  House,  and  prays  that 
it  will  be  pleased  to  cause  an  investigation  to  be 
made  into  the  claims  of  your  petitioner  and  his 
friends  before  the  passage  of  any  such  bill. 
''H.  B.  Willson 

''New  York,  March  21,  1866." 

This  proved  to  be  the  swan  song  of  Willson  and  the 
Metropolitan  Company.  Though  first  in  the  field  their 
labors  were  to  go  for  naught  and  the  first  subway  project 
was  to  be  throttled  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  pow- 
erful corporations  which  controlled  the  horse  car  lines  in 
New  York  City.  Willson  had  the  sympathy  of  the  public, 
and  the  New  York  Times  in  an  editorial  expressed  the 
belief  that  he  had  "suffered  unfairly." 

The  day  after  the  memorial  was  published  a  letter  in 
reply  from  Thomas  B.  Van  Buren  appeared  in  the  Times. 
Van  Buren  had  been  a  member  of  the  Assembly  in  1865 
and  had  supported  the  bill  which  Governor  Fenton  vetoed. 
He  followed  Vandenburgh  on  the  latter 's  desertion  of  the 
Willson  cause  and  became  one  of  the  incorporators  of  the 
company  formed  by  the  bill  which  Vandenburgh  suc- 
ceeded in  putting  through  the  Assembly.  In  his  reply  he 
denied  Willson 's  charges  of  a  combination  and  ''hold- 
up ' '.  He  excused  his  own  course  by  making  the  statement 
that  Mr.  Barney,  the  president  of  the  Metropolitan  Com- 
pany, had  told  him  that  he  intended  to  "drop  the  enter- 
prise entirely".  As  he  "hated  to  see  the  project 
dropped",  he  and  Vandenburgh  got  up  the  bill  which  was 
introduced  in  the  Assembly.  Finding  two  other  bills 
pending,  he  explained,  he  sought  to  get  the  promoters  of 
the  three  measures  together  on  a  new  bill,  which  would 
give  representation  to  all.     To  his  letter  to  this  effect, 


LEGISLATIVE    COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  55 

he  said,  the  Metropolitan  Company  made  no  reply,  and 
he  finally  compromised  with  the  backers  of  the  third  bill 
and  the  measure  they  agreed  upon  was  favorably  report- 
ed in  the  Assembly. 

Willson  answered  this  statement  by  a  letter  published 
in  the  Times  of  March  31.  He  declared  that  Van  Buren's 
proposal  of  compromise  was  answered  and  refused  by 
the  Metropolitan  Company,  for  the  reason  that  it  pro- 
posed that  Mr.  Barney  desert  the  Metropolitan  and  join 
Vandenburgh's  Company.  He  also  claimed  to  have  in  his 
possession  a  letter  written  by  Vandenburgh  in  which  the 
latter  offered  to  buy  out  the  Metropolitan  Company  for 
$112,500,  of  which  $12,500  was  to  be  paid  in  money  some 
months  after  the  Vandenburgh  bill  should  become  a  law, 
and  the  balance  in  the  latter  company's  stock.  He  ex- 
plained the  allusion  to  Mr.  Barney's  alleged  desire  to 
''drop  the  enterprise"  by  saying  that,  in  the  autumn  of 
1865,  Mr.  Barney  had  a  serious  illness  and  asked  his  asso- 
ciates in  the  Metropolitan  Company  to  allow  him  to  retire 
from  active  participation  in  the  company's  affairs,  but 
that  later  when  he  recovered  his  health  he  changed  his 
mind  and  consented  to  remain  at  the  head  of  the  company. 

The  Vandenburgh  bill  had  been  favorably  reported  in 
the  Assembly  on  March  15.  On  March  24  the  same  Com- 
mittee on  Railroads  reported  adversely  on  five  bills  for 
elevated  railroads  on  Broadway  and  other  streets.  On 
March  '29,  in  spite  of  Willson 's  appeal,  the  Assembly  took 
up  and  passed  the  Vandenburgh  bill.  On  April  4  it 
passed  the  bill  providing  for  the  construction  of  the  Mont- 
gomery "corrugated"  elevated  railroad  in  Broadway. 
There  were  prospects,  too,  that  the  Broadway  surface 
railroad  bill  would  get  the  approval  of  the  complacent 
Assembly.  The  New  York  Tribune  of  April  5  editorially 
condemned  the  granting  of  any  more  surface  railroad 
rights,  saying: 

"We  most  earnestly  protest  against  any  more 


56  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


tracks  being  laid  in  our  crovrded  streets  until  some 
one  of  the  projects  contemplating  an  elevated  rail- 
road and  one  of  those  intending  an  underground  rail- 
road shall  have  had  a  fair  trial". 

After  the  passage  of  the  Vandenburgh  bill  by  the 
Assembly  the  fight  was  transferred  to  the  Senate,  which 
killed  the  bill  in  spite  of  a  favorable  report  by  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Committee  on  Railroads.  Before  this  result 
was  reached,  however,  there  were  exciting  scenes  in  the 
Senate,  culminating  in  the  mention  of  alleged  charges  of 
bribery. 

Meantime  the  Senate  Railroad  Committee  gave  a  pub- 
lic hearing  on  all  bills  affecting  Broadway,  and  a  large 
delegation  of  w^ealthy  men  from  New  York  City  attended. 
Among  them  were  William  B.  Astor  and  A.  T.  Stewart. 
The  latter  argued  against  the  giving  away  of  franchises, 
and  offered  $3,000,000  for  the  rights  which  the  pending 
bills  proposed  to  confer  for  nothing.  When  asked  to 
make  a  hona  fide  offer  for  the  Broadway  underground 
franchise,  however,  Mr.  Stewart  declined.  In  general 
the  millionaire  delegation  opposed  all  railroads  in  Broad- 
way, but  especially  the  underground  and  elevated  pro- 
jects. 

It  was  on  April  14,  a  few  days  after  the  millionaires 
had  been  heard,  that  the  Senate  had  the  most  thrilling  day 
of  the  session.  On  the  previous  day  Senator  Folger,  on 
behalf  of  the  majority  of  the  Railroad  Committee,  had 
reported  in  favor  of  the  Vandenburgh  bill  and  Senator 
Humphrey,  for  the  minority,  against  it.  The  report  had 
been  tabled  temporarily,  and  the  next  day  Senator  Hum- 
phrey, for  the  majority  of  the  Railroad  Committee,  re- 
ported favorably  on  the  Broadway  surface  railroad  bill. 
Senator  Low  dissented  from  this  report  and  moved  to 
take  the  underground  and  elevated  railroad  bills  from 
the  table.    The  motion  prevailed  and  a  debate  ensued. 

After  a  few  commonplace  speeches,  Senator  LaBau 


LEGISLATIVE   COMMISSION  ON  RAPID  TRANSIT  57 

electrified  the  Senate  by  stating  that  he  had  been  informed 
two  weeks  previously  that  the  majority  of  the  Railroad 
Committee  would  report  as  it  had  done.  He  could  tell  the 
gentlemen  composing  that  majority,  he  continued,  that 
there  were  rumors  about  the  porticos  and  halls  of  the 
capitol  and  on  the  streets  of  Albany,  to  the  effect  that 
each  of  them  had  received  $10,000  for  their  action  on  these 
bills.  This  action  gave  color  to  the  foul  rumors,  and  the 
gentlemen  owed  it  to  their  own  vindication  to  favor  the 
reference  of  the  bills  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole. 

Immediately  the  debate  turned  from  the  bills  to  the 
sensational  remarks  of  Senator  La  Bau.  The  three  Sen- 
ators composing  the  majority  of  the  Railroad  Committee 
disclaimed  having  received  anything  for  their  votes 
against  the  underground  and  in  favor  of  the  surface  road. 
Other  Senators  were  ''astonished"  that  such  language 
should  be  used  on  the  floor,  while  a  few  pointed  out  that 
Mr.  La  Bau  had  not  made  any  charges  but  had  simply 
stated  that  the  ugly  rumors  were  in  circulation.  La  Bau 
himself,  who  hailed  from  the  First  District  of  New  York 
City,  disclaimed  any  intention  of  indorsing  the  rumors, 
but  had  merely  stated  them  and  pointed  out  to  the  Sen- 
ators how  they  could  disprove  them  by  their  votes  on  the 
pending  motion. 

On  the  vote  the  lobby  was  defeated,  and  the  bills  went 
to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole,  the  Senate  thus  refusing 
to  indorse  the  report  of  the  majority  of  the  Railroad 
Committee.  On  April  17  the  Vandenburgh  bill  was  con- 
sidered in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  when  the  motion  to 
report  it  favorably  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  14  to  12. 
The  Senate  later  refused  to  order  it  to  third  reading  by 
a  vote  of  17  to  12,  and  the  President  declared  it  lost.  A 
motion  to  reconsider  was  made,  but  this  too  was  defeated, 
17  to  9.  The  elevated  and  surface  bills  went  the  same 
way,  so  that  the  Senate  killed  everything  granting  rail- 
road rights  on  Broadway. 

But  the  rapid  transit  idea  would  not  down.    On  the 


58  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

last  day  of  the  session,  April  20, 1866,  the  Senate  received 
'*a  memorial  and  remonstrance  from  S.  P.  Ruggles", 
requesting  the  appointment  of  a  commission  by  the  Gov- 
ernor to  report  at  the  next  session  what  accommodation 
was  required  in  the  way  of  railroads  in  New  York  City. 
Friends  of  rapid  transit  saw  in  this  suggestion  at  least 
a  promise  of  something  in  the  way  of  progress,  and  at 
the  afternoon  session  the  following  resolution  was  offered 
by  Senator  Andrews,  of  Otsego,  and  adopted : 

**Eesolved: — That  a  select  committee  of  three  be 
appointed,  to  sit  during  the  recess  with  the  Mayor 
of  New  York,  the  State  Engineer  and  the  Engineer 
of  the  Croton  Board,  to  ascertain  and  report  to  the 
Senate  the  most  advantageous  and  proper  route  or 
routes  for  a  railway  or  railways,  suited  to  rapid 
transportation  of  passengers  from  the  upper  to  the 
lower  portion  of  the  city  of  New  York,  having  in 
view  the  greatest  practicable  benefit  and  safety  to 
the  public  and  the  least  loss  and  injury  to  property 
on  or  adjacent  to  said  route  or  routes." 

Before  adjournment  Senators  Andrews,  Low  and  C. 
G.  Cornell  were  appointed  as  such  committee  by  the 
President  of  the  Senate.  This  action,  together  with  the 
passage  of  a  bill  which  attracted  little  attention  at  the 
time,  gave  New  York  its  first  rapid  transit  line — the  ele- 
vated railroad.  This  bill  was  an  amendment  to  the  Gen- 
eral Railroad  law  of  1850.  It  was  passed  by  the  Legisla- 
ture of  1866  and  authorized  any  number,  not  less  than 
ten,  persons  to  form  themselves  into  a  company  to  build 
a  railroad  to  be  operated  "by  means  of  a  propelling  rope 
or  cable  attached  to  stationary  power."  It  also  author- 
ized such  a  company  to  charge  fares  not  exceeding  five 
cents  per  mile,  with  a  minimum  fare  of  ten  cents.  The 
bill  was  passed  in  the  interest  of  Charles  T.  Harvey,  the 
father  of  the  elevated  railroads,  who  had  invented  a  plan 
for  the  propulsion  of  trains  on  an  elevated  structure  by 


LEGISLATIVE  COMMISSION  ON  KAPID  TRANSIT  59 

cables  operated  by  steam  power  furnished  by  stationary 
engines  along  the  route.  In  the  clash  of  rival  under- 
ground and  elevated  schemes,  this  amendment  to  the 
railroad  law  slipped  through  without  attracting  much 
notice  and  without  its  importance  being  generally  recog- 
nized. How  it  gave  New  York  the  first  elevated  road  will 
be  told  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Work  and  Conclusions  op  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Rapid  Transit  in  1866. 

/CREDIT  for  the  first  systematic  study  of  the  rapid  tran- 
sit question  by  a  public  authority  belongs  undoubtedly 
to  the  Special  Committee  of  the  Senate  appointed  at  the 
session  of  1866,  as  told  in  the  preceding  chapter.  That 
committee's  work  was  the  first  of  many  eiforts  by  the 
public  authorities  to  solve  the  rapid  transit  problem.  It 
did  its  work  intelligently  and  well,  and  had  its  recom- 
mendations been  followed  New  York  would  have  had 
rapid  transit  of  the  right  kind  long  ago,  and  the  present 
generation  might  not  have  known  the  universally  exe- 
crated ''strap-hanging."  But  greed  conflicted  with  prog- 
ress, and  the  battle  for  franchises  prevented  for  many 
years  the  carrying  out  of  this  well-conceived  plan. 

In  its  report,  which  was  presented  to  the  Legislature 
of  1867,  the  Committee  unanimously  recommended  sub- 
ways or  underground  railroads  as  the  best  and  quickest 
means  of  relief,  although  it  suggested  that  permission 
be  granted  Charles  T.  Harvey  to  try  out  his  elevated  rail- 
road on  an  experimental  stretch  of  track.  The  tenor  of 
the  report,  however,  was  favorable  to  the  underground, 
and  the  arguments  therefor  were  set  forth  in  full.  An 
east  side  line  and  a  west  side  line  of  subways  were  recom- 
mended, and  every  member  of  the  Committee,  including 
the  city  officers  named  ex  officio,  signed  the  report.  Even 
A.  W.  Craven,  engineer  of  the  Croton  Board,  who  had 
held  the  Metropolitan  underground  project  impracticable 
earlier  in  the  year,  now  certified  to  his  belief  that  an 
underground  system  was  the  best  solution  of  the  problem. 
The  Committee  met  in  New  York  City  on  June  1, 1866, 
and  organized  by  electing  Senator  George  H.  Andrews 
chairman  and  James  F.  Ruggles  secretary.  It  at  once 
advertised  for  plans  and  suggestions  to  meet  the  objects 


CHARLES  T.  HARVEY 
INVENTOR  OF  THE  ELEVATED  RAILROAD. 


WOEK  OF  SENATE  COMMITTEE  OF  1866  61 

sought  in  the  Senate  resolution,  and  gave  four  months 
time  for  their  preparation  and  submission.  By  October 
a  great  many  plans  had  been  submitted,  and  in  November 
the  Committee  met  and  began  their  consideration.  Days 
were  set  for  the  consideration  of  each  plan,  and  the  engi- 
neers and  promoters  were  invited  to  come  before  the 
Committee  to  explain  the  advantages  of  their  respective 
projects.  The  Committee  devoted  two  months  to  this 
work,  made  up  its  report  and  on  January  31,  1867,  trans- 
mitted it  to  the  Legislature. 

That  the  Committee  studied  and  understood  the  prob- 
lem before  it  is  shown  by  the  nature  of  its  report.  After 
reciting  the  appointment  and  organization  of  the  Com- 
mittee and  its  method  of  proceeding,  this  report  says : 

"It  is  proper  here  briefly  to  recite  some  of  the 
circumstances  which  demanded  the  appointment  of 
this  Commission.  Since  1860  there  had  been  no  legis- 
lation which  tended  to  afford  additional  facilities  for 
the  transportation  of  passengers  in  the  direction  indi- 
cated in  the  resolution — that  is,  on  lines  running 
lengthwise  of  the  city.  In  the  meantime  the  popula- 
tion had  largely  increased,  and  the  inexorable  de- 
mands of  business  had  continued  to  appropriate  for 
its  necessities  essential  portions  of  the  most  densely 
inhabited  lower  districts,  thus  separating  more  and 
more  widely  the  residence  from  the  store  and  work- 
shop. 

'*The  Central  Park,  bounded  on  the  South  and 
North  by  59th  and  110th  streets,  on  the  East  by  the 
Fifth  Avenue  and  on  the  West  by  the  Eighth  Avenue 
(and  between  77th  and  78th  streets  by  the  Ninth 
Avenue)  an  area  more  than  half  a  mile  broad  by 
more  than  two  and  a  half  miles  long,  containing  some 
862  acres,  not  only  excluded  from  its  boundaries  all 
tenements,  but  all  property  within  the  area  on  either 
side  of  it  extending  nearly  to  the  rivers  and  for  some 


62  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

distance  above  and  below  the  Park  has  advanced  so 
enormously  in  value  within  the  past  six  years  as 
practically  to  exclude  the  laboring  classes  from  resi- 
dence in  a  district  more  than  three  miles  long  and 
extending  nearly  the  whole  width  of  the  city.  For 
a  large  population,  then,  this  area  on  either  side  of 
the  Park,  unavailable  for  its  greater  portion  for 
domiciles  for  the  working  classes,  requires  in  effect 
to  be  traversed  by  some  method  affording  rapid 
means  of  transit  from  the  extreme  upper  to  the 
lower  portions  of  the  city. 

' '  That  magnificent  park,  the  Central,  is  correctly 
designated,  occupying  as  it  does  the  central  portion 
of  the  island.  In  the  form  of  a  parallelogram,  or 
nearly  so,  it  substantially  divides  the  city  lengthwise 
into  two  districts,  and  considered  in  connection  with 
the  width  of  the  island  north  of  Grand  street  left  the 
Commission  no  option  but  to  recommend  two  lines 
of  transit  in  preference  to  a  single,  central  line.  Such 
a  line  (even  if  the  park  did  not  present  an  insuper- 
able obstacle)  would  still  fail  to  afford  the  accom- 
modation demanded  by  the  necessities  of  the  popula- 
tion. The  requirements  of  travel  can  only  be  prop- 
erly met  by  two  lines,  which  shall  run  as  nearly  as 
may  be  through  central  portions  of  two  longitudinal 
sections  of  the  city  on  its  eastern  and  western  sides." 

When  one  considers  the  fact  that  the  above  was  writ- 
ten a  half  century  ago,  before  the  first  elevated  road  was 
built,  one  must  credit  the  Committee  of  1866  with  extra- 
ordinary foresight.  In  later  years  the  accuracy  of  its 
conclusions  became  apparent  and  its  plan  for  two  longi- 
tudinal lines,  one  on  each  side  of  the  city,  was  carried 
out  in  the  elevated  construction,  but  it  took  nearly  forty 
years  (till  1904)  before  its  recommendation  for  subways 
was  put  into  practical  effect,  and  then  the  authorities 
made  the  mistake  of  zigzagging  one  route  lengthwise  of 


WORK  OF  SENATE  COMMITTEE  OF  1866  63 

the  island,  instead  of  building  two  complete  lines,  one  on 
each  side.  It  is  only  now,  a  half  century  after  the  Com- 
mittee of  1866  pointed  the  way,  that  the  present  system 
of  underground  roads  is  being  expanded  into  the  double 
system  then  recommended.  This  will  be  accomplished  by 
the  Dual  System  routes  adopted  by  the  Public  Service 
Commission  for  the  First  District,  which  will  continue 
the  first  subway  down  Seventh  Avenue  and  up  Lexington 
Avenue  from  42d  street,  thus  making  a  complete  East 
Side  line  and  a  complete  West  Side  line.  Lack  of  money 
when  the  first  subway  was  built  is  some  excuse  for  the 
erratic  laying  out  of  its  original  route,  as  will  be  further 
explained  in  the  chapters  devoted  to  that  work.  But  the 
mistakes  of  modern  times  make  all  the  more  remarkable 
the  clear  vision  and  correct  attitude  of  the  men  of  1866. 
New  Yorkers  of  the  present  generation,  familiar  with 
the  long  fight  which  has  been  waged  to  get  the  New  York 
Central  tracks  off  the  surface  of  the  streets  on  the  West 
Side  of  the  city,  will  hardly  believe  that  the  same  prob- 
lem engaged  the  attention  of  this  Committee  in  1866. 
Yet  here  is  what  its  report  said : 

' '  The  traction  of  freight  and  passenger  trains  by 
ordinary  locomotives  upon  the  surface  of  the  streets 
is  an  evil  which  has  already  been  endured  too  long 
and  must  speedily  be  abated." 

Had  anyone  told  the  man  who  penned  that  sentence 
that  the  city  still  would  be  struggling  with  that  "evil" 
in  the  seventeenth  year  of  the  Twentieth  Century  he  prob- 
ably would  have  refused  to  believe  it.  Yet  the  tracks,  or 
most  of  them,  are  still  in  the  streets  they  occupied  in  1866 ! 

The  conclusions  of  the  Committee  of  1866  w^ere  epito- 
mized in  a  set  of  resolutions,  which,  the  report  says,  were 
''unanimously  adopted"  after  "protracted  and  careful 
consideration  of  all  the  plans  submitted."  These  resolu- 
tions were  as  follows: 


64  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

"Resolved,  That  in  the  opinion  of  this  Commis- 
sion the  best  method  of  speedily  attaining  the  design 
contemplated  by  the  Senate  resolution  passed  at  its 
last  session  is  by  the  construction  of  underground 
railways. 

"That  in  view  of  the  prospective  increase  in 
travel  there  should  be  one  line  of  such  railway  from 
the  Battery  to  City  Hall  Park,  under  Broadway, 
connecting  at  the  City  Hall  Park  with  two  or  more 
lines  of  underground  railway,  each  with  double 
tracks,  east  and  west  of  the  line  of  Broadway. 

"That  to  accommodate  the  larger  passenger 
transportation  the  following  routes  are  recommend- 
ed, each  connecting  with  the  said  first  mentioned 
track  at  the  City  Hall  Park: 

"One  under  Chatham  street  to  the  Bowery  and 
Third  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River. 

"The  other  under  Park  Place  (or  Murray  or 
Warren  street  or  by  the  most  feasible  route)  to 
Hudson  street,  thence  under  Hudson  street  to  Eighth 
Avenue,  thence  under  Eighth  Avenue  to  Broadway, 
thence  under  Broadway  to  Ninth  Avenue,  thence 
under  Ninth  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River. 

"The  line  under  Broadway  between  the  Battery 
and  City  Hall  Park  to  be  constructed  only  as  part  of 
one  or  more  of  the  through  lines." 

Reasons  which  led  to  the  above  conclusions  are  given 
at  length  in  the  report.  The  Senate  resolution  called  for 
a  plan  which  should  have  the  elements  of  speed,  safety, 
cheapness  and  rapidity  of  construction.  As  surface  roads 
could  not  be  relied  upon  for  speed,  the  Committee  dis- 
missed them  from  consideration  at  the  outset.  There 
remained  only  elevated  roads  or  subways  to  be  consid- 
ered. Out  of  many  plans  for  the  former  submitted  the 
Committee  found  only  one  worthy  of  recommendation, 
namely  that  offered  by  Charles  T.  Harvey,  which,  the 


WORK  OF  SENATE  COMMITTEE  OF  1866  65 

report  said,  "appeared  to  have  been  the  most  carefully 
prepared,  the  most  free  from  engineering  difficulties  in- 
volving the  question  of  safety  and  the  least  objectionable 
as  to  the  application  of  the  motive  power."  Harvey 
asked  for  the  privilege  of  building  one  half  mile  of  his 
structure  in  the  southern  portion  of  Greenwich  street  as 
an  experiment,  and  the  Committee  recommended  "that 
permission  be  granted  by  the  Legislature  to  that  extent." 

After  dismissing  two  plans  for  a  depressed  railroad 
on  the  ground  of  expense  and  the  length  of  time  it  would 
take  to  get  title  to  the  property  required,  the  Committee 
took  up  the  underground  method  and  discussed  it  at 
length.  A  comparison  of  the  physical  conditions  in  New 
York  with  those  of  London  was  made,  and  the  report  re- 
ferred to  a  communication  from  Mr.  James  P.  Kirkwood, 
an  engineer,  which  stated  that  in  London  the  under- 
ground road  passes  through  several  open  cuts  and  that 
in  no  place  has  it  an  uninterrupted  line  of  tunnel  equal 
in  length  to  the  distance  from  the  Battery  to  Fourteenth 
street.  Without  similar  open  cuts  in  the  New  York  tun- 
nel the  Committee  feared  that  "the  generation  of  steam 
would  be  attended  with  difficulties  hardly  to  be  over- 
come." To  eliminate  this  objection  the  report  suggested 
the  trial  of  a  pneumatic  method  of  propulsion,  concerning 
which  it  presented  as  an  appendix  a  statement  by  Mr.  M. 
0.  Davidson,  an  engineer,  "who  has  recently  returned 
from  England,  after  devoting  much  time  there  to  a  crit- 
ical investigation"  of  that  method. 

"The  successful  application  of  this  principle  upon  a 
large  scale"  said  the  report,  "would  be  a  practical  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulties  which  embarass  an  underground 
plan  relying  upon  locomotive  engines  for  power,  in  the 
matter  of  ventilation  and  injurious  concussion  and  the 
accommodation  of  the  tunnel  to  the  grade  of  the  surface." 

The  following  summary  of  the  conclusions  of  the  Com- 
mittee ended  the  report: 


66  FIFTY  TEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

"1.  That  commercial,  moral  and  hygienic  con- 
siderations all  demand  an  immediate  and  large  addi- 
tion to  the  means  of  travel  in  the  city  of  New  York. 

* '  2.  That  if  every  avenue  lengthwise  of  the  island 
were  to  be  occupied  at  once  by  surface  rails,  the 
relief  afforded  thereby  would  not  be  adequate  to 
present  requirements,  and  in  three  years'  time  the 
pressure,  with  all  its  accompanying  annoyances,  in- 
conveniences and  dangers  would  be  as  great  as  it  is 
today. 

''3.  That  the  steam  roads  upon  the  surface  now 
in  use  should  be  removed  from  the  island  of  New 
York  as  soon  as  other  sufficient  and  rapid  means  of 
transportation  can  be  substituted. 

'*4.  That  a  central  line  would  not  suffice  to  meet 
the  present  requirements  for  increased  facilities. 

"5.  That  elevated  railways  erected  on  supports 
in  the  middle  or  on  the  sides  of  the  present  streets 
of  the  city  cannot  be  fully  adapted  to  the  transpor- 
tation of  freight,  and  have  never  been  tested  in  any 
practical  way  so  as  to  warrant  an  unconditional 
recommendation  of  them  for  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers. 

"6.  That  a  system  of  railways  running  wholly 
through  blocks  would  involve  an  expense  for  right 
of  way  and  resulting  damages,  which  would  render 
it  impracticable  to  convey  passengers  for  long  dis- 
tances at  rates  of  fare  as  low  as  the  necessities  of 
the  case  require,  and  would  moreover  involve  too 
great  delay  in  the  acquisition  of  the  right  of  way 
required. 

''7.  That  the  continual  increase  of  population 
and  the  consequently  growing  necessity  for  trans- 
portation throughout  the  city  will  very  soon  demand 
the  construction  of  several  lines  of  railways  other 
than  surface  roads.  That  more  than  the  two  roads 
herein  recommended  may  be  eventually  required  and 


WORK  OF  SENATE  COMMITTEE  OF  1866  67 

successfully  operated,  and  the  opening  of  new  ave- 
nues and  the  erection  therein  of  viaducts  upon  the 
scale  hereinabove  mentioned  may  be  found  to  be  of 
the  greatest  advantage  and  improvement  to  the  city, 
and  while  gratifying  the  public  taste  will  effect  the 
desired  object. 

"8.  That  underground  railways  passing  under 
streets  present  the  only  speedy  remedy  for  the  pres- 
ent and  prospective  wants  of  the  city  of  New  York 
in  the  matter  of  the  safe,  rapid  and  cheap  transpor- 
tation of  persons  and  property." 

Here  were  appended  the  signatures  of  the  entire 
Committee  as  follows: 

George  H.  Andrews,  H.  R.  Low,  Charles  Gr.  Cornell, 

Committee  of  the  Senate. 

John  T.  Hoffman,  Mayor  of  New  York. 

Alfred  W.  Craven,  Engineer  of  the  Croton  Board. 

In  appendices  to  the  report  descriptions  of  the  several 
plans  submitted  are  given.  Among  them  were  the  fol- 
lowing : 

From  A.  P.  Robinson,  an  underground  railway. 

From  0.  Vandenburgh,  an  underground  railway. 

From  M.  0.  Davidson,  a  pneumatic  system  of  under- 
ground railway. 

From  S.  B.  Nowlan,  an  arcade  and  basement  plan. 

From  John  Schuyler,  a  depressed  railway. 

From  James  B.  Swain,  for  the  Metropolitan  Transit 
company,  an  underground,  surface  and  elevated  railroad. 

From  Charles  T.  Harvey  and  others,  an  elevated  rail- 
road. 

From  Gouverneur  Morris  and  Isaac  D.  Colman,  an 
elevated  railway. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  while  the  Committee  recom- 
mended an  underground  railroad,  it  expressed  no  favor 
for  any  one  of  the  several  plans  submitted  for  that  kind 
of  a  road.    Evidently  it  was  not  able  to  agree  upon  any 


68  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

specific  plan  and  decided  to  let  the  rival  claimants  for  a 
franchise  fight  it  out  before  the  Legislature.  This  is  just 
what  those  claimants  proceeded  to  do,  but  they  fought  so 
hard  that  it  was  some  years  before  any  underground 
franchise  was  conferred,  and  that  was  for  a  pneumatic 
railroad  which  never  got  beyond  the  experimental  stage. 

As  it  is  not  worth  while  to  reproduce  or  even  to  de- 
scribe all  the  plans  considered  by  the  Committee,  a 
glance  at  a  few  of  the  principal  suggestions  may  be  in- 
teresting. 

A.  P.  Robinson,  who  had  drawn  the  plans  submitted 
to  the  Legislature  by  the  Willson  company,  offered  the 
Committee  a  plan  on  behalf  of  the  Manhattan  Railway 
Company,  an  organization  formed  two  years  later  than 
the  Metropolitan  Railway  Company,  organized  by  Will- 
son.  On  behalf  of  the  Manhattan  Company  Robinson 
now  submitted  practically  the  same  plans  he  had  drawn 
for  the  Metropolitan  company,  which  have  been  described 
in  a  previous  chapter. 

Willson 's  former  associate  and  later  antagonist,  Ori- 
gen  Vandenburgh,  submitted  an  underground  plan  in  his 
own  name.  It  was  clearly  derived  from  Robinson's  plan, 
the  only  difference  being  that  he  proposed  to  build  two 
tunnels  instead  of  one — one  for  each  track — and  alleged 
that  it  could  be  built  so  far  above  ^vater  level  that  the 
sewers  could  run  under  it.  He  also  proposed  to  lay  the 
rails  in  beds  of  gutta  percha  to  minimize  noise  in  opera- 
tion. He  estimated  the  cost  of  construction  at  $15,000,000, 
with  an  extra  $1,500,000  for  lands  and  buildings, 

A  plan  for  a  pneumatic  tube  w^as  presented  by  an  engi- 
neer, M.  0.  Davidson,  who  proposed  to  build  three  routes 
from  City  Hall  northward.  His  plan  called  for  circular 
tunnels  12  to  13  feet  in  diameter,  constructed  of  brick  and 
cement,  with  wrought  iron  tubing  where  necessary.  The 
cars  were  to  bo  blown  from  station  to  station  by  huge 
fans  operated  from  stationary  steam  engines  capable  of 
creating  a  current  of  air  giving  a  pressure  of  three  to 


WORK  OF  SENATE  COMMITTEE  OF  1866  69 

seven  ounces  per  square  inch.  The  estimated  cost  for 
two  tracks  to  100th  street  was  $4,821,000. 

The  elevated  railroad  plan  which  most  commended 
itself  to  the  Committee,  as  before  stated,  was  that  sub- 
mitted by  Charles  T.  Harvey.  The  route  was  from  the 
Battery  up  Greenwich  street  to  Ninth  Avenue,  up  Ninth 
Avenue  to  a  convenient  point  and  thence  by  the  most 
eligible  route  to  Kingsbridge  and  Yonkers.  He  also  pro- 
posed a  route  up  Broadway  to  64th  street  and  thence  to 
Yonkers,  and  an  east  side  line  mainly  up  Third  Avenue  to 
the  Harlem  River  and  thence  to  New  Rochelle.  All  these 
roads  were  to  be  constructed  under  Mr.  Harvey's  patents 
for  cable  propulsion  by  stationary  steam  engines,  and 
became  known  as  "patent"  railways.  The  cars  were  to 
be  operated  on  an  elevated  structure  by  means  of  endless 
wire  ropes.  These  ropes  were  to  be  in  series,  each  series 
covering  about  1,500  feet  of  track,  and  were  to  be  moved 
by  power  furnished  by  engines  placed  at  intervals  along 
the  route.  Harvey  estimated  the  cost  of  the  structure  at 
from  $250,000  to  $500,000  per  mile. 

Another  elevated  project  which  got  a  good  word  from 
the  Committee,  which,  however,  was  forced  to  condemn  it 
on  account  of  cost  and  the  time  necessary  to  get  title  to 
the  required  land,  was  the  plan  submitted  by  Gouverneur 
Morris  and  Isaac  D.  Colman.  The  line  was  to  be  built 
through  the  center  of  blocks  between  Broadway  and  Third 
Avenue  from  Chambers  or  Chatham  street  north  to  the 
Harlem  River  on  the  East  Side,  with  a  branch  from  below 
14th  street  to  Ninth  Avenue  and  thence  north  to  59th 
street  on  a  course  through  blocks  parallel  to  Ninth  Ave- 
nue. It  was  proposed  to  acquire  a  strip  of  ground  50  feet 
wide  through  these  blocks  for  the  right  of  way,  and  to 
erect  thereon  an  elevated  structure  for  a  four  track  road 
and  strong  enough  to  carry  freight  trains  and  thirtj^-ton 
locomotives.  The  cost  of  the  constuction  was  estimated 
at  $1,165,000  per  mile,  but  no  estimate  was  made  of  the 
cost  of  real  estate  for  right  of  way,  which,  of  course. 


70  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

would  have  been  tremendous. 

Such  were  the  chief  features  of  the  report  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  1866.  It  was  an  important  piece  of  work,  as  it 
pointed  the  way  for  rapid  transit  development.  The  two 
plans  it  recommended — for  subways  and  elevated  lines — 
contained  the  germs  which  later  developed  into  the  exist- 
ing rapid  transit  railroads.  Its  desire  to  avoid  steam  as 
a  motive  power  and  its  guarded  expressions  in  favor  of 
pneumatic  propulsion  probably  led  to  the  trial  later  of 
the  Beach  Pneumatic  railroad.  The  routes  it  proposed 
were  better  than  those  subsequently  built  upon.  Its  treat- 
ment of  the  steam  railroad  problem  and  its  expressed 
opinion  that  such  railroads  should  be  driven  off  the  sur- 
face of  the  streets  were  such  as  command  general  con- 
currence today. 


CHAPTER  ril 
Inception  of  the  Elevated  Railroads. 

TN  spite  of  the  recommendation  for  an  underground  rail- 
road, made  by  the  Special  Senate  Committee,  the  next 
session  of  the  Legislature,  that  of  1867,  failed  to  pass  a 
bill  authorizing  any  such  road.  Three  bills  were  intro- 
duced by  as  many  rival  interests,  but  none  of  them  gained 
the  approval  of  both  houses.  This  session,  however,  did 
take  an  important  step  in  providing  rapid  transit.  It 
passed  a  bill  authorizing  the  construction  of  the  first  ele- 
vated railroad.  In  this  it  acted  on  the  recommendation 
made  by  the  Special  Senate  Committee  for  a  trial  of 
Charles  T.  Harvey's  scheme.  This  act,  which  was 
promptly  approved  by  Governor  Fenton,  gave  New  York 
its  elevated  railroad  system,  and  much  as  the  type  is  con- 
demned today  it  was  an  important  element  in  the  growth 
and  prosperity  of  the  city. 

H.  B.  Willson  and  his  friends  made  another  fruitless 
effort  at  this  session  to  gain  the  underground  franchise 
for  which  they  had  been  fighting  for  three  j^ears.  Their 
bill  was  introduced  and  a  strong  effort  was  made  to  pass 
it,  but  it  was  opposed  by  two  others,  one  backed  by  the 
accomplished  lobbyist,  Vandenburgh,  and  the  perplexed 
Legislators  could  not  decide  between  them.  An  effort  was 
made  near  the  close  of  the  session  to  combine  all  three 
bills  and  pass  one  which  would  embrace  all  the  rival  in- 
terests, but  this  came  to  naught,  and  the  session  closed 
without  the  authorization  of  any  underground  road.  The 
Legislature,  it  may  be  said  in  passing,  did  pass  a  bill 
granting  Jacob  Sharp  and  his  associates  the  right  to 
build  and  operate  a  surface  railroad  in  Broadway,  but 
this  was  vetoed  by  Governor  Fenton  and  its  friends  were 
not  strong  enough  to  override  the  veto.  It  is  highly  prob- 
able that  the  passage  of  this  bill  was  a  factor  in  prevent- 
ing the  approval  of  any  of  the  underground  measures  for 
Broadway. 


72  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

As  before  stated  Harvey  at  the  session  of  1866  had 
obtained  the  passage  of  an  amendment  to  the  General 
Railroad  law  allowing  him  and  his  associates  to  form  an 
incorporation  for  the  purpose  of  building  an  elevated 
railroad  to  be  operated  according  to  his  patents  by  means 
of  cables  driven  by  stationary  engines.  In  July  1866 
they  acted  under  this  authority  and  incorporated  the 
West  Side  and  Yonkers  Patent  Railway  company.  The 
capital  stock  was  placed  at  $5,000,000,  and  the  company 
was  to  continue  for  999  years.  It  proposed  to  build  a 
line  25  miles  long,  from  the  Battery  by  way  of  Greenwich 
street  and  Ninth  Avenue  and  other  streets  to  Kingsbridge 
and  Yonkers. 

The  directors  and  stockholders  named  in  the  articles 
were  as  follows : 

William  H.  Appleton — New  York  and  Riverdale 

Chauncey  Vibbard — New  York 

Walter  S.  Gurnee — New"  York  and  Tarrytown 

Frank  Work — New  York 

Samuel  M.  Pettingill — Brooklyn 

Moses  A.  Hoppoch — Hastings 

Charles  T.  Harvey — New  York  and  TarrytowTi 

The  above  were  named  as  directors  and  stockholders 
and  the  following  as  additional  stockholders: 

John  H.  Hall— New  York 

John  Perkins — New  York 

Robert  Turner — New  York 

Isaac  Scott — New  York 

David  Crawford,  Jr. — New  York 

John  P.  Yelverton — New  York 

F.  P.  James — New  York 

The  act  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  1867  authorized 
the  construction  by  this  company  of  an  experimental  line 
one-half  mile  long  in  Greenwich  street  northward  from 
Battery  Place.  It  created  a  commission  of  three,  two  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Governor  and  one  by  the  Croton 
Aqueduct  Board,  to  inspect  the  road  on  its  completion 


INCEPTION   OF   THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  73 

and  if  approved  to  certify  such  approval  to  the  Grovernor. 
If  approved  by  him  the  line  was  to  be  extended  north- 
ward, but  if  disapproved  the  part  already  built  was  to 
be  removed.  If  approved  the  company  was  given  the 
right  to  extend  the  road  northward  on  both  sides  of 
Greenwich  street  and  on  both  sides  of  Ninth  Avenue  or 
streets  west  of  Ninth  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River.  One 
year  was  allowed  for  the  completion  of  the  experimental 
section. 

Fares  to  be  charged  by  the  company  were  fixed  as 
follows:  Five  cents  for  any  distance  less  than  two  miles; 
one  cent  for  each  additional  mile  or  fraction  thereof. 
The  company  was  allowed  at  its  option  to  establish  a 
uniform  rate  of  ten  cents  and  to  collect  the  same  for  five 
years  after  the  passage  of  the  act. 

Compensation  to  the  city  was  provided  for  in  the  fol- 
lowing section  of  the  act: 

"The  said  company  shall  pay  a  sum  not  exceed- 
ing five  per  cent,  of  the  net  income  of  said  railway 
from  passenger  traffic  upon  Manhattan  Island,  as 
aforesaid,  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  of  New  York, 
in  such  manner  as  the  Legislature  shall  hereafter 
direct,  as  a  compensation  to  the  corporation  thereof 
for  the  use  of  the  streets  thereof." 

Harvey's  plan  of  operating  the  road  by  means  of 
cables  was  specified  in  the  act,  which  said : 

"The  railway  hereby  authorized  as  aforesaid  shall 
be  operated  exclusively  by  means  of  propelling  cables 
attached  to  stationary  engines,  placed  beneath  or 
beyond  the  surface  of  any  street  through  which  such 
railway  may  pass,  and  shall  be  concealed  from  view 
so  far  as  the  same  may  be  detrimental  to  the  ordinary 
uses  of  said  street.  The  structures  shall  consist  of 
a  single  track,  upon  which  the  cars  are  to  be  moved 
in  contrary  directions,  upon  opposite  sides  of  the 


74  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

streets,  which  track  shall  not  exceed  five  feet  in  width 
between  center  of  rails,  and  shall  be  supported  by  a 
series  of  iron  columns  not  exceeding  18  inches  in 
diameter  at  surface  of  pavement,  or  equivalent  space 
(if  in  elliptical  form)  which  columns  shall  be  placed 
at  intervals  of  not  less  than  20  feet  (except  at  street 
crossings  or  sidings)  along  the  curbstone  line  be- 
tween the  sidewalk  and  carriageway  and  attached  at 
their  upper  extremities  to  the  track  aforesaid,  so 
that  center  of  the  track  shall  be  perpendicular  to  the 
center  of  the  columns,  and  at  a  distance  of  not  less 
than  14  feet  above  the  surface  of  the  pavement. 
Whenever  deemed  necessary  to  prevent  oscillation 
of  the  track  afores^aid,  a  second  series  of  columns 
may  be  extended  on  the  building  side  of  the  sidewalk 
at  intervals  of  not  less  than  20  feet,  which  shall  not 
be  more  than  9  inches  in  diameter  at  surface  of  pave- 
ment, and  shall  be  so  placed  as  not  to  obstruct  any 
existing  door  or  window  without  consent  of  the 
owner,  and  from  the  upper  extremity  of  which  bracers 
or  girders  may  be  extended  to  the  first  series  of  col- 
umns mentioned  for  purposes  aforesaid." 

On  December  3,  1867  Governor  Fenton  appointed  two 
Commissioners,  as  provided  in  the  act,  las  follows :  Free- 
men J.  Fithian,  and  John  H.  Morris.  To  these  was  added, 
January  4,  1868,  Jacob  S.  Frear,  appointed  by  the  Croton 
Aqueduct  Board,  which  at  the  time  consisted  of  Thomas 
Stephens,  Robert  €.  Darragh  and  A.  W.  Craven. 

In  the  meantime  Harvey  had  gone  ahead  with  the 
construction  of  the  experimental  section  of  the  first  ele- 
vated railroad  ever  built  in  New  York.  It  was  located 
in  lower  Greenwich  street  and  designed  to  be  operated 
by  cables  according  to  Harvey's  patented  system.  It  was 
completed  within  the  one  year  specified,  and  in  June, 
1868,  was  placed  in  operation  for  trial.  As  may  be  sup- 
posed it  was  the  wonder  of  the  city.    Crowds  watched  its 


INCEPTION   OF   THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  75 

construction,  and  almost  universal  skepticism  as  to  its 
practicability  was  expressed.  Its  builders  were  jeered, 
and  the  prediction  was  made  that  the  structure  would 
never  stand  the  strain  of  train  operation,  but  would  col- 
lapse and  fall  under  the  weight.  Harvey  demon- 
strated to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Commissioners,  how- 
ever, that  he  could  operate  cars  over  it,  and  on  July  1, 
1868,  they  certified  their  approval  to  Grovernor  Fenton, 
who  on  the  following  day  gave  his  formal  approval  to 
their  report  and  the  railroad.  They  had  inspected 
the  road  on  June  23,  and  in  their  report  certified 
that  '*it  was  in  practical  operation  as  contemplated  by 
the  West  Side  and  Yonkers  Patent  Eailway  company," 
and  approved  the  structure,  plan  and  operation  and  found 
''that  the  same  can  be  operated  with  safety  and  dis- 
patch." 

There  is  no  evidence  in  the  newspapers  of  the  day 
that  the  trial  of  the  first  elevated  railroad  excited  popu- 
lar interest.  No  ceremonies  outside  of  the  necessary 
official  participation  marked  the  event.  Nowadays  it 
would  be  heralded  for  days  in  advance  and  signalized  by 
civic  celebration.  In  1868  it  seems  to  have  been  taken 
as  a  matter  of  course.  It  was  on  Friday,  July  3,  of  that 
year  when  the  trial  was  made,  and  the  following  account 
of  it,  published  in  small  type  under  a  single  line  heading, 
is  taken  from  the  New  York  Times  of  July  4: 

"The  trial  trip  upon  the  elevated  road  in  Green- 
wich street  having  been  postponed  on  Thursday  on 
account  of  an  accident  to  the  machinery  came  off 
yesterday  at  noon  and  was  very  satisfactory.  The 
car  ran  easily  from  the  Battery  to  Cortlandt  street, 
starting  at  the  rate  of  five  miles  an  hour  and  in- 
creasing to  a  speed  of  ten  miles.  The  company  does 
not  pretend  with  its  present  machinery  to  run  the 
cars  faster  than  fifteen  miles  an  hour;  but  during  the 
next  two  months  will  make  arrangements  for  much 
more  rapid  motion. 


76  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

**0n  the  first  day  of  July,  1867,  the  work  was 
commenced,  $100,000  then  being  pledged  for  the  pur- 
pose. Contracts  were  made  and  the  first  column  was 
placed  in  position  on  the  seventh  of  October.  The 
machinery  was  first  tried  on  the  7th  of  December  on 
the  first  quarter  mile.  So  well  were  the  directors 
pleased  that  they  authorized  the  inventor  to  order 
the  remainder  to  Cortlandt  street.  This  was  erected 
in  March  and  April  and  some  improvements  intro- 
duced. About  the  first  of  May  the  new  trial  car  was 
placed  on  the  road,  and  the  directors  took  a  ride  at 
the  rate  of  fifteen  miles  an  hour,  propelled  by  an 
engine  out  of  sight  and  hearing. 

''On  the  6th  of  last  June  the  railway  was  placed 
in  charge  of  the  Commissioners  appointed  by  the 
Governor,  Messrs.  Fithian  and  Morris,  and  ex-Sena- 
tor Frear  (of  Sullivan  county)  appointed  by  the  Cro- 
ton  Board  for  its  inspection.  During  that  month 
Governor  Fenton  came  from  Albany  and  inspected  it 
himself  by  examining  the  machinery  and  taking  a 
ride  upon  it;  also  the  Croton  Board  with  their  Engi- 
neer; Mayor  Hoffman;  the  Governor  of  Minnesota; 
a  deputation  from  the  Common  Council  of  Boston 
and  many  eminent  engineers  and  civilians.  The 
opinion  was  expressed  that  it  was  a  great  mechanical 
success.  On  July  1st  the  Commissioners  reported  in 
its  favor.  The  Governor  gave  it  his  official  approval 
promptly  on  the  following  day.  This  indorsement 
vests  in  the  constructing  conjpany  full  powers  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  railway  at  once  from  the  Battery  to 
Spuyten  Duyvil. 

"The  chief  engineer  and  inventor  expresses  the 
opinion  that  there  is  no  engineering  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  having  the  railway  completed  to  the  Hudson 
Eiver  depot  at  Thirtieth  street  the  present  year. 
Then  the  passage  from  Wall  street  can  be  made  in 
fifteen  minutes!    He  is  desirous  of  having  the  whole 


IISrCEPTION    OF   THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  77 

line  put  under  contract  at  once,  that  the  time  of  its 
being  thrown  open  to  public  use  may  occur  during 
the  terms  of  the  present  incumbents  of  the  offices  of 
Governor  of  the  State  and  Mayor  of  the  City,  who 
have  recommended  the  project  and  assisted  its  de- 
velopment as  a  means  of  relief  to  the  overcrowded 
thousands  of  this  city.  The  inventor  will  proceed 
next  week  to  take  down  the  present  machinery  and 
substitute  some  special  improvements  which  he  has 
perfected  after  testing  the  working  of  that  already 
up." 

The  financing  of  this  pioneer  rapid  transit  railroad 
must  have  been  a  work  of  great  difficulty  considering  the 
skepticism  of  the  time.  Mr.  Harvey,  a  year  or  so 
before  his  death  in  1913,  stated  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  raise  money,  and  that  he  went  to 
usurious  lenders  to  get  the  funds  to  keep  it  going.  The 
first  money,  $100,000,  was  put  up  by  Harvey  and  his  asso- 
ciates in  the  company,  but  once  the  road  had  received 
official  approval  it  was  possible  to  borrow  on  it.  As  above 
said,  this  approval  was  given  on  the  first  and  second  of 
July,  1868.  On  the  first  of  August  following  the  property 
was  mortgaged  to  George  S.  Coe  and  James  H.  Benedict, 
trustees,  for  $750,000  to  secure  a  bond  issue  of  like 
amount.  The  bonds  were  issued  in  denominations  of 
$500  each,  bore  7  per  cent  interest  and  were  to  run  15 
years.  The  mortgage  was  signed  by  W.  S.  Gurnee,  pres- 
ident, and  Henry  W,  Taylor,  secretary  of  the  company. 

This  bond  issue  was  floated  by  two  prominent  Wall 
Street  houses  of  the  day — Clark,  Dodge  and  Co.,  of  No. 
51  Wall  street,  and  Lockwood  and  Co.,  of  No.  94  Broad- 
way. In  the  advertisements  offering  the  bonds  it  was 
stated  that  "Messrs.  George  S.  Coe,  president  of  the 
American  Exchange  National  Bank,  and  James  H.  Ben- 
edict, of  Lockwood  and  Co.,  hankers,  are  trustees  for  the 
bondholders."    The  advertisement  was  dated  at  the  office 


FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 


of  the  West  .Side  Elevated  Railroad  Oompany,  No.  48 
Cortlandt  street,  August  6,  1868.  In  it  the  officers  of 
the  company  were  given  as  follows :  W.  S.  Gurnee,  presi- 
dent; William  H.  Appleton,  treasurer;  W.  H.  Taylor, 
Secretary;  and  the  following  directors:  William  E. 
Dodge,  A.  S.  Barnes,  Samuel  D.  Bahcock,  S.  M.  Pettingill, 
C.  T.  Harvey  and  Robert  P.  Getty. 

The  Harvey  company,  however,  never  succeeded  in 
getting  the  elevated  railroad  further  than  the  experi- 
mental stage.  It  fell  into  financial  difficulties,  Harvey 
was  forced  out  and  others  reaped  the  reward  which 
should  have  been  his.  H.  C.  Stryker,  in  his  "Historical 
Sketches",  describes  this  phase  of  the  Harvey  fortunes 
as  follows : 

"Financial  arrangements  followed  with  a  leading 
banking  firm  to  extend  the  line  to  the  then  terminal 
of  the  New  York  Central  railway  at  Ninth  Avenue 
and  Thirtieth  street.  The  cars  were  placed  on  the 
extension  and  won  the  approval  of  the  adjoining 
property  owners  to  the  structure  as  ornamental  and 
to  the  train  service  as  comparatively  noiseless.  The 
stock  was  in  demand  at  a  premium,  when  '  Black  Fri- 
day' (Sept.  26,  1869)  panic  occurred  and  the  bankers 
raising  the  funds  failed,  with  the  extension  to  Thir- 
tieth street  aObout  half  completed  to  the  point  where 
a  traffic  revenue  could  be  realized. 

"In  the  emergency  an  offer  was  made  of  a  loan 
to  complete  the  extension  from  the  most  powerful 
clique  of  Wall  Street  stock  operators  and  accepted, 
which  was  upon  condition  that  the  stock-voting  con- 
trol should  be  vested  in  them  as  security  for  the  loan 
until  paid.  They  conceived  the  idea  of  having  tlie 
railway  appear  for  a  time  as  a  failure  until  they 
could  acquire  nearly  its  entire  stock  ownership  at  a 
low  valuation  and  then  "boom"  the  same  to  high 
premium  prices,  make  large  issues  of  new  stock  and 


INCEPTION   OF  THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  79 

realize  millions  by  the  "deal."  They  outlined  this 
scheme  to  Harvey,  and  although  his  share  of  the 
profits  would  have  been  increased,  he  declined  to 
participate  in  the  plot  because  of  its  perfidy  to  the 
original  stockholders  and  its  intrinsic  dishonesty. 
The  clique  determined  to  carry  out  the  plan,  dis- 
placed Harvey  from  his  official  connection  with  the 
railway,  forcibly  prevented  his  perfecting  details 
and  caused  it  to  appear  in  temporary  disuse  and  dis- 
credit in  order  to  depress  its  stock  market  values." 

These  men  did  nothing  with  the  property  until  1870, 
when  they  completed  the  single  track  line  up  Ninth  Ave- 
nue to  Thirtieth  street.  To  do  this,  however,  they  en- 
cumbered the  property  with  a  large  debt.  On  August  1, 
1870,  the  company  issued  a  second  mortgage  to  George  S. 
Coe  and  Alfred  S.  Barnes  to  secure  a  bond  issue  of 
$2,500,000  which  was  to  be  used  to  pay  off  the  previous 
loan  of  $750,000  and  to  raise  new  funds.  Only  200  of 
these  bonds,  in  denominations  of  $500  each  were  issued 
or  printed,  and  they  were  numbered  1,501  to  1700,  the 
first  1,500  being  reserved  for  the  first  mortgage.  Of  these 
200  bonds  only  21  were  parted  with,  and  they  have  been 
paid  off.  The  others  are  said  to  be  now  among  the 
archives  of  the  Manhattan  Railway  company,  the  present 
owner  of  the  elevated  railroads  in  Manhattan  and  the 
Bronx. 

After  the  track  was  completed  to  Thirtieth  street  ef- 
forts were  made  to  operate  it,  but  the  stationary  power 
method  proved  a  failure  and  the  road  again  lay  idle  for 
some  months.  On  November  15,  1870  the  property  of  the 
West  Side  and  Yonkers  Patent  Railway  company  was 
sold  at  sheriff's  sale  and  bought  in  by  Francis  H.  Tows. 
The  property  thus  conveyed  is  described  as  including  the 
road  from  the  Battery  to  31st  street  on  Greenwich  street 
and  Ninth  Avenue,  six  ear  bodies  and  three  passenger 
ears.  Tows  represented  the  bondholders,  and  a  com- 
mittee appointed  by  them  attempted  to  get  the  road  in 


80  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

running  order.  One  of  the  acts  of  the  Legislature  relat- 
ing to  the  comi3any  permitted  it  to  substitute  locomotives 
for  stationary  engines  if  the  Commissioners  appointed  by 
the  Governor  consented.  This  consent  was  obtained,  and 
on  April  20,  1871  the  trustees  for  the  bondholders  began 
running  a  train  of  three  cars  hauled  by  a  dummy  engme. 
Thereafter  the  road  continued  in  uninterrupted  and  suc- 
cessful operation. 

The  bondholders  then  organized  a  new  company  to 
take  over  the  property.  They  also  interested  in  it  Will- 
iam L.  Scott,  a  wealthy  coal  dealer  of  Erie,  Pa.,  whose 
money  and  influence  put  the  struggling  enterprise  on  its 
feet.  Mr.  Scott  was  the  coal  agent  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad,  and  counted  a  wealthy  man  for  those  days.  The 
new  company  was  named  the  New  York  Elevated  Rail- 
road company.  Its  articles  of  association  were  filed  Oc- 
tober 27,  1871.  The  capital  stock  was  placed  at  $10,000,- 
000,  and  the  following  were  named  as  directors:  David 
Dows,  Francis  H.  Tows,  Ashbel  H.  Barney,  John  D. 
Mairs,  Haney  Kennedy,  all  of  New  York  Oity;  William 
L.  Scott,  of  Erie,  Pa. ;  Danf orth  N.  Barney  and  Frederick 
H.  Foster,  of  Irvington,  N.  Y. ;  William  L.  Wallace,  of 
Tarrytown;  George  H.  Marvin,  John  H.  Cowing,  Alfred 
C.  Barnes  and  George  C.  Martin,  of  Brooklyn. 

In  addition  to  the  directors  the  stockholders  included 
Edward  C.  Delavan,  of  New  York ;  William  L.  Oakey,  of 
Brooklyn;  Charles  T.  Barney,  of  New  York;  William  N. 
Goddard,  of  Brooklyn;  Henry  W.  Taylor  and  Augustus 
Hull,  of  New  York;  James  R.  Cowing,  Charles  H.  Marvin 
and  T.  H.  Marvin,  of  Brooklyn;  Daniel  W.  Wyman,  of 
Jersey  City;  James  R.  Jessup,  of  New  York  and  Milton 
Courtright,  of  Erie,  Pa. 

David  Dows  took  400  shares  of  the  stock ;  Danf  orth  A. 
Barney  400 ;  William  L.  'Scott,  600 ;  Alfred  C.  Barnes,  150 ; 
Ashbel  H.  Barney,  100 ;  Milton  H.  Courtright,  100  and  the 
others  10  shares  each. 

The  life  of  the  company  was  placed  at  100  years.    It 


INCEPTION   OF  THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  81 

proposed  to  build  altogether  160  miles  of  road.  It  named 
a  route  from  the  Battery  thr-ough  the  Western  part  of  the 
city  to  Westchester  county  and  through  the  westerly  part 
of  that  county  to  Putnam  county;  also  from  the  Battery 
through  the  easterly  part  of  the  city  and  the  easterly  part 
of  Westchester  county  to  Portchester ;  also  lines  in  every 
ward  of  New  York  City  across  town  from  river  to  river ; 
also  from  Yonkers  across  to  New  Eochelle  and  from  Tar- 
rytown  to  Portchester.  In  addition  the  company  named 
the  route  of  the  West  Side  and  Yonkers  Patent  Railway 
company  from  the  Battery  up  Greenwich  street,  Ninth 
Avenue  and  other  streets  on  the  West  Side  to  Kings- 
bridge  and  Yonkers.  Stock  in  the  New  York  Elevated 
Railroad  company  to  the  amount  of  $801,825  was  issued 
for  the  property  and  franchises  of  the  Patent  Railway 
company. 

From  the  list  of  stockholders  and  directors  of  the  New 
York  Elevated  Railroad  company  it  is  apparent  that  Har- 
vey, the  originator  of  the  elevated  plan,  was  finally  elimi- 
nated. With  him  went  the  cable  method  of  operating, 
which  never  thereafter  was  tried  on  an  elevated  road  in 
New  York  City.  The  dummy  engines,  introduced  by  the 
trustees  for  the  bondholders  in  1871,  continued  as  the 
motive  power,  with  slight  variations  in  type,  until  the 
elevated  roads  were  electrified  31  years  later  in  1902. 

One  reason  for  the  embarrassment  of  the  old  company 
was  the  litigation  in  which  it  became  involved.  Another 
was  the  opposition  by  the  Tweed  Ring.  After  the  experi- 
mental half  mile  had  been  built  and  accepted  by  the  Gov- 
ernor, lawsuits  were  brought  to  prevent  the  extension  of 
the  line  to  Thirtieth  street.  While  some  of  these  suits 
were  inspired,  no  doubt,  by  the  horse  railroad  interests, 
others  were  brought  by  property  owners  who  alleged  that 
the  road  would  injure  their  holdings.  This  question  of 
damage  to  property  became  a  burning  issue  in  the  '70 's 
and  it  required  a  constitutional  amendment  and  several 
court  decisions  to  settle  it. 


82  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

After  the  New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Company  had 
taken  over  the  property  it  obtained  the  passage  of  an  act 
by  the  Legislature,  confirming  its  acquisition  of  the  rights 
granted  to  the  West  'Side  and  Yonkers  Patent  Railway 
Company  and  authorizing  it  to  continue  and  complete  the 
railroad  thereby  granted.  This  act  required  the  New 
York  Elevated  Railroad  Company  to  construct  and  com- 
plete at  least  one  track  within  five  years,  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  Commissioners  named  by  the  Governor,  who 
were  continued,  vacancies  in  their  number  to  be  filled  by 
the  Governor.  The  Commissioners  were  to  receive  $10 
per  day  each,  to  be  paid  by  the  company.  The  supple- 
mental act  also  authorized  the  company  to  charge  a  10 
cent  fare  for  five  miles  or  less  and  not  exceeding  two 
cents  for  each  additional  mile  or  fraction.  This  ended 
the  first  period  of  the  elevated  railroad  movement,  which 
thereafter  gained  great  impetus.  Another  company,  the 
Gilbert,  was  soon  chartered,  and  the  two  were  firmly  es- 
tablished by  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  of  1875,  as 
will  be  told  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

The  Tweed  opposition  to  the  first  elevated  road  is 
described  as  follows  by  H.  C.  Stryker  in  his  Historical 
Sketches  above  quoted,  which  were  indorsed  by  Charles 
T.  Harvey  himself: 

"But  a  new  transit  possibility  had  developed 
from  the  then  political  dictator  of  the  city  and  the 
state — the  most  notorious  corruptionist  of  the  cen- 
tury— William  M.  Tweed — having  decided  to  intro- 
duce another  rapid  transit  system  known  as  the 
"Viaduct  Plan"  for  exclusive  extension  on  Manhat- 
tan Island.  He  was  then  Commissioner  of  Public 
Works  of  the  city  of  New  York,  with  its  immense 
patronage.  He  was  a  State  Senator  and  considered 
the  actual  representative  of  the  city  in  Legislative 
affairs.  He  had  a  charter  granted  for  the  "New 
York  Railway  Company",  with  a  capital  of  $25,000,- 
000,  of  which  the  city  of  New  York  was  directed  to 


INCEPTION   OF   THE   ELEVATED  RAILROADS  83 

take  five  millions  at  par,  the  county  of  Westchester 
was  authorized  to  be  bonded  to  aid  it  to  any  extent 
the  Board  of  Supervisors  might  decide,  which  might 
be  twenty-five  millions  or  more. 

''The  Board  of  the  Railway  company  comprised 
some  of  the  wealthiest  capitalists  of  the  city  as  asso- 
ciate directors  with  Tweed.  A  magnificent  suite  of 
offices  was  occupied,  and  printed  plans  published 
showing  a  grand  terminal  station  facing  the  City 
Hall  Park,  where  the  city  office  building  is  now  being 
erected.  The  railway  was  to  be  built  upon  elevated 
masonry  arches  through  blocks  instead  of  streets, 
and  a  picture  was  published  of  its  crossing  Broadway 
on  a  heavy  masonry  arch  some  forty  feet  high.  That 
its  cost  per  mile  would  be  in  millions  was  certain,  and 
that  it  would  never  serve  as  adequate  or  convenient 
transit  for  the  wage-earning  masses  was  no  less  sure. 

"The  only  rival  in  sight  was  the  discredited  Ele- 
vated Railway  on  Ninth  Avenue  and  Greenwich 
street,  and  this  (Senator  Tweed  decided  to  have  de- 
stroyed forthwith.  He  introduced  a  bill  in  the  Sen- 
ate, March  28,  1871,  authorizing  him  as  Commis- 
sioner of  Public  Works  to  remove  it  within  ninety 
days,  and  made  his  boast  that  within  sixty  days  after 
the  bill  became  a  law  he  would  have  it  wholly  torn 
down.  The  bill  passed  the  Senate  two  days  later 
by  a  vote  of  20  yeas  to  9  nays,  and  was  sent  to  the 
Assembly  for  concurrence,  it  being  known  that  the 
Governor  would  approve  it. 

''The  clique  in  control  of  the  Elevated  Railway 
were  taken  by  surprise  and  were  hopelessly  unpre- 
pared to  effectually  defend  it  at  Albany.  Harvey 
was,  however,  informed  of  the  emergency,  and  valu- 
ing the  public  interests  above  any  instincts  of  per- 
sonal revenge  upon  his  despoilers,  he,  as  its  origina- 
tor, appealed  to  Hon.  Erastus  Corning,  then  residing 
at  Albany,  to  save  the  Railway  for  friendship's  sake. 


84  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

as  Mr.  Corning  had  no  investment  interest  whatever 
in  it.  The  memory  of  the  Canal  episode  sufficed  to 
cause  Mr.  Corning  to  appear  in  the  Assembly  cham- 
ber to  oppose  Tweed's  bill.  An  onlooker  saw  on  the 
afternoon  of  that  fateful  day  Tweed  in  one  part  of 
the  chamber  marshalling  the  New  York  City  .mem- 
bers to  vote  for  his  destructive  measure,  while  Mr. 
Corning  was  seen  in  another  part  of  the  chamber 
among  groups  of  country  members  urging  them  to 
vote  against  it.  He  was  considered  as  the  most  in- 
fluential citizen  of  the  State  outside  of  New  York 
City,  and  the  country  Assemblymen  generally  ac- 
cepted his  advice. 

"When  the  vote  was  taken  the  bill  was  defeated 
by  the  decisive  majority  of  74  nays  to  34  yeas — the 
only  defeat  Dictator  Tweed  experienced  during  that 
session.  Conclusive  evidence  is  preserved  in  State 
documents  proving  that  the  Tweed  measure  would 
have  passed  but  for  Mr.  Coming's  interference,  and 
that  his  only  motive  was  his  personal  regard  for 
Harvey,  coupled  with  the  memory  of  the  latter 's  en- 
gineering achievement  before  mentioned.  But  for 
that  memory-inspired  victory,  the  nucleus  of  the  Ele- 
vated Railways  of  New  York  would  have  then  been 
destroyed  and  the  system  become  too  discredited  to 
enlist  capital  for  its  re-introduction.  With  Tweed 
in  control,  the  ** Viaduct"  system  would  doubtless 
have  been  adopted  as  the  only  transit  system  avail- 
able. Contracts  to  build  it  would  have  been  let  with 
a  "rush,"  New  York  as  well  as  Westchester  county 
heavily  bonded  under  special  laws  and  a  hundred 
millions  probably  expended  to  prove  the  system  a 
practical  failure. 

"The  Elevated  system  thus  saved  passed  through 
several  changes  of  control,  but  was  gradually  ex- 
tended and  enlarged  until  it  had  a  patronage  of  over 
a  million  passengers  per  diem  and  for  thirty-five 


INCEPTION   OP  THE   ELEVATED  KAILROADS  85 

years  was  the  only  means   of   rapid  transit  in  the 
city." 

The  "canal"  incident  alluded  to  in  the  above  was  a 
happening  in  Harvey's  younger  days.  He  was  engineer 
for  a  company,  of  which  Erastus  Corning  was  president, 
engaged  in  constructing  the  first  great  ship  canal  around 
the  falls  at  the  outlet  of  Lake  Superior.  The  work  was 
being  done  under  a  contract  with  the  State  of  Michigan, 
and  when  the  time  limit  was  nearly  up  it  was  discovered 
that  what  was  thought  to  be  a  sand  bar  was  really  a  ledge 
of  rock,  which  the  dredge  provided  for  the  purpose  could 
not  excavate.  Harvey  saved  the  day  and  got  the  contract 
finished  in  the  time  specified  by  inventing  a  machine 
which  broke  up  the  ledge  under  water  so  that  it  could  be 
dredged  out  with  the  apparatus  provided.  The  directors 
gave  him  a  vote  of  thanks  and  Corning  never  forgot  the 
service. 

It  has  been  said  above  that  the  first  elevated  road 
incurred  the  antagonism  of  the  Tweed  Eing.  This  oppo- 
sition was  described  in  an  airticle  published  in  the  New 
York  Herald  of  June  5,  1877,  favoring  the  holding  of  a 
citizens'  meeting  to  encourage  the  companies  then  beset 
by  vexatious  legislation.    That  article  said: 

''In  the  days  of  the  Tweed  ring  the  corruption- 
ists  went  so  far  as  to  try  to  indict  the  Greenwich 
Street  elevated  railroad  as  a  nuisance ;  they  boasted 
that  they  would  not  only  tear  down  the  road,  but 
would  fine  and  imprison  the  enterprising  citizens 
who  advanced  money  to  try  this  important  and  now 
entirely  successful  experiment.  Engineers  and 
newspapers  were  hired  to  assert  that  the  road  would 
not  stand ;  that  it  was  dangerous  to  the  lives  of  the 
passengers;  that  it  would  cause  constant  runaways 
of  horses;  that  it  would  destroy  business;  and  at- 
tempts were  even  made  at  one  time  to  incite  mob 
violence  against  it.    Today  the  elevated  railway  is, 


86  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

as  far  as  the  track  extends,  one  of  the  greatest  con- 
veniences the  city  has." 

Harvey,  who  died  in  1913,  maintained  his  interest  in 
rapid  transit  to  the  last.  In  the  early  part  of  1912  he 
submitted  to  the  Public  Service  Commission,  then  en- 
gaged in  perfecting  the  Dual  System  plans,  a  project  for 
an  improved,  noiseless  elevated  railroad  and  urged  its 
adoption.  The  plan,  however,  was  not  adopted,  and  soon 
thereafter  Harvey  was  stricken  with  his  last  illness. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

FiEST  Underground   Charters  and   First   Tunnel 
Built  under  Broadway. 

TN  the  Legislature  of  1868  the  scramble  for  rapid  tran- 
sit charters  was  resumed.  In  addition  to  the  former 
applicants  several  new  names  appeared  in  a  multitude 
of  bills  introduced.  In  one  of  these,  which  proposed  to 
confer  a  grant  for  a  road  under  Broadway  to  Madison 
Square  and  thence  to  the  Harlem  River,  the  names  of  the 
incorporators  included  those  of  Cornelius  Vanderbilt, 
August  Belmont,  Horace  Greeley,  William  G.  Fargo, 
Peter  B.  Sweeney  and  Jacob  Sharpe.  The  biU  did  not 
pass. 

The  session  produced  a  law,  which  led  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  first  passenger  subway  in  New  York 
City,  but  this  experiment  in  underground  transit,  like 
the  first  elevated  road,  ended  in  failure.  This  was  the 
so-called  Beach  tunnel  built  under  Broadway  at  Murray 
street,  the  remnants  of  which  were  exhumed  in  1912 
when  the  Public  Service  Commission  began  work  on  the 
new  Broadway  subway.  In  the  construction  of  the  Beach 
tunnel  a  huge  practical  joke  was  played  on  Father 
Knickerbocker.  The  law  passed  by  the  Legislature  of 
1868  authorized  certain  men  to  form  a  company  and  to 
construct  a  "pneumatic  dispatch"  line  under  Broadway, 
to  consist  of  two  tubes  each  of  54  inches  diameter,  through 
which  parcels  etc.  were  to  be  transmitted  by  pneumatic 
power.  Without  official  or  public  knowledge,  however, 
the  company  actually  built  a  tunnel  nine  feet  in  diameter, 
carried  passengers  in  it  without  authority  of  law  and 
excused  the  feat  on  the  ground  that  it  had  to  build  one 
large  tunnel  to  carry  the  two  54  inch  tubes  and  since  it 
was  built  desired  to  demonstrate  the  practicability  of 
propelling  passenger  cars  by  the  pneumatic  method! 

Those  authorized  in  the  bill  to  form  a  company  for  the 


88  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

purpose  of  building  the  pneumatic  tubes  were : 

Alfred  E.  Beach,  Robert  G.  Hatfield,  Horace  T.  Cas- 
well, Nathan  Kellogg,  Moses  S.  Beach,  Salem  H.  Wales, 
R.  H.  McClellan,  Julius  H.  Pratt,  Frederick  H.  Betts, 
Charles  H.  Neill,  Thomas  Graham,  T.  G.  Ford,  John  E. 
Ashe,  John  Leonard,  J.  Netto  Burns,  Charles  H.  Whiley 
and  iSamuel  Marsh,  Jr. 

These  men  organized  the  Beach  Pneumatic  Transit 
Company,  the  articles  of  which  were  filed  August  1,  1868. 
The  capital  stock  was  placed  at  $5,000,000  and  the  follow- 
ing were  named  as  directors : 

Alfred  E.  Beach,  Horace  T.  Caswell,  Joseph  Dixon, 
Moses  iS.  Beach  and  Frederick  H.  Betts. 

The  Beach  Pneumatic  Railroad  was  the  invention  of 
Alfred  Ely  Beach,  an  engineer  and  editor  of  the  Scien- 
tific American,  who  was  a  prominent  figure  in  the  life  of 
New  York  City  in  the  late  '60 's  and  early  '70 's.  His  son, 
Frederick  C.  Beach  and  his  grandson  (son  of  the  latter) 
are  today  on  the  editorial  staff  of  the  same  publication. 

In  the  early  60 's  pneumatic  power  was  exploited  in 
England,  and  in  1867  Alfred  Ely  Beach  introduced  it  to 
New  York.  In  that  year  he  gave  an  exhibition  of  its  pos- 
sibilities at  the  American  Institute,  held  in  Armory  Hall 
in  Fourteenth  street.  There  he  erected  a  section  of  pneu- 
matic tube  in  the  main  hall  of  the  exposition,  and  in  it  by 
means  of  a  blower  he  operated  a  car  large  enough  to  carry 
passengers.  He  also  exhibited  a  smaller  tube  for  the  dis- 
patch of  letters  and  parcels  by  the  same  method.  That  it 
was  then  his  intention  to  apply  this  principle  to  the  trans- 
portation of  passengers  in  the  streets  of  New  York  City 
or  under  them  is  shown  by  a  pamphlet  he  published  in  the 
fall  of  1867.  The  pamphlet  was  entitled  ' '  The  Pneumatic 
Dispatch,  with  Illustrations".  In  it  he  described  the 
demonstration  of  pneumatic  power  at  the  American  Insti- 
tute.   Here  is  a  paragraph  from  it : 

'  *  The  pneumatic  system  appears  to  be  admirably 
adapted  to  the  purposes  of  rapid  city  transit,  since 


FIRST   TUNNEL   UNDER  BROADWAY  89 

the  ventilation  is  perfect  and  the  freedom  from  all 
jarring  and  dust  is  complete.  Mr.  Beach  is  inde- 
fatigably  laboring  to  accomplish  its  introduction 
here,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  his  efforts  will  meet  with 
due  encouragement  and  reward.  About  75,000  have 
already  enjoyed  the  atmospheric  ride,  and  it  is  ex- 
pected that  more  than  100,000  will  have  passed 
through  the  tube  before  the  close  of  the  exhibition, 
about  November  1.  As  soon  as  proper  Legislative 
authority  can  be  obtained  it  is  proposed  to  lay  down 
tubes  under  the  principal  streets  and  under  the  adja- 
cent rivers,  when,  it  is  stated,  passengers  will  be 
carried  from  City  Hall,  New  York,  to  Madison 
Square  in  five  minutes.  Central  Park  in  eight  min- 
utes, Harlem  and  Manhattanville  in  fourteen  min- 
utes, Washington  Heights  in  twenty  minutes,  Jersey 
City  or  Hoboken  in  five  minutes  and  City  Hall, 
Brooklyn,  in  three  minutes." 

Under  the  authority  conferred  by  the  act  of  1868  the 
company  began  work  in  that  year,  but  so  quietly  was  it 
done  that  the  public  remained  in  ignorance  of  it  for  many 
months.  The  first  public  announcement  of  it  was  made  by 
the  New  York  Times  in  January,  1869.  This  was  supple- 
mented by  an  article  in  the  same  paper  of  February  17, 
1869,  which  said : 

''Nearly  a  month  ago  the  Times  exclusively  ad- 
vised the  public  that  a  company  of  English  capi- 
talists, who  had  obtained  a  charter  from  the  Legis- 
lature for  that  purpose,  had  commenced  to  construct 
a  pneumatic  disptach  tube  in  the  lower  part  of  the 
city  for  the  conveyance  of  parcels  and  letters  and, 
it  might  be,  passengers  also.  As  then  published,  Mr. 
Moses  Beach,  president  of  the  company,  hired  the 
basement  of  the  Messrs.  Devlin's  store,  corner  of 
Broadway  and  Murray  street,  as  a  starting  point  for 
the  line,  with  the  intention  of  carrying  it  to  the  Nas- 


90  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

sau  street  post-office.  The  work  of  tunneling  be- 
neath Broadway  then  begun  has  been  slowly  but 
steadily  progressing  and  will  be  pushed  forward  to 
completion  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  details  of 
these  operations  of  the  company  have  been  carefully 
withheld  by  them  from  the  public,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  otherwise  inevitable  annoyance  of  injunctions 
from  stage-line  proprietors  and  property  owners  on 
the  route." 

As  before  stated  the  company  decided  to  build  two 
tubes  at  once,  and  to  this  end  bored  one  large  tunnel,  in 
which  it  was  proposed  later  to  construct  the  two  small 
tubes.  In  a  pamphlet  issued  subsequently  by  the  company 
it  is  explained : 

"It  is  a  portion  of  this  outer  tunnel  which  has 
been  erected;  and  as  it  proved  to  be  strong  enough 
and  large  enough  for  the  transit  of  passengers,  the 
company  laid  down  therein  a  railway  track  and  pro- 
vided a  passenger  car  for  the  purpose  of  temporarily 
illustrating  by  an  actual  demonstration  the  feasi- 
bility of  placing  a  railway  under  Broadway  without 
disturbance  of  the  street  surface  or  injury  to  adja- 
cent property." 

The  tunnel  was  312  feet  long  and  started  on  a  curve 
from  the  west  curb  line  of  Broadway  at  Warren  street 
and  extended  down  the  middle  of  Broadway  to  a  point  a 
little  beyond  the  south  line  of  'Murray  street.  It  was 
21  feet  beneath  the  surface,  was  painted  white  and  lighted 
with  gas.  It  consisted  of  a  circular  tube  9  feet  in  diam- 
eter, built  of  iron  plates  for  about  60  feet  on  the  curved 
portion  and  of  brick  masonry  for  the  rest  of  the  distance. 
It  had  been  bored  by  means  of  a  metallic  shield,  invented 
by  Alfred  Ely  Beach,  and  this  was  the  first  application 
of  the  shield  method  of  tunneling  in  America.  This  shield 
was  pushed  forward  by  means  of  hydraulic  jacks  as  fast 


FIEST   TUNNEL   UNDER  BROADWAY  91 

as  the  earth  in  front  of  it  was  excavated,  when  the  bore 
behind  it  was  immediately  filled  with  a  lining  of  brick 
masonry  or  iron  plating.  The  work  was  carried  on  with- 
out opening  the  surface  of  Broadway,  and  few  persons 
who  walked  over  it  daily  knew  what  was  going  on  beneath 
their  feet. 

Early  in  1870  the  tunnel  was  opened  to  the  public  and 
experimental  operation  was  carried  on.  A  circular  car 
to  fit  the  inner  diameter  of  the  tube  was  provided,  large 
enough  to  hold  twenty  passengers.  A  huge  blower  or 
fan  was  installed  at  the  end  of  the  tube  and  the  car  was 
blown  forward  by  force  of  the  air.  In  February,  1870, 
a  trial  trip  was  made  with  the  Mayor  and  other  notables, 
and  thereafter  hundreds  of  citizens  enjoyed  the  "atmos- 
pheric ride".  Many  persons  now  living  recall  the  expe- 
rience. 

Thereafter  no  attempt  was  made  to  build  the  dispatch 
tubes,  as  the  company  bent  every  effort  to  get  a  franchise 
for  a  passenger  railroad.  The  Legislature  of  1871  passed 
such  a  bill,  but  it  was  vetoed  by  Governor  Hoffman.  The 
Legislature  of  1872  repassed  the  measure,  but  it  again 
encountered  the  gubernatorial  veto.  In  1873  Governor 
John  A.  Dix  succeeded  Hoffman,  and  he  approved  a 
similar  bill  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  that  year.  In 
this  bill  the  company  was  authorized  to  build  an  under- 
ground road  and  to  operate  it  with  steam  locomotives, 
the  pneumatic  method  not  having  proved  a  success.  By 
this  time  (1873)  the  new  elevated  railroad  was  already 
in  successful  operation,  and  the  Beach  company  failed  to 
raise  the  capital  necessary  to  build  the  road.  The  fran- 
chise slumbered  for  a  number  of  years  and  finally  passed 
into  the  possession  of  the  New  York  Parcel  Dispatch 
Company. 

The  name  and  objects  of  the  Beach  company  were 
changed  by  amendatory  acts  passed  at  different  times. 
The  act  of  1873  gave  the  company  the  right  to  build  and 
operate  an  underground  railroad  from  Bowling  Green  up 


92  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Broadway  to  Madison  Square  and  thence  up  Madison 
Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River ;  also  from  Madison  Square 
up  Broadway  to  Central  Park  and  Eighth  Avenue.  The 
act  of  1874  changed  the  name  to  the  Broadway  Under- 
ground Eailway  Company.  In  January,  1885,  by  order 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  name  was  changed  to  the  New 
York  Arcade  Railway  Company,  and  by  a  Legislative  act 
of  1897  to  the  New  York  Parcel  Dispatch  Company, 
which  is  the  present  title. 

As  may  be  inferred  from  the  foregoing,  the  company 
passed  through  much  litigation.  In  1870,  when  the 
knowledge  of  the  construction  of  the  tunnel  under  Broad- 
way became  public,  the  City  of  New  York  brought  suit 
for  an  injunction  on  constitutional  grounds.  The  courts 
upheld  the  act,  refusing  to  grant  an  injunction.  Many 
years  later,  when  it  was  known  as  the  New  York  Arcade 
Railway  Company,  it  lost  a  much  more  important  suit. 
This  was  the  case  of  Astor  and  others  against  the  New 
York  Arcade  Railway  Company.  The  plaintiffs  attacked 
the  rights  of  the  company  to  build  a  railroad  for  passen- 
ger transportation,  and  the  courts  held  the  act  of  1873, 
which  conferred  such  rights,  unconstitutional  by  reason 
of  a  defective  title.  The  original  act  of  1868,  however, 
was  upheld,  and  the  company  now  claims  only  such  rights 
as  were  granted  by  it — namely  the  rights  to  build  and 
operate  underground  tubes  for  the  transmission  of  let- 
ters, packages  and  merchandise. 

The  act  of  1897  confirmed  these  rights,  but  limited 
their  exercise  to  such  streets  as  are  not  required  for  rapid 
transit  roads  unless  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Railroad 
Commissioners  give  their  consent.  This  board  was  suc- 
ceeded by  the  Public  Service  Commission,  and  in  1909 
the  New  York  Parcel  Dispatch  Company  applied  to  that 
Commission  for  its  consent  to  the  building  of  tubes  for 
the  transportation  of  letters,  packages  and  merchandise, 
or  for  a  freight  subway  as  it  was  called,  on  such  streets 
as  the  Commission  should  designate.    No  action  was  ever 


FIEST   TUNNEL  UNDER  BROADWAY  93 

taken  on  the  application.  Three  years  later,  when  the 
Commission  awarded  the  contract  for  the  construction 
of  the  new  Brooklyn  subway  in  lower  Broadway,  the 
company,  through  its  attorneys,  Krauthoff,  Harmon  and 
Mathewson,  filed  this  protest: 

*'New  York  City,  February  19,  1912. 
**To  the  New  York  Public  Service  Commission  of  the 
First  District,  to  William  R.  Willcox,  John  E. 
Eustis,  Milo  R.  Maltbie,  J.  Sergeant  Cram,  Will- 
iam MoCarroll,  and  all  whom  it  may  concern : 
'*  Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  tunnel  under 
Broadway  from  Warren  Street  southward  about  two 
hundred  and  ninety-four  (294)  feet  in  the  Borough 
of  Manhattan,  City,  County  and  State  of  New  York, 
is  the  property  of  the  New  York  Parcel  Dispatch 
Company,  that  anyone  molesting  or  interfering  there- 
with will  be  proceeded  against  as  a  trespasser  and 
that  the  rights  of  the  owner  will  be  enforced  in  the 
courts. 

(Signed)     New  York  Parcel  Dispatch  Company 
By  Eugene  W.  Austin,  President." 

No  attention  was  paid  to  the  protest.  The  Commission 
had  awarded  the  contract  before  it  was  received,  and  the 
contractor  proceeded  with  the  work,  which  involved  the 
unearthing  and  destruction  of  the  old  tunnel.  Parts  of 
the  old  car,  the  rails  and  the  boring  shield  were  found, 
although  the  wooden  parts  were  rotted  away  with  their 
forty-two  years  entombment  under  Broadway.  The 
metallic  parts  of  the  boring  shield  were  fairly  well  pre- 
served. The  Commission  offered  the  relic  to  Mr.  Fred- 
erick C.  Beach,  editor  of  the  Scientific  American  and  son 
of  the  inventor.  Mr.  Beach  looked  over  the  shield,  found 
that  it  could  be  restored  and  had  it  removed.  He  pre- 
sented it  to  Cornell  University  as  an  interesting  engineer- 
ing relic.    The  University  accepted  it,  took  it  to  Ithaca 


94  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

and  placed  it  on  exhibition  in  the  museum  of  Sibley  Col- 
lege, where  it  can  be  seen  today. 

When  opened  the  old  tunnel  was  found  to  be  in  good 
condition.  The  brick  walls  had  withstood  leakage,  and 
the  air  in  the  tube  was  dry  and  warm.  The  remaining 
wood  work  of  the  car  was  brittle  with  dry  rot,  and  some 
of  it  fell  apart  when  removed.  Enough  of  it  was  saved  to 
assemble  in  the  office  of  the  Pu'blic  "Service  Commission 
almost  the  complete  end  of  the  car. 

To  return  to  the  Legislative  session  of  1868,  when 
as  before  stated  a  number  of  rapid  transit  bills 
were  introduced.  In  the  past  most  of  the  opposition  to 
underground  grants  had  arisen  because  such  rights  were 
sought  in  Broadway,  the  leading  thoroughfare  of  the  city, 
the  property  o^vners  in  which  discountenanced  any  kind 
of  a  railroad  therein.  In  1868  a  group  of  new  applicants, 
believing  in  following  the  line  of  least  resistance,  asked 
for  an  underground  grant  in  other  streets.  The  result 
proved  their  wisdom,  for  the  Legislature  passed  their 
bill,  which  was  duly  approved  by  Governor  Fenton — the 
same  Governor  who  in  1865  vetoed  the  Willson  under- 
ground bill  for  the  Broadway  route.  The  act  of  1868,  ap- 
proved April  18,  incorporated  the  New  York  City  Cen- 
tral Underground  Railroad  Company,  with  a  capital 
stock  of  $10,000,000  and  the  following  incorporators : 

W.  Butler  Duncan  William  B.  Ogden 

George  Griswold  James  Boorman  Johnston 

George  D.  Cragin  James  M.  Brown 

William  E.  Dodge  Henry  F.  Vail 

Lewis  B.  Brown  Edwin  Dodge 

S.  W.  Hopkins  Edward  K.  Bell 

J.  S.  Thayer  Clarence  S.  Brown 

Henry  E.  Davis  Julius  F.  Cheesboro 

W.  W.  Huntington  D.  M.  Hildreth 

J.  S.  Schultz  H.  W.  Slocum 

Horace  Deming  John  Phillips 

Everett  H.  Kimbark  Bryan  Lawrence 


FIRST   TUNNEL  UNDER  BROADWAY  95 

Joseph  Dixon  Eugene  Bissell 

Heniy  Marshall  Edwin  J.  McKee 

Royal  N.  Torrey  Thomas  Canary 

William  Johnson  Bernard  Kelly 

William  C.  iSquier  John  Fitch 

Edward  C.  Byrne  Henry  Smith 

Benjamin  Weed  Edward  €oles 

Samuel  K.  Jewett  Ezra  Clark  Jr. 

Issac  Bell  John  T.  Conover 

These  men  were  authorized  to  construct  and  operate 
an  underground  railroad  in  the  following  route:  Begin- 
ning at  Broadway  and  Park  Place  in  front  of  the  old  City 
Hall  and  curving  to  City  Hall  Place,  thence  to  Pearl 
Street,  to  Mulberry  Street,  to  Bleecker  Street,  to  Lafay- 
ette Place,  to  Astor  Place,  to  Eighth  Street  and  **  easterly 
of  St.  Ann's  church  on  Eighth  Street"  to  Fourth  Avenue, 
to  Union  'Square,  .to  17th  Street,  private  property,  to 
23d  Street  and  Madison  Square  to  26th  Street  and  Madi- 
son Avenue,  up  Madison  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River, 
and  easterly  and  westerly  along  the  Harlem  River,  con- 
necting with  the  Harlem  Bridge  at  Third  Avenue. 

North  of  99th  Street  an  elevated  or  surface  road  was 
permitted.  South  of  that  street  the  road  was  to  be  a 
subway,  'built  deep  enough  to  avoid  interference  with  the 
water  mains  of  the  Croton  Board.  The  fare  was  fixed 
at  6  cents  for  any  distance  under  three  miles  and  two 
cents  for  each  additional  mile  or  fraction.  The  road  was 
to  connect  with  the  Harlem  Railroad  at  42d  Street,  and 
up  to  that  point  was  to  be  finished  in  two  years.  The 
company  was  required  to  deposit  $300,000  with  the  Con- 
troller of  the  City,  to  be  forfeited  if  the  road  was  not 
completed  in  that  time.  Five  years  more  were  allowed 
for  the  completion  of  the  road  to  the  Harlem  River.  It 
was  to  be  operated  in  connection  with  the  Harlem  Rail- 
road so  that  there  should  be  "a  steam  road  from  one  end 
of  the  Island  to  the  other."  This  quotation  is  from  the 
New  York  Times  of  x^pril  18,  1868,  which  stated  that 


96  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

among  the  incorporators  were  Edward  Dodge,  of  Jay 
Cooke  and  Oo. ;  Henry  F.  Vail,  of  the  Bank  of  Commerce 
and  James  M.  Brown  and  Clarence  Brown,  of  Brown 
Brothers. 

The  New  York  City  Central  company  failed  to  deposit 
$300,000  with  the  Controller  as  provided  in  its  charter, 
and  went  back  to  the  next  Legislature,  that  of  1869,  for 
an  amendment  of  the  act.  By  an  amendatory  act,  passed 
May  11,  1869,  new  directors  were  added  and  the  time  to 
do  the  work  was  extended.  The  new  directors  were  Mar- 
shall 0.  Roberts,  William  A.  Whitbeck  and  Origen  Van- 
denburgh.  The  company  was  given  two  years  in  which 
to  begin  and  five  years  in  which  to  complete  the  work. 
After  this  act  took  effect  the  company  retained  three 
engineers,  W.  W.  Evans,  E.  S.  Chesbrough  and  George 
S.  Greene,  to  make  surveys.  They  did  so  and  made  a 
report  to  William  B.  Ogden,  president  of  the  company, 
in  October,  1869.  They  estimated  the  cost  of  building 
and  equipping  the  line,  from  the  Battery  to  the  Harlem 
River,  at  $17,625,301.  From  the  traffic  expected  they 
estimated  the  gross  earnings  at  $7,200,000  a  year,  of 
which  $214,560  was  to  come  from  freight.  They  ex- 
pected to  carry  70,000,000  passengers  a  year.  Operating 
expenses  were  estimated  at  $3,000,000,  leaving  $4,200,000 
for  interest  and  dividends.  It  was  proposed  to  use  loco- 
motives with  coke  as  fuel,  and  to  have  trains  of  from  five 
to  eight  cars,  each  car  to  seat  40  passengers. 

The  two  years  in  which  the  company  was  to  begin 
work  expired  in  May,  1871,  and  just  before  the  limit  some 
actual  construction  was  done.  According  to  the  first  re- 
port of  the  company,  dated  December  1, 1871,  excavations 
were  made  in  May  at  Madison  Avenue  and  96th 
Street  and  a  cut  was  opened  ''to  a  proper  point  to  begin 
a  heading  of  the  tunnel  southwardly."  It  was  also  stated 
that  a  section  of  tunnel  abutment  wall  was  built  on  the 
route  thirty  feet  deep  between  Bond  and  Great  Jones 
streets.    While  this  was  enough  to  save  the  franchise,  it 


FIRST  TUNNEL  UNDER  BROADWAY  97 

proved  of  little  moment,  for  the  directors  got  to  quarrel- 
ing and  no  more  work  was  done.  After  the  year  1872 
the  company  became  embarrassed  and  in  1874  Origen 
Vandenburgh,  one  of  the  directors,  sued  and  got  judg- 
ment against  it  for  about  $95,000.  This  judgment  was 
affirmed  by  a  decree  in  1876,  when  the  property  was  sold 
under  foreclosure,  the  total  of  Vandenburgh 's  claim  then 
being  $102,977.93.  This  indebtedness,  it  was  said,  was  in- 
curred during  the  years  1869,  1870  and  1871.  Vanden- 
burgh bought  in  the  property,  had  its  franchise  amended 
by  an  act  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  1880  and  organ- 
ized the  New  York  Underground  Railway  company, 
which  took  over  what  was  left  of  the  old  company.  Van- 
denburgh was  the  man  who  began  fighting  for  an  under- 
ground franchise  in  1865  after  he  had  parted  from  Hugh 
B.  Willson,  whose  original  plan  for  a  subway  he  sup- 
ported in  1864. 

A  glimpse  of  the  troubles  of  the  New  York  City  Cen- 
tral Underground  company  is  given  in  a  letter  signed 
by  W.  W.  Evans  and  published  in  the  New  York  Herald 
early  in  February,  1875.  Evans  Avas  chairman  of  the 
board  of  three  engineers  who  reported  on  the  scheme  in 
1869.    In  this  letter  he  said : 

''I  might  here  state  that  a  contract  drawn  by  Mr. 
Ogden  to  build  this  railway  was  made  and  executed 
with  a  gentleman  from  London,  and  that  this  rail- 
way would  have  been  built  and  in  use  at  the  present 
day  but  for  three  reasons :  One  was  that  Mr.  Ogden 
was  called  to  the  West  and  was  away  for  some 
months;  another  was  that  some  of  the  members  of 
the  Board  of  Directors  got  a  'crotchet'  in  their  heads 
that  the  contract  had  enormous  profits  in  it  and 
should  be  quashed,  also  that  others  wished  'a  finger 
in  this  pie';  the  third  reason  for  the  failure  of  this 
company  and  the  contract  was  that  Tweed  was  then 
'the  King'  and  nothing  could  be  done  without  his 
assent  and  concurrence." 


98  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

Other  underground  charters  beside  the  New  York 
City  Central  Underground  and  the  Beach  Pneumatic  were 
granted  by  the  Legislatures  of  those  times,  but  for  vari- 
ous reasons  the  roads  so  authorized  were  never  built. 
Among  them  was  the  franchise  of  the  New  York  City 
Rapid  Transit  Company,  granted  by  an  act  of  the  Legis- 
lature of  1872.  This  act  authorized  Cornelius  Vanderbilt 
(the  Commodore)  and  such  other  persons  as  he  should 
associate  with  him  to  organize  this  company,  with  a  capi- 
tal stock  of  $12,000,000  and  to  build  and  operate  a  two- 
track  tunnel  railroad  from  the  City  Hall  Park  to  Fifty- 
ninth  street,  with  a  connection  with  the  Vanderbilt  rail- 
road system.  The  bill  as  first  introduced  covered  a  part 
of  the  route  already  granted  to  the  New  York  City  Cen- 
tral Underground  company,  but  when  Governor  Hoffman 
during  the  session  vetoed  the  second  Beach  tunnel  bill 
because  it  did  the  same  thing,  Vanderbilt,  in  the  last  days 
of  the  session,  had  the  measure  amended  so  that  a  conflict 
with  the  Central  Underground  route  was  avoided.  As 
amended  the  bill  passed  both  houses  and  was  approved 
by  the  Governor  on  May  22, 1872.  The  route  as  fixed  was 
from  the  East  iSide  of  Broadway  at  City  Hall  Park  east- 
ward to  Chatham  or  Centre  Street,  to  Park  Street,  to 
Mott  iStreet,  to  the  Bowery,  to  Third  Avenue,  to  Fourth 
Avenue  and  up  Fourth  Avenue  to  ' '  a  point  between  48th 
Street  and  59th  Street." 

While  the  bill  was  pending  the  Legislature  passed  an- 
other Vanderbilt  measure,  authorizing  the  separation  of 
grades  on  the  New  York  Central  north  of  42nd  Street. 

The  charter  of  the  Central  Underground  company  also 
covered  an  East  Side  route,  the  line  north  of  23rd  Street 
running  up  Madison  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River.  While 
the  Vanderbilt  bill  was  pending  in  the  Legislature,  Oliver 
W.  Barnes,  president  of  the  Central  Underground  com- 
pany, publicly  charged  Vanderbilt  with  trying  to  steal 
the  route  of  the  latter.  In  a  signed  statement  published 
in  the  New  York  Times  of  April  30, 1872,  Barnes  said  the 


FIKST   TUNNEL  UNDER  BEOADWAY  99 

Vanderbilt  bill  was  introduced  at  about  the  same  time 
that  news  of  the  combination  between  the  Hudson  River 
and  Harlem  railroads  for  a  line  to  Montreal  was  pub- 
lished, and  that  this  line  depended  on  the  Central  Under- 
ground route  for  access  to  New  York  City. 

In  the  statement  Barnes  also  declared  that  his  com- 
pany had  only  recently  thrown  off  the  control  of  the 
Tweed  Ring,  whose  influence  had  prevented  it  from  be- 
ginning work.  The  avowed  purpose  of  the  Ring,  he  said 
was  to  allow  the  charter  to  expire  by  lapse  of  time  *'in 
order  that  they  might  profit  by  other  and  competing 
schemes."  When  Tweed  was  Commissioner  of  Public 
Works  in  1871  the  Central  Underground  company  applied 
to  him  for  the  necessary  permit  to  open  the  streets  for 
the  beginning  of  work.  The  request  was  *'met  with  a 
flat  refusal  and  the  threatening  statement  that  the  com- 
pany should  never  put  spade  in  the  earth  of  Manhattan 
Island." 

Before  the  Tweed  Ring  got  control  of  the  company, 
Barnes  said,  every  effort  was  made  to  get  Vanderbilt  in- 
terested. His  son-in-law  was  a  director  in  the  company, 
and  he  was  offered  every  inducement  to  build  the  road. 
His  only  reply,  according  to  Barnes,  was :  ''No,  I  shall  be 
underground  a  d d  sight  sooner  than  this  thing." 

As  before  stated,  however,  the  Vanderbilt  bill  was 
amended  so  that  the  route  would  not  conflict  with  the 
Central  Underground  charter  and  became  a  law.  The 
Commodore's  plans  must  have  changed  soon  after  its 
passage,  for  the  New  York  City  Rapid  Transit  Company 
did  not  build.  All  that  was  done  was  to  get  the  engineer 
of  the  Harlem  Railroad  Company,  Mr.  Buckhout,  to 
make  surveys,  plans  and  estimates  for  the  line.  In  1877 
Allan  Campbell,  Commissioner  of  Public  Works  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  in  a  report  to  the  Mayor  on  the  feasi- 
bility of  building  a  rapid  transit  road  from  42d  street 
down  town  by  private  enterprise,  wrote : 

"In  regard  to  the  Vandei'^bilt  underground  road, 


100  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

no  reports  or  estimates  were  published,  though  sur- 
veys, plans  and  estimates  were  made  by  Mr.  Buck- 
hout,  the  engineer  of  the  Harlem  Railroad  company. 
These  documents  cannot  at  present  be  found,  but  the 
information  obtained  by  me  when  the  work  was  under 
consideration,  at  which  time  I  had  several  interviews 
with  Commodore  Vanderbilt  upon  the  subject,  will 
suffice  for  our  present  purpose." 

Campbell  then  quoted  the  following  figures,  which  he 
said  had  been  prepared  for  Commodore  Vanderbilt  by 
"responsible  and  experienced  contractors": 

Construction  work $6,000,000 

Private  property 1,000,000 

Rolling  stock  and  engineering.  . .  .   1,250,000 
10%  for  contingencies 850,000 


$9,100,000 


Campbell  said  the  estimate  for  the  same  distance  made 
by  Chesbrough  and  Greene  for  the  Central  Underground 
company,  was  more  than  $10,000,000.  He  also  cited  the 
fact  that  the  law  provided  for  openings  every  20  feet  in 
the  Vanderbilt  tunnel. 

Among  other  early  charters  for  underground  roads 
was  one  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  1868  to  incorporate 
the  New  York  and  Brooklyn  Iron  Tubular  Tunnel  Com- 
pany. This  act  authorized  Silas  C.  Herring,  George 
Hazewell  and  others  to  form  a  company  with  $5,000,000 
capital  to  "erect  an  iron  tubular  tunnel"  across  the  bed 
of  the  East  River  from  a  point  between  Wall  and  Jackson 
streets,  New  York,  to  a  point  between  Montague  street 
and  Hudson  Avenue,  Brooklyn.  The  act  failed  to  specify 
what  the  tunnel  was  to  be  used  for,  and  in  1869  it  was 
amended  to  authorize  the  company  to  transport  passen- 
gers and  freight  through  it.  The  amendment  changed 
the  name  of  the  company  to  the  New  York  Tunnel  com- 


FIRST  TUNNEL  UNDER  BROADWAY  101 

pany  and  allowed  the  company  two  years  to  begin  and 
seven  years  to  complete  the  work.  Nothing  ever  came  of 
this  ambitious  scheme,  which  was  the  forerunner  of  the 
present  sub-river  tunnels  built  a  quarter  of  a  century 
later. 

It  was  the  Legislature  of  1871  which  passed  the  char- 
ter for  the  Tweed  viaduct  railroad.  This  act  authorized 
Peter  B.  Sweeney,  William  M.  Tweed  Jr.,  Jose  F.  Na- 
varro, James  G.  Bennett  Jr.,  August  Belmont,  Horace 
Greeley,  James  B.  8wain  and  others  to  incorporate  the 
New  York  Railway  company  with  $25,000,000  capital  and 
to  build  and  operate  a  steam  railroad  through  blocks  be- 
tween Broadway  and  Chatham  Street  from  Chambers 
Street  north,  up  the  East  Side  between  Third  Avenue 
and  the  East  River  to  Harlem  and  up  the  West  Side  west 
of  Sixth  Avenue  to  Spuyten  Duyvil  near  Kingsbridge. 
The  fare  was  to  be  15  cents  from  Chambers  Street  to 
Harlem  and  20  cents  to  Kingsbridge.  Tweed's  downfall 
came  so  soon  after  the  passage  of  this  act  that  nothing 
was  done  with  the  franchise,  which  lapsed  by  time  limi- 
tation. This  was  the  franchise  that  called  for  the  in- 
vestment of  $5,000,000  by  the  City  of  New  York. 

On  May  25,  1871,  the  incorporators  met  in  the  City 
Hall,  New  York,  and  elected  directors.  The  meeting  was 
held  in  the  Governors'  Room,  and  among  those  present 
were  Peter  B.  (Sweeney,  Hugh  Smith,  Forbes  Holland, 
J.  J.  Sewell,  Leopold  Eidlitz,  James  P.  Burnett,  R.  B. 
Connolly,  William  R.  Travers,  William  M.  Tweed  Jr., 
Sheppard  Knapp — the  first  ten  of  the  incorporators,  and 
Senator  Cauldwell,  James  Sweeney,  Oswald  Ottendorfer, 
Justice  Shandley,  James  Irving,  Alderman  Cowan  ''and 
many  other  well  known  Democratic  politicians". 

It  was  a  cause  for  wonder  at  the  time  how  Tweed 
managed  to  get  prominent  men  not  identified  with  poli- 
tics to  join  with  him  in  this  scheme,  but  he  succeeded  in 
convincing  many  that  the  only  way  to  get  rapid  transit 
was  through  a  company  which  had  his  support,  and  men 


102  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

like  A.  T.  Stewart,  August  Belmont,  Horace  Greeley  and 
John  Jaco/b  Astor  took  stock  in  the  enterprise  and  al- 
lowed themselves  to  be  named  and  advertised  as  direc- 
tors. The  new  directors  met  in  June  to  take  subscrip- 
tions to  the  capital  stock  of  the  company,  for  the  act  pro- 
vided that  no  steps  toward  construction  could  be  taken 
until  at  least  $1,000,000  had  been  subscribed.  Most  of 
the  directors  took  500  shares  each. 

But  Tweed's  downfall  was  approaching,  and  he  was 
soon  deserted  by  his  respectable  associates.  In  Novem- 
ber all  the  directors  of  the  company  resigned,  and  the 
board  was  reorganized  with  the  Tweed  men  left  out. 
John  Taylor  Johnston  was  elected  president  and  the 
following  men  composed  the  new  board  of  directors : 

A.  T.  Stewart,  Sydney  Dillon,  August  Belmont, 
Charles  A.  Lamont,  James  F.  D.  Lanier,  Franklin  Os- 
good, William  Butler  Duncan,  Oswald  Ottendorfer, 
Charles  L.  Tiffany,  William  E.  Travers,  William  B.  Og- 
den,  John  Jacob  Astor,  Abraham  S.  Hewitt,  Levi  P.  Mor- 
ton, S.  D.  Babcock,  William  P.  Blodgett,  James  B.  Col- 
gate, Jose  F.  Navarro,  Edward  B.  Westley,  John  Taylor 
Johnston,  Andrew  H.  Grreen,  William  H.  Appleton  and 
Joseph  Seligman. 

This  was  a  board  to  command  the  confidence  of  the 
financial  world,  but  even  with  such  men  interested  the 
viaduct  scheme  was  found  to  be  too  expensive  to  justify 
the  large  investment  involved,  and  no  serious  effort  was 
made  to  carry  it  out.  The  project  languished  and  the 
franchise  lapsed.  It  was  impracticable  from  the  start, 
for  it  contemplated  the  purchase  of  a  wide  right  of  way 
through  blocks  of  property  so  valuable  that  a  road  built 
thereon  could  not  possibly  get  enough  traffic  to  pay  the 
interest  on  the  investment. 

The  collapse  of  the  Viaduct  Railway  stimulated  inter- 
est in  the  underground  projects,  forgotten  during  its 
exploitation  by  Tweed.  Vandenburgh  tried  to  inject  new 
life  into  the  Central  Underground  company  by  proposing 


FIEST  TUNNEL  UNDER  BROADWAY  103 

a  consolidation  of  that  concern  with  the  reorganized  Via- 
duct company,  but  nothing  came  of  the  move,  and  in  a 
few  months  Vandenburgh  was  busy  at  Albany  trying  to 
save  the  Central  Underground  franchise  from  being 
wiped  out  by  the  grant  to  the  Vanderbilt  company  (the 
New  York  City  Rapid  Transit  Company)  by  the  Legis- 
lature of  1872. 

Forty  years  later,  namely  in  1912,  when  the  Metro- 
politan 'Street  Railway  Company  was  being  reorganized 
after  passing  through  the  hands  of  receivers,  the  new 
company  was  named  the  New  York  Railways  Company, 
the  plural  of  ''Railway"  being  used  because  the  name  of 
Tweed's  company,  the  New  York  Railway  Company,  still 
stood  on  the  list  of  chartered  corporations. 

Perhaps  the  oddest  of  all  the  schemes  for  rapid  tran- 
sit which  got  the  ear  of  the  Legislature  was  that  con- 
templated by  the  charter  of  the  Metropolitan  Transit 
Company,  granted  by  act  of  1872.  This  was  the  project 
of  James  B.  iSwain,  once  State  Engineer.  It  was  known 
as  the  "two-tier"  railroad,  but  in  reality  was  a  three  deck 
highway.  Instead  of  using  the  streets,  iSwain  proposed 
to  buy  a  right  of  way  through  blocks,  and  in  this  right 
of  way  build  three  railroads,  one  over  the  other.  The 
lowest  level  was  to  be  a  subway  for  freight,  the  next  a 
slightly  depressed  road  for  passenger  traffic  and  the 
third  was  to  be  an  elevated  structure  from  which  pas- 
senger cars  would  hang  suspended  and  be  drawn  by 
horses  driven  on  the  roadway  below.  Aside  from  its 
fantastic  nature,  the  cost  of  right  of  way  and  construc- 
tion would  have  been  prohibitive,  yet  in  those  days  Swain, 
a  good  engineer,  was  enthusiastic  over  the  plan  and  en- 
listed sufficient  support  to  get  his  bill  through  the  Legisla- 
ture. The  route  was  to  be  from  Bowling  Green  to  Morris 
Street  and  through  blocks  west  of  Sixth  Avenue  to  37th 
street,  thence  over  to  Seventh  Avenue  and  through  blocks 
west  of  it  to  42d  Street,  with  a  branch  to  the  Grand  Cen- 
tral station,  then  up  to  58th  Street  and  Broadway  and 


104  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

then  west  of  Ninth  Avenue  to  175th  (Street  and  the  Har- 
lem River.  In  spite  of  the  costly  nature  of  the  scheme, 
the  capital  stock  authorized  was  only  $5,000,000. 

iSwain  never  raised  the  capital  to  build  the  road,  but 
he  worked  at  it  for  several  years.  In  Februarj^,  1875,  his 
company  issued  a  statement  soliciting  subscriptions  to 
$2,000,000  of  the  stock  and  $1,000,000  of  the  bonds,  in 
which  it  was  said : 

''All  the  preliminary  steps  required  by  the  sta- 
tute have  been  taken,  and  the  construction  of  said 
railroad  has  been  commenced  sufficient  to  comply 
with  the  charter,  Peter  Cooper,  the  venerable  philan- 
thropist, laying  the  corner  stone  of  the  structure 
Dec.  24, 1874." 

Another  tubular  tunnel  act  was  passed  by  the  Legis- 
lature of  1873.  It  authorized  Drake  DeKay  and  others 
to  form  a  company  and  build  and  operate  a  tubular  tun- 
nel from  Staten  Island  to  New  Jersey  under  the  waters 
of  the  Kill  von  Kull  or  iStaten  Island  Sound.  It  allowed 
the  directors  to  use  any  motive  power  found  desirable 
and  to  charge  any  rate  of  fare,  but  when  the  profits  ex- 
ceeded 12  per  cent,  the  fare  was  to  be  reduced.  The 
amount  of  capital  stock  authorized  was  $300,000.  Noth- 
ing ever  came  of  the  scheme. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Gtilbeet  Elevated  Railroad  and  the  Rapid  Transit 
Commission  of  1875. 

gHORTLY  after  the  New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Com- 
pany had  taken  over  the  Harvey  elevated  road  in  1871 
a  rival  interest  appeared  in  the  rapid  transit  field.  This 
was  the  Gilhert  Elevated  Railway  Company,  chartered 
by  act  of  the  Legislature  of  June  17,  1872.  Like  Har- 
vey's, this  was  a  patent  railway.  The  inventor  and  pat- 
entee was  Dr.  Rufus  H.  Gilbert,  a  veteran  of  the  Civil 
War,  who  on  taking  up  a  peaceful  avocation  shortly  after 
the  close  of  the  war  devoted  himself  to  perfecting  a  de- 
sign for  an  elevated  railroad.  Like  Harvey,  too,  he  got 
a  franchise  and  started  his  road,  only  to  lose  all  interest 
in  it  to  the  men  associated  with  him  and  see  its  profits  go 
to  others. 

After  six  years  of  effort  Dr.  G-ilbert  succeeded  in  get- 
ting the  Legislature  of  1872  to  pass  an  act  incorporating 
the  Gilbert  Elevated  Railway  Company,  with  a  capital 
stock  of  $3,500,000,  to  build  and  operate  a  railroad  ac- 
cording to  the  plans  of  "Gilbert's  Improved  Elevated 
Railway."    The  incorporators  named  in  the  act  were: 

George  B.  Grinnell  B.  W.  Van  Voorhis 

Elisha  A.  Packer  Rufus  H.  Gilbert 

William  Foster  Jr.  Henry  J.  Davidson 

Burnett  Forbes  M.  0.  Davidson 

J.  E.  Southworth  Howell  W.  Bickley 

Isaac  P.  Martin  P.  Lorillard 

H.  D.  Clapp  J.  C.  Williams 

B.  J.  Dillon  Henry  S.  Winans 

The  route  was  not  fixed  in  the  act,  but  a  Board  of 
Commissioners  was  named  to  select  one.  This  Board, 
named  in  the  act,  consisted  of  Henry  G.  Stebbins,  Major 
General  Quincy  A.  Gilmore,  Sheppard  Knapp,  Chester 


106  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

A.  Arthur,  many  years  later  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  General  John  A.  Dix,  afterward  Governor  of 
New  York. 

The  plan  of  "Gilbert's  Improved  Elevated  Railway" 
provided  for  tubular  iron  roadways  suspended  above  the 
streets  by  Gothic  arches  springing  from  the  curb  lines. 
Through  these  tubular  roads  cars  were  to  be  propelled 
by  atmospheric  or  other  motive  power.  The  company 
was  to  build  a  road  from  the  Harlem  River  southward 
through  the  city  according  to  the  route  to  be  fixed  by  the 
Board  of  Commissioners.  It  was  to  complete  the  road 
as  far  north  as  42d  iStreet  in  one  and  a  half  years,  to  86th 
Street  in  two  and  a  half  years  and  to  the  Harlem  River 
in  three  years.  An  amendatory  act  passed  in  1873  pro- 
hibited the  use  of  Broadway  south  of  34th  Street. 

Here  is  the  route  selected  by  the  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners :  From  Kingsbridge  on  the  Harlem  River  down 
River  Street,  Eighth  Avenue,  110th  Street,  Ninth  Ave- 
nue, Fifty-third  Street,  Sixth  Avenue,  Amity  Street, 
South  Fifth  Avenue,  "West  Broadway,  College  Place, 
Murray  Street,  Church  Street,  New  Church  Street  to  Mor- 
ris Street;  thence  through  private  property  and  Bowling 
Green  to  Beaver  Street;  thence  by  Beaver  and  Pearl 
Streets,  the  New  Bowery,  Division  Street,  Allen  Street, 
First  Avenue,  Twenty-third  street.  Second  Avenue  and 
River  Street  to  the  first  named  line  at  River  Street  and 
Eighth  Avenue;  also  a  connecting  line  along  Chambers 
Street  and  Chatham  Street  and  a  branch  on  Sixth  Avenue 
from  53d  to  59th  Street. 

In  1874  the  Legislature  passed  an  act  confirming  the 
route  and  extending  the  time  of  construction  for  thrive 
years.  The  panic  of  1873  and  the  financial  depression 
following  it,  together  with  the  impossible  method  of  con- 
struction prescribed,  prevented  the  company  from  get- 
ting the  capital  to  build  the  line.  Accordingly  an  appeal 
was  made  to  the  Legislature  of  1875  for  relief.  This  was 
obtained  by  the  famous  act  of  1875,  creating  the  first 


ONE  OF  THE  DESIGNS  FOR  GILBERT 
ELEVATED  RAILROAD,    1872. 


THE    GILBERT    ELEVATED    RAILROAD  107 


Eapid  Transit  Commission.  This  act  confirmed  the  com- 
pany in  its  routes  and  authorized  it  to  use  a  simple 
method  of  construction.  It  was  approved  by  the  Gover- 
nor, who  was  Samuel  J.  Tilden. 

The  elevated  railroad  system  in  Manhattan  and  the 
Bronx  as  it  exists  today  owes  its  existence  to  the  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  Rapid  Transit  formed  under  this  act, 
which  not  only  provided  for  the  building  of  the  Gilbert 
road,  but  also  laid  down  "connecting"  routes  for  the 
New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Company,  the  connections 
being  longer  than  the  original  lines.  The  act,  which  was 
denominated  a  general  act  in  deference  to  a  recently 
adopted  amendment  to  the  State  constitution  forbidding 
the  enactment  of  special  legislation,  in  reality  applied 
only  to  New  'York  City.  In  general  it  provided  that, 
whenever  fifty  or  more  householders  in  a  county  or  city 
should  make  application  that  there  was  need  of  a  steam 
railway  in  such  county  or  city,  the  Board  of  Supervisors 
or  the  Mayor,  as  the  ease  might  be,  should  appoint  five 
commissioners,  who  were  thereby  empowered  to  fix  the 
routes  over  which  such  steam  railroads  should  be  built, 
and  to  fix  routes  for  the  connection  of  any  existing  steam 
elevated  railroad  with  ferries  and  other  railroads. 

In  June  1875  two  petitions  from  householders  were 
presented  to  the  Mayor  of  New  York  City,  then  W.  H. 
Wickham.  One  declared  that  need  existed  for  another 
steam  railroad  in  the  city,  and  the  other  that  the  existing 
line  of  the  New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Company,  in 
Greenwich  Street  and  Ninth  Avenue,  needed  connections 
with  other  steam  railroads  and  with  the  ferries.  Among 
those  who  signed  the  first  petition  was  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, of  No.  6  West  Fifty-seventh  Street,  New  York.  On 
July  1  Mayor  Wickham  appointed  the  following  five 
Commissioners : 

Joseph  Seligman,  of  No.  26  West  34th  Street. 
Lewis  B.  Brown,  of  No.  257  West  45th  Street. 


108  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Cornelius  H.  Delamater,  of  No.  424  West  20th  Street. 
Jordan  L.  Mott,  of  Third  Avenne  near  East  133d 
Street. 

Charles  J.  Canda,  of  No.  208  West  14th  Street. 

The  Commission  met  on  July  6  in  the  Mayor's  office. 
Mayor  Wickham  was  present  and  informed  the  Commis- 
sioners that  fifty  householders,  as  provided  by  the  act, 
had  petitioned  him  that  there  was  need  of  a  rapid  transit 
steam  railway  in  New  York  and  asking  that  commis- 
sioners be  appointed.  Later  the  Commission  organized 
by  electing  Mr.  Seligman  chairman.  Burton  N.  Harrison 
acted  as  Secretary.  It  immediately  advertised  in  the 
newspapers  for  rapid  transit  plans,  to  be  submitted  by 
August  1.  Various  plans  were  submitted,  and  the  Com- 
mission held  many  conferences  with  those  who  presented 
them. 

Many  opinions  were  obtained  from  counsel  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  act  under  which  the  Commission 
was  proceeding.  Among  them  was  one  which  led  to  the 
** connection"  of  the  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  line  with  the 
Grand  Central  station  and  the  ferries  by  doubling  the 
Battery  and  running  up  the  East  Side.  The  law  forbade 
the  laying  out  of  a  route  in  Broadway  south  of  34th 
Street,  and  the  Commission  asked  counsel  whether  this 
provision  inhibited  the  crossing  of  Broadway.  Counsel 
held  that  such  crossing  was  prohibited,  but  that  the  New 
York  Elevated  Railroad  could  be  ** connected"  with  South 
Perry  and  the  Grand  Central  station  by  an  extension 
** turning"  Broadway  at  its  southern  end  and  continuing 
up  the  East  Side  to  Forty-second  Street  and  beyond  to 
the  northern  ferries. 

On  September  2, 1875,  the  Commission  adopted  resolu- 
tions fixing  the  routes  for  the  New  York  Elevated  and 
the  Gilbert  Elevated  roads.  The  resolution  for  the  for- 
mer read  in  part  as  follows : 

''Resolved:  That,  in  pursuance  of  the  powers  and 


THE    GILBERT   ELEVATED   RAILROAD  109 


authority  conferred  upon  us  by  Chapter  606  of  the 
Laws  of  1875,  we  do  hereby  fix  and  determine  the 
route  or  routes  by  which  the  New  York  Elevated 
railroad,  an  elevated  steam  railway  now  and  at  the 
time  said  law  was  enacted  in  actual  operation,  may 
connect  with  other  steam  railways  or  the  depots 
thereof  and  with  steam  ferries  as  follows" : 

Here  the  route  of  the  Third  Avenue  elevated  was 
recited  in  full,  "turning"  Broadway  as  suggested  by 
counsel.  A  similar  resolution  was  adopted  on  the  same 
day,  fixing  the  routes  for  the  Gilbert  Elevated  road,  as 
given  above.  On  the  next  day,  September  3,  the  Com- 
mission voted  down  a  resolution  to  fix  a  route  for  the 
plan  of  J.  B.  and  J.  M.  Cornell  by  a  vote  of  three  to  two, 
Delamater  and  Mott  for,  and  iSeligman,  Brown  and 
Cauda  against.  This  was  the  only  project  outside  of  the 
New  York  and  Gilbert  Elevated  schemes  which  came  to 
a  vote.  The  Commission  refused  to  consider  any  under- 
ground projects  on  the  advice  of  counsel  that  "to  at- 
tempt to  authorize  the  construction  of  a  road  to  be  built 
entirely  or  mainly  under  the  surface  would  be  a  proceed- 
ing of  such  doubtful  legality  that  we  cannot  advise  it." 

Rates  of  fare  were  prescribed  for  both  elevated  lines. 
From  the  Battery  to  Fifty-ninth  Street  the  fare  was  to 
be  10  cents;  from  the  Battery  to  Harlem  not  to  exceed 
15  cents  and  to  Highbridge  not  to  exceed  17  cents;  for 
five  miles  10  cents  and  each  additional  mile  2  cents.  The 
resolutions  also  provided  for  "Commission  trains",  to 
be  operated  from  5 :30  to  7 :30  o'clock  in  the  morning  and 
from  5  to  7  o'clock  in  the  evening,  on  which  the  fares 
should  be  half  the  above,  namely  5  cents  from  the  Bat- 
tery to  Fifty-ninth  'Street,  7  cents  to  Harlem  and  8  cents 
to  Highbridge. 

By  railroad  men  the  so-called  "rush  hours"  in  New 
York  are  known  as  "commission  hours,"  because  of  the 
fact  that  "commission  trains"  as  provided  for  by  the 


110  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TEANSIT 

Commission  of  1875  were  operated  at  a  cheaper  fare  in 
those  hours. 

As  the  act  authorized  the  Commission  to  organize  a 
company  to  build  a  road  in  case  no  company  carried  out 
the  plans  approved,  the  Commission  in  October  caused 
the  organization  of  the  Manhattan  Railway  Company, 
with  a  capital  stock  of  $2,000,000,  all  of  which  was  sub- 
scribed for.  The  incorporators  included  men  interested 
in  both  the  New  York  and  Gilbert  Elevated  companies. 
The  directors,  elected  under  supervision  of  the  Commis- 
sion, November  10,  1875,  were: 
Cornelius  K.  Garrison  George  M.  Pullman 

Horace  Porter  Jose  F.  Navarro 

Milton  Oourtright  William  L.  Scott 

John  F.  Tracy  David  Dows 

John  Ross 

The  articles  of  association  for  the  Manhattan  Railway 
company  recited  at  length  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the 
Commission  in  fixing  the  routes  for  the  two  elevated  sys- 
tems, as  well  as  the  resolutions  in  which  the  Commission 
specified  the  plans  on  which  the  roads  should  be  built. 
These  contained  directions  for  placing  the  elevated  pil- 
lars to  support  the  elevated  structure  and  complete  spe- 
cifications for  the  work  and  the  materials  to  be  used. 
The  company  was  given  till  May,  1877,  to  complete  the 
roads  to  Fifty-ninth  Street  and  till  June,  1878,  to  the 
Harlem  River,  on  the  West  Side  of  the  city,  and  till  De- 
cember, 1877  and  December,  1878,  respectively  those  por- 
tions on  the  East  Side. 

The  schedule  of  fares  adopted  by  the  Commission  was 
also  included  in  the  articles.  An  interesting  feature  of 
this  schedule  was  that  it  provided  that  passengers  in 
non-rush  hours  who  could  not  get  a  seat  in  the  trains 
could  travel  free.  Provision  also  was  made  for  ''saloon 
or  drawing  room"  cars,  for  a  seat  in  which  the  company 
might  charge  an  extra  fare.    The  articles  declared  spe- 


THE    GILBERT   ELEVATED   RAILROAD  111 

cifically  that  the  Manhattan  company  should  not  build 
the  roads  authorized  to  be  built  by  the  Gilbert  Elevated 
or  the  New  York  Elevated  company  unless  the  latter 
failed  to  construct  its  road  in  the  time  allowed. 

The  Board  of  Directors  met  on  November  12,  1875, 
and  elected  David  Dows  president  and  Horace  Porter 
secretary  of  the  Manhattan  company. 

At  the  request  of  the  New  York  Elevated  company 
the  Commission  on  December  2,  1875,  fixed  more  def- 
initely the  route  across  the  Battery,  by  which  the  ''con- 
nection" with  ferries  and  the  Grand  Central  station  was 
to  be  made.  This  action  gave  the  company  specific  rights 
across  Battery  Park.  After  approving  and  filing  the 
bonds  given  by  the  two  elevated  companies,  the  Commis- 
sion finished  its  work  and  on  December  11,  1875,  ad- 
journed ''subject  to  the  call  of  the  president  or  of  any 
two  of  the  Commissioners."  Its  last  act  was  to  draft 
and  send  to  Mayor  William  H.  Wickham  a  farewell  let- 
ter, in  which  it  said: 

"We  have  every  reason  to   expect  that  Eapid 
Transit  will  now  be  afforded  to  the  city." 

The  effect  of  the  Commission's  action  was  soon  seen. 
Each  of  the  companies  made  the  requisite  financial  ar- 
rangements and  began  construction,  which  was  pressed 
as  fast  as  circumstances  would  allow.  Obstacles  of  vari- 
ous kinds  were  encountered,  not  the  least  of  which  were 
injunction  suits  brought  by  property  owners.  These, 
however,  were  fought  successfully,  and  in  1877  final  de- 
cision in  favor  of  the  roads  was  handed  down  by  the 
Court  of  Appeals.  The  New  York  Elevated  company 
completed  its  line  up  Ninth  Avenue  to  Fifty-ninth  Street 
and  began  operating  it  in  1876;  its  line  from  Battery 
Place  to  South  Ferry  in  1877;  the  Third  Avenue  line 
from  South  Ferry  to  42d  iStreet  in  August,  1878,  and  to 
129th  Street  in  December,  1878.     In   1880  the  Second 


112  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Avenue  line  reached  67tli  Street  and  the  Ninth  Avenue 
line  Harlem. 

Work  on  the  Gilbert  Elevated  company's  lines  began 
in  1876,  but  was  stopped  by  legal  proceedings  brought  by 
property  owners  and  the  surface  railroad  companies, 
culminating  in  the  injunction  which  was  finally  dissolved 
by  the  Court  of  Appeals  decision  in  November,  1877. 
Construction  was  then  pushed  rapidly,  and  the  line  from 
Morris  Street  to  Fifty-ninth  Street  (the  Sixth  Avenue 
road)  was  completed  in  April  and  placed  in  operation 
in  June,  1878.  In  the  same  month  by  court  order  the 
name  of  the  Gilbert  company  was  changed  to  the  Metro- 
politan Elevated  Railway  company.  Financial  difficulties 
beset  the  company,  and  differences  arose  among  its  di- 
rectors. As  a  result  the  Manhattan  Railway  Company, 
organized  by  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  of  1875  for 
just  such  an  emergency,  stepped  in,  leased  both  roads  and 
took  control  of  the  work  on  the  Gilbert  road  in  Septem- 
ber, 1879,  and  completed  construction  to  the  Harlem 
River.  It  was  in  May,  1879,  that  both  old  companies,  the 
New  York  and  the  Metropolitan,  made  a  contract  with 
the  Manhattan  Railway  Company,  for  the  lease  of  the 
property  and  rights  of  the  former.  The  lease  took  effect 
as  of  January  31,  1879. 

This  lease  was  made  the  subject  of  special  inquiry  by 
the  Railroad  Committee  of  the  New  York  Assembly  in 
an  investigation  of  railroads  held  in  1879.  It  was  spread 
upon  the  minutes  and  men  prominent  in  both  the  New 
York  and  the  Gilbert  companies  were  examined  as  to  its 
terms  and  conditions.  It  was  testified  that  the  Manhat- 
tan Railway  Company  had  $13,000,000  in  capital  stock, 
half  of  which  was  issued  to  each  company  in  return  for 
stock  in  the  old  companies.  The  lease  was  to  run  999 
years  and  the  rental  w^as  fixed  at  ten  per  cent,  on  the 
stock  of  each  of  the  old  companies,  which  was  $6,500,000 
each.  It  was  also  brought  out  in  the  testimony  that  the 
New  York  Elevated  company  was  obligated  to  pay  to  the 


HORRORS  OF  ELEVATED  RAILROAD  OPERATION 
AS  SEEN  BY  ITS  OPPONENTS. 


THE    GILBERT   ELEVATED   RAILROAD  113 

City  of  New  York  five  per  cent,  of  its  net  earnings,  and 
the  Metropolitan,  or  Grilbert  company,  two  per  cent  of  its 
dividends. 

According  to  the  testimony  the  original  elevated  roads 
cost  about  $700,000  to  $800,000  per  mile  of  double  tracked 
structure  and  the  cars  about  $3,100  to  $3,500  apiece. 
Jose  F.  Navarro  was  the  leading  promoter  of  the  Gilbert 
road.  He  testified  that  he  had  obtained  his  stock  at  vari- 
ious  prices,  some  as  low  as  twenty  cents  a  share  and  some 
as  high  as  par  value.  Before  the  charters  were  upheld 
by  the  Court  decision  of  1877  he  said  it  was  difiQcult  to 
interest  capitalists  in  the  project.  After  he  persuaded 
Commodore  Grarrison  and  George  M.  Pullman  to  take 
stock,  it  was  easier  to  interest  others.  William  H.  Van- 
derbilt  had  been  approached,  but  he  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  project,  because  he  believed  that  people 
never  would  consent  to  walk  up  and  down  stairs  to  and 
from  the  railroad.  Navarro  said  his  road  had  increased 
the  assessed  value  of  city  property  $100,000,000  and  in 
five  years  more  would  increase  it  $500,000,000. 

Benjamin  Brewster,  a  stockholder  in  the  New  York 
Elevated  company,  which  took  over  the  old  Harvey  road, 
testified  as  to  the  reasons  for  the  merger  of  the  two  com- 
panies in  the  lease  to  the  Manhattan  Eailway  company. 
Both  old  companies,  he  said,  were  compelled  to  use  the 
same  tracks  in  Pearl  street  from  Beaver  street  to  Chat- 
ham Square,  and  in  Ninth  Avenue  from  53d  street  to 
110th  street.  This  involved  grade  crossings  for  the 
trains  of  each  and  meant  dangerous  operation.  His 
company  had  appealed  to  the  Assembly  for  the  right  to 
build  crossings,  but  had  been  told  that  it  was  a  matter 
the  companies  must  settle  between  themselves.  The  only 
way  they  could  settle  it  was  by  getting  together  and  form- 
ing one  operating  company;  hence  the  lease. 

Both  Navarro  and  Brew^ster  were  examined  as  to  the 
rates  of  fare,  which  then  were  ten  cents  on  each  road, 
with  five  cents  in  the  "commission"  hours,  so  called  be- 


114  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

cause  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  stipulated  for  a 
five  cent  fare  for  workers  going  to  and  coming  from  work. 
Each  declared  that  a  uniform  five  cent  fare  would  be  too 
low.  Navarro  said  his  company  was  entitled  to  charge 
26  cents  to  Harlem  and  12  cents  to  Central  Park,  but 
voluntarily  had  reduced  the  rates  to  ten  cents,  which  he 
thought  low  enough.  Brewster  said  his  company  was 
entitled  to  charge  ten  cents  from  Battery  to  Fifty-ninth 
street  and  two  cents  a  mile  additional,  not  exceeding  fif- 
teen cents  to  Harlem  River.  He  also  said  the  New  York 
Elevated  stock  was  then  (1879)  worth  $165  and  had  been 
as  high  as  $200. 

Brewster  was  asked  about  certain  letters  published 
in  the  daily  press,  crediting  Samuel  J.  Tilden  and  Cyrus 
W.  Field  with  having  made  $1,000,000,  out  of  an  invest- 
ment of  about  $200,000  in  New  York  Elevated  stock.  He 
said  he  imagined  that  came  from  the  fortunate  period 
when  Mr.  Field  and  Mr.  Tilden  went  into  the  enterprise. 
It  was  practically  broken  down  and  elevated  roads  were 
in  bad  odor;  that  was  before  the  Court  of  Appeals  had 
affirmed  the  validity  of  the  elevated  road  legislation. 

With  the  extension  of  the  elevated  roads  to  the  Har- 
lem River,  their  business  expanded  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
In  1878,  before  either  line  had  reached  Harlem,  the  total 
number  of  passengers  carried  on  both  roads  was  9,236,- 
670.  In  December  of  that  year  the  Third  Avenue  line 
reached  129th  street,  and  the  passengers  carried  in  1879 
jumped  to  45,945,401.  In  1880  the  Ninth  Avenue  line 
reached  Harlem  and  the  Second  Avenue  line  reached  67th 
street.  The  figures  for  that  year  increased  to  60,831,757. 
As  this  immense  business  of  course  meant  large  profits, 
it  is  small  wonder  the  stock  of  the  elevated  roads  was  in 
demand. 

By  this  time  the  success  of  the  elevated  system  of 
city  travel  was  established.  That  it  was  so  is  due  almost 
entirely  to  the  act  of  1875  and  the  proceedings  of  the 
Rapid  Transit  Commission  acting  under  it.    In  a  report 


THE   GILBERT   ELEVATED   RAILROAD  115 

made  to  a  sub-committee  of  the  committee  appointed  by 
the  Assembly  in  1879  to  investigate  railroad  conditions 
in  New  York  City,  E.  Sweet,  an  engineer,  wrote : 

"The  Rapid  Transit  act  of  1875  and  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  Commission  appointed  under  it  insured 
a  certain  and  rapid  solution  of  the  quick  transit 
question  in  New  York  City  by  fixing  so  small  a  num- 
ber of  routes  as  to  make  them  valuable,  and  by  mak- 
ing the  enjoyment  of  these  routes  by  the  companies 
on  which  they  were  conferred  dependent  upon  im- 
mediate development.  They  created  for  both  the 
Metropolitan  and  the  New  York  Elevated  companies 
the  possibility  of  the  success  they  have  now  real- 
ized." 

The  evolution  of  the  elevated  railroad  from  the  crude 
conception  of  Harvey  in  1866  to  the  successful  operation 
of  1879  was  attended  by  revolutions  within  the  companies 
themselves.  It  has  been  told  how  Harvey,  the  inventor, 
lost  the  rewards  which  his  work  merited  and  was  elimi- 
nated from  the  reorganization  of  his  company.  A  similar 
fate  overtook  Dr.  Rufus  H.  Gilbert,  the  inventor  or  pro- 
jector of  the  Gilbert  or  Metropolitan  railroad.  Gilbert, 
like  Harvey,  had  a  crude  idea.  His  plan  contemplated 
the  construction  of  a  huge  iron  tube  through  which  he 
proposed  to  propel  cars  by  pneumatic  power.  The  law 
granting  the  rights  for  this  railroad  had  to  be  amended 
so  as  to  permit  the  building  of  a  simple  structure  carry- 
ing an  open  track  which  could  be  operated  by  locomotive 
engines  before  the  project  became  practicable.  Like  Har- 
vey, also,  Gilbert  lacked  the  financial  ability  to  success- 
fully organize  his  scheme.  In  his  efforts  to  enlist  capital 
he  gave  away  the  control  of  the  company,  and  his  final 
elimination  without  the  reward  to  which  he  was  entitled 
followed  its  reorganization.  Others  reaped  what  he 
sowed.  One  version  of  his  unfortunate  experience  was 
given  in  a  speech  made  by  Isaac  Hayes,  a  member  of 


116  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Assembly,  at  a  meeting  held  in  Chickeiring  Hall  on  June 
21,  1877,  as  a  protest  against  allowing  the  Gilbert  Ele- 
vated company  to  inflict  damage  on  private  property 
without  compensating  the  owners.  In  that  speech  Mr. 
Hayes  said: 

"Things  in  the  Gilbert  company  appear  to  be 
rather  mixed.  They  don't  seem  to  deal  any  more 
fairly  by  each  other  than  they  do  by  the  property 
owneirs  whom  they  threaten  with  calamity  nor  the 
public  who  demand'  the  building  of  the  road.  I 
judge  this  from  reading  the  title  of  a  suit  now  pend- 
ing in  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  which  runs  thus: 
'Rufus  H.  Gilbert,  plaintiff,  against  J.  T.  Navarro, 
William  Foster  Jr.,  the  Gilbert  Elevated  Eailway 
Company,  the  New  York  Loan  and  Improvement 
Company  and  the  Edgemoor  Iron  Company,  defend- 
ants.' 

*'Now  all  of  these  parties  to  the  suit  have  been 
more  or  less  interested  directly  in  this  combination 
to  destroy  South  Fifth  Avenue,  Amity  Street  and 
Sixth  Avenue.  I  will  tell  you  how,  to  begin  at  the 
beginning.  Dr.  Gilbert,  who  has  been  apparently 
most  grievously  wronged,  conceived  the  idea  of  a 
rapid  transit  road  to  be  built  of  iron.  He  had  seen 
plenty  of  shot  and  shell  during  the  war,  and  iron 
was  a  favorite  with  him.  He  worked  away  over  that 
idea  for  six  long  years,  and  finally  in  1872  he  secured 
a  charter  from  the  Legislature.  Then  he  meets  Will- 
iam Foster  Jr.,  and  they  together  make  up  a  com- 
pany. They  create  directors  and  issue  stock.  Foster 
Jr.  takes  some  thousands  of  these  shares  to  sell,  but 
he  doesn't  sell  them.  But  he  falls  in  with  Mr.  Na- 
varro, who  has  some  knowledge  of  a  company  with  a 
charter,  called  the  'New  York  Loan  and  Improve- 
ment Company'.  And  now  others  step  in,  and  a 
little  ring  is  formed,  and  this  little  ring  manage  to 
get  possession  of  all  the  stock  of  the  Gilbert  Elevated 


THE    GILBERT   ELEVATED   EAILEOAD  117 

Railway  Company,  the  Doctor's  included,  and  Dr. 
Gilbert,  who  had  obtained  the  franchise,  after  six 
years  finds  himself  out  in  the  cold.  But  he  pockets 
a  promise  of  ever  so  many  shares  of  the  New  York 
Loan  and  Improvement  Company  in  lieu  of  his  own, 
and  is  content.  To  be  sure,  he  never  got  the  stock, 
as  he  swears,  hence  the  suit.  Well,  this  Improvement 
company  undertook  to  construct  the  road.  *  *  * 
The  Gilbert  Elevated  Railway  Company  *  *  * 
never  did  have  any  money,  as  one  would  think,  or 
they  would  hardly  have  gone  over  body  and  soul 
through  the  agency  of  Foster  Jr.  and  Navarro  to 
the  Improvement  company.  And  now  the  said  Im- 
provement company,  finding  itself  in  this  sad  predica- 
ment of  impecuniosity,  sublet  their  contract  with  the 
Railway  company  to  the  Edgemoor  Iron  Company, 
of  the  State  of  Delaware." 

Mr.  Sweet  in  the  report  above  quoted  said  that  the 
New  York  Loan  and  Improvement  Company  financed  the 
Gilbert  project,  making  a  contract  in  1876  with  the  Rail- 
way company  to  build  and  equip  the  line  for  $500,000  in 
stock,  $750,000  in  first  mortgage  bonds  and  $750,000  in 
second  mortgage  bonds  for  each  completed  mile  of  double 
track  road. 

While  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  of  1875  un- 
doubtedly did  much  for  the  New  York  Elevated  Railroad, 
it  must  not  be  inferred  that  it  did  everything  for  it.  That 
company  was  on  its  feet  and  part  of  its  road  was  in  suc- 
cessful operation  at  the  time  the  Commission  was  created. 
Its  report  dated  January  20,  1875,  shows  that  it  was  then 
running  cars  from  Greenwich  Street  up  Ninth  Avenue 
as  far  as  34th  Street,  and  an  immediate  extension  to  59th 
Street  was  recommended.  By  this  report  it  was  shown 
that  the  company  had  expended  more  than  $1,300,000  in 
building  and  equipping  the  road.  Its  receipts  from  pas- 
senger fares  for  the  year  were  $82,945,  and  this  was  for 


118  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

only  313  days,  the  road  not  having  been  operated  on 
Sundays.  Its  trains  were  composed  of  two  cars  or  three 
cars,  and  the  average  daily  receipts  were  $265.  Owing 
to  a  lack  of  turnouts,  it  took  35  minutes  to  make  the  trip 
from  34th  Street  to  the  Battery  and  return,  and  among 
the  recommendations  of  the  report  were  more  turnouts 
and  the  immediate  extension  of  the  line  to  59th  Street. 
Another  recommendation  was  that  the  guage  of  the  track 
be  reduced  from  five  feet  to  four  feet,  eight  and  one-half 
inches,  the  standard  of  the  steam  railroads.  On  the  lower 
part  of  the  road  the  rails  had  been  laid  on  longitudinal 
timbers,  while  above  30th  Street  they  w^ere  laid  on  iron 
cross-ties.  The  report  recommended  the  substitution  of 
wooden  cross-ties  as  better  and  less  expensive.  All  these 
changes  were  made  in  time. 

That  the  company  was  apprehensive  of  the  results  of 
pending  legislation  (the  Eapid  Transit  Act  of  1875)  is 
shown  by  the  following  closing  paragraph : 

''This  company,  as  the  pioneer  in  the  experiment 
of  elevated  rapid  transit  in  this  city,  and  in  consid- 
eration of  the  long  struggle  it  has  had  and  the  large 
expenditure  it  has  made  in  demonstrating  its  suc- 
cess, is,  I  think,  entitled  to,  and  will,  I  trust,  receive 
proper  consideration  from  the  State  authorities  and 
from  the  authorities  and  people  of  this  city  in  the 
movement  now  going  on  for  a  general  system  of 
elevated  rapid  transit  for  the  city." 

The  report  was  signed  by  Milton  Courtright,  then 
president  of  the  New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Company. 

James  Grant  Wilson's  History  of  New  York  says  the 
Greenwich  street  elevated  road,  while  the  germ  of  real 
rapid  transit,  was  ''the  butt  of  good  natured  ridicule  till 
it  was  sold  out  by  the  sheriff  in  1871.  Its  new  manage- 
ment made  a  strong  effort  to  push  it  northward,  but  legal 
obstacles  beset  them  on  all  sides,  thrown  in  their  way  by 


THE    GILBEET   ELEVATED   EAILEOAD  119 

the  strenuous  opposition  of  the  horse  railroads  and  of 
property  owners." 

The  "terrors"  of  the  elevated  railroad  are  pictured 
in  an  old  print,  which  is  reproduced  on  another  page. 
This  print  was  found  in  a  pamphlet  published  in  1877 
describing  a  meeting  of  the  "antis"  in  Chickering  Hall 
on  June  21  of  that  year.  This  meeting  was  held  to  "pro- 
test against  the  destruction  of  property  by  elevated  rail- 
roads without  compensation  to  owners."  Henry  M. 
Taber  was  elected  chairman,  and  there  was  a  large  list 
of  vice-presidents,  headed  by  Smith  Ely  Jr.  The  resolu- 
tions adopted  included  the  following : 

"Eesolved,  that  we  will  aid  by  our  means  and 
influence  any  legitimate  and  adequate  method  for 
rapid  transit,  believing  that  a  necessity  exists  for  a 
speedy,  safe  and  comprehensive  system  of  communi- 
cation between  the  two  extremities  of  the  city;  but 
in  doing  so  we  utterly  repudiate  the  idea  that  the 
property  of  one  man  is  to  be  sacrificed  to  put  money 
into  the  pockets  of  another.  We  believe  that  the 
citizens  of  New  York  can  afford  to  act  honestly  and 
pay  fairly  for  what  the  city  needs;  and  we  believe 
that  the  so-called  elevated  railroads  are  a  sham  and 
a  snare,  the  tendency  of  which  is  to  defeat  the  real 
object  in  view." 

How  the  opposition  to  the  elevated  roads  viewed  the 
Hapid  Transit  act  of  1875  is  shown  by  an  address  deliv- 
ered at  this  meeting  by  Robert  H.  Strahan,  chairman  of 
the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  Assembly  of  1877.  A 
part  of  Strahan 's  speech  follows: 


if 


'Let  it  be  understood,  then,  that  by  certain 
amendments  to  the  constitution  of  this  State,  which 
went  into  effect  on  the  first  of  January  1875,  all 
special  legislation  as  to  street  railroads  was  pro- 
hibited.   It  was  necessary  to  the  success  of  the  two 


120  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

projects  in  question  (the  Gilbert  elevated  and  the 
New  York  elevated)  that  this  prohibition  be  got 
around  in  some  way.  To  do  it  an  act  purporting  to 
be  a  General  Rapid  Transit  act  was  passed.  This 
was  also  in  1875.  This  was  a  very  remarkable  piece 
of  legislation.  It  purported  to  be  a  general  act, 
applicable  to  the  whole  State,  this  to  avoid  the  con- 
stitutional objection  as  to  special  legislation;  but  it 
was  in  fact  of  the  most  special  character.  It  was  in- 
tended for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  these  two  com- 
panies— the  Gilbert  Elevated  and  the  New  York 
Elevated  companies. 

''This  'general'  act  authorized  the  appointment  of 
five  commissioners,  to  whom  were  given  powers  of 
legislation  and  administration.  This  commission  of 
five  was  authorized  in  the  first  place  to  determine 
upon  the  necessity  of  these  railways  in  any  county 
or  city;  they  were  given  exclusive  power  to  locate 
these  railways  over,  across  or  under  any  of  the 
streets  or  avenues  of  the  cities  of  this  State.  They 
were  given  power  also  to  adopt  plans  of  construction 
and  conditions  of  construction,  and  they  had  power 
to  prepare  articles  and  to  organize  companies.  If  a 
corporation  be  formed  by  enactment  of  this  com- 
mission to  build  these  railways,  certain  powers  were 
given  to  it  by  this  act,  among  which  was  the  power 
of  eminent  domain — that  is,  the  right  to  take  private 
property. 

"Such  a  Commission  of  Five  was  appointed  by 
the  Mayor  of  the  City  of  New  York  for  this  city  and 
county,  and  they  were  clothed  with  these  general 
powers." 

The  speaker  then  pointed  out  that,  if  the  commission 
should  happen  to  locate  a  route  coincident  with  the  route 
of  an  existing  corporation,  that  corporation  might  build 
its  route  according  to  the  plans  of  the  Commission.    This 


riilttttgr   III  riirrff  fimjfll  tttvng   Ivitli 
thrtti   In  rnnf  tlir  Iniln  Jiimpt  tin 


» -hll,  ,r„lllng  fnr  tht  Irnln,  In,,-- 
rlrririiH  uiiiiinr  Ihrmtrltnn  nailtnt 
Ihr  Hiiiilil  rnin,!!  .V/fin. 


Another  Chapter  on  Hapld  Tranall 


DODGER  ISSUED  BY  OPPONENTS  OF  CON- 
STRUCTION OF  SIXTH  AVENUE 
ELEVATED  RAILROAD. 


THE    GILBERT   ELEVATED   RAILROAD  121 

provision,  the  Gilbert  corporation  claimed,  exempted  it 
from  building  the  kind  of  a  structure  required  by  its 
charter,  and  accordingly  *'it  is  now  endeavoring  to  build 
the  cheap  and  unsightly  and  unheard  of  structure  which 
is  intended  as  its  road." 

Another  provision  of  the  law  empowered  the  Com- 
mission, in  case  there  was  an  elevated  railroad  already  in 
operation,  to  lay  out  and  give  it  what  was  called  "connect- 
ing" routes  with  other  railroads  or  ferries.  That  meant 
the  New  York  Elevated  company,  the  speaker  said,  and 
''this  peculiar  phraseology  enables  it  to  encircle  the 
whole  island.  It  was  the  only  corporation  in  the  whole 
world  which  had  an  elevated  railway,  or  part  of  one,  in 
operation.  Now,  that  is  all  there  is  of  this  great  General 
rapid  transit  law.  That  Commission,  clothed  with  these 
general  powers,  is  dead;  it  cannot  again  be  called  into 
life.  It  has  left  nothing  to  show  for  its  work  except  just 
what  it  did  for  the  Gilbert  company  and  for  the  New 
York  Elevated  company.  By  this  peculiar  legislation 
and  the  operation  of  the  Commission  appointed  under  it, 
these  two  private  corporations  have  got  possession,  now 
and  forever  apparently,  of  the  whole  field  of  rapid  transit 
operations  in  the  whole  city  of  New  York." 

This  period,  namely,  from  1870  to  1877,  was  made 
notable  by  other  transit  improvements.  Up  to  1871  the 
Hudson  River  Railroad,  the  New  York  and  New  Haven 
Railroad  and  the  New  York  and  Harlem  Railroad  had 
their  terminals  in  the  center  of  the  up-town  district — the 
Hudson  River  company  at  30th  iStreet  and  Ninth  Avenue, 
and  the  other  two  at  Madison  and  Fourth  Avenues, 
Twenty-sixth  and  Twenty-seventh  streets.  In  1871  the 
first  Grand  Central  station  at  42d  Street  and  Park 
Avenue  was  opened,  and  all  three  roads  terminated 
there.  In  1875  the  work  of  separating  grades  north  of 
the  station  was  completed,  and  for  4^2  miles  the  railroad 
ran  through  tunnel,  open  cut  and  on  a  stone  viaduct  above 
the  street  surface  from  42d  Street  to  the  Harlem  River. 


122  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

This  work  cost  $6,000,000  and  was  paid  half  by  the  city 
and  half  by  the  railroads.  The  train  service  was  in- 
creased, and  rapid  transit  to  Harlem  by  this  route  was 
realized. 

In  ten  years  after  Harvey  started  his  experimental 
line  in  1867  the  elevated  railroads  were  carrying  3,000,000 
passengers  a  year,  and  their  practicability  and  success 
were  thoroughly  demonstrated.  In  1877  they  attracted 
the  attention  of  Cyrus  W.  Field,  the  great  financier  who 
had  built  the  Atlantic  cable.  He  decided  to  invest  in  the 
new  railroads  and  purchased  control  of  the  entire  system, 
embarking  his  whole  fortune  in  the  undertaking.  It  was 
under  the  stimulating  influence  of  his  genius  and  capital 
that  they  were  completed  and  made  into  a  really  import- 
ant transportation  system. 


CHAPTER  X 

Era  of  Public  Ownership  Opens  and  Makes  Possible 
New  York's  First  Subway. 

tN  the  preceding  pages  the  origin  and  development  of 
Rapid  Transit  have  been  traced  for  the  fifteen  years 
between  1865,  when  the  first  rapid  transit  bill  was  passed 
by  the  Legislature,  and  1880,  when  the  completion  of  the 
elevated  railroads  to  Harlem  and  the  increased  business 
thereby  obtained  demonstrated  the  complete  success  of 
passenger  transportation  on  overhead  structures  built 
above  the  street  surface.  This  period  might  well  be 
termed  the  Era  of  Private  Ownership,  for  all  transporta- 
tion enterprises  then  undertaken  were  based  upon  the 
absolute  ownership,  control  and  operation  of  such  facili- 
ties, even  though  dependent  on  public  grants  for  their 
rights  of  way,  by  private  capital. 

The  next  fifteen  years,  namely  from  1880  to  1895,  may 
be  as  properly  called  the  Era  of  Public  Ownership,  for 
during  that  time  the  perpetual  and  gratuitous  franchise 
was  abolished  and  the  right  of  the  public  to  build,  pay 
for,  own  and  if  necessary  operate  street  railroads  was 
successfully  asserted.  It  was  in  1891  that  the  present 
Eapid  Transit  Act  was  enacted  and  soon  thereafter 
amended  so  as  to  permit  cities  to  use  their  own  capital 
in  construction,  and  in  1894  on  a  referendum  vote  the 
people  of  New  York  City  decided  by  a  substantial  major- 
ity in  favor  of  public  ownership.  But  before  entering 
upon  a  description  of  this  momentous  change  in  public 
policy  it  may  be  well  to  trace  briefly  the  struggle  to 
effect  it. 

Following  the  introduction  of  horse-drawn  street  cars 
on  metallic  rails  in  1832  the  possibility  of  profit-making 
in  the  transportation  of  large  numbers  of  passengers  for 
a  small  per  capita  fare  appealed  to  the  moneyed  men  of 
the  day  and  in  consequence  to  the  politicians,  who  found 


124  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

tliemselves  in  position  to  confer  the  needed  rights  in  the 
public  streets.  As  the  city  controlled  such  thoroughfares 
for  other  purposes,  it  was  taken  as  a  matter  of  course 
that  the  Common  Council  was  the  authority  to  confer 
upon  a  private  corporation  the  right  to  lay  and  operate 
street  railroads.  The  first  street  railway  franchises  were 
granted  in  this  way,  the  city  granting  the  charters  for 
the  Sixth  Avenue,  Eighth  Avenue,  Second  Avenue,  Third 
Avenue  and  Ninth  Avenue  surface  lines.  In  a  report  on 
the  subject  made  by  the  Committee  on  Political  Reform 
of  the  Union  League  Club  in  January,  1873,  this  language 
was  used: 

''The  immense  values  thus  given  away  by  a 
simple  resolution  of  the  Common  Council  opened  up 
visions  of  sudden  wealth  to  members.  Rings  were 
formed,  candidates  nominated  and  elected  simply 
for  their  readiness  to  plunder  the  city. 

''The  Broadway  franchise  for  only  two  miles 
was  valued  by  the  company  who  thought  they  had 
secured  it  at  $1,500,000.  Unseemly  contests  for  pos- 
session between  rival  companies  occurred  in  the 
streets.  The  defeated  and  disappointed  companies 
appealed  to  the  courts.  It  was  then  found  that  the 
City  had  not  the  legal  right  thus  to  give  away  to 
corporations,  to  use  for  private  gain,  the  public 
streets  purchased  and  graded  with  money  obtained 
from  the  people  by  taxation  and  assessment.  In 
1854  the  Legislature,  by  an  act  that  appeared  to  be 
for  a  different  purpose,  yet  by  a  clause  skillfully 
thrust  into  the  third  section,  confirmed  and  made 
valid  the  grants  theretofore  obtained  from  the  City. 

"The  courts  having  decided  that  the  City  officials 
could  not  donate  to  their  friends  the  'City  streets  and 
squares,  the  whole  business  of  giving  to  these  cor- 
porations the  public  property  of  the  City  was  then 
transferred  to  Albany.    The  Legislature  at  once  be- 


ERA  OF  PUBLIC   OWNERSHIP  125 

came  surrounded  and  besieged  annually  by  an  army 
called  the  Eailroad  Lobby.  Members  were  chosen 
for  their  subserviency  to  this  interest.  Such  pro- 
ceedings were  had  that  street  after  street  was  given 
away,  when  on  the  point  of  donating  the  Broadway 
franchise  Mr.  A.  T.  Stewart  checked  the  evil  by 
offering  to  pay  the  City  for  this  grant  two  millions 
of  dollars.  This  was  justice,  for  there  was  no 
plunder  either  for  the  Lobby  or  the  Legislature  in 
this  offer;  and  the  grant  was  refused.  Finally  the 
demand  of  the  citizens  for  protection  against  the 
rapacity  of  these  corporations  was  recognized,  and 
the  Twenty-third  street  franchise  was  sold  at  public 
auction.  The  extension  of  the  Dry  Dock,  East 
Broadway  and  Battery  road  was  granted  on  condi- 
tion that  five  per  cent,  of  the  proceeds  of  the  cars 
run  thereon  should  be  paid  annually  to  the  City. 
The  word  'net'  having  been  inserted  before  'pro- 
ceeds', the  company,  though  doing  a  lucrative  busi- 
ness, paid  nothing  for  five  years,  till  overhauled  by 
a  member  of  this  Committee  last  spring,  when  they 
paid  up  for  the  five  years  the  sums  due  the  City. 
The  extension  of  the  Second  Avenue  road  was 
granted  last  winter  on  condition  that  they  pay  to 
the  City  the  value  of  the  franchise  for  the  extension. 
''After  long  struggle  against  the  Lobby,  the 
Reformers  have  at  last  got  the  principle  of  payment 
to  the  City  for  the  franchises  recognized.  It  now 
remains  to  fix  a  just  rule  of  value  for  franchises 
that  may  be  hereafter  granted". 

Even  after  this  principle  was  recognized  the  idea  that 
only  private  capital  could  properly  engage  in  the  con- 
struction of  such  facilities  prevailed.  Municipal  owner- 
ship was  a  theory  held  by  some  advanced  thinkers,  doubt- 
less looked  upon  as  visionary  radicals  in  those  days. 
However,  its  advocates  eventually  got  a  hearing.     In 


126  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

1873,  the  same  year  in  which  the  Union  League  committee 
made  the  report  just  quoted  from,  a  bill  was  introduced 
in  the  Legislature  by  a  Mr.  Opdyke  to  authorize  a  board 
of  Oity  officers  to  build  and  turn  over  to  a  City  depart- 
ment to  operate  a  rapid  transit  railroad.  This  measure, 
which  was  introduced  in  January,  was  endorsed  in  Feb- 
ruary at  a  meeting  of  the  Eapid  Transit  Association  in 
New  York  city,  at  which  General  Sigel  delivered  an  ad- 
dress. As  far  as  research  discloses,  this  is  the  first 
recognition  of  municipal  ownership  in  legislation  or  at- 
tempted legislation.  The  time,  however,  invited  such  a 
move.  Samuel  J.  Tilden,  reformer,  had  been  elected 
Governor  in  1872,  and  the  Legislature  of  1873,  elected 
with  him,  had  a  membership  more  or  less  sympathetic  to 
reform  ideas.  Indeed,  it  was  Tilden 's  influence  which 
brought  about  the  important  legislation  resulting  in  the 
formation  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  of  1875. 

In  the  same  month,  February  1873,  a  mass  meeting 
was  held  in  Cooper  Institute,  New  York,  at  which  Abram 
S.  Hewitt,  afterwards  Mayor,  made  an  address  in  favor 
of  City-owned  rapid  transit  lines.  Resolutions  were 
adopted  favoring  a  City-built  and  City-operated  line,  and 
a  Committee  of  One  Hundred  was  appointed  to  go  to 
Albany  to  support  the  Opdyke  bill.  This  bill  authorized 
the  Governor  and  Senate  to  appoint  six  commissioners, 
who,  with  the  Mayor  and  two  heads  of  City  departments, 
was  to  constitute  a  commission  with  power  to  survey  and 
build  a  rapid  transit  railroad.  The  fare  was  to  be  seven 
cents,  and  the  interest  on  the  bonds  issued  by  the  City 
for  construction  was  to  be  paid  out  of  earnings  and  the 
fare  reduced  if  the  earnings  would  permit.  The  Chair- 
man of  the  Committee  of  One  Hundred  was  Rudolph  A. 
Witthaus.  It  did  valiant  work,  and  mass  meetings  were 
held  in  various  parts  of  the  city  to  aid  the  cause,  but  the 
time  was  not  yet  ripe,  and  the  Opdyke  bill  failed  to  pass. 
It  undoubtedly  had  a  marked  effect  on  the  public  mind 
and  unquestionably  led  the  Legislature  of  1875  to  the  con- 


ERA  OF  PUBLIC  OWNERSHIP  127 

sideration  and  passage  of  the  bill  authorizing  the  Mayor 
to  appoint  the  first  Rapid  Transit  Commission,  which  con- 
firmed and  amplified  the  rights  of  the  new  elevated  roads. 

The  Legislature  of  1874  considered  the  subject,  but 
took  no  remedial  action.  In  March  the  Assembly  Com- 
mittee on  Railroads  reported  against  the  creation  of  a 
rapid  transit  commission,  on  the  ground  that  no  commis- 
sion could  build  a  road  unless  the  City  would  pay  for  it, 
and  this  was  not  desired. 

Public  sentiment  as  voiced  by  the  press,  also,  was  still 
hostile  to  public  ownership.  The  Times  in  an  editorial 
published  on  April  1,  1874,  said : 

''Much  as  we  have  found  to  condemn  in  the  action 
of  the  Assembly  Railroad  Committee,  we  thoroughly 
approve  of  their  determination  to  sanction  no  scheme 
which  provides  for  the  expenditure  of  City  money  in 
the  construction  of  local  railroads." 

In  March  1875  the  Committee  on  Rapid  Transit  of  the 
Board  of  Aldermen  reported  a  recommendation  that 
private  capital  be  given  the  first  chance  to  build  a  rapid 
transit  line,  and  if  that  failed  the  City  should  undertake 
the  work.  A  minority  report  favored  City  ownership, 
but  the  Board  adopted  the  majority  report. 

Early  in  the  year  1875  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  held 
a  meeting  at  which  subscriptions  were  taken  to  start  a 
rapid  transit  fund.  A  Committee  of  Fifty  was  named  to 
solicit  further  subscriptions,  and  the  subscribers  or- 
ganized the  New  York  Rapid  Transit  Association  to  fur- 
ther the  construction  of  a  road.  Gouverneur  Morris  was 
chairman  and  C.  H.  Roosevelt  secretary  of  this  meeting. 
During  the  early  part  of  the  same  year  a  committee  of 
the  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers  made  a  report 
recommending  the  construction  of  elevated  roads  to  sup- 
ply the  rapid  transit  needs  of  the  city. 

Mayor  Wickham  in  his  annual  message  in  January 
1875  mentioned  the  subject  and  stated  that  the  need  of 


128  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

rapid  transit  had  been  partially  supplied  by  the  New 
York  Central  improvement  from  42d  street  to  the  Harlem 
Kiver.  This  was  the  tunnel  and  viaduct  carrying  four 
tracks  which  was  paid  for  half  by  the  City  and  half  by 
the  company.  The  City's  share  was  $3,200,000.  It  is  dif- 
ficult now  to  appraise  a  state  of  public  sentiment  which 
frowned  upon  using  public  money  to  build  a  road  to  be 
owned  by  the  public,  but  condoned  the  outright  gift  of 
$3,200,000  to  a  corporation  for  improving  its  own  prop- 
erty. Of  course,  in  this  case  the  City  gained  something 
in  the  elimination  of  many  grade  crossings,  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  contributing  toward  the  cost  of  such  work  is  still 
recognized  as  sound,  but  such  a  disposition  of  public 
funds  in  those  days  seems  a  contradiction  of  the  evidently 
prevalent  opposition  to  public  ownership. 

In  the  same  message  Mayor  Wickham  congratulated 
the  city  on  the  rapid  transit  assured  by  the  Central  im- 
provement.    He  said: 

'*As  provided  by  the  law  authorizing  the  improve- 
ment, two  of  the  tracks  are  to  be  devoted  exclusively 
to  rapid  transit  within  the  city. ' ' 

A  later  enactment  relieved  the  company  of  this  obligation. 
The  first  elevated  railroad  was  built  in  the  absence  of 
any  law  to  compensate  owners  of  property  along  the  line. 
In  1872  a  constitutional  amendment  was  adopted  requir- 
ing the  consents  of  property  owners  as  a  prerequisite  to 
railroad  construction,  to  the  extent  of  at  least  one  half  in 
value  of  the  abutting  property.  This  requirement  was 
embodied  in  the.  Eapid  Transit  act  of  1875,  which  pro- 
vided that  in  lieu  of  such  consents  the  railroad  must  get 
a  favorable  decision  from  three  commissioners  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  General  Term  of  the  Supreme  Court,  such 
decision  to  be  reported  to  and  confirmed  by  that  court. 
This  bill  was  known  as  the  Husted  bill,  it  having  been 
introduced  in  the  Senate  by  General  Husted,  who  worked 
indefatigably  for  the  cause  of  rapid  transit  both  in  and 


ERA  OF  PUBLIC   OWNERSHIP  129 

out  of  the  Legislature.  Grovernor  Tilden  also  supported 
the  measure,  which  was  also  known  as  ''the  Grovernor 's 
bill".  The  appointment  of  commissioners  under  this  bill 
by  Mayor  Wickham  and  the  important  work  they  did  have 
been  noted  in  a  previous  chapter. 

The  extension  of  the  two  elevated  railroads  under  the 
plan  adopted  by  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  of  1875 
allayed  for  a  time  the  agitation  for  rapid  transit.  Many 
thought  the  problem  solved,  and  the  next  ten  years  were 
barren  of  any  important  movements  looking  to  new  con- 
struction aside  from  that  of  the  elevated  roads.  By  the 
end  of  the  80 's,  however,  the  elevated  lines  had  become 
congested  and  it  became  apparent  that  additional  rapid 
transit  roads  must  be  provided. 

In  1888  Mayor  Abram  S.  Hewitt,  whom  many  regard 
as  the  father  of  modern  rapid  transit  and  who  had  urged 
public  ownership  as  early  as  1873,  sent  to  the  Common 
Council  a  message,  in  which  he  advocated  the  use  of  the 
credit  of  the  City  for  the  construction  of  a  road  to  be 
owned  by  the  City  but  which  could  be  leased  to  a  private 
company  for  operation.  His  plan,  which  was  practically 
that  later  incorporated  in  the  Rapid  Transit  act  of  1894, 
provided  for  construction  by  a  contracting  company, 
which  should  lease  the  road  for  operation  for  a  term  of 
years,  give  a  sufficient  bond,  pay  for  the  equipment  of  the 
line  but  give  the  City  a  lien  on  such  equipment  and  guar- 
antee to  pay  the  City  annual  interest  and  one  per  cent, 
for  a  sinking  fund  on  the  bonds  issued  for  construction. 

The  Common  Council  did  not  approve  the  plan,  but 
Mr.  Hewitt  and  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  had  drafted  a 
bill  embodying  it,  and  this  bill  was  introduced  in  the 
Legislature  of  1888.  It  failed  for  reasons  which  Mr. 
Hewitt  himself  thus  described: 

"The  prejudice  against  the  scheme  was  so  great, 
however,  that  it  was  difficult  to  find  any  member  of 
the  Legislature  who  would  be  responsible  for  the 


130  FIFTY  YEARS  OP  RAPID  TRANSIT 

introduction  of  a  bill,  which  was  opposed  not  only 
by  the  Common  Council  of  the  City,  but  by  the  polit- 
ical organization  which  controlled  the  politics  of  the 
City.  The  Mayor  appeared,  however,  before  the 
Committee  of  the  Legislature  and  made  a  very  elabo- 
rate argument  as  to  the  necessity  for  increased  rapid 
transit  facilities  and  of  the  mode  under  which  he 
proposed  to  secure  them  at  an  early  date.  The  Com- 
mittee, however,  declined  to  report  the  bill  back  to 
the  Senate,  and  so  far  as  that  session  was  concerned 
the  proposition  entirely  failed." 

Hugh  J.  Grant,  a  Tammany  man,  was  inaugurated 
Mayor  in  January,  1889,  and  with  his  inaugural  message 
took  up  the  question.  Sentiment  for  public  ownership, 
however,  apparently  had  not  crystallized  in  the  preceding 
decade,  for  Mayor  Grant,  while  urging  the  construction  of 
new  lines,  declared  that  they  must  be  built,  equipped  and 
operated  by  private  capital.  Here  is  an  extract  from  his 
message : 

"It  may  be  proper,  however,  to  state  that,  in  the 
construction  of  a  rapid  transit  road,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  rely  upon  private  enterprise.  We  might  in- 
deed prefer  that  the  road  be  constructed  at  the  public 
expense  and  when  completed  leased  for  a  term  of 
years  to  the  highest  bidder,  upon  conditions  which 
would  carefully  provide  for  the  comfort  of  the  citi- 
zens and  for  a  suitable  return  to  the  public  treasury, 
but  in  view  of  the  limit  to  which  the  borrowing 
capacity  of  the  City  is  now  restricted,  this  scheme 
would  be  impracticable.  Private  capital  must,  there- 
fore, furnish  the  means  for  the  construction  of  the 
road,  but  the  public  authorities  must  be  vigilant  to 
guard  the  right  of  the  citizens  to  the  enjoyment  of  a 
fair  proportion  of  the  benefits  that  will  flow  from  its 
operation." 


EEA  OF  PUBLIC   OWNERSHIP  131 

The  tone  of  this  message  shows  what  a  change  had 
taken  place  in  public  sentiment  in  the  preceding  decade. 
While  preference  for  construction  by  private  capital  is 
shown,  the  advantage  of  limited  term  franchises  is  recog- 
nized and  the  duty  of  public  officers  to  see  that  the  public 
shall  share  in  the  profits  of  the  undertaking  is  affirmed. 
The  day  of  perpetual  franchises  granted  without  com- 
pensation to  the  municipality  was  gone  forever. 

Mayor  Grrant  in  March  1889  had  drafted  a  bill  to 
amend  the  Rapid  Transit  law,  which  he  sent  to  Albany. 
This  bill  gave  the  Mayor  power  to  appoint  a  rapid  transit 
commission  without  waiting  for  a  petition  from  tax- 
payers, as  required  by  the  original  act.  Owing  to  politi- 
cal opposition,  however,  this  bill  failed  of  passage.  The 
Mayor,  with  considerable  acumen,  appealed  to  the  Legis- 
lature to  give  to  the  City  of  New  York  the  right  to  name 
the  men  to  act  as  Commissioners.  This  invocation  of  the 
home  rule  principle  eventually  proved  successful.  In 
1890  a  hostile  Senate  again  killed  his  bill,  but  in  1891  the 
bill  was  reintroduced  and  passed  both  houses.  Mean- 
while, in  December  1890,  in  order  to  get  action  Mayor 
Grant,  on  the  petition  of  taxpayers,  appointed  a  commis- 
sion under  the  Act  of  1875.  The  men  he  named  were 
William  iSteinway,  John  H.  Starin,  Samuel  Spencer, 
Eugene  L.  Bushe  and  John  C.  Inman.  How  this  action 
was  brought  about  was  told  by  the  late  John  D.  Crim- 
mins.  In  a  statement  published  in  the  Evening  Post  on 
October  24,  1913,  Mr.  Crimmins  said : 

"In  1889  on  the  assumption  of  office  by  Mayor 
Grant  I  made  known  to  him  the  importance  of  taking 
up  the  rapid  transit  situation.  I  personally  circu- 
lated the  petition  and  knew  every  signer,  had  the 
signatures  acknowledged  and  brought  the  petition  to 
Presiding  Justice  Van  Brunt  of  the  Appellate  Divi- 
sion of  the  Supreme  Court  who  prepared  and  ad- 
ministered the  required  oath.    I  may  mention  here 


132  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

that  Mr,  George  S.  Lespinasse  was  enlisted  with  me 
in  this  movement,  securing  and  witnessing  signa- 
tures. I  brought  the  completed  petition  to  Mayor 
Grant,  who  instructed  me  to  find  the  men  who  would 
serve.  I  received  more  refusals  than  consents.  I 
made  the  offer  to  James  MoCreary,  Charles  Stewart 
Smith  and  others.  Mr.  Smith  was  later  a  member 
of  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Commissioners.  The 
Commissioners  appointed  by  Mayor  Grant,  were  re- 
quired first  to  adopt  the  routes  and  general  plan  of 
construction  of  a  rapid  transit  railroad,  and  then  to 
obtain  the  necessary  consents  for  its  construction 
from  the  local  authorities  and  the  property  holders 
affected.  That  was  the  beginning  of  the  work  of  the 
Eapid  Transit  Commission,  the  results  of  which  we 
see  today." 

The  Commission  named  by  Mayor  Grant  met  and  or- 
ganized on  January  6,  1891,  electing  William  Steinway 
chairman.  On  January  9  following  the  Commission  met 
again  and  decided  to  proceed  under  the  existing  law,  al- 
though a  bill  for  a  new  act  was  pending.  The  Commis- 
sioners, however,  seemed  to  have  felt  assured  that  the 
bill  if  passed  would  not  upset  what  they  might  do.  Ac- 
cordingly they  issued  a  public  call  for  plans  and  sug- 
gestions. 

Before  the  end  of  the  month  of  January  the  Legis- 
lature passed  the  Stewart  rapid  transit  bill  and  on  the 
last  day  of  the  month  it  was  signed  by  Governor  David 
B.  Hill.  William  F.  Sheehan,  later  prominent  as  a  trac- 
tion la^wer  in  New  York  City,  was  Speaker  of  the  Assem- 
bly and  by  his  rulings  assisted  the  final  passage  of  the 
bill  in  that  house. 

This  was  the  Rapid  Transit  Act  of  1891,  which  with 
numerous  amendments  still  stands  on  the  statute  books. 
Tt  created  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Commissioners 
and  named  as  the  first  Commissioners  the  five  men  ap- 


EBA  OF  PUBLIC  OWNEBSHIP  133 

pointed  in  December  1890  by  Mayor  Grant.  The  act 
authorized  the  board  to  lay  out  routes  and  adopt  plans 
for  a  rapid  transit  railroad,  either  supra-  or  sub- 
terranean, and  to  put  up  the  franchise  to  build  and 
operate  at  public  auction.  It  also  required  the  consents 
of  the  local  authorities  and  of  the  abutting  property 
owners  to  the  extent  of  one  half  in  value  of  the  property 
affected. 

The  Commission  on  February  9,  1891,  reorganized 
under  the  new  law,  electing  William  Steinway,  President, 
John  H.  Starin  Vice  President  and  Eugene  L.  Bushe 
Secretary.  Its  work  went  right  along  unaffected  by  the 
reorganization,  and  it  proceeded  to  consider  plans,  hear 
arguments  and  receive  suggestions. 

The  law  itself,  as  shown  by  the  provision  for  the 
auction  of  the  right  to  build  and  operate,  contemplated 
private  ownership,  but  the  advocates  of  public  owner- 
ship soon  made  themselves  heard.  One  of  the  first  if 
not  the  first  was  Jacob  H.  Schiff,  the  banker,  who  ap- 
peared before  the  new  Commission  on  March  13  and 
made  an  argument  for  the  use  of  City  funds  to  defray 
the  cost  of  construction.  Mr.  Schiff 's  theory  was  that  an 
underground  railroad  would  be  a  very  expensive  under- 
taking and  it  was  doubtful  whether  its  operation  would 
pay  a  sufficient  return  on  the  money  invested  to  make  it 
an  attractive  investment  for  private  capital.  The  City, 
however,  could  borrow  money  at  three  per  cent.,  a  much 
lower  rate  than  private  capital  could  command,  and  there- 
fore could  better  afford  such  an  investment. 

Another  phase  of  the  problem  to  which  the  Commis- 
sion devoted  considerable  attention  was  the  question  of 
motive  power.  It  was  the  desire  of  all  interested  that  an 
underground  road  should  be  built  if  practicable,  and  the 
kind  of  motive  power  to  be  used  was  a  most  important 
consideration.  The  experience  of  the  London  under- 
ground with  steam,  in  spite  of  smoke-consuming  devices, 
had   not   been    satisfactory,    and   the   best    engineering 


134  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

thought  of  the  day  in  the  United  States  was  averse  to 
employing  it  for  an  underground  road  in  New  York, 
where  from  the  nature  of  things  there  must  he  long 
stretches  of  tunnels  without  open  spaces  such  as  relieve 
the  London  tube.  Electricity  had  been  recently  applied 
to  street  car  propulsion,  and  it  was  favored  for  the  new 
underground  road  if  built.  At  the  same  meeting  at  which 
Mr.  Schiff  urged  public  construction,  Mr.  Frank  J. 
Sprague,  afterwards  famous  as  an  electrical  engineer, 
appeared  and  advocated  the  use  of  electricity. 

The  Commission  appointed  William  E.  Worthen  as  its 
Chief  Engineer,  and  later  William  Barclay  Parsons 
Deputy  Chief  Engineer.  During  the  summer  it  came  to 
a  decision  to  build  an  underground  road  and  announced 
its  preference  for  a  route  running  up  Broadway  and  the 
extension  of  Broadway  then  known  as  the  Boulevard. 
Worthen  and  Parsons  reported  plans  for  an  underground 
road,  and  in  October,  1891,  the  Commission  adopted  and 
submitted  them  to  the  Common  Council  for  approval. 
On  October  28  that  body  approved  the  routes  and  plans 
and  gave  its  consent  as  the  local  authority  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  underground  road.  The  Mayor's  ap- 
proval was  added  on  October  31. 

In  the  'Commission's  report  to  the  Common  Council 
there  is  evidence  of  much  valuable  work  done  in  a  short 
time.  Its  engineers  had  made  borings  to  determine  the 
depth  and  character  of  the  rock  along  the  proposed  route, 
had  investigated  the  trend  and  extent  of  traffic  and 
studied  the  problem  of  treating  the  sewer  and  water 
pipes,  the  several  possible  methods  of  construction  and 
other  matters  necessary  to  the  intelligent  undertaking  of 
a  work  of  such  importance.  The  Commission  decided  to 
build  the  road  as  close  to  the  surface  of  the  streets  as 
possible,  so  as  to  make  access  to  the  stations  easy  for 
passengers,  but  was  in  doubt  whether  to  construct  the 
four  tracks  contemplated  on  one  level  or  to  make  a  double 
deck  subway  with  local  tracks  on  the  upper  and  express 


ERA  OF  PUBLIC   OWNERSHIP  135 

tracks  on  the  lower  level.  Its  engineers,  therefore,  were 
instructed  to  make  alternative  plans  showing  both 
methods,  but  the  Commission  in  its  report  plainly  showed 
a  preference  for  the  one  level  construction. 

On  the  subject  of  motive  power  the  report  said : 

"While  the  Board  is  convinced  that  electricity 
as  a  motive  power  is  available  for  the  purposes  of 
the  railway  recommended  by  this  report,  it  is  not 
deemed  wise  at  the  present  time  to  exclude  other 
forms  of  power  answering  the  essential  conditions 
of  speed  and  non-combustion  in  the  tunnel,  or  to 
attempt  to  direct  the  exact  method  of  application  of 
such  power  as  shall  finally  be  adopted." 

The  report  was  accompanied  by  reports  from  four 
consulting  engineers  to  whom  the  plans  prepared  by 
Worthen  and  Parsons  were  submitted.  These  engineers 
were  Octave  Ohanute,  of  Chicago ;  Joseph  M.  Wilson,  of 
Philadelphia;  Theodore  iCooper,  of  New  York  and  John 
Bogart,  iState  Engineer  of  New  York. 

In  the  plans  submitted  by  Mr.  Worthen  and  Mr.  Par- 
sons there  was  a  notable  difference.  Worthen  proposed 
four  tracks  on  a  level  built  near  the  surface,  but  below 
the  level  of  gas  and  water  and  sewer  pipes,  so  that  the 
latter  might  be  left  undisturbed.  Parsons  suggested  a 
double-deck  subway  on  each  side  of  the  street,  the  space 
between  to  be  made  into  a  pipe  gallery  under  the  center 
of  the  street  in  which  all  pipes  removed  in  construction 
should  be  placed,  such  gallery  to  contain  all  pipes  laid  in 
the  future.  Some  years  later,  when  Parsons  became 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Board  which  built  the  first  subway, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Worthen  plan  for  four 
tracks  on  one  level  was  adopted. 

Following  the  approval  of  the  project  by  the  municipal 
authorities  the  Commission  had  the  detail  plans  made 
and  advertised  for  bids  for  the  franchise.  Bids  were 
solicited  in  the  fall  of  the  year  1892.    Only  one  bid  was 


136  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

received,  that  of  Col.  W.  N.  Amory,  who  offered  $1,000 
for  the  rights.  His  bid  was  rejected.  It  was  openly 
hinted  that  the  opposition  of  the  elevated  railroads,  then 
in  the  control  of  Jay  Gould,  was  responsible  for  the  fail- 
ure to  sell  the  franchise.  Gould,  of  course,  did  not  want 
a  competitive  transit  line  in  the  city,  and  certainly  was 
powerful  enough,  financially  and  politically,  to  interpose 
obstacles.  Later  the  Steinway  Commission  tried  to  get 
the  elevated  roads  to  build  extensions,  but  this  effort  also 
proved  abortive. 

William  Barclay  Parsons,  in  a  conversation  in 
1913,  declared  that  the  Steinway  Commission  was  a  Tam- 
many board  and  that  the  elevated  railroads,  which  did 
not  want  the  competition  of  an  underground  road,  were 
all  powerful  in  shaping  its  work. 

After  the  failure  to  sell  the  franchise,  Mr.  Parsons 
said,  a  strange  thing  happened  in  the  Steinway  Commis- 
sion. "All  the  employes  of  the  Board,  myself  included," 
said  Mr.  Parsons,  "were  dismissed,  and  in  thirty  days 
all  were  reappointed  except  me.  The  Board  then  offered 
the  elevated  railroads  rights  for  important  extensions. 
Having  failed  to  enlist  capital  for  an  underground  road, 
the  Board  did  what  was  expected  of  it  and  made  elaborate 
plans  for  extending  the  elevated  railroads.  Then  another 
strange  event  happened.  The  elevated  railroad  interests, 
then  dominated  by  Jay  Gould,  and  Russell  Sage,  refused 
to  build  the  extensions  offered.  They  felt  so  secure  in 
their  monopoly  that  they  actually  scorned  the  gift  the 
Board  would  make  them.  That  ended  the  Board  of  1891. 
Having  failed  to  build  either  subway  or  elevated  lines 
there  was  nothing  more  for  it  to  do.  The  Legislature  of 
1894  abolished  the  body  and  created  a  new  Rapid  Transit 
Commission,  of  which  Alexander  E.  Orr  Avas  made  chair- 
man. This  was  the  board  which  built  the  first  subway, 
and  I  became  its  chief  engineer." 

There  could  be  no  more  fitting  close  to  this  chapter 
than  the  following  extract  from  an  address  delivered  by 


ERA  OF  PUBLIC   OWNEESHIP  137 


AbramiS.  Hewitt  on  October  3, 1901,  upon  receiving  from 
the  New  York  Cham-ber  of  Commerce  a  gold  medal  be- 
stowed in  recognition  of  his  long  and  effective  work  for 
rapid  transit: 

''In  the  meantime  (after  the  failure  of  the  plan 
to  obtain  construction  by  private  capital  by  the  1891 
board)  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  became  more 
and  more  manifest,  until  at  length  a  proposition  was 
made  to  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  State  of 
New  York  by  a  well  known  and  responsible  banking 
house  in  this  city  to  undertake  the  construction  of 
the  underground  system,  provided  the  City  of  New 
York  would  loan  its  credit  to  the  corporation  under- 
taking the  work  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  thirty 
millions  of  dollars.     This  proposition  was  referred 
to  a  committee  of  the  Chamber,  who,  despairing  of 
any  other  solution  of  the  question,  reported  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Chamber  in  favor  of  the  proposition. 
It  was  my  privilege  to  point  out  in  the  discussion 
which  followed  that  such  a  loan  of  credit  would  be 
contrary  to  the  Constitution  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  and  that  it  was  not  expedient  to  submit  to  the 
people  any  proposition  under  which  the  public  credit 
could  be  utilized  for  private  enterprises.     The  im- 
portance of  vesting  ownership  in  the  City  was  in- 
sisted upon,  and  after  full  discussion  my  contention 
was  unanimously  approved  by  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, and  a  new  committee,  of  which  I  was  a  mem- 
ber, was  constituted  to  formulate  a  bill  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Legislature  under  which  the  suggestions 
made  by  the  Mayor  in  1888  were  to  be  incorporated 
in  the  proposed  legislation. 

''Taking  the  original  bill  as  a  basis,  and  with  the 
aid  of  the  late  Henry  R.  Beekman,  who  as  Corpora- 
tion Counsel  had  drawn  the  original  bill,  a  new  bill 
was  prepared  and  reported  to  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce for  its  approval.     Having  received  a  unani- 


138  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

mous  vote  in  its  favor,  tlae  committee  caused  it  to  be 
submitted  to  the  Legislature,  where,  after  full  dis- 
cussion and  some  amendments,  one  of  which  required 
a  referendum  to  the  people,  the  bill  was  enacted  into 
a  law  on  the  22nd  of  May,  1894.  Under  its  provisions 
the  work  is  to  be  done  as  proposed  by  the  Mayor  in 
1888  by  the  issue  of  bonds  under  contract  open  to 
public  competition,  providing  for  an  adequate  bond 
for  the  completion  of  the  work  and  for  the  investment 
of  a  large  amount  of  capital,  estimated  between  seven 
and  ten  millions  of  dollars,  for  rolling  stock,  real 
estate  and  appliances,  all  of  which  are  held  by  the 
City  as  security  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  lease  by 
the  lessee." 


CHAPTER  XI 

Public  Ownership  Assured — The  Rapid  Transit  Act 
AND  Commission  of  1894. 

T^  HE  failure  of  the  Steinway  Commission  to  bring  about 
the  construction  of  new  rapid  transit  lines  spurred 
the  people  of  New  York  City  to  further  efforts.  Led  by 
Mayor  Hewitt  and  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  citi- 
zens appealed  to  the  Legislature  of  1894  for  some  sort  of 
legislation  which  would  bring  about  the  long  desired 
result.  The  act  passed  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of 
Mayor  Hewitt,  May  22,  1894,  accomplished  what  previous 
acts  had  failed  to  achieve  mainly  if  not  entirely  because 
of  the  provision  for  public  ownership.  This  made  pos- 
sible the  use  of  the  city's  credit  in  providing  the  millions 
needed  to  bring  the  great  project  to  fruition. 

''The  great  object  aimed  at",  said  Mr.  Hewitt  in  the 
address  before  quoted,  "was  to  secure  the  early  com- 
pletion of  the  work,  its  continued  ownership  by  the  city 
and  its  reversion  at  the  end  of  fifty  years  to  the  city,  free 
and  clear  of  all  encumbrances  of  every  kind  and  nature 
whatever." 

While  this  feature  was  new,  the  statute  in  form  was 
but  an  amendment  of  the  act  of  1891,  which,  though  it 
failed  of  its  immediate  purpose,  nevertheless  was  the  first 
practicable  legislation  since  the  act  of  1875.  This  was 
recognized  by  the  board  created  in  1894,  and  in  its  first 
published  report  it  gave  credit  to  the  important  work 
done  by  its  predecessor  under  the  act  of  1891. 

Governor  Flower  signed  the  bill  of  1894  on  the  day  of 
its  enactment,  namely  May  22,  and  it  went  into  effect 
immediately.  By  its  terms  a  new  board,  known  as  the 
Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Railroad  Commissioners,  was 
substituted  for  that  appointed  under  the  act  of  1891.  The 
act  itself  provided  that  the  new  board  should  consist  of 
the  Mayor  and  the  Controller  of  New  York  City  and  the 


140  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRAlSrSIT 

president  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce  as 
ex  officio  members,  and  of  Messrs.  William  Steinway, 
Seth  Low,  John  Claflin,  Alexander  E,  Orr  and  John  H. 
Starin.  These  men  were  all  prominent  business  men  of 
New  York  and  Brooklyn,  and  commanded  the  confidence 
and  respect  of  the  community.  Seth  Low  later  became 
Mayor  of  Greater  New  York. 

The  provisions  of  the  act  of  1891  authorizing  the  board 
to  grant  additional  franchises  to  existing  railroads 
(namely  the  elevated  lines)  was  retained  unmodified  in 
the  new  statute.  In  brief  the  new  board  was  authorized 
to  lay  out  routes  for  rapid  transit  lines,  to  cause  such 
lines  to  be  constructed  if  the  constitutional  consents  of 
abutting  property  owners  and  of  the  local  authorities 
were  obtained,  to  adopt  the  plans  made  by  the  old  board 
or  to  make  new  ones,  and  prior  to  undertaking  construc- 
tion but  after  adopting  plans  and  getting  consents  to 
submit  to  the  qualified  electors  of  the  city  at  the  next 
general  election  **the  question  whether  such  railway  or 
railways  shall  be  constructed  by  the  city  and  at  the  public 
expense."  In  the  event  of  a  negative  vote  on  the  refer- 
endum, the  board  was  authorized  to  sell  the  franchise  to 
build  and  operate  the  railway  to  some  private  corpora- 
tion as  provided  in  the  act  of  1891. 

After  adopting  the  routes  and  plans  and  getting  the 
necessary  consents  the  board  was  authorized,  in  case  of 
an  affirmative  vote  on  the  referendum,  to  advertise  for 
proposals  and  to  enter  into  a  contract  with  some  person 
or  corporation  to  build  the  road  for  the  city  and  at  its 
expense.  The  contractor  was  to  be  required  to  operate 
the  railroad  as  the  lessee  of  the  city  for  a  term  not  less 
than  thirty-five  nor  more  than  fifty  years,  and  at  an 
annual  rental  sufficient  to  pay  the  interest  upon  the  bonds 
issued  by  the  city  for  construction  and  one  per  cent,  in 
addition  as  a  sinking  fund  to  retire  such  bonds  at 
maturity. 

It  was  also  provided  that  the  contractor  should  fur- 


BOARD  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT  RAILROAD 
COMMISSIONERS  —  1904 

1.    Mayor  George  B.  McClellan;     2.   John  Claflin;      3.    Morris  K.  Jessup; 

4.    Chairman  Alexander    E.  Orr:     5.   John  H.  Starin;     6.    Woodbury 

Langdon;     7.    Charles  Stuart  Smith;    8.    Comptroller  Edward  M.  Grout. 


THE  EAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  141 

nisli  the  equipment  for  the  road  at  his  own  expense,  but 
that  the  city  should  have  a  lien  on  such  equipment.  A 
bond  to  guarantee  faithful  performance  of  the  contract, 
in  an  amount  to  be  fixed  by  the  board,  was  prescribed, 
and  the  qontractor  was  to  be  obliged  to  deposit  with  the 
Controller  the  amount  of  $1,000,000,  to  be  returned  to  the 
depositor  upon  the  completion  and  equipment  of  the  road. 
The  board  was  invested  with  the  duty  of  supervising  the 
construction  and  operation  of  the  road. 

No  time  was  lost  by  the  new  board  in  setting  to  work. 
It  met  for  the  first  time  on  June  8,  1894,  and  organized, 
electing  Alexander  E.  Orr,  as  president.  No  higher 
encomium  could  be  passed  on  Mr,  Orr  than  to  cite  the 
fact  that  he  remained  president  until  the  board  had  suc- 
cessfully performed  its  gigantic  task  and  was  replaced 
by  the  Public  Service  Commission  in  1907.  In  other 
words  for  thirteen  years  Mr.  Orr  devoted  himself  to  the 
service  of  the  public  and  masterfully  piloted  the  board 
through  innumerable  difficulties  to  triumphant  success. 

At  the  time  of  his  election  as  president  Mr.  Orr  was 
also  president  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce. 
He  therefore  resigned  the  individual  appointment  con- 
ferred on  him  by  the  act,  and  Mr.  John  H.  Inman,  one  of 
the  members  of  the  iSteinway  Commission,  was  elected  to 
fill  the  vacancy,  the  statute  permitting  the  board  to  re- 
cruit its  membership.  At  subsequent  meetings  John  H. 
Starin  was  elected  vice-president,  Henry  R.  Beekman  and 
Albert  B.  Boardman  were  chosen  counsel  and  William 
Barclay  Parsons  chief  engineer. 

Early  in  its  deliberations  the  new  board  reached  the 
conclusion  that  the  only  way  of  meeting  the  transit  situ- 
ation was  to  build  underground  railroads,  and  this  deci- 
sion as  soon  as  announced  met  the  approval  of  a  public 
wearied  with  the  inadequacy  of  the  service  supplied  by 
the  elevated  railroads  and  of  the  presence  of  their  un- 
sightly structures  in  the  streets  of  the  city.  It  also  de- 
cided that  the  plans  made  by  the  Steinway  Commission 


142  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

must  be  changed  in  some  respects  if  the  cost  of  the 
proposed  railroad  was  to  be  kept  within  the  limit  fixed 
by  the  statute,  $50,000,000,  but  as  the  act  permitted  modi- 
fications of  such  plans  the  new  board  contented  itself 
with  a  tentative  approval  of  the  old  plans  and  routes  as 
a  basis  for  submitting  to  the  voters  the  question  whether 
the  new  road  should  be  constructed  and  owned  by  the 
city.    This  course  was  adopted  on  advice  of  counsel. 

This  action  was  taken  on  July  17,  and  before  the  elec- 
tion in  the  ensuing  November  the  board  issued  an  address 
to  the  people,  in  which  the  intention  was  declared  of  con- 
sidering the  question  of  routes  and  plans  de  novo  should 
the  electors  decide  for  municipal  ownership.  At  the  same 
time  it  sent  Mr.  Parsons,  its  chief  engineer,  to  foreign 
lands  to  study  the  systems  of  rapid  transit  employed  in 
certain  cities  on  the  continent  of  Europe  and  in  Great 
Britain.  Mr.  Parsons'  report  was  published  later  under 
the  title,  '^ Report  on  Rapid  Transit  in  Foreign  Cities." 

The  proposed  referendum  was  held  on  November  6, 
1894  at  the  general  election,  and  the  climax  of  the  Era  of 
Public  Ownership  was  reached  in  an  overwhelming  ma- 
jority in  favor  of  municipal  construction.  The  total  vote 
was  184,035,  of  which  132,647  were  for  and  42,916  against 
municipal  construction  and  o'wmership  of  the  new  roads, 
there  having  been  cast  399  ballots  which  were  declared 
defective  and  not  counted. 

Having  received  the  mandate  of  the  people,  the  board 
proceeded  to  push  the  difiicult  work  of  selecting  the  final 
routes  and  perfecting  the  detail  plans,  which  already  had 
received  much  consideration.  At  the  election  a  new 
Mayor,  William  L.  Strong,  had  been  chosen  to  succeed 
Thomas  F.  Gilroy.  The  Controller,  Ashbel  P.  Fitch,  was 
continued  in  office,  so  that  the  only  change  in  the  compo- 
sition of  the  board  with  the  coming  of  the  new  year,  1895, 
was  the  substitution  of  Mayor  ^Strong  for  Mayor  Gilroy 
as  one  of  the  ex  officio  members.  One  of  its  counsel,  how- 
ever, Henry  R.  Beekman,  had  been  elected  Justice  of  the 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  143 

Supreme  Court,  and  upon  his  retirement  the  board  named 
Parsons,  Shepard  and  Ogden  to  serve  with  Tracy,  Board- 
man  and  Piatt  as  counsel.  This  brought  to  the  service 
of  the  public  the  brilliant  mind  of  the  late  Edward  M. 
Shepard,  to  whose  able  work  much  of  the  later  success  of 
the  board  was  due. 

There  was  such  great  divergence  of  opinion  as  to  the 
best  route  to  be  adopted  that  the  board  decided  (Decem- 
ber 26,  1894)  to  submit  the  recommendations  of  its  own 
engineer  to  a  special  board  of  experts.  As  such  a  board 
President  Orr  appointed  Abram  S.  Hewitt,  Thomas  C. 
Clarke,  Charles  Sooysmith,  Octave  Chanute  and  Pro- 
fessor William  H.  Burr,  of  Columbia  University.  These 
men  at  once  began  their  investigations,  and  on  January 
29,  1895,  submitted  their  report. 

This  report  approved  the  estimates  made  by  Mr. 
Parsons  that  an  underground  road  could  be  built  to  the 
northerly  city  line  within  the  $50,000,000  limit  and  that 
the  subway  for  four  tracks  should  be  made  fifty  feet  wide 
instead  of  forty -four  as  fixed  by  the  Steinway  Commis- 
sion. 

On  the  question  of  route  the  experts  suggested  a  line 
from  the  City  Hall  northward  through  Elm  Street,  La- 
fayette Place  and  Fourth  Avenue  to  Fourteenth  Street, 
instead  of  the  line  up  Broadway  favored  by  the  Commis- 
sion. It  was  estimated  that  such  a  change,  by  avoiding 
the  expensive  construction  in  lower  Broadway,  would 
save  $3,700,000.  The  Commission  had  considered  such  a 
change  itself,  but  did  not  make  it  at  this  time.  On  May 
9,  1895,  the  board  adopted  a  resolution  fixing  the  route 
for  the  new  line  and  transmitted  it  to  the  Common  Coun- 
cil.   Briefly  sketched,  this  route  was  as  follows :    ' 

From  a  loop  at  Battery  Park  up  Broadway  to  Fifty- 
ninth  street  and  up  the  Boulevard  (Broadway  extended) 
to  about  124th  street;  thence  by  viaduct  over  the  Boule- 
vard to  about  134th  street;  thence  under  the  Boulevard 
and  Eleventh  Avenue  to  about  185th  street.    There  was 


144  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

to  be  a  loop  at  City  Hall,  connecting  with  a  line  from  Park 
Eow  to  a  junction  with  the  Broadway  line  at  Fulton 
street. 

Also  a  line  diverging  from  the  Broadway  route  at 
f^ourteenth  street,  running  under  Union  Square  to  Fourth 
Avenue  and  up  Fourth  and  Park  Avenues  to  about  98th 
street;  thence  by  viaduct  over  Park  Avenue  to  the  Har- 
lem Eiver,  across  the  Harlem  by  bridge  and  up  Walton 
Avenue  to  about  146th  street. 

In  the  resolution  it  was  specified  that  the  line  should 
be  a  four  track  road  from  Park  Place  on  the  South  to 
135th  street  on  the  North  on  the  West  Side,  and  from 
Union  'Square  to  Forty-second  street  on  the  East  side; 
elsewhere  there  were  to  be  only  two  tracks.  All  tracks 
were  to  be  constructed  on  one  level  at  standard  guage, 
with  a  width  of  12  feet  and  one  half  for  each  track.  The 
whole  line  was  to  be  a  subway  except  for  the  viaducts  on 
the  West  Side  between  124th  and  134th  streets  and  on  the 
East  Side  north  of  98th  Street.  The  tube  was  to  be  at 
least  twelve  feet  in  height  in  the  clear,  and  the  roof  as 
near  the  surface  of  the  street  as  possible.  Along  Broad- 
way from  Park  Place  to  34th  street  all  water  and  sewer 
pipes  and  other  sub-surface  structures  were  to  be  placed 
in  pipe  galleries  built  as  part  of  the  subway  work. 

The  right  to  construct  pipe  galleries  was  conferred 
on  the  board  by  an  amendment  to  the  Rapid  Transit  Act 
passed  at  its  solicitation  by  the  Legislature  of  1895.  This 
amendment  also  provided  that  the  City  should  extinguish 
all  easements  of  abutting  property  owners  whose  prop- 
erty might  be  affected  by  the  building  of  the  road  and 
authorized  the  expenditure  of  $5,000,000  additional  for 
that  purpose.  Litigation  over  such  rights  had  been  the 
source  of  much  trouble  and  expense  in  the  construction 
of  the  elevated  railroads.  The  board  also  was  given 
power  to  grant  franchises  for  the  extension  of  existing 
railroads  by  a  vote  of  six  of  its  members,  instead  of  the 
unanimous  vote  previously  required,  but  only  on  condi- 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  145 

tlon  that  the  recipients  of  such  grant  should  make  proper 
compensation  to  the  City  and  that  this  compensation 
should  be  subject  to  adjustment  at  the  end  of  periods  to 
be  fixed  by  the  board,  such  period  not  to  exceed  thirty- 
five  years. 

Not  being  able  to  obtain  the  requisite  number  of  con- 
sents of  property  owners  along  the  proposed  route,  the 
board  in  the  fall  of  1895  made  application  to  the  Appel- 
late Division  of  the  iSupreme  Court  for  the  appointment 
of  commissioners  and  a  determination  by  the  Court  in 
lieu  of  such  consents.  The  matter  came  up  on  the  request 
of  the  board  for  the  Court  to  name  the  newspapers  in 
which  such  application  should  be  published.  To  the  sur- 
prise of  all  the  Court  refused  to  consider  the  matter  at 
all,  and  entered  an  order  to  that  effect  on  October  7, 1895. 
The  board  at  once  appealed,  and  the  decision  was  re- 
versed by  the  Court  of  Appeals  on  October  22  following. 
The  Supreme  Court  then  named  Frederic  R.  Coudert, 
George  Sherman  and  William  H.  Gelshenen  as  Commis- 
sioners to  take  testimony  and  report  whether  the  pro- 
posed rapid  transit  railroad  ought  to  be  constructed. 
After  a  long  contest,  with  the  Rapid  Transit  board  and 
advocates  of  subways  on  one  hand  and  property  owners 
who  opposed  the  project  on  the  other,  the  commissioners, 
on  March  6,  1896,  reported  unanimously  in  favor  of  the 
new  road.  On  the  argument,  the  Appellate  Division 
unanimously  refused  to  confirm  the  report  of  its  commis- 
sioners. This  decision  was  rendered  on  May  22,  1896, 
and  the  board  gave  careful  and  respectful  consideration 
to  the  reasons  advanced  by  the  Court  for  its  decision. 

These  reasons  in  brief  were :  that  the  proposed  road 
when  constructed  would  not  furnish  a  complete  system  of 
transit  from  one  end  of  the  city  to  the  other;  that  it  was 
doubtful  whether  any  large  part  of  the  road  could  be 
built  within  the  limit  of  the  funds  then  at  the  city's  dis- 
posal, and  that  it  was  certain  that  the  expenditure  of 
such  a  large  amount  for  rapid  transit  would  deprive  the 


146  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

city  of  the  financial  ability  to  engage  in  any  other  public 
work  and  possibly  might  impair  its  credit  for  years. 
The  board  deduced  from  this  decision  that  the  Court 
would  not  consent  to  any  route  under  Broadway  or  to  an 
underground  road  on  any  other  route  unless  it  extended 
practically  from  one  end  of  the  city  to  the  other  and  it 
was  conclusively  shown  that  the  total  cost  would  be  much 
less  than  $50,000,000. 

The  effect  of  such  a  decision  on  the  mind  of  a  public 
clamoring  for  additional  rapid  transit  facilities  may  be 
imagined.  Public  meetings  were  held,  resolutions 
adopted,  the  press  urged  some  action  and  the  board  re- 
ceived letters  from  many  prominent  citizens  advocating 
a  continuance  of  the  work.  The  board  therefore  set 
about  devising  a  scheme  which  would  meet  the  approval 
of  the  court.  Routes  and  plans  were  reconsidered,  and 
by  the  end  of  the  year  1896  the  board  had  determined  to 
adopt  the  Elm  Street  route  in  place  of  the  Broadway 
line  south  of  Forty-second  street.  The  decision  was  not 
formally  made,  however,  until  the  next  year. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  board  had  been  fighting  for  its 
very  life  in  another  litigation,  which  attacked  the  con- 
stitutionality of  the  Rapid  Transit  Act.  This  w^as  caused 
by  an  action  brought  by  the  Sun  Printing  and  Publishing 
Association  and  others  as  taxpayers,  seeking  to  enjoin 
the  city  from  expending  its  funds  for  a  rapid  transit  sub- 
way on  the  ground  that  the  act  of  1894  was  unconstitu- 
tional. On  February  20,  1896,  Justice  Truax  in  Special 
Term  of  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  constitutionality 
of  the  act,  and  his  decision  later  was  affirmed  by  the 
Appellate  Division  in  July,  1896,  and  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals  in  March,  1897.  During  this  trying  year  of  1896, 
w^hen  the  board  was  fighting  for  its  life  in  the  Sun  case 
and  struggling  wdth  the  court  to  get  legal  authority 
to  build  a  subway,  the  rapid  transit  situation  was  further 
complicated  by  an  attempt  of  the  Manhattan  Railway 
company,  probably  made  to  head  off  the  threatened  sub- 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  147 

way,  to  obtain  rights  for  extensions  of  the  elevated  rail- 
roads. This  application  was  made  on  June  11  and  after 
conferences  with  the  board  was  modified  on  July  15.  The 
company  asked  for  franchises  for  thirty  miles  of  new 
routes  besides  additional  facilities  upon  existing  routes. 
It  did  not  pledge  itself,  however,  to  build  such  extensions 
within  any  period  of  time,  made  no  offer  of  rental  to  the 
city  for  such  privileges  and  limited  its  application  by  a 
condition  that  it  must  receive  immunity  from  claims  for 
damages  on  account  of  construction. 

The  board  on  August  6, 1896,  rejected  this  application, 
pointing  out  in  its  answer  that  the  board  had  no  power 
under  the  law  to  grant  to  a  private  corporation  immunity 
from  damage  claims,  that  the  statute  required  a  company 
to  pay  rental  to  the  city  for  extensions  and  that  a  grant 
not  limited  as  to  time  would  be  tantamount  to  giving  an 
option  for  rapid  transit  extensions  which  the  company 
could  build  or  not,  and  if  it  did  not  build  the  very  exist- 
ence of  the  grant  would  prevent  relief  from  any  other 
quarter.  The  board  then  requested  the  company  to 
amend  its  offer  to  overcome  these  difficulties,  but  no  fur- 
ther application  was  received,  A  year  and  a  half  later, 
however,  when  it  became  apparent  that  the  city  was 
actually  going  to  build  a  rapid  transit  railroad,  the  com- 
pany filed  another  application,  of  which  notice  will  be 
taken  further  on. 

During  the  year  1896  Seth  Low  resigned  from  the 
board  and  John  H.  Inman  and  William  Steinway  died. 
The  vacancies  were  filled  by  the  board,  which  elected 
Woodbury  Langdon  to  succeed  Low,  Geo.  L.  Rives  to 
succeed  Inman  and  Charles  Stewart  Smith  to  succeed 
Steinway. 

With  the  coming  of  the  year  1897  the  board  was  ready 
to  change  the  proposed  route  to  meet  the  views  of  the 
Appellate  Division,  namely  that  the  road  should  extend 
from  one  end  of  the  city  to  the  other  and  must  be  built 
at  a  cost  much  less  than  $50,000,000.    Accordingly,  after 


148  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

receiving  a  report  from  Engineer  Parsons,  the  board  on 
January  14,  1897,  adopted  a  revised  route  and  general 
plan,  under  which  the  proposed  road  would  run  up  Elm 
street  and  Fourth  Avenue  from  City  Hall  and  connect 
with  the  Broadw^ay  route  by  a  cross-town  line  through 
Forty-second  street.  The  modified  route  began  at  the 
intersection  of  Broadway  and  Park  Row,  ran  thence 
under  Elm  street,  Lafayette  Place  and  private  property 
to  Fourth  Avenue,  up  Fourth  and  Park  Avenues  to  Forty- 
second  street,  west  under  Forty-second  street  to  Broad- 
way, and  up  Broadway  and  the  Boulevard  to  124th  street, 
thence  by  viaduct  over  the  Boulevard  to  134th  street, 
thence  under  the  Boulevard  and  Eleventh  Avenue  to  a 
point  north  of  190th  street,  over  private  property.  Ell- 
wood  street  and  Broadway  to  Riverside  Avenue  and  over 
Riverside  Avenue  to  a  point  near  Kingsbridge  station  of 
the  New  York  and  Putnam  railroad. 

The  route  also  provided  for  a  loop  at  City  Hall  and 
for  an  extension  from  the  main  line  near  103d  street 
under  Lenox  Avenue  to  and  under  the  Harlem  River  and 
under  149th  street  to  Westchester  Avenue  and  thence 
over  Westchester  Avenue  by  viaduct  to  Southern  Boule- 
vard, over  Southern  Boulevard  to  Boston  Road  and  over 
Boston  Road  to  Bronx  Park. 

It  was  provided  that  the  road  should  have  four  tracks 
from  City  Hall  to  103d  street  and  two  tracks  elsewhere, 
and  that  all  tracks  should  be  built  on  one  level.  The 
resolution  also  contained  this  clause :  ' '  The  general  mode 
of  operation  shall  be  by  electricity  or  some  other  power 
not  requiring  combustion  within  the  tunnels  or  on  the 
viaducts,  and  the  motors  shall  be  capable  of  moving 
trains  at  a  speed  of  not  less  than  forty  miles  per  hour 
for  long  distances,  exclusive  of  stops." 

The  modified  route  was  later  approved  by  the  court 
and  was  followed  in  the  construction  of  the  road.  This 
change  in  the  route  is  responsible  for  the  zig-zag  line 
of  the  first  subway.     The  Rapid  Transit  Commission, 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  149 

therefore,  cannot  be  charged  with  this  peculiar  align- 
ment. The  board  originally  favored  a  straight  line  up 
Broadway,  but  the  court  objected  to  the  expense  and  the 
Elm  street  route  was  substituted  to  save  a  few  millions 
of  dollars.  In  consequence  the  first  subway  is  an  East 
Side  line  below  and  a  West  Side  line  above  Forty-second 
street.  This  initial  mistake  proved  costly  to  the  City  in 
later  years  when  the  building  of  extensions  of  the  sub- 
way was  undertaken,  for  the  zig-zag  line  compelled  the 
laying  out  of  a  new  route  on  the  same  plan  or  the  build- 
ing of  north  and  south  wings  to  the  existing  road,  w^hich 
of  course  meant  operation  by  the  company  which  leased 
the  first  subway.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  time  con- 
sumed in  adjusting  the  new  lines  to  this  situation,  but  it 
is  safe  to  say  that  rapid  transit  relief  was  delayed  some 
years  in  consequence. 

At  the  time,  however,  the  Elm  street  route  was  gen- 
erally approved,  for  it  was  felt  that  it  would  meet  the 
main  objection  advanced  by  the  Appellate  Division.  The 
people  wanted  rapid  transit,  and  it  mattered  very  little 
to  them  whether  the  new  road  ran  straight  up  and  down 
the  island  or  zig-zag  across  town.  In  a  report  published 
after  the  subway  was  completed,  the  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
mission spoke  as  follows  of  the  Elm  street  route : 

"The  scheme  thus  adopted  complied,  it  was 
hoped,  with  the  requirements  of  the  Appellate  Divi- 
sion. In  the  first  place  the  road  was  estimated  to 
cost  about  $35,000,000,  and  that  this  estimate  was 
correct  time  has  conclusively  proved.  In  the  second 
place  it  ran  from  the  City  Hall — or  near  the  souther- 
ly end  of  Manhattan  Island, — to  Kingsbridge  as  the 
terminus  of  one  branch  and  to  the  Bronx  Park  as 
the  terminus  of  the  other.  At  Kingsbridge  a  physi- 
cal connection  with  the  New  York  Central  lines  to 
Yonkers  and  beyond  was  easy.  At  the  Bronx  Park 
the  northerly  limits  of  the  city  were  nearly  reached ; 


150  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

and  if  the  court  had  insisted  on  a  further  extension 
here,  it  would  have  cost  little,  comparatively,  to  ex- 
tend the  road  still  further  by  an  elevated  structure 
through  the  Park. 

"The  necessity  of  avoiding  Broadway  below 
Thirty-fourth  street  so  as  to  meet  the  views  of  the 
court  compelled  the  use  of  Fourth  Avenue  and  Elm 
street  for  the  main  stem,  and  the  introduction  of  an 
awkward  alignment  from  Fourth  Avenue  to  the 
Westward  along  Forty-second  street  to  Broadway." 

In  the  modified  route  no  provision  was  made  for  the 
extension  of  the  subway  south  from  City  Hall,  the  board 
being  unwilling  to  plan  an  extension  down  Broadway  in 
view  of  the  dicta  of  the  court.  When  this  became  known 
the  property  owners  along  Broadway  filed  with  the 
board  a  petition  for  such  a  route  signed  by  a 
majority  in  value  of  the  abutting  property.  Accordingly 
on  April  1,  1897,  the  board  adopted  a  resolution  provid- 
ing for  a  two  track  extension  of  the  subway  down  Broad- 
way to  Battery  Place,  with  a  loop  under  Battery  Park, 
Whitehall  street  and  State  street. 

The  city  authorities  promptly  gave  their  consents  to 
the  route  above  City  Hall,  but  the  board  was  unsuccessful 
in  obtaining  the  consents  of  the  property  owners  for  that 
part  of  the  line.  Therefore  it  determined  to  pursue  the 
alternative  course  and  applied  to  the  Appellate  Division 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  inquire  and 
report  whether  such  a  railroad  ought  to  be  constructed 
in  the  public  interest.  In  July,  1897,  the  court  appointed 
Arthur  D.  Williams,  John  Sabine  Smith  and  George  W. 
Young  as  such  commissioners.  Again  opposing  interests 
made  a  fight  against  the  proposition,  but  the  commis- 
sioners on  November  6,  1897,  submitted  a  unanimous  re- 
port in  its  favor. 

In  a  short  time,  namely  on  December  17,  1897,  the 
Appellate  Division  confirmed  the  report  of  its  commis- 


THE  EAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  151 

sioners,  but  coupled  its  approval  with  the  condition  that 
the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  should  stipulate  that  upon 
awarding  any  contract  for  construction  and  operation  of 
the  railroad,  "the  penalty  of  the  bond  specified  in  Sec- 
tion 34  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Act  will  be  fixed  at  not  less 
than  $15,000,000."  In  the  language  of  the  court  this  was 
done  to  give  "some  assurance  that  the  powers  of  the 
Rapid  Transit  Commissioners  in  respect  to  security 
should  be  exercised  so  as  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
city  in  a  substantial  manner." 

Such  an  approval  was  tantamount. to  disapproval  in 
the  minds  of  those  conversant  with  the  situation,  for  the 
requirement  of  a  bond  in  such  an  amount  as  $15,000,000 
to  run  for  the  whole  period  of  the  lease  of  the  road,  as 
required  by  section  34,  was  about  equivalent  to  a  prohibi- 
tion of  any  lease.  Nevertheless  the  board  endeavored  to 
comply  with  the  wishes  of  the  court  and  appointed  a 
committee  to  inquire  whether  such  a  bond  could  be  ob- 
tained. 

While  this  committee  was  at  work  another  serious 
problem  confronted  the  board,  which  seemed  fated  to 
encounter  a  new  obstacle  as  soon  as  an  old  one  had  been 
solved.  This  was  the  financial  condition  of  the  city  after 
its  enlargement  to  take  in  Brooklyn,  Queens  and  Rich- 
mond boroughs.  This  consolidation  took  effect  January 
1,  1898,  when  Robert  A.  Van  Wyck  became  Mayor  and 
Bird  iS.  Coler  'Controller.  Under  the  statute  these  new 
officers  became  ex  officio  members  of  the  Rapid  Transit 
board,  taking  the  places  respectively  of  William  L.  Strong 
and  Ashbel  P.  Fitch.  As  G-reater  New^  York  had  to  as- 
sume the  indebtedness  of  all  the  communities  it  absorbed, 
it  was  feared  that  the  added  burden  would  bring  the  debt 
of  the  city  so  close  to  the  constitutional  limit  of  ten  per 
cent,  of  the  assessed  value  of  its  real  estate  as  to  prohibit 
the  issue  of  bonds  in  amounts  large  enough  to  defray  the 
cost  of  the  proposed  rapid  transit  railroad.  The  danger, 
however,  was  more  apparent  than  real.     It  was  found 


152  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

that  property  in  the  old  city  had  been  assessed  much 
lower  than  the  property  in  the  communities  absorbed, 
and  as  the  law  provided  for  assessment  at  actual  value, 
the  assessment  of  the  old  city  was  soon  raised  to  some- 
where near  an  equality  with  that  in  the  annexed  boroughs, 
thereby  expanding  the  debt-incurring  power  of  the  city 
as  a  whole  to  such  an  extent  that  no  difficulty  was  antici- 
pated in  financing  the  new  road. 

Another  effect  of  the  consolidation  and  one  not  antici- 
pated was  the  hostile  sentiment  developed  in  Kings, 
Queens  and  Richmond  boroughs  against  the  proposed 
rapid  transit  road.  As  laid  out  the  road  ran  entirely 
within  New  York  county,  or  in  the  boroughs  of  Manhat- 
tan and  the  Bronx.  By  the  consolidation,  however,  the 
property  in  the  other  boroughs  must  be  taxed  to  defray 
a  portion  of  the  cost.  Objection  at  once  was  made  against 
using  the  general  credit  of  the  city  to  pay  for  an  improve- 
ment confined  to  two  boroughs,  and  for  a  time  the  mem- 
bers of  the  board  feared  that  this  sentiment  would  defeat 
the  project.  The  press  supported  the  board,  as  did  many 
broad-minded  citizens  having  property  in  the  other  bor- 
oughs, and  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  road  would  be  used 
by  residents  of  all  boroughs  and  undoubtedly  would  be 
extended  to  Brooklyn,  Queens  and  Richmond  in  the 
course  of  time.  Opposition  gradually  lessened  and  the 
board  soon  was  able  to  proceed  with  the  project,  but  dur- 
ing the  first  part  of  the  year  1898  there  is  no  doubt  that 
its  members  felt  discouraged  and  apprehensive  of  the 
failure  of  the  enterprise. 

The  opportunity  was  seized  by  the  Manhattan  Rail- 
way company  to  create  another  diversion.  It  made  pub- 
lic a  statement  that  it  would  enlarge  its  system  of  ele- 
vated railroads  just  as  soon  as  it  could  get  the  rights 
from  the  board  or  from  the  Legislature.  On  January  31 
it  filed  with  the  board  an  application  for  the  right  to  make 
certain  extensions  of  the  existing  elevated  roads,  mainly 
by  lengthening  the  lines  to  the  north,  but  made  no  offer 


STAFF  OF  BOARD  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 
RAILROAD  COMMISSIONERS 

A.  B.  Boardman,  Counsel;      2.    William  Barclay  Parsons,  Chief  Engineer; 

3.    Edward  M.  Shepard,  Counsel;       4.    Georg'  L.  Rives,  Counsel. 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  153 

of  rental  to  the  city.  The  board  referred  the  matter  to  a 
special  committee  and  its  chief  engineer,  who  held  several 
conferences  with  Jay  Gould,  Russell  iSage  and  others 
interested  in  the  elevated  company.  The  committee  re- 
ported on  March  17,  1898,  to  the  effect  that  the  northern 
extensions  asked  for  by  the  company  would  not  give  the 
additional  facilities  demanded  unless  additional  tracks 
were  built  on  the  southern  portions  of  the  lines,  where 
the  two  tracks  existing  were  already  badly  overcrowded. 
The  committee  accordingly  recommended  that  seven  cer- 
tificates for  new  rights  should  be  prepared  and  offered 
to  the  company,  which  would  provide  for  substantially 
everything  asked  for  and  in  addition  the  extra  tracks 
needed  to  enlarge  the  capacity  of  the  whole  system. 

The  lines  covered  by  the  proposed  seven  franchises 
had  been  approved  by  the  board's  engineer  and  submitted 
to  the  elevated  company.  The  latter,  while  admitting  the 
practicability  of  the  routes  from  an  engineering  stand- 
point, declined  in  the  absence  of  accurate  figures  as  to 
cost  to  commit  itself  to  their  construction,  and  also  asked 
for  further  time  in  which  to  determine  what  if  any  rental 
it  would  be  able  to  pay  the  city  for  the  new  rights.  To 
save  time,  therefore,  the  committee  recommended  that  the 
seven  certificates  be  prepared  for  tender  to  the  company 
and  that  during  the  time  taken  in  their  preparation  the 
officers  of  the  latter  could  deliberate  upon  and  decide  the 
questions  as  to  cost  of  construction  and  the  amount  of 
rental  to  be  paid  to  the  city. 

''Every  day  is  adding  to  the  difficulties  of  the  situa- 
tion" said  the  report.  *'So  long  as  the  Manhattan  appli- 
cation is  pending,  the  consideration  of  other  plans  looking 
to  a  solution  of  the  rapid  transit  problem  is  necessarily 
deferred." 

The  report  was  adopted,  the  seven  franchises  were  pre- 
pared and  formally  tendered  to  the  company  by  the  board 
on  April  7,  1898.  The  company,  however,  did  not  accept 
them,  and  the  board  pursued  its  work  to  bring  about  the 


154  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

construction  of  the  proposed  subway.  Indeed  its  work 
in  this  regard  had  never  been  intermitted.  While  the 
Manhattan  proposal  was  pending  and  before  it  was  sub- 
mitted, the  board  sought  the  aid  of  men  of  wealth  and 
influence  to  consider  the  building  and  operation  of  the 
road.  Conferences  were  held  with  the  leading  transpor- 
tation men  of  the  city,  including  Cornelius  Vanderbilt 
and  Chauncey  M.  Depew,  of  the  New  York  Central  sys- 
tem ;  Charles  P.  Clark,  of  the  New  York,  New  Haven  and 
Hartford  company  and  William  C.  Whitney  and  others 
interested  in  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway  company. 
None  of  them  would  take  any  active  part  in  the  project. 
Could  any  of  them  have  foreseen  the  enormous  profits 
later  made  out  of  the  operation  of  the  first  subway  by 
the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  company,  there  would 
have  been  a  different  reception  accorded  the  advances  of 
the  board  in  1898. 

On  January  13,  1898,  the  board  received  the  report 
of  its  committee  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  possibility 
of  obtaining  a  bond  of  $15,000,000,  as  required  by  the 
court.  The  committee  found  that  it  would  be  next  to 
impossible  to  get  a  contractor  who  would  be  able  or  will- 
ing to  give  such  a  large  bond,  and  accordingly  recom- 
mended that  the  court  be  requested  to  limit  its  require- 
ment to  a  bond  for  construction  and  equipment  and  to 
leave  to  the  board  the  fixing  of  the  amount  of  the  bond 
to  be  given  to  protect  the  city  in  regard  to  the  payment 
of  rental  and  satisfactory  operation  of  the  road.  The 
board  followed  this  recommendation  and  on  January  17, 
1898,  instructed  its  counsel  to  apply  to  the  court  for  a 
modification  of  its  order. 

The  application  was  duly  made  and  the  Appellate 
Division  granted  it  to  the  extent  of  modifying  its  pre- 
vious order  so  that,  while  insisting  on  a  bond  of  $15,000,- 
000,  it  consented  that  the  liahility  of  the  sureties  as  to 
$14,000,000  thereof  should  terminate  on  the  completion 
and  equipment  of  the  railroad,  limiting  the  permanent 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  155 


bond  to  $1,000,000.  While  this  was  still  a  severe  restric- 
tion in  the  opinion  of  the  board,  it  was  not  prohibitive, 
and  the  board  accordingly  entered  into  the  stipulation 
required  by  the  court. 

After  all  these  difficulties  had  been  surmounted  the 
board  should  have  had  plain  sailing,  but  its  usual  adverse 
luck  still  prevailed  and  a  formidable  but  unlooked  for 
obstacle  arose.  The  law  required  that  any  contract  pre- 
pared by  the  board  for  the  construction  and  operation  of 
the  railroad  must  be  approved  as  to  form  by  the  Corpora- 
tion Counsel,  the  legal  advisor  of  the  city  government. 
This  official  was  John  Whalen,  appointed  by  Van  Wyck, 
the  new  Mayor.  The  proposed  contract  was  adopted  by 
the  board  on  March  31,  1898,  and  submitted  to  the  Cor- 
poration Counsel  on  April  7  following.  He  was  asked  to 
give  it  his  attention  and  report  at  once.  Instead  of  act- 
ing promptly  he  held  the  contract  for  nearly  a  year  and 
a  half  without  acting,  and  in  September  1899  returned  it 
to  the  board  with  suggestions  for  several  amendments. 
His  ;reason  for  holding  it  so  long  was  that  it  was  the 
practice  of  the  Law  Department  never  to  approve  a  con- 
tract, which  could  not  legally  be  made. 

This  delay  by  the  city  administration,  which  if  it  re- 
flected the  sentiment  of  the  people  would  have  cordially 
supported  the  Kapid  Transit  board,  brought  matters  to 
a  standstill,  and  the  year  1899  opened  with  the  Commis- 
sioners marking  time  and  longingly  awaiting  the  action 
of  the  Corporation  Counsel.  The  situation  was  intoler- 
able, and  the  board  determined  to  appeal  to  the  new 
Legislature  just  convened.  A  memorial  to  that  body 
was  prepared  by  the  board  and  sent  to  Albany,  and  its 
publication  and  discussion  eventually  cleared  the  atmos- 
phere. In  this  memorial  the  board  set  forth  the  whole 
rapid  transit  situation,  called  attention  to  the  debt  limit 
restriction  and  the  doubts  of  the  city  authorities  that  a 
sufficient  margin  existed  to  justify  undertaking  city  con- 
struction of  the  rapid  transit  railroad;  suggested  a  pos- 


156  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

sible  way  out  by  authorizing  New  York  county  instead 
of  the  city  to  issue  bonds  for  its  construction;  and  in 
view  of  the  possibility  of  not  getting  enough  public  funds 
to  construct  the  line  suggested  that  the  board  be  em- 
powered to  resort  to  private  capital  and  given  the  broad- 
est powers  to  make  the  franchise  attractive  and  arouse 
competition. 

Hardly  had  this  memorial  been  transmitted  when  cer- 
tain men  interested  in  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway 
company,  who  a  year  before  had  refused  to  consider 
building  and  operating  the  rapid  transit  road  for  the  city, 
informed  the  board  that  if  a  new  company  to  be  formed 
by  them  were  granted  a  perpetual  franchise  they  would 
construct  a  road  according  to  the  plans  of  the  board, 
complete  the  west  side  branch  to  Fort  George  within 
three  years  and  the  remainder  of  the  road  within  two 
years  after  the  corporation  should  earn  five  per  cent,  on 
the  cost  of  building  the  first  section.  They  offered  to  pay 
the  city  five  per  cent,  of  the  gross  receipts  annually,  pro- 
vided the  company  first  took  out  of  earnings  five  per  cent, 
net  upon  the  cost  of  construction. 

This  offer  was  seriously  considered  by  the  board, 
which,  while  favoring  public  ownership,  believed  that 
rapid  transit  by  aid  of  private  capital  was  better  than 
no  rapid  transit  at  all.  Accordingly  it  unanimously  ap- 
proved a  resolution  offered  by  Mayor  Van  Wyck  on 
March  29,  1899,  declaring  ''that  it  is  in  the  public  inter- 
est that,  in  addition  to  the  powers  already  possessed  by 
the  board,  the  Legislature  should  grant  to  the  board  the 
power  to  contract  for  the  construction  and  operation  of 
the  rapid  transit  railroad  by  private  capital." 

Something  might  have  been  achieved  along  these  lines 
if  the  friends  of  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway  had  not 
overplayed  their  hand.  A  bill  was  introduced  in  the 
Legislature  to  confer  on  the  board  the  power  to  grant  a 
perpetual  franchise  to  a  private  corporation.  The  press 
and  the  public  instantly  took  alarm.    The  bill  was  taken 


THE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  157 

as  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Metropolitan  to  "grab" 
a  valuable  franchise  for  the  underground  railroad  and 
was  bitterly  denounced.  Agitation  continued  and  at- 
tained such  proportions  that  the  bill  failed,  and  the 
Metropolitan  coterie  who  had  approached  the  board  with- 
drew its  offer,  stating  that  the  opposition  which  had  de- 
veloped had  created  such  a  situation  that  "success  in  the 
enterprise  would  be  impossible." 

The  Legislature,  however,  passed  the  bill  amending 
the  rapid  transit  act,  which  had  been  submitted  by  the 
board,  but  amended  it  so  materially  that  it  would  seri- 
ously hamper  any  negotiations  which  the  board  might  un- 
dertake to  enlist  the  aid  of  private  capital  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  railroad.  Mayor  Van  Wyck  refused  to 
accept  it  for  the  city,  and  so  the  legislative  session  ended 
without  any  rapid  transit  relief.  The  board,  there- 
fore, began  prodding  the  city  authorities  for  action,  as 
public  construction  was  now  the  only  course  open. 

Meanwhile  a  new  member  had  entered  the  board  in 
the  person  of  Morris  K.  Jesup,  who  was  elected  president 
of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  May,  1899,  and  thereby 
became  a  member  of  the  board,  succeeding  Alexander  E. 
Orr,  the  president.  But  John  Claflin  resigned  at  the  first 
meeting  thereafter,  and  the  board  elected  Mr.  Orr  to 
succeed  him,  so  that  there  was  no  break  in  Mr.  Orr's 
service.  Another  election  was  held,  and  Mr.  Orr  was  re- 
elected as  president  on  May  29,  1899,  Mr.  Starin,  the 
vice-president,  having  acted  as  president  during  the  in- 
terim, namely  from  May  11  to  May  29.  About  the  same 
time  Lewis  L.  Delafield,  the  secretary  of  the  board,  re- 
signed and  Bion  L.  Burrows  was  elected  to  succeed  him. 

The  first  gun  in  the  board's  assault  on  the  city  au- 
thorities was  in  the  form  of  a  letter  to  Mayor  Van  Wyck, 
dated  May  19,  1899.  It  opened  with  the  inquiry  as  to  the 
extent  "to  which  the  municipal  authorities  will  feel  able 
to  promote  construction  by  the  city  of  the  proposed  rapid 
transit  railroad."    It  then  set  forth  briefly  the  various 


158  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

steps  taken  to  date  by  the  board,  including  the  submis- 
sion of  the  draft  contract  to  the  Corporation  Counsel  for 
his  approval  on  April  7,  1898,  adding  significantly  "but 
no  communication  has  as  yet  been  received  from  him, 
whether  of  approval  or  disapproval." 

Municipal  construction  under  the  law  as  it  stood  was 
declared  by  the  board  to  be  entirely  feasible,  ''provided 
the  municipal  authorities  will  co-operate  with  the  board." 
Further  progress,  however,  was  impossible  until  the 
Corporation  Counsel  should  give  his  approval  to  the  form 
of  the  contract  as  required  by  law. 

The  debt  limit  situation  was  discussed  in  the  letter, 
and  it  was  stated  that  the  board  believed  the  provisions 
concerning  it  in  the  contract  were  sufficient,  but  that  if 
the  Corporation  Counsel  deemed  them  insufficient  he 
should  advise  the  board  to  that  effect  so  that  the  con- 
tract might  be  amended.    In  conclusion  the  letter  said : 

"The  board  begs  to  repeat  that  its  power  to  carry 
out  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  created  now  de- 
pends practically,  first  upon  the  permission  of  the 
Corporation  Counsel  to  make  any  contract,  and,  sec- 
ond, upon  the  assent  of  the  Board  of  Estimate  to  a 
postponement  of  the  making  of  other  contracts  in- 
volving large  municipal  debt  until  a  rapid  transit 
contract  actually  made  shall  assure  the  carrying  out 
of  that  great  public  measure.  The  board,  therefore, 
respectfully  asks  your  Honor,  and  through  you  the 
other  municipal  authorities,  whether  in  these  two 
respects  it  may  be  aided  to  secure  prompt  and  actual 
construction  of  the  rapid  transit  road  by  the  city." 

This  letter  placed  the  responsibility  for  further  delay 
squarely  on  the  city  administration  and  focused  public 
attention  on  Mayor  Van  Wyck.  There  was  no  other  diffi- 
culty in  the  way.  A  new  assessment  had  been  made  in 
July  raising  the  valuation  of  the  real  estate  of  the  city 
more  than  $420,000,000,  and  thus  adding  $42,000,000  to 


THIE  RAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  159 

the  borrowing  capacity  under  the  debt  limit.  In  addition 
a  constitutional  amendment  was  to  come  before  the  people 
for  adoption  in  the  ensuing  election  exempting  from 
charging  against  the  Greater  City  an  indebtedness  of 
about  $30,000,000  carried  by  the  separate  counties  when 
taken  into  the  consolidation.  This  amendment,  which 
was  approved  by  the  people,  still  further  added  to  the 
city's  borrowing  capacity. 

Through  the  spring  and  into  the  summer  the  City  Hall 
remained  silent.  The  board  waited  respectfully  for  a 
reply  until  July  13,  when  it  addressed  another  letter,  this 
time  to  the  Board  of  Estimate,  again  reviewing  the  situa- 
tion. Attention  was  called  to  the  fact  that  the  margin 
below  the  debt  limit  was  fully  $40,000,000,  that  no  con- 
tract could  be  made  till  the  Corporation  Counsel  acted, 
that  a  rapid  transit  debt  could  not  be  created  till  after 
the  contract  was  executed  and  that  meanwhile  other  debts 
might  be  incurred  which  would  so  lessen  the  borrowing 
capacity  of  the  city  as  to  prevent  any  rapid  transit  con- 
struction and  thus  defeat  the  will  of  the  people  as  regis- 
tered in  the  vote  on  the  referendum  in  1894.  The  board, 
therefore,  expressly  asked  that  no  further  debt  be  au- 
thorized in  an  amount  sufficient  to  reduce  the  borrowing 
margin  below  the  estimated  cost  of  the  proposed  road 
until  there  should  have  been  reasonable  opportunity  for 
the  letting  of  the  contract. 

This  evoked  a  response  on  'September  20,  when  the 
Corporation  Counsel  transmitted  to  the  board  his  views 
on  the  draft  contract,  as  before  mentioned.  In  this  letter 
he  stated  that  the  city  was  now  in  a  position  to  undertake 
the  work  and  he  had  already  conferred  with  the  counsel 
for  the  board  with  a  view  ''to  expediting  the  business." 
The  Corporation  Counsel  made  eight  points  against  the 
contract,  to  which  the  board  replied.  His  first  point  was 
that  the  Law  Department  of  the  city  should  have  charge 
of  all  proceedings  for  the  condemnation  of  land.  The 
board  tersely  responded  that  the  law  itself  expressly  pro- 


160  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

vided  that  the  Coi-poration  Counsel  should  have  charge 
of  such  proceedings. 

His  second  point  was  that  the  contract  ought  to  pro- 
vide for  the  transportation  of  light  parcels  and  packages. 
Again  the  board  countered  by  quoting  another  provision 
of  the  act  which  authorized  the  use  of  the  railroad  for 
that  purpose. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  most  of  the  other  points. 
The  best  suggestion  made  was  that  the  contract  be 
amended  by  making  special  reference  to  the  Labor  law, 
although  it  already  contained  a  provision  requiring  com- 
pliance with  all  laws.  The  board  agreed  to  this  sugges- 
tion and  subsequently  incorporated  a  special  provision 
on  the  Labor  law. 

The  board  then  revised  its  form  of  contract  and  again 
transmitted  it  for  approval  to  the  Corporation  Counsel 
on  October  6,  1899.  The  most  important  amendment  was 
a  provision  to  limit  the  initial  work  to  that  part  of  the 
road  extending  from  Brooklyn  Bridge  to  59th  street  and 
giving  the  city  the  option  to  require  the  contractor  to 
complete  the  rest  of  the  line  within  certain  specified 
periods.  By  thus  limiting  the  initial  expenditure  it  was 
thought  that  all  question  as  to  obtaining  the  funds  neces- 
sary would  be  avoided.  Conferences  followed  with  the 
Corporation  Counsel,  and  the  amended  form  of  contract 
was  approved  by  him  on  October  11,  1899,  about  a  year 
and  six  months  after  it  had  been  submitted  to  him. 

Once  having  decided  to  co-operate  with  the  board  in 
providing  new^  rapid  transit  facilities,  it  must  be  said  that 
the  city  authorities  gave  generous  assistance.  The  Cor- 
poration Counsel  joined  counsel  for  the  board  in  making 
application  to  the  Appellate  Division  for  a  modification 
of  the  stipulation  previously  entered  into  by  the  board  on 
the  matter  of  the  bond  to  be  required  of  the  contractor. 
This,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  for  a  $1,000,000  continu- 
ing bond  and  for  a  bond  of  $14,000,000  during  the  prog- 
ress of  the  work.     The  joint  application  was  made  on 


THE  EAPID  TRANSIT  ACT  OF  1894  161 

October  20,  1899,  and  was  argued  on  October  30 .  It 
proved  successful,  for  the  court  on  November  10  gave  a 
decision  ordering  a  modification  of  the  stipulation  so  as 
to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  bond  to  $5,000,000.  Thus  the 
year  1899  ended  with  all  the  legal  difficulties  cleared  away, 
all  other  obstacles  surmounted  and  the  path  open  for  the 
advertisement  and  a"ward  of  the  great  contract. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Contract  for  $35,000,000  for  ^Construction  of  First  Sub- 
way Awarded  to  McDonald. 

T  T  was  on  June  8, 1894,  that  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit 
^  Railroad  Commissioners  created  by  the  act  of  that 
year  held  its  first  meeting.  A  period  of  five  years  and  a 
half,  therefore,  had  been  consumed  in  the  preparatory 
and  preliminary  work.  The  actual  work  necessary  could 
have  been  done  in  a  year,  but  pioneer  labors  always  take 
more  time  than  similar  labors  after  the  pathway  has  been 
blazed.  For  none  of  the  delay  can  the  Rapid  Transit 
Commission  be  blamed;  it  was  due  entirely  to  legal  obsta- 
cles and  municipal  tardiness. 

But  ''all's  well  that  ends  well",  and  both  the  com- 
mission and  the  public  forgot  the  troubles  of  the  past  in 
the  joy  of  starting  the  final  work  which  was  to  bring 
about  the  beginning  of  actual  construction.  But  joy  was 
not  unconfined  by  apprehension  lest  there  might  be  diffi- 
culty in  finding  a  contractor  with  money  enough  and  cour- 
age enough  to  undertake  the  work.  For  be  it  remembered 
that  underground  transportation  of  passengers  was  then 
an  untried  experiment  in  New  York  City.  True,  London 
had  for  some  years  successfully  operated  a  subterranean 
r(.>ad,  but  the  conditions  there  were  vastly  different  from 
those  in  New  York,  and  skeptics  were  many  and  vocifer- 
ous. A  bit  of  encouragement  came  from  Boston,  where 
a  subway  had  been  completed  and  was  working  well.  But 
here  again  the  cry  was  that  conditions  were  totally  dis- 
similar and  that  what  might  succeed  in  Boston  might  fail 
in  New  York. 

There  was  a  difference  of  opinion  even  among  engi- 
neers and  men  experienced  in  the  transportation  busi- 
ness. Among  the  former  there  were  some  who  scouted 
the  idea  of  a  subway  underneath  the  heavily  traveled 
streets  of  New  York,  with  their  tall  and  costly  buildings 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  163 

erected  on  either  side  of  the  route.  Nothing  could  pre- 
vent such  buildings  from  settling  or  falling  into  the  cut, 
it  was  claimed.  Well  known  railroad  men,  including 
Chauncey  M.  Depew,  were  doubtful  of  the  success  of  the 
railroad  even  if  constructed.  Human  beings,  they  de- 
clared, liked  the  open  air  and  would  not  readily  bur- 
row into  the  ground  unless  compelled  to  do  so.  Mr. 
Depew  said  that  the  great  majority  of  passengers  would 
avoid  the  underground  road  if  there  were  any  other 
way  of  traveling.  We  now  know  that  such  views  were 
mistaken  ones,  but  at  the  time  they  were  held  by  many 
and  voiced  to  such  an  extent  that  a  respectable  minority 
of  the  public  questioned  the  practicability  of  the  project. 

As  was  told  in  the  last  chapter,  several  men  eminent 
in  the  railroad  world  had  been  approached  by  the  board 
and  urged  to  take  a  hand  in  the  work,  but  all  without 
exception  refused.  None  had  faith  enough  in  the  project 
or  courage  enough  in  pioneer  endeavor  to  make  the  ven- 
ture, entailing  as  it  did  an  expenditure  of  millions  even 
though  the  cost  of  construction  should  be  defrayed  by 
the  municipality.  But  there  were  two  men  in  New  York, 
who  had  the  qualities  demanded  by  the  crisis — one  with 
nerve  and  immense  financial  resources,  and  the  other  with 
nerve  and  the  capital  of  actual  experience  in  under- 
ground construction — namely,  August  Belmont,  a 
banker  and  John  B.  McDonald,  a  contractor.  The  pub- 
lic had  called  for  volunteers  and  they  responded.  And 
they  were  not  alone,  for  Andrew  Onderdonk,  another  ex- 
perienced contractor,  also  volunteered,  but  fortune  fav- 
ored McDonald  and  he,  backed  by  the  Belmont  money 
and  influence,  undertook  the  work. 

Immediately  after  the  court  had  reduced  the  amount 
of  the  bond  to  be  required  of  the  contractor,  the  board 
prepared  an  invitation  to  contractors  and  published  it  as 
required  by  law.  It  was  inserted  in  six  daily  newspapers 
twice  a  week  for  three  successive  weeks,  and  the  date 
of  opening  bids  was  fixed  for  January  15,  1900. 


164  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

During  the  period  of  advertising  the  newspapers 
were  filled  with  speculations  as  to  the  possible  bidders, 
and  there  were  not  wanting  the  pessimists  who  predicted 
that  there  would  be  no  bids  at  all.  When  the  fifteenth  of 
January  came,  however,  two  proposals  in  the  form  pre- 
scribed by  the  board  were  received,  one  from  John  B. 
McDonald  and  the  other  from  Andrew  Onderdonk.  Mr. 
McDonald  offered  to  build  the  whole  road  for  $35,000,000; 
Onderdonk  for  $39,300,000.  Onderdonk  in  addition 
agreed  to  pay  the  city  five  per  cent,  on  the  first  million 
dollars  of  revenue  in  excess  of  $5,000,000  a  year  and  two 
and  a  half  per  cent,  on  each  additional  million  up  to  a 
maximum  of  15  per  cent.  Both  bidders  agreed  to  the 
statutory  rental,  namely  interest  on  the  bonds  issued  by 
the  city  for  construction  and  one  per  cent,  additional  for 
a  sinking  fund. 

The  board  after  referring  both  bids  to  a  committee 
and  in  accordance  with  the  recommendations  thereof,  de- 
cided to  award  the  contract  to  McDonald.  The  latter 
promptly  made  arrangements  with  August  Belmont  for 
the  necessary  financial  backing.  After  the  decision  had 
been  made  negotiations  were  entered  into  with  McDonald 
and  with  August  Belmont  and  Company,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  the  latter  should  organize  a  new  company  to 
enter  into  a  contract  with  McDonald  to  promote  the  work, 
to  furnish  the  security  to  be  given  by  him  and  to  finance 
the  undertaking.  This  company  was  incorporated  later 
as  the  Eapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  company. 

It  was  also  agreed  that  the  Rapid  Transit  Commis- 
sion should  apply  to  the  Appellate  Division  for  a  further 
modification  of  the  requirements  as  to  bonds;  first  to 
annul  the  provision  as  to  the  construction  bond  requiring 
sureties  to  qualify  in  double  the  amount  of  the  liability 
and  to  reduce  the  minimum  amount  to  be  taken  by  each 
surety  from  $500,000  to  $250,000 ;  second  that  McDonald 
should  furnish  the  continuing  bond  in  amount  of  $1,000.- 
000,  with  sureties  qualifying  in  double  that  amount  and 


FINANCIER  AND  BUILDER  OF  FIRST  SUBWAY 

1.    August  Belmont;     2.    John  B.  McDonald. 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  165 

at  the  same  time  deposit  with  the  Controller  securities 
of  the  value  of  $1,000,000,  which  ultimately  were  to  be 
substituted  for  the  bond  for  that  amount ;  third,  that  the 
Rapid  Transit  'Subway  Construction  company  become 
surety  on  McDonald's  bond  for  $4,000,000;  fourth,  that 
McDonald  deposit  $1,000,000  in  cash  as  required  by  the 
contract  and  assign  to  the  city  his  beneficial  interest  in 
the  bonds  to  be  required  of  sub-contractors;  fifth,  that 
McDonald  cause  an  additional  $1,000,000  to  be  deposited 
by  January  1,  1901,  to  be  held  as  additional  security  for 
the  sureties  on  the  construction  bond. 

The  Appellate  Division  promptly  approved  this 
plan  when  it  was  presented,  and  the  board,  after  approv- 
ing the  various  bonds,  executed  the  contract  on  February 
21,  1900,  the  various  deposits  of  cash  and  securities  being 
made  on  the  same  day. 

This  contract,  now  known  as  iContraot  No.  1,  provided 
both  for  construction  of  the  road  and  its  proper  equip- 
ment and  operation  under  a  lease  to  run  for  fifty  years 
and  to  be  renewable  for  twenty-five  years  on  readjust- 
ment of  the  rental.  McDonald  was  both  contractor  and 
lessee,  but  the  city  through  the  board  was  to  exercise 
constant  supervision  over  construction,  even  to  the  in- 
spection and  approval  of  materials  and  work.  The  con- 
tractor was  bound  to  begin  construction  within  thirty 
days  after  the  execution  of  the  contract  and  to  complete 
the  entire  road  within  four  years  and  a  half. 

While  the  city  agreed  to  pay  McDonald  $35,000,000 
for  the  work,  it  was  obligated  also  to  purchase  the  real 
estate  required  for  terminals  and  stations.  The  eon- 
tractor  was  required  to  construct  such  terminals  as  work 
aside  from  that  covered  by  the  $35,000,000,  and  was  to 
be  paid  therefor  cost  plus  ten  per  cent,  up  to  a  limit  of 
$1,750,000;  the  city  also  was  to  provide  land  necessary 
for  stations  to  the  extent  of  $1,000,000,  but  if  the  needed 
property  cost  more  than  such  amount  the  excess  should 
be  paid  bv  the  contractor. 


166  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Cars  and  other  equipment  were  to  be  provided  by  the 
contractor  at  his  own  expense,  but  were  to  be  purchased 
by  the  city  at  the  end  of  the  lease  at  a  price  to  be  agreed 
upon  or  if  not  agreed  upon  to  be  fixed  by  arbitration. 
When  the  construction  work  was  two-thirds  finished  the 
contractor  was  to  begin  supplying  the  equipment,  which 
was  to  be  delivered  complete  three  months  before  the 
completion  of  the  road  or  any  part  of  it  ready  for  opera- 
tion. 

For  the  lease  the  contractor  bound  himself  to  pay  to 
the  city  as  rental  each  year  an  amount  equal  to  the  in- 
terest paid  by  the  city  on  its  bonds  issued  for  construc- 
tion, plus  one  per  cent,  a  year  for  a  sinking  fund  to  re- 
tire such  bonds  at  maturity,  except  that,  if  the  profits 
from  operation  fell  short  of  five  per  cent.,  payment  of 
the  sinking  fund  for  five  years  would  be  suspended  and 
reduced  to  one  half  of  one  per  cent,  for  the  next  five 
years  provided  the  profits  continued  to  fall  below  five 
per  cent. 

Motive  power,  it  was  specified,  should  be  either  elec- 
tricity or  compressed  air,  but  if  in  future  any  method  of 
generating  or  transmitting  power  superior  to  electricity 
and  involving  no  injury  to  the  purity  of  the  air  in  the 
tunnels  or  cars  shall  become  practicable,  the  contractor 
should  have  the  right  to  adopt  such  method,  if  approved 
by  the  board,  on  two  months'  notice. 

Such  in  brief  were  the  terms  of  the  contract  which 
gave  New  York  city  her  first  subway.  It  was  an  epoch 
in  municipal  history,  for  it  embodied  the  right  of  the  peo- 
ple to  build  and  if  need  be  operate  their  own  transporta- 
tion lines.  In  spite  of  precedent,  in  spite  of  prejudice 
and  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  private  interests  engaged 
in  transportation,  not  however  without  a  severe  struggle, 
the  people  had  asserted  and  maintained  this  right,  and 
the  rapid  transit  contract  of  1900  exercised  it  for  the  first 
time  and  thereby  sealed  the  doom  of  private  exploitation 
of  citv  franchises.    Credit  for  the  achievement  is  due  to 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  167 

the  long  line  of  public  spirited  men  who  championed  pub- 
lic ownership  from  the  early  days  of  the  70 's,  but  in  the 
end  chiefly  to  the  broad-minded  members  of  the  Orr 
Rapid  Transit  Commission,  who  with  exceptional  courage 
and  a  perseverance  that  knew  no  flagging  kept  hammer- 
ing away  at  legal  and  political  obstacles  until  the  goal 
was  gained. 

The  impartial  historian  would  be  false  to  his  duty  if 
he  neglected  to  credit  August  Belmont  with  the  important 
work  he  did  in  assuring  the  construction  of  the  first  sub- 
way. He  had  the  broad  and  penetrating  vision  which 
other  financiers  of  that  day  lacked.  He  saw  the  dawning 
of  the  day  of  public  ownership,  he  realized  the  need  of 
additional  rapid  transit  facilities  and  he  felt  that  unless 
some  one  came  to  the  assistance  of  the  city  in  this  emer- 
gency not  only  would  rapid  transit  relief  be  delayed  but 
the  cause  of  public  ownership  would  be  set  back  and  the 
existing  monopoly  of  urban  transportation  would  be 
perpetuated.  Mr.  Belmont  for  years  had  been  interested 
in  the  subject.  He  had  been  in  the  promotion  and  organi- 
zation of  the  Brooklyn  elevated  railroads,  and  the  limi- 
tations of  such  agencies  in  crowded  streets  had  impressed 
him  strongly  w^ith  the  desirability  of  underground  rail- 
roads. 'So  when  John  B.  McDonald  bid  for  and  obtained 
the  rapid  transit  contract  in  January  1900,  Belmont  was 
ready  to  lend  a  willing  ear  to  his  request  for  financial 
assistance.  Mr.  Belmont  himself  in  June,  1914,  gave  his 
own  view  of  the  situation.  The  conversation  took  place 
in  his  private  office.  Mr.  Belmont  talked  for  an  hour  or 
more,  and  his  expressions  in  substance  were  as  follows : 

''With  all  due  respect  to  McDonald,  Freedman 
and  others,  the  subway  would  not  have  been  built  if 
I  had  not  taken  hold  of  the  work.  McDonald  had  a 
contract  with  the  city,  but  he  could  not  get  the  money 
to  finance  the  work.  He  had  verbal  assurances  from 
surety  companies  that  he  could  get  the  necessary 


168  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TKANSIT 

help  when  he  needed  it,  but  after  he  got  the  contract 
this  help  was  not  forthcoming. 

*' Andrew  Freedman  brought  McDonald  to  me 
first.  I  had  been  interested  in  rapid  transit  for 
many  years — was  in  the  Kings  County  elevated,  and 
I  believed  that  with  electric  traction  an  underground 
road  w^ould  pay.  I  went  over  the  matter  with  Mc- 
Donald, and  he  showed  me  figures  from  other  con- 
tractors, agreeing  to  build  the  subway  for  a  price 
well  within  the  amount  he  was  to  get  from  the  city. 
I  then  took  hold  of  it  and  agreed  to  find  the  money 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  contract. 

''McDonald  under  his  contract  had  to  deposit 
$150,000  with  the  Controller.  I  helped  him  to  make 
that  payment.  Just  how  much  I  paid  I  do  not  now 
remember.  Then  there  was  another  payment  of 
$1,000,000.  I  paid  that,  knowing  that  I  had  no  legal 
security  to  protect  me.  It  was  necessary  to  get  an 
assignment  from  McDonald,  and  pending  the  trans- 
fer of  the  lease  and  the  formation  of  an  operating 
company,  all  I  had  to  secure  me  was  a  paper  signed 
by  McDonald — I  think  it  was  filed  with  the  Control- 
ler— to  pay  over  to  me  his  receipts  from  the  city; 
and  during  that  time  he  collected  every  dollar  from 
the  city  and  turned  it  over  to  me.  Had  he  not  done 
so  I  would  have  had  great  difficulty  in  establishing 
legally  my  right  to  the  money. 

"Of  course,  I  relied  on  McDonald's  integrity,  but 
if  anything  had  happened  to  him  I  w^ould  have  been 
in  a  dangerous  position.  My  lawyers  told  me  I  was 
taking  a  great  risk.  Mr.  Shepard,  then  of  counsel 
for  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission,  and  my  own  law- 
yer tried  to  work  out  a  plan  which  would  absolutely 
protect  me,  but  it  could  not  be  done.  Finally  I  told 
them  I  would  take  the  risk,  and  I  did.  If  I  had  not, 
the  subway  would  not  have  been  built — at  least  not 
at  that  time.     The  result  justified  my  action,  and 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  169 

everything  came  out  all  right  in  the  end,  but  I  con- 
fess I  was  uneasy  for  a  time. 

"Then  the  matter  of  getting  an  operating  com- 
pany caused  me  considerable  annoyance.  McDonald 
had  agreed  to  assign  the  operating  lease  to  a  com- 
pany to  be  formed  by  me,  but  it  was  necessary  to  get 
a  charter  for  such  a  company  from  the  Legislature. 
At  that  time  the  old  street  car  interests  were  all 
powerful  with  the  Legislature,  and  when  I  tried  to 
get  a  charter  I  found  the  door  closed.  Apparently 
nothing  I  could  do  was  able  to  get  that  charter 
through  the  Legislature.  Finally,  after  trying  in 
every  possible  way  to  get  action,  I  resolved  to  go 
straight  to  a  man  who  was  all  powerful,  or  at  least 
most  influential  with  the  powers  that  were,  and  I  did. 
I  went  to  that  man,  told  him  just  what  I  was  trying  to 
do,  what  the  project  meant  for  New  York  and  how 
certain  influences  were  trying  to  prevent  me  from 
carrying  it  out.  He  promised  his  help  and  gave  it, 
and  a  short  time  later  we  got  our  charter." 

This  description  so  well  fitted  the  late  Senator  Thom- 
as 0.  Piatt,  at  that  time  known  as  the  "boss"  of  the 
Republican  party  in  New  York  state,  that  Mr.  Belmont 
was  asked  if  the  man  he  referred  to  was  Senator  Piatt. 

"I  will  not  say  who  it  was",  Mr.  Belmont  replied, 
"as  it  is  immaterial  now.  But  meanwhile  I  had  tried 
other  means.  When  I  found  that  it  would  be  difficult  if 
not  impossible  to  get  a  charter  from  the  Legislature,  I 
looked  about  to  see  if  I  could  get  one  ready-made.  Every 
street  car  company  with  an  operating  franchise  was  owned 
or  controlled  by  the  old  traction  interests,  but  after  a  search 
I  found  a  little  company  up  in  the  Bronx  which  had  a  per- 
fectly valid  charter  to  operate  a  street  railroad.  That 
was  the  City  Island  railroad.  It  wasn't  much  of  a  road, 
but  I  bought  it  and  fully  intended  to  operate  the  subway 
under  its  franchise  if  I  couldn't  get  one  of  my  own." 


170  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  EAPID  TKANSIT 

Mr.  Belmont  was  asked  what. led  him  to  go  into  the 
rapid  transit  project.    He  replied : 

"I  lived  on  Long  Island  for  many  years.  As  I 
have  said  I  was  interested  in  the  Kings  County  ele- 
vated, and  I  realized  that  the  elevated  roads,  while 
they  had  served  a  most  useful  purpose,  must  be 
superseded  or  supplemented  by  fast,  electric  under- 
ground roads.  And  by  the  way,  that  Brooklyn  ex- 
tension of  the  first  subway  was  my  idea.  I  always 
believed  in  it.  You  know  what  I  mean :  the  original 
contract,  Contract  No.  1,  ended  at  the  City  Hall. 
The  extension  down  Broadway  and  under  the  river 
to  Brooklyn  was  built  under  a  separate  contract. 
Mr.  Bryan,  then  president  of  the  Interborough  com- 
pany, and  others  of  our  people  were  opposed  to  it. 
But  I  believed  in  it  and  insisted  that  we  should  bid 
for  it  and  bid  low  enough  to  get  it. 

"Well,  after  Contract  No.  1  was  signed,  giving 
us  a  lease  for  fifty  years,  the  Citizens'  Union  got 
busy  and  there  was  a  great  agitation  for  a  shorter 
lease  for  the  Brooklyn  extension,  Contract  No.  2. 
They  wanted  it  cut  down  to  twenty-five  years.  I 
remember  very  well  the  hearing  on  the  subject  be- 
fore the  Rapid  Transit  Commission.  There  were 
present  Mr.  Orr,  the  chairman,  Mr.  Grout,  the  Con- 
troller, and  you  will  recall  the  other  members.  Grout 
luckily  made  the  suggestion  that  the  new  lease  be 
made  for  thirty-five  years.  I  recall  that  Mr.  Bald- 
win, president  of  the  Long  Island  railroad,  was 
sitting  beside  me.  When  Grout  made  that  sugges- 
tion I  saw  instantly  what  a  good  thing  it  would  be 
for  us  to  have  two  leases  expiring  at  different  times 
— but  that's  been  changed  now  by  the  Dual  System 
contracts — so  I  leaned  over  to  Baldwin  and  said: 
*That  suits  me.  Now,  I'm  going  to  get  up  and  op- 
pose it,  and  if  I  do  they'll  adopt  it.'  I  did.  I  made 
a   speech  opposing  the   thirty-five   year  lease   and 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  171 

pointing  out  how  much  better  it  would  be  for  the 
city  to  have  both  leases  expire  at  the  same  time.  What 
I  said  had  the  effect  I  expected,  and  they  adopted  the 
thirty-five  year  lease. 

''The  result  justified  my  expectations.  The 
Brookl5nQ  extension  has  been  a  most  profitable  one. 
And  now  they're  talking  a  good  deal  about  the  Dual 
System  contracts — how  much  better  they  are  than 
the  old  contracts,  especially  as  to  the  preferential 
payments.  Why,  that  idea  came  from  Brooklyn. 
It  was  the  only  way  the  Brooklyn  company  could 
get  out  of  a  bad  situation  and  insure  a  continuation 
of  its  present  profits.  When  Shouts,  president  of 
the  Interborough  company,  found  out  that  the  city 
was  willing  to  give  it  to  the  Brooklyn  company,  he 
said  'if  it's  good  enough  for  them  it's  good  enough 
for  us',  and  forthwith  put  it  in  his  proposition. 
That's  how  we  got  the  preferential  payment." 

On  the  witness  stand  in  a  lawsuit  ( Venner  vs.  Belmont 
et  al.)  later  in  the  year  1914  Mr.  Belmont  repeated  the 
statement  made  in  the  above  as  to  the  influential  man  to 
whom  he  appealed  for  help  to  get  his  charter  from  the 
Legislature,  When  asked  the  name  of  this  man  he  at 
first  refused  to  give  it,  but  on  direction  of  the  court  finally 
answered  the  question.  He  then  said  it  was  William  C. 
Whitney,  who  at  the  time  was  one  of  the  principal  owners 
of  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway  system,  which  oper- 
ated the  surface  car  lines  in  Manhattan. 

Belmont's  partner  in  the  subway  enterprise,  John  B. 
McDonald,  was  a  man  almost  as  well  known  in  the  con- 
tracting field  as  was  Mr.  Belmont  in  finance.  Of  power- 
ful frame  and  much  shrewd  ability,  he  was  well  fitted  for 
the  arduous  life  of  the  contractor  and  had  unusual  suc- 
cess before  he  came  to  New  York.  He  built  the  Baltimore 
&  Ohio  Railroad  tunnels  at  Baltimore,  a  celebrated  piece 
of  work  for  those  days,  and  it  was  his  experience  there 


172  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

gained  in  undergTound  construction  that  led  him  to  be- 
come a  bidder  for  New  York's  first  subway. 

On  March  24,  1900,  ground  was  broken  in  front  of  the 
City  Hall  for  the  new  subway,  although  actual  construc- 
tion lagged  for  several  months  while  the  Rapid  Transit 
Commission  was  recruiting  its  engineering  staff  and  the 
contractor  was  planning  liis  work,  subletting  it  in  sections 
and  organizing  his  own  force.  Working  drawings  also 
had  to  be  made  by  the  commission's  engineers,  and  this 
took  some  time,  so  that  it  was  well  on  in  the  year  before 
construction  was  fairly  under  way. 

Under  the  supervision  of  McDonald  the  work  was 
done  by  the  Rapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  com- 
pany, organized  by  Belmont  for  the  purpose.  This  con- 
cern was  capitalized  for  $6,000,000,  all  of  which  was  is- 
sued in  common  stock,  to  which  Belmont  and  those  he 
interested  in  the  project  subscribed.  Among  the  latter 
was  Cornelius  Vanderbilt,  son  of  the  "Commodore"  of 
the  same  name  and  one  of  the  officers  of  the  New  York 
Central  Railroad.  Others  included  General  James  Jour- 
dan,  of  Brooklyn,  Adrian  Iselin,  William  A.  Read,  Gar- 
diner M.  Lane  and  George  W.  Young.  Its  first  officers 
were: 

President,  August  Belmont;  treasurer,  Walter  G.  Oak- 
man;  secretary,  Frederick  Evans. 

During  the  year  1900  the  board  devoted  considerable 
time  to  making  needed  modifications  of  the  plans  and  con- 
tract, as  well  as  the  route.  The  route  was  changed  so  as 
to  run  the  west  side  line  from  Fort  George  to  Kings- 
bridge  by  way  of  Naegle  Avenue,  Amsterdam  Avenue  and 
Kingsbridge  Road  instead  of  by  the  route  first  approved. 
The  contract  was  changed  so  as  to  permit  of  the  con- 
struction of  local  stations  450  feet  long,  and  the  loop  at 
City  Hall  was  reduced  so  as  to  run  entirely  between  the 
City  Hall  and  the  Post  Office  instead  of  passing  com- 
pletely around  the  latter.  Cornelius  Vanderbilt  is  cred- 
ited with  the  invention  of  the  loop  idea. 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  173 

The  subject  of  an  extension  of  the  proposed  subway 
to  Brooklyn  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Rapid  Transit 
Commission  as  soon  as  the  contract  with  McDonald  for 
the  Manhattan  and  Bronx  lines  was  executed.  Imme- 
diately thereafter  the  board  instructed  its  chief  engineer 
to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  cost  of  such  an  exten- 
sion, to  run  from  City  Hall  south  to  South  Ferry  and 
thence  by  tunnel  under  the  East  River  to  Brooklyn. 
Property  owners,  as  before  stated,  had  petitioned  for 
the  extension  down  Broadway. 

In  the  meantime  the  board  sought  to  have  its  powers 
as  to  G-reater  New  York  clearly  defined.  Both  the  rapid 
transit  act  of  1894  and  the  vote  of  the  people  on  munici- 
pal ownership  antedated  the  consolidation  of  New  York, 
Brooklyn  and  the  other  neighboring  communities  into  the 
larger  city.  It  was  a  question  whether  an  act  author- 
izing the  construction  of  a  rapid  transit  road  in  the  old 
city,  comprising  only  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx,  applied 
to  the  consolidated  city  embracing  as  well  Brooklyn, 
Queens  and  Richmond.  So  the  Legislature  was  asked 
to  pass  and  did  enact  an  amendment  to  the  law,  extending 
the  powers  of  the  board  to  all  parts  of  the  Greater  City. 
This  act  became  effective  April  23,  1900. 

Early  in  the  same  year  a  large  and  important  delega- 
tion from  Kings  County  appeared  before  the  board  to 
urge  the  construction  of  a  Brooklyn  extension.  During 
the  month  of  May  several  public  hearings  were  held  on 
the  subject.  The  question  of  the  best  route  to  be  fol- 
lowed was  discussed,  and  two  lines  were  proposed.  One 
was  an  extension  of  the  Manhattan  line  from  Broadway 
to  Whitehall  street,  thence  under  the  East  River  to 
Joralemon  street,  Brooklyn,  and  up  Joralemon  street, 
Fulton  street  and  Flatbush  Avenue  to  Atlantic  Avenue. 
The  other  followed  the  same  route  in  Manhattan  but  en- 
tered Brooklyn  by  way  of  Hamilton  Avenue  and  ran 
thence  towards  South  Brooklyn  and  Bay  Ridge.  Study 
of  this  situation  occupied  the  rest  of  the  year. 


174  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Another  important  problem  which  engaged  the  atten- 
tion of  the  board  during  the  last  three  months  of  1900 
was  the  possibility  of  making  a  physical  connection  at 
the  Grand  Central  station  in  Forty-second  street  between 
the  new  rapid  transit  road  and  the  tracks  of  the  New 
York  Central  and  New  Haven  steam  railroad  lines.  It 
was  believed  that  the  public  would  be  better  served  if  the 
trains  of  the  rapid  transit  road  could  operate  over  those 
tracks  northward  into  the  suburban  communities  reached 
by  the  two  railroads.  Acting  under  the  instructions  of 
the  board,  its  president,  Mr.  Orr,  and  its  chief  engineer, 
Mr.  Parsons,  took  up  the  question  with  Mr.  W.  K.  Van- 
derbilt,  Mr.  Callaway,  then  president,  and  Mr.  Wilgus, 
then  chief  engineer  of  the  New  York  Central.  The  Cen- 
tral authorities  insisted  that,  if  a  connection  were  made, 
the  rapid  transit  road  must  not  at  any  point  be  on  Grand 
Central  station  property.  This  condition  was  regarded 
by  the  board  as  prohibitory,  and  after  considerable  cor- 
respondence Mr.  Callaway  refused  to  yield,  stating  that 
their  plans  were  "when  an  electric  or  air  motor  can  be 
had  to  run  our  trains  any  considerable  distance,  to  tun- 
nel underneath  the  depot  and  use  the  space  there  for 
our  own  suburban  service."  Many  years  later  the  idea 
thus  suggested  by  Mr.  Callaway  was  carried  out. 

The  decision  to  omit  pipe  gallaries  also  was  reached 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1900.  Construction  of  such 
galleries  was  actually  commenced  on  the  Elm  street  route, 
but  both  the  contractor  and  the  Departments  of  Sewers 
and  Water  'Supply  of  the  City  objected  to  them,  and  the 
board,  on  McDonald's  agreement  to  stand  the  cost  of 
abandoning  the  work,  agreed  to  its  indefinite  suspension. 
The  pipe  gallery  as  an  adjunct  to  subways  was  revived 
in  later  years,  and  some  contracts  including  them  were 
awarded,  but  every  time  the  city  departments  objected 
and  eventually  the  matter  was  dropped. 

The  year  1900  also  saw  the  passage  of  an  amendment 
to  the  rapid  transit  act,  proposed  by  the  board,  which 


FIRST  SUBWAY  CONTRACT  175 


enlarged  its  powers  in  respect  of  the  condemnation  of 
land.  Under  the  original  act  the  city  was  limited  to  the 
condemnation  of  the  right  or  easement  for  the  passage  of 
the  rapid  transit  line.  By  this  amendment  the  city  was 
given  power  to  condemn  the  fee  of  property  so  that,  if  it 
became  necessary  to  tear  dowm  buildings,  the  board  could 
take  the  title  to  the  property,  remove  the  buildings  and 
later  sell  the  property  subject  to  the  easement  for  the  sub- 
way. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Fikst  Subway  Completed  and  Placed  ix  Operation. 

On  January  24, 1901,  the  Rapid  Transit  board  adopted 
the  route  and  general  plan  for  the  Brooklyn  extension  of 
the  subway.  This  was  done  in  less  than  a  year  after  the 
execution  of  the  contract  with  McDonald  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  Manhattan-Bronx  subway.  The  line  as 
approved  extended  from  City  Hall  down  Broadway  to 
the  Battery  and  thence  by  tunnel  under  the  East  River 
to  Joralemon  street,  Brookl>Ti,  up  Joralemon  street  to 
Fulton  street  near  Borough  Hall,  thence  under  Fulton 
street  to  Flatbush  Avenue  and  under  Flatbush  Avenue 
to  Atlantic  Avenue,  near  the  Brooklyn  station  of  the  Long 
Island  Railroad. 

The  resolution  approving  the  route  was  transmitted 
to  the  Municipal  Assembly  on  February  2,  1901,  accom- 
panied by  a  letter  in  which  the  board  set  forth  its  reasons 
for  the  choice.    In  this  letter  the  board  said : 

* '  The  board  is  aware  that  the  route  now  proposed 
does  not  afford  a  complete  solution  of  the  rapid  tran- 
sit problem  in  Brooklyn.  It  is,  however,  beyond 
doubt,  the  best  route  for  the  first  rapid  transit  con- 
nection between  the  boroughs.  It  reaches  two  great 
distributing  points  in  Brooklyn,  Borough  Hall  Park 
and  the  Long  Island  Railroad  station.  The  new  road 
can  thence  be  conveniently  extended  as  the  financial 
means  of  the  city  will  permit,  to  any  and  every  im- 
portant district  in  Brooklyn.  It  is  to  the  interest  of 
the  city  that  the  rapid  transit  connection  now  pro- 
posed between  the  boroughs  should  be  promptly 
constructed  rather  than  that  the  city  and  especially 
the  Borough  of  Brooklyn  should  be  made  to  wait 
several  years  for  the  initiation  of  a  system  more 
nearly  complete." 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  177 

After  public  hearings  the  Municipal  Assembly  on  May 
21,  1901,  approved  the  new  route,  the  Mayor  gave  his 
approval  on  June  1  and  the  Park  Board  its  consent  on 
July  11.  This  completed  the  consents  of  the  local  au- 
thorities, and  the  Eapid  Transit  board,  having  failed  to 
get  the  statutory  consents  of  property  owners,  applied  to 
the  Appellate  Division,  First  and  Second  Departments, 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  and  a  determina- 
tion in  lieu  of  such  consents.  The  First  Department 
tribunal  appointed  Theron  G.  Strong,  Thomas  C.  T.  Grain 
and  Plenry  W.  Gray  as  its  commissioners,  while  the  Sec- 
ond Department  named  William  Cullen  Bryant,  Eichard 
H.  Laimbeer  and  Frederick  R.  Kellogg  in  similar  capac- 
ity. To  expedite  proceedings  both  sets  of  Commissioners 
sat  together  to  take  testimony,  and  on  December  26  and 
27  respectively  reported  favorably  on  the  route.  There- 
upon the  board  proceeded  with  the  preparation  of  detail 
plans  preliminary  to  the  letting  of  the  construction  con- 
tract. The  reports  were  confirmed  by  orders  of  the 
respective  Appellate  Divisions  on  January  30  and  Jan- 
uary 17,  1902. 

A  sub-committee  consisting  of  Mr.  Orr  and  Mr. 
Charles  Stewart  Smith  was  appointed  to  draft  the  con- 
tract for  the  Brooklyn  extension.  This  committee  re- 
ported on  May  23,  1902,  submitting  a  draft  following  the 
general  lines  of  Contract  No.  1  for  the  Manhattan-Bronx 
road.  It  was  provided,  however,  that  the  bidder  should 
name  in  his  bid  what  connections  he  would  make  with 
other  railroads  or  rapid  transit  lines  for  a  single  fare 
of  five  cents.  This  was  undoubtedly  to  provide  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  Belmont  company,  which  was  building  the 
Manhattan-Bronx  line,  to  bid  for  the  Brooklyn  extension, 
so  that  both  roads  might  be  operated  as  one  and  for  a 
single  fare  between  the  boroughs.  The  contractor  was 
required  to  deposit  $1,000,000  in  cash  or  securities,  to 
give  a  bond  in  the  same  amount,  to  deposit  with  the  board 
all  bonds  of  sub-contractors,  and  to  provide  at  his  own 


178  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

expense  all  of  the  equipment  of  the  road  on  which  the 
city  was  to  have  first  lien.  The  work  was  to  be  done  and 
the  road  ready  for  operation  in  two  years  after  the  exe- 
cution of  the  contract.  A  new  provision  not  in  Contract 
No.  1  was  that  no  advertisements  were  to  be  allowed  in 
the  stations  except  by  special  permission  from  the  board. 

After  a  public  hearing  the  board  adopted  the  form 
of  contract  substantially  as  submitted  by  the  committee, 
the  only  changes  of  consequence  being  the  length  of  the 
leasing  term,  which  was  fixed  at  thirty-five  instead  of 
fifty  years  and  the  extension  of  the  period  for  construc- 
tion from  two  to  three  years.  The  contract  was  approved 
eTune  12,  1902,  and  the  board  immediately  advertised  for 
bids,  to  be  opened  July  21.  On  that  day  three  proposals 
were  received  as  follows : 

From  John  L.  Wells,  of  counsel  for  and  representing 
the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company,  who  offered  to 
build  the  road  for  $8,000,000— $7,000,000  for  construction 
and  $1,000,000  for  terminals.  For  connections  at  a  single 
fare  Mr.  Wells  offered  a  series  of  rides  over  various  lines 
of  the  Brooklyn  Eapid  Transit  Company  extending  to 
Fort  Hamilton  on  the  south.  Kings  Highway  on  the  roads 
to  Coney  Island,  East  New  York  and  interior  points. 

From  the  Rapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  Com- 
pany, offering  to  build  the  road  for  $3,000,000  for  con- 
struction and  $1,000,000  for  terminals.  For  connections 
at  a  single  fare  the  company  offered  through  rides  from 
the  Brooklyn  extension  over  the  lines  of  the  Manhattan- 
Bronx  subway  to  be  operated  by  the  Interborough  Rapid 
Transit  Company,  except  if  the  contractor  made  any 
agreement  with  a  connecting  line  to  carry  a  passenger  for 
less  than  five  cents  such  passenger  coming  from  the 
Brooklyn  line  should  not  be  carried  beyond  Fifty-ninth 
street  for  the  less  fare.  This  bid  was  accompanied  by  a 
letter  from  John  B.  McDonald  stating  that  in  the  event 
of  its  acceptance  he  would  agree  to  build  an  extension  of 
the  Manhattan  subway  from  Forty-second  street  south  in 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  179 

Broadway  to  Union  Square  for  $100,000  provided  he  was 
awarded  the  contract  prior  to  July  1,  1903. 

From  the  Rapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  Com- 
pany, offering  to  build  the  road  for  $2,000,000  for  con- 
struction and  $1,000,000  for  terminals,  with  the  same  pro- 
visions for  connecting  trips  at  a  single  fare  as  in  the  other 
bid  by  the  same  company.  McDonald's  offer  to  build  the 
Broadway  extension  in  Manhattan,  however,  was  not  em- 
braced in  this  bid. 

The  last  bid,  namely  $2,000,000  for  construction  and 
$1,000,000  for  terminals,  being  the  lowest,  was  accepted 
by  the  Commission  on  July  24,  1902,  when  the  contract 
was  awarded  to  the  Eapid  Transit  Subway  Constrution 
Company.  It  was  executed  on  the  11th  day  of  September 
following.  Thus  on  account  of  the  Belmont  company's 
eagerness  to  acquire  the  Brooklyn  extension,  the  city  got 
for  the  sum  of  $3,000,000  a  piece  of  railroad  and  tunnel 
construction  which  the  Commission's  engineers  estimated 
could  not  be  done  for  less  than  $6,000,000.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  it  cost  much  more  than  that.  Construction  of  the 
road  was  formally  begun  in  front  of  No.  17  State  Street, 
Manhattan,  on  November  8,  1902. 

During  the  year  1902  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Com- 
pany obtained  its  franchise  to  construct  its  tunnel  and 
terminal  system  in  Manhattan,  so  as  to  bring  its  trains 
into  the  heart  of  New  York  City.  Its  first  appeal  was  to 
the  Legislature,  where  a  bill  was  introduced  to  confer  the 
required  rights.  The  Rapid  Transit  board  successfully 
asserted  the  rights  of  the  city  to  control  underground 
railroad  construction  in  its  streets,  and  obtained  the  pas- 
sage of  an  amendment  to  Section  32  of  the  Rapid  Tran- 
sit Act  making  it  the  duty  of  the  board  to  grant  such 
franchises,  with  the  result  that  the  Pennsylvania  Com- 
pany received  its  franchise  from  the  board  only  after  a 
complete  study  had  been  made  of  the  project  and  the 
route  and  terms  had  been  fixed  satisfactorily  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  city. 


180  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Under  the  same  amendment  the  board  also  acted  on 
the  application  of  the  New  York  and  Jersey  Railroad 
Company  for  a  tunnel  under  the  New  York  half  of  the 
Hudson  River  to  Morton  Street  and  to  Christopher 
Street  in  Manhattan.  This  franchise  was  granted  by  the 
board  on  July  10, 1902,  and  with  subsequent  modifications 
made  possible  the  construction  of  the  McAdoo  system  of 
tubes  now  operated  by  the  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Rail- 
road Company. 

The  success  in  placing  the  contract  for  the  Brooklyn 
extension  led  the  board  to  consider  the  plan  for  another 
tunnel  to  Brooklyn  to  connect  with  the  Brooklyn  Rapid 
Transit  system  and  thus  to  give  the  people  of  both  bor- 
oughs the  benefit  of  the  connections  on  the  Brooklyn  side 
offered  in  the  bid  submitted  by  that  company.  Accord- 
ingly on  July  24  Mr.  Orr  offered  and  the  board  adopted 
a  resolution  directing  its  chief  engineer  to  submit  route 
and  general  plan  for  a  rapid  transit  railroad  which  would 
''as  directly  as  practicable  connect  the  general  region  of 
the  City  Hall  Park,  in  the  Borough  of  Manhattan,  with 
the  general  region  of  Borough  Hall  Park,  or  some  other 
equally  convenient  passenger  transportation  center,  in 
the  Borough  of  Brooklyn." 

Prior  to  this  time  the  board  on  May  9  had  instructed 
its  chief  engineer  to  prepare  and  submit  to  the  board  a 
comprehensive  scheme  or  plan  of  rapid  transit  for  the 
whole  city,  looking  to  the  needs  of  the  future  as  well  as 
to  the  present.  In  his  letter  to  Mr.  Parsons  conveying 
these  instructions  Mr.  Orr  said: 

''The  far-reaching  plan  I  have  suggested  could  not, 
of  course,  be  carried  out  at  once,  or  perhaps,  com- 
pletely carried  out  for  many  years.  But  if  such  a 
plan  be  now  wisely  prepared  and  the  streets  of  New 
York  be  dedicated  to  tunnel  railroad  purposes  with 
a  proper  regard  to  the  long,  and  no  doubt  splendid 
future  of  the  city,  two  things  may  be  reasonably 


OLD  AND  NEW  METHODS  OF  BUILDING 
SUBWAYS 

Upper  Broadway  During  Construction  of  First 
Subway;     2.    Lower  Broadway  During  Con- 
struction of  Brooklyn  Extension,  Showing 
Decked  Roadway. 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  181 

expected:  First  that  rapid  transit  construction  will 
proceed  upon  the  lines  so  laid  down  as  rapidly  as 
the  means  of  the  city  and  the  amount  of  private  cap- 
ital ready  for  rapid  transit  investment  will  permit. 
And,  second,  that  relatively  unimportant  franchises 
will  not  be  granted  in  such  way  or  special  routes  be 
so  devised  as  to  prevent  or  obstruct  a  permanent  and 
sufficient  programme." 

Later  we  shall  see  the  result  of  this  foresight  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Orr  and  his  fellow  commissioners. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  an  important  change  took 
place  in  the  comjoosition  of  the  city  government  and 
therefore  in  the  personnel  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Commis- 
sion. In  the  campaign  of  1901  for  the  election  of  officers 
of  the  Greater  City,  Tammany  Hall  met  with  a  crushing 
defeat.  Seth  Low,  the  candidate  of  the  fusion  forces, 
was  elected  Mayor  with  all  his  associates  on  the  city 
ticket,  the  fusionists  also  capturing  a  small  majority  of 
the  Board  of  Aldermen.  At  the  end  of  the  year,  there- 
fore. Mayor  Van  Wyck  and  Controller  Bird  S.  Coler  re- 
tired and  were  succeeded  on  January  1,  1902  by  Mayor 
Low  and  Controller  Edward  M.  Grout,  who  became  ex 
officio  members  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission. 

Another  change  in  the  board's  membership  took  place 
at  the  close  of  the  year  1901.  George  L.  Rives  resigned 
on  December  27  and  John  Claflin  was  elected  in  his  place. 
Mr.  Claflin  was  named  in  the  act  of  1894  as  one  of  the 
original  members,  but  had  resigned  in  1899.  Mayor  Low 
also  had  been  one  of  the  original  members,  but  had  re- 
signed in  1896.  The  opening  of  the  year  1902  saw  them 
both  back  in  the  board,  much  to  the  gratification  of  the 
other  members.  Mr.  Rives  later  was  appointed  one  of 
the  board's  counsel  on  the  retirement  of  Edward  M.  Shep- 
ard. 

Construction  work  on  the  Manhattan-Bronx  rapid 
transit  road  proceeded  rapidly  after  the  signing  of  the 


182  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

contract  with  McDonald.  At  the  end  of  the  year  1902 
the  board  reported  that  $23,464,000  had  been  expended, 
out  of  the  estimated  total  of  $35,000,000.  It  was  neces- 
sary here  and  there  to  alter  the  plans,  and  in  some  cases 
the  route,  but  these  were  minor  changes  and  did  not  affect 
the  general  lay-out  of  the  line.  The  work  was  unattended 
with  serious  interruptions  or  accidents  until  January  27, 
1902,  when  an  explosion  of  dynamite  in  the  contractor's 
shanty  at  Forty-first  street  and  Park  Avenue  near  the 
Murray  Hill  hotel  killed  five  persons  and  injured  many 
others.  The  explosion  shook  down  the  plaster  in  the  Mur- 
ray Hill  hotel,  broke  all  the  windows  in  houses  in  the 
vicinity  and  in  some  buildings  600  feet  distant.  No  ser- 
ious damage  was  done  to  buildings  or  to  the  subway  struc- 
ture. This  accident  led  to  the  appointment  by  Mayor  Low 
of  a  Municipal  Explosives  Commission,  which  revised  the 
city  regulations  governing  the  storage  and  use  of  high 
explosives  in  the  city  limits. 

On  March  20  and  21  slides  of  rock  occurred  in  the  deep 
tunnel  for  the  subway  on  the  eastern  side  of  Park  Avenue 
between  Thirty-seventh  and  Thirty-eighth  streets.  No 
lives  were  lost  here,  but  the  accident  caused  some  delay 
and  gave  the  contractor  much  trouble. 

Pursuant  to  the  act  of  the  Legislature  of  1902  Bel- 
mont and  his  associates  were  enabled  to  form  a  corpora- 
tion for  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  munic- 
ipally-owned rapid  transit  railroad.  This  was  done  in 
April,  1902,  when  they  incorporated  the  Interborough 
Rapid  Transit  Company  for  the  purpose.  The  original 
capital  of  this  company  was  placed  at  $25,000,000  divided 
into  250,000  shares  of  the  par  value  of  $100  each,  all  of 
the  stock  to  be  common  stock.  The  incorporators,  each 
of  whom  subscribed  for  ten  shares  of  stock,  were :  William 
H.  Baldwin  Jr.,  Charles  T.  Barney,  August  Belmont,  An- 
drew Freedman,  James  Jourdan,  John  B.  McDonald,  De- 
lancey  Nicoll,  Walter  G.  Oakman,  John  Peirce,  William 
A.  Read,  Cornelius  Vanderbilt,  George  W.  Wickersham, 


riKST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  183 

George  W.  Young,  all  of  New  York  City;  E.  P.  Bryan,  of 
Yonkers,  N.  Y.;  and  Gardiner  M.  Lane,  of  Boston,  Mass. 
Of  these  all  but  Nicoll  and  Wickersham  were  named  as 
directors.  The  capital  stock  subsequently  was  increased 
to  $35,000,000. 

It  was  provided  in  the  articles  of  incorporation  that 
the  directors  might  annually  appoint  an  executive  com- 
mittee composed  of  seven  of  the  directors,  who  should 
exercise  all  the  powers  of  the  board  of  directors  except 
when  the  board  is  in  session.  The  certificate  of  incor- 
poration was  filed  with  the  Secretary  of  State  on  May  6, 
1902,  and  the  company  paid  a  tax  of  $12,500  for  the  privi- 
lege of  organizing. 

The  type  of  cars  to  be  used  in  the  subway  when  com- 
pleted gave  the  Interborough  company  much  concern. 
Finally  two  cars  were  built  to  illustrate  various  details 
of  manufacture.  The  car  chosen  was  to  be  a  wooden 
frame  on  a  steel  bottom,  with  sides  sheathed  with  copper 
and  the  electrical  machinery  encased  in  fireproof  casing. 
The  length  was  about  51  feet  and  the  width  eight  feet 
eleven  and  seven-eighths  inches.  This  was  four  feet 
longer  and  four  inches  wider  than  the  cars  used  on  the 
Manhattan  elevated  lines.  While  the  question  of  multiple 
doors  was  considered,  the  company  decided  to  adhere  to 
the  usual  plan  with  platforms  and  end  doors.  Contracts 
were  placed  for  five  hundred  of  these  cars  during  the  year. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1902  the  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
mission had  322  men  on  its  engineering  payroll.  The 
executive  officers  of  this  department  were:  William  Bar- 
clay Parsons,  Chief  Engineer;  Geo.  S.  Rice,  Deputy  Chief 
Engineer;  Albert  Carr,  Engineer  First  Division;  Alfred 
Craven,  Engineer  Second  Division;  Beverly  R.  Value,  En- 
gineer Third  Division;  Eugene  Klapp,  Engineer  Fourth 
Division;  Calvin  W.  Hendrick,  Engineer  Sewer  Division; 
St.  John  Clarke,  General  Inspector  of  Designs;  W.  A. 
Aiken,  General  Inspector  of  Materials;  M.  J.  Farrell, 
Private  Secretary. 


184  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

The  construction  work  was  divided  into  five  divisions, 
each  being  placed  in  charge  of  a  Division  Engineer.  The 
First  Division  covered  the  work  from  City  Hall  north  to 
■ilst  street  and  Park  Avenue;  the  Second  Division,  from 
Forty-first  street  north  to  104th  street  and  Broadway;  the 
Third  Division,  from  104th  street  to  the  portal  of  the 
tunnel  at  Fort  George  on  the  west  side,  and  to  the  portal 
of  the  tunnel  at  Westchester  Avenue  on  the  east  side;  the 
Fourth  Division,  all  of  the  viaduct  or  elevated  railroad 
work  north  of  the  last  two  mentioned  points  and  the  via- 
duct over  Manhattan  valley  between  125th  and  135th 
streets;  the  Fifth  or  Sewer  Division,  all  reconstruction  of 
sewers  in  streets  off  the  line  of  the  road. 

The  above  divisions  were  strictly  engineering  divi- 
sions; for  construction  purposes  the  work  w^as  further 
divided  into  sections  and  each  section  was  awarded  to  a 
sub-contractor  by  the  Rapid  Transit  Subway  Construc- 
tion company. 

In  all  there  were  seventeen  contract  sections  and  as 
many  different  sub-contracts,  but  as  some  contractors 
got  more  than  one  section  the  number  of  sub-contractors 
was  only  twelve.  They  were :  The  Degnon-McLean  Con- 
tracting Company,  the  Holbrook.  Cabot  and  Daly  Con- 
tracting Company,  Ira  A.  Shaler,  Naughton  and  Com- 
pany, William  Bradley,  Farrell  and  Hopper,  McMullen 
and  McBean,  J.  C.  Rogers,  the  Terry  and  Tench  Con- 
struction Company,  E.  P.  Roberts,  John  Shields,  and 
L.  B.  McCabe  and  Brother.  The  Degnon-McLean  Com- 
pany, which  had  the  two  contracts  extending  from  City 
Hall  to  Great  Jones  and  Centre  streets,  was  the  first  to 
begin  work,  which  was  started  on  March  24,  1900.  Nine 
other  contracts  were  begun  in  that  year,  and  the  remain- 
der in  1901  and  1902. 

The  furnishing  of  materials  of  construction  was  also 
committed  to  sub-contractors,  of  whom  the  leading  ones 
were  the  American  Bridge  Company  for  steel,  John  Fox 
and  Company  for  cast  iron,  the  United  Building  Material 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  185 

Company  for  cement  and  the  Sicilian  Asphalt  Paving 
Company  for  asphalt,  waterproofing  and  felt.  All  sub- 
contractors were  placed  under  heavy  bonds. 

As  the  contract  with  the  city  made  it  the  duty  of  the 
contractor  to  supply  all  the  equipment,  including  power 
houses,  the  Eapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  Company 
purchased  a  site  for  the  main  power  house  between  58th 
and  59th  streets  and  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Avenues  and 
there  erected  a  complete  electricity  generating  plant  with 
a  total  energy  of  90,000  horse  power.  Property  also  was 
purchased  for  the  necessary  sub-stations,  of  which  there 
are  eight  located  in  various  parts  of  the  territory  reached 
by  the  road. 

In  the  days  since  the  subway  traffic  reached  a  million 
passengers  a  day,  the  statement  has  been  made  frequently 
that  it  was  designed  to  carry  only  400,000  a  day.  Efforts 
to  verify  this  statement  have  failed.  George  S.  Eice,  who 
was  Deputy  Chief  Engineer  under  Mr.  Parsons,  asserted 
that  the  engineers  used  no  upset  figure  in  calculating  the 
capacity  of  the  line,  or  rather  did  not  plan  a  road  to  carry 
any  estimated  number  of  passengers,  but  planned  to  give 
it  as  great  a  carrying  capacity  as  the  limitations  of  the 
line  would  permit.  There  must  have  been  some  reason, 
however,  for  limiting  the  length  of  station  platforms,  for 
at  first  these  were  built  to  accommodate  seven-car  express 
trains  and  five  car  local  trains.  As  the  traffic  grew  the 
operating  company  managed  to  run  eight-car  express 
by  allowing  the  front  and  rear  cars  to  extend  past  the  ends 
of  the  station  platforms,  but  later  on  all  platforms  had 
to  be  lengthened. 

Careful  studies  of  the  existing  traffic  were  made,  how- 
ever, by  the  Commission's  engineers,  the  results  of  which 
are  set  down  in  the  various  annual  reports  of  the  board. 
In  the  present  year  (1917)  when  the  last  year's  travel 
on  all  the  street  railroads  was  more  than  1,800,000,000, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  1902,  when  the  subway 
was  under  construction,  it  was  about  937,000,000.     In 


186  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

other  words  since  the  first  subway  was  built  the  street 
railroad  traffic  in  fifteen  years  has  about  doubled! 

By  the  end  of  the  year  1903  the  work  was  about  90 
per  cent,  completed  and  the  city's  expenditure  on  account 
of  it  aggregated  more  than  $30,000,000.  In  the  report  for 
that  year  the  board  said  the  work  would  have  been  still 
further  advanced  were  it  not  for  delays  caused  by  labor 
strikes  both  on  the  road  and  at  the  power  house. 

On  January  1,  1903  the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit 
Company,  which  was  to  operate  the  subway,  leased  the 
Manhattan  Elevated  Railway,  then  controlled  by  the 
Gould  interests,  for  999  years,  the  lease  taking  effect 
April  1,  1903.  The  lessee  agreed  to  pay  as  rental  seven 
per  cent,  on  the  capital  stock  of  the  lessor,  which  was 
$60,000,000.  This  placed  the  Interborough  company  in 
control  of  practically  all  rapid  transit  lines  in  Manhat- 
tan and  the  Bronx,  for  the  Manhattan  company  operated 
all  the  elevated  railroads  in  those  two  boroughs.  These 
lines  were  the  Ninth  Avenue,  the  Sixth  Avenue,  the  Third 
Avenue  and  the  Second  Avenue  lines,  embracing  all  the 
elevated  roads  built  by  both  the  New  York  Elevated  and 
the  Metropolitan  Elevated  (Gilbert)  companies. 

Although  labor  strikes  continued  during  the  year  1904 
the  construction  w^ork  progressed  steadily,  and  on  Oo 
tober  27  of  that  year  operation  of  the  finished  portion  of 
the  road  began.  This  extended  from  the  City  Hall  on  the 
south  to  145th  street  and  Broadway,  on  the  West  side 
branch,  and  the  occasion  was  signalized  by  appropriate 
ceremonies.  The  first  train  over  the  road  started  from 
City  Hall  station  and  was  operated  by  Mayor  George  B. 
McClellan,  who  had  succeeded  Seth  Low  in  the  city's 
chief  magistracy  as  the  result  of  the  election  of  1903. 
Mayor  MoClellan  stationed  himself  in  the  motorman's 
closet  and  manipulated  the  electric  controller  during  the 
journey  northward. 

The  ceremonies  were  held  in  the  Aldermanic  chamber 
of  the  City  Hall  prior  to  the  starting  of  the  train.    At 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  187 


one  o'clock  the  Mayor  led  a  procession  into  the  chamber. 
He  walked  with  Archbishop  John  Farley,  now  a  Cardinal 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  church,  and  following  them  came 
Charles  V.  Fornes,  president  of  the  Board  of  Aldermen, 
with  Coadjutor  Bishop  David  H.  Greer,  of  the  Episcopal 
church;  Alexander  E.  Orr,  president  of  the  Board  of 
Rapid  Transit  Railroad  Commissioners,  with  Rev.  M.  J. 
Lavelle,  rector  of  St.  Patrick's  cathedral;  John  H.  Starin, 
Vice  President  of  the  Rapid  Transit  board,  with  the 
former  Mayor,  Robert  A.  Van  Wyck;  Controller  Edward 
M.  Grout;  Deputy  Controllers  J.  W.  Stevenson  and  N. 
Taylor  Phillips;  Morris  K.  Jesup,  Woodbury  Langdon, 
John  Claflin  and  Charles  Stewart  Smith,  members  of  the 
Rapid  Transit  board ;  August  Belmont,  the  financier  and 
John  B.  McDonald,  the  builder  of  the  subway;  William 
Barclay  Parsons,  chief  engineer,  Edward  M.  Shepard, 
Albert  B.  Boardman  and  George  L.  Rives,  counsel; 
George  S.  Rice,  deputy  chief  engineer  and  H.  A.  D.  Holl- 
mann,  auditor  of  the  board. 

President  Fornes  called  the  assemblage  to  order  and 
asked  Bishop  Greer  to  offer  prayer.  After  the  prayer 
Mr.  Fornes  yielded  the  chair  to  Mayor  McClellan,  who 
made  an  address,  in  which  he  emphasized  the  importance 
of  the  occasion  and  said  that  without  rapid  transit  Great- 
er New  York  would  be  little  more  than  a  geographical 
expression. 

Addresses  were  then  made  by  Mr.  Orr,  Mr.  Starin, 
Mr.  McDonald,  and  Mr.  Belmont.  These  addresses  are 
published  in  full  in  the  annual  report  of  the  board  for 
1904.  At  their  conclusion  benediction  was  pronounced 
by  Archbishop  Farley,  the  Mayor  declared  the  new  sub- 
way open  and  received  from  Mr.  Belmont  an  ornamented 
controller  in  a  mahogany  case  with  which  to  start  the 
first  train.  The  ceremonies  ended  at  twenty-four  min- 
utes past  two  o'clock  and  ten  minutes  later  the  first 
train  bearing  all  the  above  named  officials  and  many  in- 


188  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

vited  guests  whirled  out  of  the  City  Hall  station  under 
the  guiding  hand  of  Mayor  McClellan. 

The  people  took  kindly  to  the  new  mode  of  transpor- 
tation, and  within  a  few  days  after  the  opening  the  sub- 
way began  to  show  signs  of  crowding  during  the  rush 
hours.  There  never  was  a  break  in  the  increasing  tide 
of  travel  and  the  traffic  it  has  built  up  is  one  of  the  won- 
ders in  the  world  of  railroading.  Nothing  approaching 
it  had  ever  been  recorded. 

On  December  1,  1904,  William  Barclay  Parsons  re- 
signed as  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Board. 
The  great  work  which  he  had  called  into  being  was  nearly 
finished — ^the  greater  part  of  it  in  successful  operation — 
and  he  desired  to  resume  private  practice  in  his  profes- 
sion. Later  he  became  and  still  is  consulting  engineer 
for  the  Interborough  Eapid  Transit  Company.  The  first 
New  York  subw^ay  stands  as  a  monument  to  his  skill  and 
courage  as  an  engineer.  In  a  conversation  in  July,  1913, 
Mr.  Parsons  said: 

"I  was  thirty-five  years  of  age  when  I  became 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission. 
When  I  look  back  now  I  am  glad  I  was  not  older.  I 
doubt  if  I  could  now  undertake  or  would  undertake 
such  a  work  under  similar  conditions.  But  I  had  the 
enthusiasm  of  youth  and  inexperience.  Had  I  fully 
realized  all  that  was  ahead  of  me,  I  do  not  think  I 
could  have  attempted  the  work.  As  it  was  I  was 
treated  as  a  visionary.  Some  of  my  friends  spoke 
pityingly  of  my  wasting  time  on  what  they  consid- 
ered a  dream. ^  They  said  I  could  go  ahead  making 
plans,  but  never  could  build  a  practical,  underground 
railroad.  This  skepticism  was  so  prevalent  that  it 
seriously  handicapped  the  work." 

Mr.  Parsons,  who  had  been  an  engineer  for  the  Erie 
railroad,  began  business  in  New  York  City  toward  the  end 
of  the  year  1885.    He  soon  became  connected  with  the  New 


FIRST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  189 

York  District  Railway  Company,  an  offshoot  of  the  old 
Arcade  Railwiay,  which  held  the  old  Beach  Pneumatic 
franchise  for  an  underground  road  in  Broadway.  The 
directors  of  the  Arcade  Railway  quarreled  among  them- 
selves, and  the  dissatisfied  element  organized  the  New 
York  District  Railway.  August  Belmont  was  a  stock- 
holder in  this  enterprise  and  Mr.  Parsons  became  its  chief 
engineer. 

"The  New  York  District  Railway,"  said  Mr.  Parsons, 
**was  important  in  its  way,  for  it  settled  the  fundamental 
law  governing  the  building  of  a  rapid  transit  railroad. 
The  State  constitution  provided  that  no  such  line  could 
be  built  without  the  consents  of  the  local  authorities  and 
of  a  certain  proportion  of  the  property  owners  along  the 
line.  Holding  that  the  old  Beach  franchise  was  not  for  a 
railroad  but  for  a  tube  54  inches  in  diameter,  the  District 
Railway  applied  to  the  Board  of  Aldermen  of  New  York 
City  for  a  franchise  for  a  railroad  subway  in  Broadway. 
Dominated  by  Tammany  and  the  elevated  railroad  inter- 
ests, the  Board  of  Aldermen  refused  to  make  the  grant, 
and  the  District  Railway  appealed  to  the  courts.  The 
company  contended  that  the  refusal  of  the  local  authori- 
ties justified  it  under  the  Rapid  Transit  act  and  the  con- 
stitution in  asking  the  court  for  a  determination  in  lieu 
of  their  consent.  The  case  was  fought  to  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  which  diecided  that  the  consent  of  the  City  was 
vital  and  that  the  court  determination  could  serve  only 
in  lieu  of  the  consent  of  property  owners.  And  that  is 
the  law  today.  This  decision,  rendered  in  1886,  ended 
the  efforts  of  thie  Arcade  Railway  and  the  District  Rail- 
way to  build  a  subway  in  Broadway." 

In  December,  1904,  George  S.  Rice  was  promoted  to 
be  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Rapid  Transit  board  to  suc- 
ceed Mr.  Parsons.  This  and  other  changes  in  the  staff 
made  the  executive  force  of  the  engineering  department 
of  the  board  in  1905  as  follows : 

Chief  Engineer,  George  S.  Rice ;  Deputy  Chief  Engi- 


190  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

neer,  Alfred  Craven;  Engineer  First  Division,  George 
Hallett  Clark;  Second  Division,  John  H.  Myers;  Third 
and  Fourth  Divisions,  C.  V.  V.  Powers;  Fifth  Division, 
Frederick  C.  Noble;  Sewer  Division,  Amos  L.  Schaeffer; 
General  Inspector  of  Designs,  Sverre  Dahm;  General 
Inspector  of  Materials,  W.  A.  Aiken;  General  Inspector 
of  Stations,  D.  L.  Turner;  Secretary  to  Chief,  M.  J.  Far- 
rell;  Official  Photographer,  Pierre  P.  Pullis.  The  other 
staff  officers  of  the  board  were  Bion  L.  Burrows,  Secre- 
tary, and  H.  A.  D.  Hollmann,  Auditor. 

Mr.  Eice  remainjed  Chief  Engineer,  Burrows  Secre- 
tary and  Hollmann  Auditor  until  the  board  was  abolished 
in  1907  and  immediately  after  the  Public  Service  Com- 
mission was  created  Mr.  Rice  and  Mr.  Hollman  and  most 
of  the  engineers  mentioned  joined  its  staff  and  continued 
their  former  work.  Mr.  Burrows  went  into  private  busi- 
ness and  promoted  an  unsuccessful  installation  of  a  type 
of  mono-rail  railroad  in  the  Bronx.    He  died  in  1916. 

Other  parts  of  the  first  subway  were  opened  to  traffic 
as  follows:  Broadway,  145th  to  157th  street,  November 
5,  1904;  Lenox  Avenue  branch,  Broadway  and  Ninety- 
sixth  street  to  145th  street,  November  20,  1904 ;  and  from 
149th  street  and  Third  Avenue  along  Westchester  Av- 
enue and  Boston  Road  to  the  terminus  at  180th  street, 
November  26,  1904.  The  intervening  link  from  145th 
street  under  the  Harlem  River  to  Westchester  Avenue 
was  opened  later  and  the  remainder  of  the  Broadway  line, 
157th  street  to  Kingsbridge,  in  March,  1906. 

Exceptionally  rapid  progress  was  made  on  the  Man- 
hattan part  of  the  Brooklyn  extension,  which  was  com- 
pleted land  ready  for  operation  in  about  two  years  after 
the  commencement  of  work.  The  line  from  the  Brooklyn 
Bridge  station  at  City  Hall  to  the  Battery  was  opened  in 
1905.  This  section  was  built  under  the  direct  supervision 
of  Albert  Carr,  Division  Engineer  for  the  Rapid  Transit 
board.  The  rest  of  the  line,  including  the  river  tunnel, 
was  built  under  the  direction  of  Robert  Ridgway,  also 


FIBST  SUBWAY  COMPLETED  191 


a  Division  Engineer  for  the  board.  Mr.  Ridgway  later 
supervised  the  construction  of  a  part  of  the  Catskill 
aqueduct  for  the  City  and  then  returned  to  rapid  transit 
work  under  the  Public  Service  Commission,  with  whom 
he  became  Engineer  in  Charge  of  Subway  Construction. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Meteopolitan  Company  Fights  for  Franchise  and  Com- 
pels Merger  with  Subway. 

"IxyHEN  the  first  subway  was  begun  the  street  railway 
interests  of  New  York  City  were  controlled  by  two 
separate  and  distinct  companies,  the  Manhattan  Elevated 
Railway  Company  and  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway 
Company.  The  former  was  owned  principally  by  the 
Gould  and  Sage  interests.  It  operated  the  elevated 
lines  in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx.  These  consist- 
ed of  the  Ninth  Avenue  line,  running  up  and 
down  the  West  Side  of  the  city  from  the  Battery  to 
155th  stretet  and  Eighth  Avenue ;  the  Sixth  Avenue  line, 
running  from  the  Battery  mainly  up  Sixth  Avenue  to 
53d  street  and  through  53d  street  to  a  junction  with  the 
Ninth  Avenue  line ;  the  Third  Avenue  line  running  from 
the  Battery  mainly  up  Third  Avenue  to  and  across  the 
Harlem  River  to  Fordham;  and  the  Second  Avenue  line 
running  from  the  Battery  mainly  up  Second  Avenue  to 
129th  street  and  a  junction  with  the  Third  Avenue  line. 
As  told  in  a  previous  chapter  all  these  lines  were  leased 
by  the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  Company,  the  op- 
erator of  the  subway. 

The  Metropolitan  Street  Railway  system  embraced 
practically  lall  the  surface  car  lines  in  Manhattan  and 
the  Bronx.  It  was  controlled  by  Thomas  F.  Ryan 
and  the  late  William  C.  Whitney,  formerly  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  in  the  cabinet  of  President  Cleveland.  They 
and  their  associates  had  consolidated  several  surface  car 
properties  into  one  system  by  means  of  leases  or  out- 
right purchases  until  they  finally  controlled  all  the  main 
north  and  south  and  crosstown  lines.  They  believed  in 
free  transfers  as  a  means  of  stimulating  traffic,  and  with 
each  new  line  acquired  the  transfer  privilege  was  ex- 
tended until  it  covered  the  whole  island. 


METKOPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER         193 

The  consolidation  was  accompanied  by  much  watering 
of  securities  and  the  making  of  some  extravagant  leases. 
Expenditures  were  made  on  a  grand  scale  for  electrifica- 
tion of  tracks,  new  equipment,  etc.,  and  the  earnings  did 
not  increase  sufficiently  to  provide  needed  revenue. 

Before  the  subway  was  completed  it  was  apparent  to 
men  in  the  business  that  it  would  prove  a  great  traffic 
getter,  and  with  the  elevated  lines  paying  well  the  Bel- 
mont consolidation  promised  to  become  a  most  successful 
one.  It  was  probable  that  for  a  time  the  street  surface 
lines  would  lose  traffic  when  the  subway  opened,  and  they 
were  in  no  condition  to  surrender  any.  In  such  circum- 
stances, therefore,  the  astute  managers  of  the  Metropoli- 
tan system,  formed  a  bold  plan  to  meet  the  situation.  The 
plan  was  to  get  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  to  give  the 
Metropolitan  company  a  franchise  for  a  competing  sub- 
way, or  at  least  for  the  company  to  apply  for  such  a  fran- 
chise. With  such  a  grant  the  Metropolitan  would  be  in  a 
position  not  only  to  sell  out  to  Belmont  but  to  make  him 
buy  or  merge. 

The  scheme  was  a  masterly  one  and  it  was  master- 
fully carried  on.  Ryan's  company  entered  upon  an  ener- 
getic campaign  to  influence  public  sentiment  and  through 
it  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission.  This  campaign  was 
an  epoch  in  the  transit  history  of  New  York.  To  carry 
it  on  Ryan  detailed  one  of  his  ablest  lieutenants,  Lemuel 
E.  Quigg,  a  well  educated,  clever  man  who  had  begun  life 
as  a  newspaper  reporter,  gone  into  politics,  been  elected 
to  Congress  where  he  served  one  term,  become  an  ally 
and  lieutenant  of  Thomas  C.  Piatt,  the  Republican  leader 
and  under  him  had  acted  as  president  of  the  Republican 
County  Committee  of  New  York  County.  Later  Quigg 
studied  law  and  became  a  member  of  the  bar. 

Ryan's  first  open  move  was  made  in  December,  1903, 
nearly  ten  months  before  the  subway  was  opened  for 
traffic.  He  informed  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  that, 
if  it  would  lay  out  routes  for  another  north  and  south 


194  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

rapid  transit  railroad,  independent  of  the  one  under  con- 
struction, and  so  devised  as  to  supplement  the  surface 
car  lines,  his  company  would  be  a  bidder  for  the  fran- 
chise, provided  the  terms  exacted  by  the  city  would  not 
be  too  onerous.  The  news,  which  quickly  got  into  the 
newspapers,  caused  a  tremendous  sensation.  Rapid 
transit  certainly  was  ** looking  up".  Here  it  was  only 
four  years  ago  that  none  of  the  transportation  managers 
wanted  to  have  anything  to  do  with  a  city-owned  rapid 
transit  line,  and  nobody  but  Belmont  could  be  found  to 
finance  one,  and  he  was  blamed  by  many  for  his  adven- 
turous leap  into  strange  waters.  And  now,  before 
the  first  city-owned  subway  was  completed,  here  were 
the  rich  and  influential  traction  kings  of  the  Metropolitan 
system  actually  petitioning  for  a  chance  to  build  and 
operate  another  and  competing  road. 

The  city  gasped.  So  did  Belmont.  The  press  raved 
about  it,  and  all  New  York  could  talk  of  nothing  else  for 
months.  The  Rapid  Transit  Commission  openly  exulted 
and  in  its  report  for  1903  congratulated  the  city  upon 
the  alluring  j^rospect.  The  commission,  however,  was 
not  content  with  verbal  promises.  It  politely  requested 
Mr.  Ryan  and  his  associates  to  put  their  offer  in  writing. 
This  they  promptly  did,  and  on  February  25,  1904  Ryan 
and  H.  H.  Vreeknd,  then  president  of  the  Metropolitan 
company,  submitted  their  written  proposals.  Mr.  Vree- 
land's  letter  contained  the  formal  proposal;  Mr.  Ryan's 
his  endorsement  thereof. 

In  brief  the  proposal  was  that  the  board  should  lay 
out  a  route  beginning  at  about  138th  street  and  Third 
Avenue  in  the  Bronx  and  extending  thence  southward 
under  the  Harlem  River  to  Lexington  Avenue,  dowm 
Lexington  Avenue  to  Fifteenth  street,  under  Fifteenth 
street  and  Union  Square  to  Broadway,  down  Broadway 
to  Chambers  street,  through  Chambers  street  to  William 
street  and  down  William  street,  through  Hanover  Square, 
Coenties  Slip  and  South  street  to  the  Battery;  thence 


METROPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER        195 

turning  through  the  Battery  to  Greenwich  street,  up 
Greenwich  street,  West  Broadway  and  Hudson  street  to 
Eighth  Avenue,  up  Eighth  Avenue  to  Thirty-fourth 
street,  and  through  Thirty-fourth  street  to  a  junction 
with  the  line  in  Lexington  Ayenue. 

Under  the  proper  terms  the  Metropolitan  company 
agreed  to  build  such  a  line  for  the  city  and  to  operate  it 
under  lease  in  connection  with  its  surface  lines,  to  and 
from  which  it  proposed  to  give  free  transfers  for  a  uni- 
form rate  of  five  cents  a  passenger.  "By  utilizing  the 
surface  lines  for  local  traffic",  wrote  Vreeland,  "and  for 
carrying  long-distance  passengers  to  and  from  the  near- 
est subway  stations,  it  would  be  possible  to  very  greatly 
reduce  the  number  of  subway  stations  which  would  other- 
wise be  necessary,  thus  materially  increasing  the  speed 
and  efficiency  of  the  underground  service. 

"The  transfer  system  which  we  propose,  by  which 
the  underground  lines  and  the  surface  lines  w^ould  be 
operated  as  one  system,  would  establish  means  of  expedi- 
tious communication  between  all  parts  of  Manhattan  isl- 
and for  a  five-cent  fare.  Such  a  comprehensive  result  is, 
of  course,  possible  only  with  underground  lines  operated 
in  connection  with  a  complete  network  of  surface  lines." 

The  letter  also  set  forth  that  the  Metropolitan  com- 
pany had  in  operation  'about  three  hundred  miles  of  sur- 
face lines,  and  that  the  plan  would  relieve  congestion  on 
many  overcrowded  roads.  In  the  course  of  time  the 
West  Side  underground  line  could  be  extended  from 
Thirty-fourth  street  up  Eighth  Avenue  to  the  Harlem 
River.  The  proposed  terminus  in  the  Bronx  was  the 
point  at  which  most  of  the  surface  lines  converged,  and 
the  new  line,  therefore,  would  bring  rapid  transit  facili- 
ties "within  easy  reach  of  a  much  larger  proportion  of 
the  population  of  the  Bronx  than  can  be  served  by  the 
rapid  transit  line  about  to  be  opened. ' ' 

Ryan  in  his  letter  said:  "Under  the  transfer  system 
which  we  propose,  by  which  the  underground  lines  and 


196  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TRANSIT 

our  three  hundred  miles  of  surface  lines  on  Manhattan 
Island  would  be  operated  as  one  system,  almost  every 
person  on  Manhattan  Island  would  be  able  to  ride  from 
his  place  of  resid,ence  to  his  place  of  business  for  a  single 
fare  of  five  cents  and  at  a  rate  of  speed  which  would  be 
possible  only  with  underground  lines  operated  in  con- 
nection with  a  complete  system  of  surface  lines.  In  other 
words,  our  plan  would  practically  bring  rapid  transit  to 
the  door  of  every  citizen." 

This  proposal  was  taken  under  consideration  by  the 
Rapid  Transit  Commission,  which  proceeded  to  study  the 
entire  situation  and  to  devise  a  comprehensive  plan  which 
would  not  only  insure  proper  rapid  transit  development 
for  the  present  but  also  provide  logical  extensions  for 
the  future.  It  will  be  remembered  that  th,e  Chief  Engi- 
neer had  been  called  upon  to  report  to  the  board  a  system 
of  routes  to  serve  these  purposes.  These  reports  were 
submitted  in  1904  and  1905,  and  in  May  of  the  latter 
year  the  board  began  adopting  routes  and  general  plans 
and  continued  to  do  so  until  the  map  of  the  city  had  been 
grid-ironed  with  routes  for  rapid  transit  railroads.  The 
first  lines  laid  out  were  those  in  Third,  Lexington,  Sev- 
enth and  Eighth  Avenues  in  Manhattan;  then  followed 
various  loop  lines  connecting  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn, 
a  line  in  Fourth  Avenue,  Brooklyn,  one  in  Eastern  Park- 
way, Brooklyn  and  another  in  Jamaica  Avenue,  Brook- 
lyn, to  Jamaica  in  Queens. 

In  the  same  month.  May,  1905,  a  new  law  went  into 
effect  depriving  the  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the  authority 
to  give  the  municipal  consent  to  the  construction  of  rapid 
transit  lines  and  conferring  that  authority  on  the  Board 
of  Estimate  and  Apportionment.  The  passage  of  this 
law  had  been  forced  by  public  sentiment  which  was 
aroused  by  the  frequent  delays  of  such  matters  in  the 
Board  of  Aldermen,  its  long  dalliance  with  the  Pennsyl- 
vania tunnel  franchise  in  1904  having  brought  about  a 


METROPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER  197 

crystallization  of  this  sentiment.  On  July  14,  1905,  the 
Board  of  Estimate  gave  consent  to  the  new  routes. 

Meanwhile  the  Metropolitan  interests  prosecuted 
their  campaign  to  enlist  public  sentiment  in  behalf  of 
their  proposal.  The  newspapers  teemed  with  articles 
pointing  out  the  d,esirability  of  competition  in  the  rapid 
transit  field  and  the  benefits  to  be  conferred  on  the  gen- 
eral public  by  the  Metropolitan's  proposal  to  transfer 
from  rapid  transit  to  surface  lines  and  vice  versa.  Civic 
associations  in  all  parts  of  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx 
met  and  pasSjCd  resolutions  favoring  the  proposal,  which 
were  duly  forwiarded  to  the  newspapers  and  the  Rapid 
Transit  Commission.  Delegations  from  such  societies 
haunted  the  corridors  of  No.  320  Broadway,  where  the 
Rapid  Transit  board  had  its  offices,  and  clamored  for 
hearings.  Many  such  hearings  were  held  and  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  most  congested  parts  of  Manhattan 
and  the  most  undeveloped  sections  of  the  Bronx  lifted 
their  voices  to  acclaim  the  Metropolitan  scheme. 

WhiliC  the  'Metropolitan  interests  thus  sought  to  array 
public  sentiment  on  their  side,  the  Rapid  Transit  board 
was  engaged  in  studying  the  whole  problem  and  consider- 
ing the  extension  of  rapid  transit  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  needs  of  the  whole  city.  Wh,en  the  Metropolitan 
proposal  was  submitted  it  was  referred  to  the  plan  com- 
mittee of  the  board,  which  in  due  time  reported.  This 
report  favored  the  laying  out  of  a  system  of  routes  which 
would  embody  the  best  of  the  Metropolitan  suggestions 
as  well  as  the  logical  extensions  of  the  first  subway  fav- 
ored by  the  Belmont  company.  Such  a  course  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  board,  and  the  engineers  were  set  to  work 
to  draw  plans. 

Suddenly  the  community  was  electrified  by  the  news 
that  the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  company  and  the 
Metropolitan  Street  Railway  company  had  merged,  and 
that  the  two  immense  transportation  systems  were  here- 
after to  be  controlled  by  one  new  company  entitled  the 


198  FIETY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Interborough-Metropolitan  Company.  For  a  second 
time  the  community  gasped.  It  seemed  impossible  that 
the  rival  traction  interests  which  had  been  at  each  other's 
throats  in  competition  for  the  new  rapid  transit  lines, 
should  come  together.  Y,et  such  was  the  fact,  and  it  was 
not  long  until  the  cat  was  let  out  of  the  bag  and  the  finan- 
cial district  rang  with  the  story  of  how  Eyan  had 
forced  Belmont  into  the  merger  by  the  threat  of  con- 
structing a  new  subway  to  be  operated  in  competition 
with  the  underground  road  into  which  Belmont  had  put 
his  millions. 

The  new  company  was  incorporated  as  a  business, 
not  a  railroad  corporation,  in  January  1906,  with  a  capi- 
tal of  $155,000,000,  55  preferred,  100  common.  It  was  to 
hold  the  stock  of  both  the  Interborough  Eapid  Transit 
and  the  Metropolitan  Street  Railway  companies.  Its 
first  directors  were :  Walter  G.  Oakman,  James  Jourdan, 
John  B.  McDonald,  Morton  F.  Plant,  all  of  New  York, 
and  Peter  A.  B.  Widener,  of  Philadelphia. 

In  a  conversation  with  Mr.  August  Belmont  in  June, 
1914,  before  quoted,  he  was  asked  about  this  merger. 

''You  remember  how  the  street  car  people  talked 
about  building  a  system  of  subways  and  giving  transfers 
to  the  surface  lin,es",  he  said.  "Well,  we  couldn't  stand 
that  kind  of  competition,  and  so  we  combined  with  them. 
I  admit  that  we  didn't  know  the  exact  condition  of  the 
surface  car  system — the  interlacing  of  companies  etc. 
It  took  us  some  months  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  it.  I  got 
Shonts  to  do  it.  But  when  we  got  down  to  the  bottom  of 
things  they  were  worse  than  we  expected.  But  now  there 
is  hope.  The  old  system  has  been  reorganized,  improved 
and  put  into  shape  where  it  ought  to  develop  into  a  fine 
property.    Everything  will  work  out  all  right,  I  think." 

In  a  Legislative  investigation  of  the  Public  Service 
Commission,  held  several  years  later,  namely  in  191 5- '16, 
it  was  brought  out  that  the  merger  had  cost  the  Inter- 
borough interests  about  $40,000,000.    This  loss  was  prac- 


METEOPOLITAIsr  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER  199 


tically  written  off  in  1915,  when  the  Interborough-Con- 
solidated  Company  was  formed  to  take  over  the  stock  of 
the  Interborough  company  and  the  old  Metropolitan  Se- 
curities Company,  which  held  the  stock  of  the  surface 
lines  taken  in  by  the  merger  and  later,  after  going 
through  receiverships,  reorganized  under  the  name  of 
the  New  York  Eailways  Company. 

Public  resentment  followed  quickly  upon  public  sur- 
prise. The  press  denounced  the  merger  and  the  overcapi- 
talization of  the  new  company.  The  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
mission saw  in  the  merger  the  collapse  of  competition,  but 
nevertheless  continued  the  laying  out  of  routes  and  the 
preparation  of  plans  for  additional  subways.  In  De- 
cember, 1906,  several  of  these  routes  had  been  legalized, 
plans  for  some  of  th,em  made  and  those  for  others  were 
under  way.  Whether  to  advertise  for  bids  for  construc- 
tion alone,  or  for  both  construction  and  operation  was  a 
question  on  which  the  Commission  asked  the  advice  of 
the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment.  This  course 
was  made  neqessary  by  the  Elsberg  amendments  to  the 
Rapid  Transit  act,  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  1906, 
which  not  only  provided  for  alternative  means  of  con- 
struction, but  also  limited  the  life  of  any  lease  of  a  city- 
owned  rapid  transit  railroad  to  twenty  years,  with  the 
privilege  of  twenty  years'  renewal.  The  Board  of  Esti- 
mate and  Apportionment  on  December  7,  1906,  adopted 
a  resolution  in  response  to  the  Commission's  request, 
recommending  that  alternate  bids  be  invited,  first  for 
construction  alone,  and  second  for  construction,  equip- 
ment and  operation.  The  routes  covered  by  the  resolu- 
tion were: 

Seventh  and  Eighth  Avenue  route. 

Lexington  Avenue  route. 

Third  Avenue  route. 

Jerome  Avenue  route. 

Fourth  Avenue  and  Bensonhurst  route  in  Brooklyn. 

Tri-borough    route,    embracing    the    Third    Avenue 


200  PIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

route,  a  route  over  the  Manhattan  Bridge  to  Brooklyn 
and  part  of  the  Fourth  Avenue  route  in  that  borough. 

West  Farms  and  White  Plains  route. 

Accordingly  the  Rapid  Transit  Commission  ordered 
th,e  contracts  prepared  so  that  the  work  might  be  put 
up  for  public  bidding.  These  routes  embraced  nearly 
100  miles  of  road,  and  the  estimated  cost  of  construction 
was  more  than  $181,000,000.  Of  the  seven  routes  the 
Commission  selected  the  Lexington  Avenue  route  as  the 
one  to  be  first  advertised.  This  route  began  at  the  Bat- 
tery and  ran  up  Greenwich  street.  Trinity  Place,  Vesey 
Street,  Broadway,  Fifth  Avenue,  35th  and  36th  streets 
and  Lexington  Avenue  to  the  Harlem  River,  where  it  was 
to  divide  into  three  branches,  one  through  Park  Avenue 
and  153d  street  to  164th  street,  another  through  Park 
Avenue  to  156th  street  and  the  third  through  Morris 
Avenue  to  149th  street.  There  was  also  to  be  a  spur 
connection  from  Lexington  Avenue  through  42d  street 
to  the  first  subway  in  Park  Avenue.  The  total  length 
was  about  fourteen  miles  and  the  cost  of  construction 
was  estimated  at  about  $30,000,000.  On  account  of  the 
narrow  width  of  Lexington  Avenue,  it  was  decided  to 
make  the  subway  in  that  thoroughfare  a  double-deck 
structure,  with  the  express  tracks  on  the  lower  and  the 
local  tracks  on  the  upper  level,  and  plans  were  made 
accordingly.  The  board  located  the  stations  along  the 
line,  and  by  the  opening  of  the  year  1907  everything  was 
in  readiness  to  solicit  proposals. 

During  the  years  1905  and  1906  the  Rapid  Transit 
Commission  devoted  a  great  deal  of  time  and  work  to 
''legalizing"  various  rapid  transit  routes,  in  other  words 
to  obtaining  the  consents  of  the  city  authorities  and  the 
abutting  property  owners  required  by  the  statute.  This 
involved  canvassing  the  property  owners,  and  as  these 
are  numerous  on  every  route  it  was  a  considerable  task 
to  interview  th,em  all.  In  many  cases  it  was  a  bootless 
task,  for  often  the  required  number  of  consents  could 


METEOPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER  201 

not  be  obtained  and  then  the  work  of  canvassing  went 
for  naught  and  the  board  had  to  apply  to  the  Appellate 
Division  of  the  Suprem^e  Court  for  the  appointment  of 
Commissioners  to  investigate  and  report  whether  the 
proposed  line  should  be  built  and  for  the  determination 
of  the  Court  to  that  effect  in  lieu  of  the  property  owmers' 
consents.  The  wonder  is  that  so  many  routes  were  legal- 
ized by  the  Commission.  The  difficulty  attending  the 
procedure  is  thus  descril^ed  in  the  Commission's  annual 
report  for  1906 : 

*■ '  The  fundamental  conditions  of  rapid  transit  are 
such  as  inevitably  to  invite  the  opposition  of  prop- 
erty owners  to  every  plan  which  promises  extensive 
reUef.  The  rapid  transit  situation  can  never  be  dealt 
with  in  a  large  way  except  by  railways  which  will 
bring  passengers  to  the  places  where  their  daily  busi- 
ness is  carried  on;  that  is  to  say,  in  nine  cases  out  of 
ten,  to  the  lower  part  of  Manhattan.  In  this  locality 
the  striCets  are  crooked  and  often  comparatively  nar- 
row. The  value  of  property  is  generally  extremely 
high.  The  necessity  for  easy  and  cheap  transporta- 
tion to  the  outlying  parts  of  the  city  does  not  appeal 
to  the  s,elfish  interests  of  property  owners.  And, 
therefore,  while  it  has  generally  been  easy  to  secure 
the  requisite  consents  in  Queens,  the  Bronx  and 
Brooklyn,  in  Manhattan  it  has  always  proved  im- 
possible, in  the  case  of  any  extended  rapid  transit 
road,  to  obtain  voluntary  consents,  and  applications 
to  the  courts  are  frequenth^  opposed.  In  three  such 
cases  this  Board  has  had  to  encounter  the  most  earn- 
est and  prolonged  opposition  to  its  plans." 

The  laying  out  of  new  routes  was  undertaken  by  the 
board  as  soon  as  the  contracts  for  the  Manhattan-Bronx 
subway  and  the  Brooklyn  extension  had  been  let.  With- 
in six  months  after  the  subway  was  opened  to  traffic  the 
board  adopted  and  submitted  to  the  city  authorities  plans 


202  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

embracing  nineteen  separate  routes,  reaching  every  bor- 
ough of  the  city  except  Richmond.  It  took  two  years 
more  before  the  constitutional  consents  for  these  lines 
were  obtained.  The  proposed  system  was  characterized 
by  the  Court  as  "the  most  stupendous  scheme  of  munici- 
pal improvement  and  expenditure  ever  undertaken,  and 
without  a  parallel  in  its  ultimate  bearing  upon  the  des- 
tiny of  the  people  of  what  we  have  reason  for  thinking 
will  be  the  greatest  city  in  the  world. ' ' 

With  the  opening  of  the  year  1906  Herman  A.  Metz 
succeeded  Edward  M.  Grout  as  Controller  and  therefore 
supplanted  him  in  the  Eapid  Transit  board.  Metz  lived 
in  Brooklyn  and  he  quickly  undertook  to  forward  the 
transit  interests  of  that  borough.  He  brought  before  the 
board  the  project  for  the  construction  of  an  elevated 
railway  loop  on  the  Manhattan  side  of  the  East  River 
to  connect  the  BrookhTi,  Williamsburg  and  Manhattan 
bridges  and  facilitate  travel  to  Brooklyn.  This  project 
had  been  considered  by  the  board  the  year  before,  but 
no  action  had  been  taken  because  the  board  believed  that 
the  problem  of  communication  between  the  bridges  could 
be  settled  by  the  building  of  subways,  and  that  the  senti- 
ment of  Manhattan  was  firmly  and  irrevocably  opposed 
to  the  erection  of  any  more  elevated  structures  in  the 
streets. 

Controller  Metz,  how^ever,  held  that  the  bridges  should 
be  connected  by  an  elevated  railroad  in  addition  to  such 
subways  as  might  be  built,  and  in  July,  1906,  brought  the 
matter  before  the  board.  He  urged  an  elevated  road 
merely  as  a  temporary  expedient,  to  be  torn  down  "as 
soon  as  the  subway  connection  is  completed  and  the  con- 
gested points  'at  the  bridges  are  relieved".  At  a  later 
date  in  July  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment 
adopted  a  r^esolution  asking  the  Eapid  Transit  Commis- 
sion to  consider  whether  it  was  for  the  interest  of  the 
public  that  an  elevated  loop  be  built,  or  whether  the  de- 
sired result  could  be  obtained  Avithout  jDlacing  any  further 


METROPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER         203 

elevated  structures  in  the  streets.  The  matter  was  re- 
ferred to  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Commission,  who  re- 
ported a  route  for  an  elevated  connection  and  also  a  sub- 
way route.  Although  the  elevated  plan  was  pressed  by 
many,  the  board  refused  to  change  its  attitude  and  finally 
adopted  plans  for  a  loop  subway,  running  from  the 
Brooklyn  bridge  up  Centre  street  to  Delancey  street  ex- 
tension and  through  Delancey  street  extension  to  the 
Williamsburg  bridge,  with  a  spur  at  Canal  street  con- 
necting with  the  Manhattan  bridge.  The  routes  adopted 
also  provided  for  a  line  from  Brooklyn  bridge  down 
William  street  to  Wall  street,  another  in  Grand  and 
Desbrosses  streets  from  Centre  street  to  Washington 
street,  a  third  in  Liberty  and  Washington  streets  from 
William  to  Desbrosses  street,  and  a  fourth  in  Washington 
street,  Greenwich  street,  Fourteenth  street.  University 
Place,  Washington  Square  East,  Wooster  street  and 
Canal  street  to  Centre  street. 

On  the  Brooklyn  side  of  the  East  River  the  loop  sub- 
way was  to  run  from  Brooklyn  bridge  through  Washing- 
ton street  to  Fulton  street,  through  Fulton,  Willoughby 
streets  and  Flatbush  Avenu,e  Extension  to  Fulton  street 
again,  through  Fulton  to  Lafayette  Avenue,  through  La- 
fayette to  Bedford  Avenue,  through  Bedford  Avenue  and 
its  extension  to  the  Williamsburg  bridge. 

It  being  impossible  to  obtain  consents  for  the  Man- 
hattan portion  of  the  loop  line,  the  board  applied  to  the 
Appellate  division  and  obtained  a  determination  in  lieu 
of  such  consents.  It  was  decided  to  advertise  for  bids 
for  construction  only,  leaving  the  question  of  operator 
for  later  decision.  Bids  for  the  Manhattan  sections  were 
received  and  the  contracts  awarded  to  the  lowest  bidders 
in  the  spring  of  1907. 

It  was  in  June,  1907  that  the  last  of  these  contracts 
were  awarded,  and  the  Commission  went  out  of  existence 
on  June  30. 

During  the  year  1906  the  subway  tunnel  under  Wash- 


204  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

ingtou  Heights  was  completed  and  in  Marcli  was  placed 
in  operation  from  157tli  street  and  Broadway  to  the  banks 
of  the  Harlem  Ship  Canal.  Here  the  terminus  remained 
while  the  old  bridge  at  that  point  was  replaced  by  a 
double  deck  structure,  as  described  in  another  chapter. 
The  replacement  was  effected  in  June,  1906,  when  the 
subway  trains  were  operated  across  it.  The  station  on 
the  north  side  of  the  bridge,  known  as  225th  street,  re- 
mained the  terminus  for  nearly  two  years,  or  until  the 
Van  Cortlandt  Park  extension  was  built.  This  extension 
carried  the  line  nearly  a  mile  further  north.  It  was  built 
by  the  Rapid  Transit  Subway  Construction  Company 
as  extra  work  under  its  contract.  The  route  was  ap- 
proved by  the  Appellate  Division  of  the  Supreme  Court 
in  July,  1906,  although  th,e  formal  order  was  not  entered 
until  the  following  October.  The  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
mission and  the  company  agreed  on  the  amount  of 
$675,000  as  the  cost  of  the  extension,  and  this  was  ap- 
proved by  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  on 
November  23,  1906.  Work  was  begun  immediately  and 
completed  in  the  early  part  of  1908,  when  the  extension 
was  opened  to  traffic. 

B,efore  the  subway  had  been  in  operation  one  year 
complaints  as  to  inadequate  service  were  made  to  the 
Commission.  iVs  traffic  grew  these  complaints  increased 
in  number,  and  in  March,  1906,  the  Commission  api^ointed 
a  sub-committe,e  of  two  members  and  the  Chief  Engineer 
to  investigate  the  question  of  service.  The  contract  with 
the  city  provided  that  the  operating  company  should 
'•meet  all  reasonable  requirements  of  the  public  in  re- 
spect of  the  frequency  and  character  of  its  railway  serv- 
ice to  the  full  limit  of  the  capacity  of  the  railroad."  This 
committee  found  tli,e  service  defective  in  certain  par- 
ticulars and  so  reported  on  March  22,  1906.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  from  this  report  that  the  company  was 
then  running  eight  car  express  trains  in  the  rush  hours 
and  five  car  express  trains  in  the  middle  of  the  day  and 


METEOPOLITAN  AND  SUBWAY  MERGER  205 

late  at  night.  The  committee  found  that  the  express 
service  was  inadequate  on  Sundays  and  recommended 
that  th,e  company  operate  seven  or  eight  car  trains  in- 
stead of  five  car  trains  during  the  whole  day;  also  that 
eight  car  trains  be  operated  on  the  express  tracks  on 
week  days  all  day  long,  and  that  the  local  train  service 
during  the  rush  hours  should  be  increased.  These  sug- 
gestions were  transmitted  to  the  company,  which  at  once 
put  them  into  effect. 

Additional  means  of  ventilating  the  subway  along  the 
trunk  line  from  Brooklyn  Bridge  to  96th  street  were 
provided  during  the  year  1906.  In  the  summer  of  1905 
many  complaints  were  made  of  the  excessive  heat  and 
poor  air.  The  Rapid  Transit  Commission  retained  Pro- 
fessor George  A.  Soper,  of  Columbia  University,  to  make 
a  further  study  of  air  conditions.  He  made  an  investiga- 
tion covering  the  last  five  months  of  1905  and  reported 
that,  while  tli,e  air  in  the  subway  was  hotter  than  the  air 
in  the  streets  in  summer,  it  was  not  deleterious  to  health 
and  would  not  have  any  bad  effects  if  proper  sanitary 
precautions  were  taken  to  keep  the  subway  free  from 
dust  and  odors. 

The  engineers  of  the  Commission  made  a  careful 
study  of  the  ventilation  problem.  They  found  that  before 
operation  began  the  subway  was  cooler  in  summer  and 
warmer  in  winter  than  the  streets.  After  trains  began 
running  the  opposite  condition  was  found  to  prevail  in 
summer,  the  air  in  the  subway  being  from  five  to  ten 
degr,ees  warmer  than  that  in  the  streets  above.  This 
increase  in  temperature  was  caused  by  the  friction  of 
train  movement,  the  grinding  of  brakes  etc.  and  to  a 
small  degree  to  the  animal  heat  thrown  off  by  the  many 
passengers.  While  the  air  was  renewed  often  enough 
to  be  sanitary,  it  was  believed  that  more  frequent  re- 
newals would  improve  it  as  well  as  the  ventilation.  Ac- 
cordingly the  engineers,  with  the  consent  of  the  Com- 
mission, caused  a  number  of  additional  ventilating  cham- 


206  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  KAPID  TKANSIT 

bers  to  be  constructed  between  stations,  fourteen  between 
Brooklyn  Bridge  and  Fifty-ninth  street.  In  these  and  in 
the  existing  chambers  constructed  when  the  subway  was 
built  they  installed  blowers  and  louvres,  for  the  purpose 
of  facilitating  the  escape  of  air  from  and  ingress  of  fresh 
air  into  the  subway.  The  louvres  were  simply  large  iron 
shutters  hung  on  axles  so  that  they  normally  remained 
closed  but  were  forced  open  by  the  rush  of  air  caused  by 
the  passage  of  trains.  At  stations,  too,  some  of  the  vault 
lights  were  removed  and  replaced  by  ventilating  gratings. 
The  effect  of  these  improvements  was  felt  during  the  next 
summer,  when  the  heat  in  the  subway  was  found  to  be 
much  less  than  in  the  previous  year. 

An  experimental  cooling  plant  also  was  installed  in 
the  Brooklyn  Bridge  station.  Two  artesian  wells  were 
sunk  and  the  water  from  them  was  pumped  into  a  series 
of  pipes  installed  on  each  side  of  the  station.  Air  is 
pumped  through  these  pipes  in  counter  current  to  the 
water,  becoming  cooled  in  the  passage,  and  is  then  de- 
livered to  the  station  platforms  by  ducts  overhead.  This 
device  worked  satisfactorily,  and  tests  in  warm  weather 
showed  that  it  kept  the  temperature  in  the  station  about 
five  degrees  lower  than  it  was  on  the  street,  whereas  it 
had  been  seven  degrees  higher  during  the  previous  sum- 
mer. 


CHAPTER  XV 

Rapid  Transit  Commission  Abolished  and  Succeeded  by 
Public  Service  Commission. 

T^HE  year  1907  will  be  forever  memorable  in  the  tran- 
sit  annals  of  New  York  City,  for  it  marked  the  pass- 
ing of  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Railroad  Commis- 
sioners and  the  creation  of  the  Public  Service  Commis- 
sions, one  of  which  (the  First  District  Commission)  was 
charged  with  the  old  board's  powers  and  duties  in  respect 
of  rapid  transit  construction. 

Why  the  change?  The  reader  of  history  may  well  ask 
that  question,  for  it  is  only  answerable  by  those  who  lived 
at  the  time  and  witnessed  one  of  the  curious  phenomena 
of  free  government.  One  would  suppose  that  the  Rapid 
Transit  Commission,  having  triumphed  over  so  many 
difficulties  and  successfully  built  the  first  subway,  would 
have  been  crowned  with  laurel  by  their  contemporaries 
and  continued  indefinitely  in  their  official  places.  Yet 
precisely  the  opposite  transpired.  Instead  of  being  com- 
mended, they  were  condemned,  not  because  they  had  not 
done  well  with  the  first  subway,  but  because  it  was  such 
a  great  success  that  they  had  not  multiplied  it  fast  enough 
to  suit  those  who,  now  that  underground  travel  was  a 
demonstrated  success,  clamored  for  new  underground 
roads  all  over  the  city!  Because  the  old  board  had  not 
ended  the  crush  at  the  Brooklyn  Bridge,  because  it  had 
not  built  subways  into  Brooklyn,  and  Queens  and  in 
other  parts  of  Manhattan,  it  was  denounced  by  the  press, 
which  clamored  for  its  abolition. 

Giving  all  due  credit  to  the  old  Commission,  it  must 
be  said  in  fairness  that  there  was  some  ground  for  com- 
plaint. It  procrastinated  unduly,  deliberating  and  nego- 
tiating when  it  should  have  been  acting.  But  it  did  not 
deserve  the  odium  heaped  upon  it.  However,  a  public 
sentiment  against  it  was  created  and  it  had  to  go.    Com- 


208  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

plaints  against  the  board  became  so  frequent,  criticism  of 
its  inaction  so  vociferous  that  it  got  a  bad  name.  Before 
the  subway  which  it  had  brought  into  being  was  two 
years  old,  demands  in  and  out  of  the  press  were  being 
made  for  its  removal. 

Denunciation  was  at  its  height  when  Charles  E. 
Hughes,  elected  Governor  in  1906,  began  his  career  as  a 
public  officer  in  January,  1907.  To  impress  upon  him  the 
need  of  action  in  the  transit  field,  a  committee  of  Brook- 
lyn men  invited  him  to  ''come  and  see  for  himself"  the 
horrors  of  the  crush  at  the  Brooklyn  Bridge.  The  Gov- 
ernor came,  saw  and  was  conquered.  He  assured  the 
Brooklynites  that  he  would  do  something  to  end  such 
conditions,  and  he  kept  the  promise.  With  his  advisors 
the  Governor  set  to  work  to  devise  an  agency  which  in 
the  name  of  the  State  should  supervise  and  regulate  the 
corporations  performing  a  public  service  under  franchises 
granted  by  the  public.  The  result  was  the  Public  Service 
Commissions  act,  which  passed  the  Legislature  of  1907 
and  was  approved  by  the  Governor  as  soon  as  passed. 
This  law  created  two  commissions  of  five  men  each,  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Governor  by  and  with  the  consent 
of  the  State  Senate,  and  gave  them  the  power  to  super- 
vise and  regulate  railroad  and  street  railroad  companies, 
gas  and  electric  light  companies  etc.  both  as  to  their 
finances  and  the  service  rendered.  One  commission  was 
given  jurisdiction  over  the  First  District,  comprising  the 
City  of  New  York,  and  the  other  over  the  Second  District, 
embracing  the  rest  of  the  State.  The  law  also  repealed 
the  act  creating  the  Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Eailroad 
Commissioners  and  devolved  their  duties  on  the  Public 
Service  Commission  for  the  First  District.  As  this  rapid 
transit  work  was  entirely  for  the  benefit  of  New  York 
City,  it  was  provided  that  the  expenses  of  this  commis- 
sion, save  and  except  the  salaries  of  the  five  commis- 
sioners, the  Secretary  and  Chief  Counsel,  should  be  paid 
by  the  City.    To  attract  a  fit  type  of  men  the  salaries  of 


PUBLIC  SERVICE  COMMISSION,  FIRST  DISTRICT, 

1907  —  1911 

1.   John  E.  Eustis;     2.    Milo  R.  Maltbie; 

3.  Chairman  W^illiam  R.  Willcox; 

4.  Edward  M.  Bassett;     5.    William  McCarroU. 


PUBLIC   SERVICE   COMMISSION    CREATED  209 

the  commissioners  were  fixed  at  $15,000  a  year  each,  that 
of  the  Secretary  at  $6,000  and  that  of  Counsel  at  $10,000. 
These  salaries  amounted  to  $91,000  for  each  commission. 
In  the  Second  District  all  other  expenses  are  paid  by  the 
State  out  of  appropriations  made  by  the  Legislature;  in 
the  First  District  all  other  expenses  were  paid  out  of  the 
City  Treasury.  The  law  was  amended  in  1916  so  as  to 
make  payable  by  the  state  all  expenses  of  the  Commission 
for  the  First  District  except  those  incurred  for  rapid 
transit  purposes  which  were  continued  as  a  charge  against 
the  City. 

The  act  took  effect  July  1,  1907,  and  on  that  day  the 
First  District  Commission  appointed  by  Governor 
Hughes  met  and  organized.  It  was  composed  of  William 
R.  Willcox,  of  Manhattan,  a  lawyer,  former  Park  Com- 
missioner and  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  Postmaster 
of  New  York;  William  McCarroU,  a  business  man  of 
Brooklyn;  Edward  M.  Bassett,  a  lawyer  and  former 
member  of  Congress,  of  Brooklyn;  Milo  R.  Maltbie,  of 
Manhattan,  then  Secretary  of  the  Municipal  Art  Com- 
mission; and  John  E.  Eustis,  of  the  Bronx,  a  lawyer  and 
former  Park  Commissioner  of  that  borough.  Willcox, 
McCarroll  and  Eustis  were  Republicans;  Bassett  and 
Maltbie  Democrats. 

By  the  terms  of  the  law  the  new  commission  took  over 
the  staff  of  the  old  Rapid  Transit  board,  and  the  work 
of  the  engineers  went  along,  with  scarcely  any  in- 
terruption. Additions  to  the  staff  were  made  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  and  in  the  selections  little  if  any  attention 
was  paid  to  political  considerations.  The  men  were 
chosen  for  fitness  and  competency  alone.  The  first  ap- 
pointment made  was  that  of  Secretary,  and  for  that  posi- 
tion the  Comjuission  chose  Travis  H.  Whitney,  a  lawyer, 
a  Republican  and  at  the  time  Secretary  of  the  Citizens' 
Union.  He  remained  Secretary  of  the  First  District  Com- 
mission for  nearly  nine  years  and  was  appointed  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Commission  by  Grovernor  Whitman  in  1916 


210  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Abel  E.  Blackmar,  now  a  Justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  was  appointed  Counsel  but  he  served  only  one 
year,  when  he  was  appointed  and  later  elected  to  the 
Supreme  Court  bench.  He  was  succeeded  by  George  S. 
Coleman,  who  serv^ed  until  1917,  when  he  was  succeeded 
by  William  L.  Ransom,  the  present  incumbent. 

For  a  time  George  S.  Rice,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  old 
board,  acted  in  similar  capacity  for  the  commission,  but 
in  1908  he  was  succeeded  by  Henry  B.  Seaman,  who 
served  until  1910,  when  he  resigned  and  Alfred 
Craven,  the  Deputy  Chief  Engineer  of  the  old 
board,  became  Acting  and  later  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
commission,  a  position  he  held  until  1916  when  he  was 
made  Consulting  Engineer  and  Daniel  L.  Turner  was  ap- 
pointed Chief  Engineer.  The  Commission  fixed  the  sal- 
ary of  the  Chief  Engineer  at  $15,000  and  it  remained  at 
this  figure  until  1913,  when  it  was  increased  to  $20,000. 
In  1916  it  was  again  made  $15,000. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  new  Commission  was  to 
inaugurate  the  Interborough-Metropolitan  investigation. 
Clothed  with  inquisitorial  powers  by  the  Legislature  and 
having  authority  to  examine  books  of  account  and  compel 
the  attendance  of  witnesses,  the  Commission  immediately 
received  requests  for  an  inquiry  into  the  famous  merger. 
It  adopted  a  resolution  for  such  an  investigation  and 
retained  the  late  William  M.  Ivins,  a  leading  member  of 
the  bar,  to  act  as  special  counsel  for  the  inquiry.  Hear- 
ings began  in  August  and  continued  until  October,  1907. 
Officers  of  the  Interborough  and  Metropolitan  companies 
were  examined  under  oath,  and  soon  the  precarious  finan- 
cial condition  of  the  surface  lines  was  exposed.  The  tes- 
timony showed  that  some  of  the  subsidiary  companies  of 
the  Metropolitan  street  railway  system  had  been  taken 
over  at  extravagant  rentals;  that  others  were  excessively 
capitalized;  that  dividends  had  been  paid  out  of  funds 
not  derived  from  earnings  and  that  money  had  been 
wasted  in  a  variety  of  ways. 


PUBLIC   SERVICE  COMMISSION   CREATED  211 

Toward  the  close  of  the  investigation  creditors  of 
the  New  York  City  Eailway  Company,  the  company* 
which  operated  the  surface  lines  for  the  Metropolitan, 
filed  petitions  in  court  alleging  insolvency  and  asking 
for  the  appointment  of  receivers.  The  petitions  were 
granted  and  the  company  went  into  the  hands  of  re- 
ceivers, Adrian  H.  Joline  and  Douglas  Robinson  being 
appointed.  Later  Frederick  W.  Whitridge  was  named 
separate  receiver  for  the  Third  Avenue  Railroad  Com- 
pany and  its  subsidiaries.  For  three  years  and  more 
the  properties  underwent  rehabilitation  and  reorganiza- 
tion, emerging  finally  as  the  New^  York  Raihvays  Com- 
pany, which  took  over  the  old  Metropolitan  lines,  and 
the  Third  Avenue  Railway  Company,  which  took  over 
the  lines  of  the  Third  Avenue  Railroad  Company.  Com- 
plete new  equipments  were  purchased  and  the  properties 
put  in  first  class  operating  shape. 

It  was  during  this  investigation  that  the  word  '^  ac- 
celeration" was  coined  into  a  local  meaning.  Lemuel  E. 
Quigg,  w^ho  handled  for  the  Ryan- Whitney  interests  the 
publicity  campaign  in  support  of  the  Metropolitan  offer 
to  build  subways  for  free  transfers  to  and  from  the  sur- 
face lines,  was  examined  as  to  the  methods  he  employed. 
He  told  how  he  had  caused  the  organization  of  various 
civic  associations  to  meet  and  pass  resolutions  in  favor 
of  the  Ryan  subway  offer;  also  of  hiring  lawyers  and 
others  to  appear  at  public  meetings  to  advocate  the  cause. 

''Did  you  do  anything  more?"  was  one  of  the  ques- 
tions asked  him  in  this  connection  by  Mr.  Ivins. 

"Yes",  replied  Mr.  Quigg,  "I  even  wrote  some  of  the 
speeches  with  which  they  confounded  the  arguments  of 
our  opponents." 

At  another  time  Mr.  Ivins  asked  whether  he  did  all 
this  to  influence  public  sentiment. 

"Not  so  much  to  influence  it,  as  to  accelerate  it;  I 
ihink  accelerate  is  the  proper  word",  replied  the  witness. 

The  press  and  public  seized  on  the  new  word  as  a 


212  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

fitting  designation  of  the  effective  form  of  influence  em- 
ployed, and  ''acceleration"  since  has  been  resorted  to  by 
numerous  parties  who  sought  to  influence  or  arouse  public 
or  official  sentiment  in  their  favor. 

The  new  board  at  once  began  a  study  of  the  rapid 
transit  situation,  with  the  view  of  affording  relief  at  the 
earliest  possible  time.  It  had  inherited  from  the  old 
board  four  different  rapid  transit  projects — the  Brook- 
lyn extension  of  the  first  subway;  the  Van  Cortlandt 
Park  Extension  of  the  Broadway  branch  of  the  subway ; 
the  Centre  Street  loop  subway  and  the  Fourth  Avenue 
(Brooklyn)  subway.  It  wisely  determined  to  push  these 
projects  to  completion  while  devising  j^lans  for  further 
amplification  of  facilities. 

Both  the  Brooklyn  and  Van  Cortlandt  Park  exten- 
sions were  in  course  of  construction  when  the  new  Com- 
mission came  into  existence.  Work  on  both  was  con- 
tinued under  the  new  regime  and  pushed  to  successful 
completion. 

The  other  two  projects  were  not  so  far  advanced. 
Contracts  for  the  construction  of  the  Centre  Street  loop 
subway  had  been  awarded  by  the  old  board,  as  told  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  but  actual  work  had  not  been 
started.  The  new  Commission  made  radical  changes  in 
the  plans,  enlarging  the  bore  of  the  subway  by  providing 
for  a  height  of  fifteen  feet  as  against  thirteen  feet  and 
for  a  width  of  fifteen  instead  of  twelve  feet  for  each 
track.  It  also  reduced  some  of  the  heavy  grades  provided 
for  in  the  old  plans.  The  contractors  accepted  the  re- 
vised plans  and  proceeded  with  the  construction  of  the 
subway. 

In  the  case  of  the  Fourth  Avenue  subway  in  Brooklyn 
matters  were  even  less  advanced.  The  old  board  had 
adopted  the  route  and  general  plan  for  this  line,  which 
was  to  run  from  the  Centre  Street  loop  subway  in  Man- 
hattan over  the  Manhattan  Bridge,  under  Flatbush  Av- 
enue Extension  to  Fulton  Street,  under  Fulton  Street  to 


PUBLIC   SERVICE  COMMISSION   CREATED  213 

Fourth  Avenue  and  under  Fourth  Avenue  to  Fort  Ham- 
ilton. It  was  found  that  two  tracks  of  the  first  subway 
occupied  a  part  of  this  route  in  Fulton  Street  and  if  made 
part  of  the  proposed  Fourth  Avenue  line  would  make  it 
difficult  for  any  company  other  than  the  Interborough,  the 
operator  of  the  first  subway,  to  operate  it.  The  new 
Commission,  wishing  to  produce  a  line  which  would  be 
attractive  to  an  independent  company,  modified  the  route 
by  diverting  it  from  Fulton  Street  around  through  Ash- 
land Place  and  thence  into  Fourth  Avenue,  thus  avoiding 
the  Interborough  tracks.  Meanwhile  it  had  held  public 
hearings  on  the  route  and  started  its  engineers  to  work 
on  detail  plans. 

At  the  same  time  a  study  was  made  of  the  situation 
in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx,  with  the  view  of  laying  out 
a  new  subway.  This  study  was  completed  during  the 
first  six  months,  and  on  December  31,  1907,  the  Com- 
mission adopted  the  Broadway-Lexington  Avenue  route. 
This  was  a  combination  of  routes  adopted  by  the  old 
board,  with  some  modifications.  As  adopted  by  the  new 
Commission  the  Broadway-Lexington  Avenue  route  be- 
gan at  the  Battery,  ran  up  Greenwich  street  to  Vesey 
street,  through  Vesey  to  Broadway  and  up  Broadway 
as  far  as  Ninth  street,  where  it  turned  eastward  through 
private  property  to  Irving  Place,  ran  up  Irving  Place 
into  Lexington  Avenue  and  up  Lexington  Avenue  to 
Harlem  River;  under  the  Harlem  River  by  tunnel  to  Park 
Avenue  and  138th  street,  the  Bronx,  where  it  divided 
into  two  branches,  one  running  up  Mott,  River,  Gerard 
and  Jerome  Avenues  to  Woodlawn  Road,  and  the  other 
through  138th  street,  Southern  Boulevard  and  West- 
chester Avenue  to  Pelham  Bay  Park. 

While  the  engineers  were  preparing  detail  plans  for 
this  route  the  Commission  studied  the  financial  situa- 
tion, for  the  City  was  close  to  its  constitutional  debt 
limit  of  ten  per  cent,  of  the  assessed  value  of  the  realty 
within  its  boundaries  and  could  not  at  the  time  provide 


214  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

funds  for  such  an  extensive  piece  of  work.  It  was  esti- 
mated that  the  construction  of  the  Broadway-Lexington 
route  would  cost  about  $50,000,000.  As  a  beginning  or 
path-finder,  the  Commission  decided  to  advertise  for  bids 
for  the  construction  of  a  part  of  the  Fourth  Avenue  sub- 
way in  Brooklyn,  estimated  to  cost  about  $16,000,000. 
Advertising  was  begun  in  February,  1908,  and  bids  were 
opened  in  March  for  six  sections,  extending  from  Man- 
hattan Bridge  to  Fourth  Avenue  and  Forty-third  street, 
Brooklyn.  In  May  awards  were  made  for  the  six  sec- 
tions to  the  lowest  bidder  in  each  case,  and  the  contracts 
were  sent  to  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment. 

A  Democratic  administration  controlled  the  city. 
George  B.  McClellan  was  Mayor  and  Herman  A.  Metz 
Controller.  Both  had  been  ex-officio  members  of  the 
Rapid  Transit  Commission,  and  neither  looked  with  par- 
ticular favor  on  the  new  Commission,  appointed  by  a 
Eepublican  Governor  and  having  a  Republican  majority. 
They  naturally  regarded  the  building  of  rapid  transit 
lines  in  the  city  a  purely  local  function  and  did  not  like 
to  see  it  entrusted  to  a  State  Commission  over  which  the 
City  authorities  not  only  had  no  control  but  in  which 
they  had  not  even  a  representation.  The  new  law  pro- 
vided that  all  the  expenses  of  the  new  Commission,  aside 
from  the  salaries  of  Commissioners,  Secretary  and 
Counsel,  should  be  paid  by  the  City  of  New  York,  and 
yet  the  City  was  denied  any  control  of  or  supervision 
over  such  expenses.  The  Commission  was  authorized  to 
draw  on  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  for 
such  expenses,  and  if  the  bill  were  not  paid  was  empow- 
ered to  apply  to  the  Court  to  compel  payment. 

The  Fourth  Avenue  subway  contracts  were  the  sub- 
ject of  the  first  difference.  Controller  Metz,  who  in  the 
Rapid  Transit  Board  had  been  the  staunch  friend  of  the 
Fourth  Avenue  project,  now  took  a  decided  stand  against 
it.  The  contracts  as  transmitted  by  the  Public  Ser\'ice 
Commission,  were  referred  to  him  for  certification,  and 


PUBLIC   SEBVICE   COMMISSION    CREATED  215 

he  reported  to  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment that  they  proposed  to  commit  the  City  to  an  ex- 
penditure of  $16,000,000,  and  that  the  City  was  so  close 
to  the  debt  limit  that  he  could  not  certify  the  contracts. 
Jefferson  M.  Levy  brought  a  tax-payer's  action  for  an 
injunction  to  restrain  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  the 
Controller  from  approving  the  contracts  on  account  of 
the  City's  financial  condition.  A  temporary  order  was 
served  and  action  on  the  contracts  was  postponed  pend- 
ing the  report  of  Benjamin  F.  Tracy,  whom  the  Court 
appointed  referee  to  ascertain  the  exact  borrowing 
capacity  of  the  City  as  of  June  30,  1908. 

About  a  year  later  the  referee  reported  that  the  City 
on  the  date  named  had  a  clear  margin  of  about  $54,000,- 
000,  which  of  course  was  more  than  ample  to  finance  the 
construction  of  the  Fourth  Avenue  subway.  The  matter 
was  taken  to  the  Court  of  Appeals,  however,  and  that 
tribunal  in  October,  1909,  confirmed  the  referee's  find- 
ings. The  temporary  injunction  was  immediately  dis- 
solved, and  the  administration,  just  then  facing  a  gen- 
eral election  for  new  City  officers,  made  haste  to  approve 
the  contracts  and  appropriate  the  necessary  funds.  Upon 
this  action  the  Public  Service  Commission  asked  the 
contractors  who  had  put  in  the  lowest  bids  for  the  six 
sections  of  the  work  in  May,  1908,  whether  they  were 
prepared  to  carry  out  the  contracts  on  the  figures  then 
submitted,  and  on  receiving  affirmative  answers  pro- 
ceeded to  execute  the  contracts.  Ground  was  broken 
with  appropriate  ceremonies  on  November  12,  1909,  in 
Flatbush  Avenue  Extension,  Brooklyn,  on  one  of  the 
contracts  of  the  Bradley  Contracting  Company,  William 
R.  Willcox,  chairman  of  the  Public  Service  Commission 
turning  the  first  shovel-full  of  earth.  Thereafter  the 
work  continued  without  serious  interruption  to  comple- 
tion. 

Meanwhile  the  Public  Service  Commission  was  seek- 
ing in  every  way  to  clear  the  pathway  for  additional  sub- 


216  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

way  building.  Two  courses  were  open — to  increase  the 
City's  borrowing  capacity  and  to  get  the  law  amended 
so  that  investment  in  rapid  transit  leases  would  be  more 
attractive  to  private  capital  than  it  was  under  the  Els- 
berg  amendment  which  limited  such  leases  to  twenty 
years.  The  Commission  found  that  bonds  issued  for 
water  w^orks  were  excluded  by  the  State  constitution 
from  the  obligations  considered  in  figuring  the  debt 
limit,  and  that  this  exemption  was  made  because  the 
works  w^ere  self-supporting  properties.  There  was  equal 
reason,  therefore,  for  exempting  the  bonds  issued  for 
the  construction  of  docks  and  the  city  subway,  which 
were  also  self-supporting.  Accordingly  the  Commission 
drafted  and  sent  to  the  Legislature  of  1908  an  amend- 
ment to  the  constitution  providing  for  the  exemption  of 
bonds  issued  for  the  docks  and  the  subway. 

The  promptness  with  which  this  was  done  speaks  well 
for  the  Public  Service  Commission.  Organized  on  July 
1,  1907,  it  had  not  been  in  office  six  months  when  it  dis- 
closed the  w^eakness  of  the  city  in  the  matter  of  borrowing 
capacity  and  applied  the  obvious  remedy.  Its  action 
later  made  possible  the  undertaking  of  rapid  transit 
expansion  on  an  extensive  scale.  Constitutional  amend- 
ments must  pass  two  sessions  of  the  Legislature  and  then 
be  approved  by  a  vote  of  the  people  at  a  general  election 
before  becoming  effective,  and  this  amendment  was  ap- 
proved successively  by  the  sessions  of  1908  and  1909. 
In  the  latter  year  it  was  submitted  to  popular  vote  and 
duly  approved,  and  the  Legislature  of  1910  passed  the 
legislation  necessary  to  put  it  into  effect.  The  immediate 
result  was  the  expanding  of  the  borrowing  capacity  of 
the  City  of  New  York  by  an  amount  estimated  at  $120,- 
000,000,  and  thanks  to  the  prompt  action  of  the  new 
Commission  this  came  at  the  very  time  when  it  was 
imperatively  needed  to  enable  the  City  to  embark  upon 
a  generous  policy  of  rapid  transit  expansion. 

During  the  same  period  the  Commission  formulated 


PUBLIC   SERVICE   COMMISSION    CREATED  217 

and  sent  to  Albany  many  amendments  to  the  Rapid  Tran- 
sit act  drafted  with  the  view  of  lessening  the  rigors  of 
that  statute.  The  twenty  years'  lease  clause  was  repealed 
and  instead  the  Public  Service  Commission  was  em- 
powered to  make  leases  of  city-owned  rapid  transit  lines 
for  any  period  deemed  advisable.  The  most  important 
of  these  amendments  were  passed  in  the  sessions  of  1909 
and  1912.  In  the  popular  mind  it  is  doubtful  if  the  Com- 
mission received  any  credit  for  these  legislative  achieve- 
ments, yet  their  importance  is  unquestionable.  Without 
them  and  the  constitutional  change  the  city  would  have 
been  absolutely  unable  to  enter  upon  the  comprehensive 
scheme  of  subway  building  later  undertaken. 

While  these  matters  were  pending  in  the  Legislature 
the  new  Commission  continued  its  study  of  the  transit 
situation  and  sought  to  devise  a  comprehensive  plan  for 
rapid  transit  extension  in  all  boroughs  of  the  city.  Hav- 
ing adopted  the  Broadway-Lexington  Avenue  route  for 
Manhattan  and  the  Bronx,  it  tried  to  adapt  certain  routes 
in  Brooklyn  for  connection  with  it.  Thus  the  so-called 
Tri-borough  plan  was  evolved  early  in  1908.  The  City 
had  spent  millions  in  building  the  Williamsburg  and 
Manhattan  bridges  over  the  East  E-iver,  and  as  yet  these 
bridges  were  giving  no  rapid  transit  service.  The 
Commission  wisely  decided  to  put  them  into  use  in  the 
new  rapid  transit  system,  and  made  them  links  in  the 
Tri-borough  chain  to  connect  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn 
lines.  On  the  Brooklyn  side  it  adopted  the  Fourth  Av- 
enue subway  running  to  Fort  Hamilton  and  Coney  Isl- 
and, and  the  Broadway-Lafayette  subway  running  from 
the  Williamsburg  bridge  out  Broadway,  Brooklyn,  to  La- 
fayette Avenue  and  back  through  Lafayette  Avenue  to  a 
junction  with  the  Fourth  Avenue  subway  at  Fulton 
street.  The  Williamsburg  and  Manhattan  bridges  were 
to  be  used  to  connect  these  lines  with  the  Centre  Street 
loop  subway  in  Manhattan.  In  1908  and  1909  the  engi- 
neers of  the  Commission  prepared  detail  plans  for  this 


218  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

system,  which,  it  was  estimated,  would  add  45  miles  of 
new  road  and  cost  about  $147,000,000. 

While  the  plans  were  being  prepared  the  Commission 
sought  to  ascertain  whether  any  private  company  would 
join  the  city  in  the  new  enterprise.  Immediately  after 
the  Legislature  of  1909  passed  the  amendments  to  the 
Rapid  Transit  act  eliminating  the  twenty  years'  lease 
provision  the  Commission  invited  proposals  from  all 
the  prominent  street  railroad  companies.  It  held  large 
ideas  as  to  the  extent  of  the  rapid  transit  improvements 
which  should  be  made  and  felt  that,  even  with  the  en- 
larged debt  limit,  the  City  would  not  be  able  at  once  to 
provide  all  the  funds  required.  Consequently  it  sought 
to  get  private  companies  who  might  become  bidders  for  a 
lease  of  such  lines  to  contribute  out  of  their  own  funds 
toward  the  cost  of  construction. 

On  June  30,  1909,  the  Interborough  Eapid  Transit 
Company  submitted  a  proposal  to  build  third  tracks  on 
the  Second,  Third  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  lines,  to 
lengthen  station  platforms  in  the  first  subway  so  that 
ten  car  express  and  six  car  local  trains  might  be  operated 
and  to  build  certain  extensions  of  the  subway  with  its 
own  money,  provided  the  City  would  authorize  their  con- 
struction as  "extra  work"  under  the  original  McDonald 
contract  for  the  first  subway.  The  company  offered  the 
City  the  option  of  building  the  new  subway  extensions 
with  its  own  funds  or  having  them  built  at  the  company's 
expense  and  operated  at  a  fixed  rental  like  the  first  sub- 
way or  under  a  profit  sharing  arrangement  by  dividing 
profits  with  the  City  after  paying  operating  expenses 
and  other  costs.  In  return  the  company  asked  for  a 
lease  of  the  new  lines  to  be  coterminous  with  the  exist- 
ing lease  of  the  first  subway,  which  would  expire  in  1954, 
and  for  practically  perpetual  franchises  for  the  elevated 
railroad  additions. 

This  proposal  provided  for  the  extension  of  the  sub- 
way from  Forty-second  street  up  Lexington  and  Third 


PUBLIC   SERVICE  COMMISSION   CREATED  219 

Avenues  to  and  under  the  Harlem  Eiver  to  a  junction 
with  the  first  subway  at  149th  street;  the  extension  of 
the  subway  on  the  West  Side  of  Manhattan  south  from 
Times  Square  through  Seventh  Avenue,  Varick  Street 
and  West  Broadway,  Canal  Street  and  the  Manhattan 
Bridge  to  a  junction  with  the  first  subway  in  Brooklyn 
and  two  tracks  south  of  Canal  Street  to  Battery  Park; 
also  to  extend  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  line 
from  149th  Street  across  McCombs  Dam  bridge  and  up 
Jerome  Avenue  in  the  Bronx  to  194th  Street;  to  extend 
the  Second  Avenue  elevated  road  across  the  Queensboro 
bridge  to  Long  Island  City,  and  finally  to  sell  to  the  City 
and  to  operate  as  part  of  the  subway  system  the  Stein- 
way  tunnel,  owned  by  Interborough  interests,  already 
built  under  the  East  River  from  42d  Street,  Manhattan, 
to  Long  Island  City,  in  Queens  Borough. 

The  Commission  gave  long  and  serious  consideration  to 
this  offer,  but  finally  rejected  it  on  August  27,  1909,  for 
various  reasons,  chiefly  because  it  did  not  provide  for 
an  adequate  scheme  of  extension.  The  Commission  in  its 
letter  to  the  company,  however,  plainly  indicated  its 
willingness  to  consider  a  further  proposal  which  would 
more  adequately  meet  the  needs  of  the  City.  This  was 
the  beginning  of  an  exchange  of  correspondence  between 
the  Commission  and  the  company,  which  lasted  for  two 
years.  Conferences  accompanied  the  passage  of  letters, 
and  steady  progress  was  made,  although  at  times  the 
differences  between  the  parties  seemed  to  be  irrecon- 
cilable. 

While  these  negotiations  were  being  carried  on  a 
momentous  change  and  one  having  an  immediate  bearing 
on  the  rapid  transit  situation  occurred  in  the  City  gov- 
ernment. In  the  election  of  1909  William  J,  Gaynor  was 
elected  Mayor,  and  while  he  was  the  Tammany  candidate, 
the  other  City  officers  and  the  members  of  the  Board  of 
Estimate  and  Apportionment  were  elected  by  the  Fusion 
forces.    The  new  Board  of  Estimate,  which  organized  in 


220'  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

January  1910,  consisted  of  William  J.  Gaynor,  Mayor; 
William  A.  Prendergast,  Controller;  John  Purroy  Mit- 
chel,  President  of  the  Board  of  Aldermen;  George  Mc- 
Aneny,  Borough  President  of  Manhattan;  A.  E.  Steers, 
Borough  President  of  Brooklyn;  Cyrus  C.  Miller,  Bor- 
ough President  of  the  Bronx;  Lawrence  Gresser,  Bor- 
ough President  of  Queens,  and  George  Cromwell,  Bor- 
ough President  of  Richmond.  Mr.  Gresser  was  later 
succeeded  as  Borough  President  of  Queens  by  Maurice 
E.  Connolly. 

With  the  advent  of  the  new  government  the  official 
atmosphere  cleared.  The  new  Board  of  Estimate  adopt- 
ed an  attitude  of  friendliness  and  co-operation  toward 
the  Public  Service  Commission,  and  thereafter  both 
boards  worked  in  harmony.  The  Board  of  Estimate 
appointed  a  special  Transit  Committee  consisting  of 
McAneny,  Miller  and  Cromwell,  and  this  committee 
worked  hand  in  hand  with  the  Public  Service  Conamis- 
sion  and  actively  participated  in  the  conferences  and 
negotiations  which  marked  the  years  1910  and  1911  as 
particularly  notable  for  rapid  transit  progress. 

Following  the  rejection  of  the  Interborough  proposal 
of  1909,  the  Commission  resolved  to  bring  matters  to  a 
focus  by  advertising  for  bids  for  the  Tri-Borough  sys- 
ter,  as  above  outlined.  While  the  engineers  were  busy 
preparing  detail  plans,  counsel  to  the  Commission  under 
its  direction  proceeded  to  draft  the  necessary  contracts. 
To  test  the  attitude  of  private  capital  toward  sharing 
the  construction  cost  or  assuming  it  altogether,  the  Com- 
mission drew  up  two  different  forms  of  contract — one 
providing  for  construction,  equipment  and  operation  by 
the  bidder,  in  other  words  a  private  capital  contract,  and 
the  other  contract  for  construction  alone,  the  City  to 
bear  the  cost  and  to  provide  an  operator  later.  The  con- 
tracts were  completed  during  the  summer,  the  required 
public  hearings  were  held,  the  detail  plans  were  finished 
and  on  September  1,  1910,  the  Commission  began  adver- 


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PUBLIC   SERVICE   COMMISSION   CREATED  221 

tising  for  bids.  The  bids  under  the  private  capital  form 
were  set  for  opening  on  October  20  and  those  under  the 
municipal  construction  form  for  October  27. 

When  October  20  came  not  one  bid  was  received  under 
the  form  of  contract  for  construction,  equipment  and 
operation  by  private  capital,  but  on  October  27  several 
responsible  contractors  submitted  bids  for  the  construc- 
tion of  various  parts  of  the  system.  While  the  private 
capital  contract  covered  the  whole  Tri-Borough  system, 
the  other  form  embraced  only  the  Broadway-Lexington 
Avenue  line,  the  Broadway-Lafayette  Avenue  line  and 
the  Canal  Street  line,  for  the  reason  that  the  city's  funds 
were  limited  and  it  was  thought  prudent  to  limit  the 
extent  of  the  bidding  to  an  amount  to  which  it  would  be 
safe  to  commit  the  City. 

While  the  failure  to  receive  bids  for  private  capital 
construction  was  a  disappointment,  it  was  not  an  unex- 
pected result.  The  Interborough  company,  which  was 
the  most  likely  bidder,  preferred  other  routes  to  those 
embraced  in  the  Tri-Borough  system  and  also  objected 
to  the  terms  of  the  contract,  which  were  deemed  too 
onerous  by  the  operating  company.  The  Commission, 
therefore,  felt  that  it  would  be  wise  to  await  another 
proposal  from  the  company,  which  indicated  that  it  was 
ready  to  make  another  offer.  No  action,  therefore,  was 
taken  on  the  construction  bids  received  October  27,  but 
they  were  held  under  advisement. 

The  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Railroad  Company, 
which  operated  the  so-called  McAdoo  tunnels  under  the 
Hudson  River,  was  then  under  the  management  of  Hon. 
William  G.  McAdoo,  who  later  became  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  under  President  Wilson.  Mr.  McAdoo  took 
up  the  Tri-Borough  matter,  and  early  in  November  1910, 
shortly  after  the  bids  were  opened,  his  company  sub- 
mitted to  the  Public  Service  Commission  a  proposition 
to  equip  and  operate  the  whole  Tri-Borough  system  if 


099 


FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 


constructed  by  the  City  and  connected  with  the  Hudson 
and  Manhattan  line. 

This  offer  spurred  the  Interborough  company  to 
further  effort,  and  on  December  5,  1910,  that  company 
made  another  proposal,  which  came  so  near  to  meeting 
the  views  of  the  Commission  as  to  the  needed  extensions 
that  it  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  situation.  While 
it  was  under  consideration  the  Hudson  and  Manhattan 
company,  in  accordance  with  a  time  limit  placed  in  its 
letter,  w^ithdrew  its  proposal,  leaving  only  ,the  Inter- 
borough offer  before  the  Commission. 

This  proposal  offered  to  construct  certain  extensions 
of  the  subway  to  cost  $128,000,000,  providing  the  City 
would  contribute  $53,000,000  thereof,  the  extensions  to 
be  as  follows : 

Down  Seventh  Avenue  from  Times  Square,  down 
Varick  street,  West  Broadway  and  Greenwich  street  to 
the  Battery,  with  a  branch  from  Greenwich  street 
through  Liberty  street,  under  the  East  River  to  Pine- 
apple street,  Brooklyn,  and  through  Pineapple  and  Ful- 
ton streets  to  a  junction  with  the  terminus  of  the  first 
subway,  and  an  extension  from  that  terminus  under  Flat- 
bush  Avenue  to  Eastern  Parkway  and  through  Eastern 
Parkway  to  Buffalo  Avenue;  also  an  extension  under 
Lafayette  Avenue  from  Flatbush  Avenue  to  Broadway, 
Brooklyn. 

Also  an  extension  of  the  first  subway  from  35th  street 
and  Park  Avenue  under  private  property  at  42d  street 
to  Lexington  Avenue  and  up  Lexington  Avenue  to  and 
under  the  Harlem  River  to  138th  street,  whence  one 
branch  would  run  to  a  connection  with  the  West  Farms 
branch  of  the  subway,  and  through  Mott  Avenue,  153d 
street,  and  River  Avenue  to  157th  street,  with  an  elevated 
extension  up  River  Avenue  to  162d  street  where  a  con- 
nection would  be  made  with  the  proposed  Jerome  Av- 
enue extension  of  the  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  railroad; 
another  branch  to  run  through  138th  street.  Southern 


PUBLIC   SEKVICE   COMMISSION    CREATED  223 

Boulevard  and  Whitlock  Avenue  to  Westchester  Avenue, 
continuing  as  an  elevated  road  over  Westchester  Avenue 
to  Pelham  Bay  Park. 

Also  an  elevated  extension  of  the  West  Farms  branch 
of  the  subway  from  its  terminus  at  180th  street  out  White 
Plains  Road  to  Gun  Hill  road,  where  it  would  connect 
with  the  proposed  extension  of  the  Third  Avenue  ele- 
vated line. 

It  was  also  proposed  that  the  company  should  turn 
over  to  the  City  the  Steinway  tunnel,  providing  the  City 
would  complete  it  at  a  cost  estimated  at  $1,500,000.  In- 
cluded in  the  offer  also  was  the  company's  previous  pro- 
posal to  add  a  third  track  to  the  Second,  Third  and  Ninth 
Avenue  elevated  lines  and  extend  the  Ninth  Avenue  line 
across  the  Harlem  River  and  up  Jerome  Avenue  to 
194th  street — all  at  its  own  expense. 

The  so-called  Steinway  tunnel  was  about  completed 
when  the  Public  Service  Commission  was  created  in  1907. 
It  was  projected  by  William  Steinway,  later  Rapid 
Transit  Commissioner,  who  got  a  charter  for  it  from 
the  Legislature.  This  charter  was  acquired  by  the  New 
York  and  Long  Island  Railroad  company,  the  stock  of 
which  was  acquired  by  the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit 
company,  which  supplied  most  of  the  funds  to  build  the 
line.  Its  charter  required  that  it  should  be  in  operation 
by  January  1,  1907,  but  it  was  not  completed  by  that 
date,  and  the  City  of  New  York  brought  suit  and  had  its 
franchise  to  operate  declared  void.  The  courts,  however, 
held  that  the  title  to  the  physical  property  remained  in 
the  trustees  of  the  New  York  and  Long  Island  Railroad 
company,  through  whom  the  Interborough  company  pro- 
posed to  turn  it  over  to  the  City  for  completion.  It  runs 
from  42d  street,  Manhattan,  from  a  point  between  Lex- 
ington and  Third  Avenues,  under  42d  street  and  the 
East  River  to  Jackson  and  Van  Alst  Avenues,  Long  Isl- 
and City,  in  Queens.  In  1908  the  Interborough  company 
placed  its  cost  up  to  that  time  at  about  $8,000,000.  This 
included  nearly  $900,000  paid  for  real  estate. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Dual  System  of  Rapid  Transit  Adopted  by  Commission 
AND  Board  of  Estimate. 

A  FTER  subjecting  the  Interborough  offer  of  Decem- 
ber,  1910,  to  rigid  scrutiny,  the  Commission  came  to 
the  conclusion  that,  with  some  slight  amendment,  it  would 
be  a  satisfactory  one  for  the  City  to  accept,  and  accord- 
ingly transmitted  a  copy  of  it  to  the  Board  of  Estimate 
and  Apportionment,  with  a  letter  indicating  the  Com- 
mission's attitude.  The  law  did  not  require  its  submis- 
sion to  the  Board  of  Estimate  in  advance  of  the  Com- 
mission's approval,  but  the  Commission  had  decided  to 
co-operate  with  the  City  government  in  all  ways  and 
desired  the  latter  to  be  thoroughly  informed  of  every 
step  taken  in  planning  for  rapid  transit  extensions  for 
which  the  City  would  have  to  pay.  It  went  further  and 
invited  the  Board  of  Estimate  to  confer  with  it 
and  to  participate  in  its  conferences  with  the  Inter- 
borough company.  The  invitation  was  accepted,  that 
Board,  as  before  mentioned,  designating  a  special  Com- 
mittee— Messrs.  McAneny,  Miller  and  Cromwell — to  rep- 
resent it.  Then  began  a  series  of  conferences  which  were 
to  culminate  in  the  adoption  of  the  Dual  System  of  Rapid 
Transit.  Results  showed  the  wisdom  of  this  conciliatory 
policy,  for  thereafter  both  boards  worked  with  perfect, 
mutual  understanding,  and  as  representatives  of  the  City 
presented  a  united  front  to  the  private  companies  seek- 
ing rapid  transit  franchises. 

These  conferences  started  with  only  the  offer  of  the 
Interborough  company  under  consideration,  but  before 
they  had  progressed  very  far  the  field  was  widened  by 
the  receipt  by  the  Commission  of  an  offer  from  the 
Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company,  which  operated  the 
elevated  railroads  in  Brooklyn  and  Queens,  to  equip  and 
operate  certain  new  subways  if  built  by  the  City,  both 


CITY  OFFICIALS  WHO  APPROVED  DUAL 
SYSTEM  CONTRACTS 

1.     William  J.  Gaynor,  Mayor  in  1913. 

2.  William  A.  Prendergast, 
Comptroller  in  1913. 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  225 

in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn,  provided  the  City  would 
give  it  the  rights  to  build  certain  extensions  of  and  addi- 
tions to  its  elevated  roads,  and  to  operate  all  of  them  as 
one  system. 

This  proposal  was  dated  March  2,  1911.  In  it  the 
Brooklyn  company  suggested  that  the  City  build,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  Tri-Borough  lines,  a  new  subway  running  from 
the  Battery  up  Church  street  to  Broadway,  up  Broadway 
to  42d  street  and  thence  up  Seventh  Avenue  to  Fifty- 
ninth  street,  with  an  extension  easterly  to  a  connection 
with  the  Queensborough  bridge;  also  that  the  City  con- 
struct another  tunnel  under  the  East  River  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  Battery  to  connect  with  the  proposed 
Broadway  subway  in  Manhattan  and  with  the  Fourth 
Avenue  subway  in  Brooklyn;  that  the  Fourth  Avenue 
subway  be  connected  with  four  rapid  transit  lines  extend- 
ing southward  and  eastward,  of  which  one  was  to  be  an 
extension  of  the  company's  Third  Avenue  elevated  line 
to  Fort  Hamilton,  another  a  four  track  elevated  railroad 
on  New  Utrecht  Avenue  from  39th  street  to  52d  street 
with  a  two  track  extension  from  there  over  the  old  West 
End  route  to  Coney  Island;  a  third  to  be  a  three  track 
elevated  railroad  over  the  Sea  Beach  railroad  right  of 
way  from  62d  street  to  Coney  Island  and  the  fourth  a 
two  track  elevated  road  over  the  old  Culver  line  down 
Gravesend  Avenue  from  Tenth  Avenue  to  Coney  Island 
— the  work  to  include  the  elimination  of  all  grade  cross- 
ings on  all  these  former  steam  railroads. 

It  was  also  proposed  that  the  City  build  a  tunnel  un- 
der New  York  Bay  to  connect  the  Fourth  Avenue  sub- 
way in  Brooklyn  with  Staten  Island;  also  that  the  Fourth 
Avenue  subway  be  extended  through  Flatbush  Avenue 
to  Prospect  Park  Circle,  there  dividing  into  two  branches, 
one  continuing  out  Flatbush  Avenue  to  a  connection  with 
the  Brighton  Beach  railroad  of  the  company's,  and  the 
other  out  Eastern  Parkway  to  Pitkin  Avenue,  with  an 
elevated  extension  from  that  point  to  a  connection  with 


226  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

the  former  Kings  County  Elevated  line  at  Snediker  Av- 
enue. 

The  company  also  asked  for  the  rights  for  a  third 
track  on  its  Fulton  street,  Broadway  and  Myrtle  Avenue 
elevated  railroads  and  to  build  the  following  extensions 
of  elevated  lines : 

An  extension  of  the  Kings  County  line  from  the  old 
City  Line  through  Queens  to  Jamaica;  a  connection  be- 
tween the  Myrtle  Avenue  and  Broadway  lines;  the  re- 
construction of  the  Lutheran  Cemetery  surface  line  as 
an  elevated  road;  and  a  new  elevated  line  from  the 
Williamsburg  to  the  Queensborough  bridge. 

The  company  also  asked  for  the  use  of  the  Centre 
Street  loop  subway  in  Manhattan  and  a  connection  be- 
tween both  Williamsburg  and  Manhattan  bridges  with 
the  new  Broadway  subway  in  Manhattan. 

The  proposal  suggested  that  the  City  should  build 
the  subways  and  that  the  company  should  equip  and 
operate  them,  upon  terms  to  be  agreed  upon,  in  con- 
nection with  its  elevated  railroads,  and  that  the  recon- 
struction and  extension  of  the  latter  should  be  paid  for 
by  the  company.  It  offered  to  accept  terms  ''not  less 
favorable  than  those  presented  in  any  other  offer  now 
under  consideration  by  your  Commission  and  the  Board 
of  Estimate  and  Apportionment." 

Probably  nothing  like  the  Dual  System  conferences 
ever  had  been  held  in  New  York  City  before,  and  certainly 
they  will  not  be  duplicated  in  the  near  future.  A  group 
of  ten  or  a  dozen  men  met  around  the  big  oak  table  in 
the  committee  room  of  the  Public  Service  Commission  on 
the  fourteenth  j9oor  of  the  Tribune  building  at  No.  154 
Nassau  Street — or  rather  on  the  thirteenth  floor,  for  the 
Tribune  skyscraper  is  one  of  the  few  big  office  buildings 
in  the  city  which  was  planned  with  deference  to  the  "13" 
superstition.  It  has  no  floor  numbered  13,  but  the  thir- 
teenth floor  is  numbered  14.  On  this  floor  the  offices  of 
the  Commissioners  and  Secretary  were  located,  and  the 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  227 

room  used  for  the  conferences  was  a  room  fronting  on 
Spruce  street  and  devoted  to  the  meetings  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  the  Whole.  If  its  old  oak  table  could  speak,  it 
would  tell  of  many  an  interesting  passage  in  the  famous 
negotiations  when  expenditures  of  hundreds  of  millions 
of  dollars  were  discussed  as  an  ordinary  business  con- 
ference would  discuss  those  of  a  few  thousands. 

Men  of  brains  and  financial  might  met  around  that 
conference  table.  At  the  head  sat  William  E.  Willcox, 
chairman  of  the  Commission,  usually  flanked  by  George 
McAneny,  chairman  of  the  Board  of  Estimate's  Com- 
mittee. Scattered  around  the  sides  were  the  other  Com- 
missioners, namely  William  McCarroll,  Edward  M.  Bas- 
sett,  Milo  R.  Maltbie  and  John  E.  Eustis;  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Board  of  Estimate  conunittee,  Cyrus  C.  Miller 
and  George  Cromwell;  the  representative  of  the  Inter- 
borough  company,  usually  Theodore  P.  Shonts,  its  presi- 
dent, infrequently  August  Belmont,  the  chairman  of  its 
Executive  Committee  and  often  Richard  Reid  Rogers, 
of  its  legal  staff.  After  the  Brookljrn  Rapid  Transit 
company  submitted  its  offer  its  president,  Col.  Timothy 
S.  Williams  and  its  counsel,  A.  M.  Williams  and  George 
D.  Yeomans  took  their  seats  at  the  conference  table.  A 
few  joint  conferences  were  held,  but  usually  Interbor- 
ough  matters  and  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  matters  were 
discussed  at  different  times.  And  many  a  battle  royal 
was  fought.  The  companies  were  bent  on  getting  the 
best  terms  they  could  out  of  the  City,  and  the  City's  rep- 
representatives  were  demanding  more  than  they 
could  get  from  the  companies.  So  keen  was  this 
competition  that  at  the  close,  while  each  side  felt  that  it 
had  made  a  good  bargain  it  also  felt  keen  regret  tha.t  it 
had  been  compelled  to  yield  so  much  to  the  other.  This 
was  well  illustrated  by  Mr.  Shonts  after  one  of  the  final 
conferences.  He  was  asked  if  his  company  had  conceded 
certain  points  to  the  City's  representatives  and  replied: 
'*I  was  fairly  well  dressed  when  I  went  into  that 


228  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

room,  but  they've  taken  away  everything  but  my 
shirt,  and  they  would  have  had  that  if  we  hadn't 
adjourned." 

The  entrance  of  the  Brooklyn  company  into  the  field 
was  w^elcomed  by  the  City.  For  some  time  the  Commis- 
sion had  been  trying  to  get  it  interested  in  rapid  transit 
extension,  but  the  old  management  of  the  company  was 
averse  to  it.  When  Timothy  S.  Williams  became  president, 
however,  its  policy  changed  and  he  welcomed  the  oppor- 
tunity which  the  plans  of  the  Public  Service  Commission 
afforded  to  expand  his  system.  His  participation  not 
only  introduced  competition  into  the  situation,  but  it 
gave  the  City  the  desired  opportunity  to  make  the  new 
system  really  comprehensive  by  fully  developing  the 
rapid  transit  field  in  Brooklyn  and  Queens  as  well  as  in 
Manhattan  and  the  Bronx.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the 
rejection  of  the  first  Interborough  proposition  was  that 
it  did  not  do  enough  for  Brooklyn,  and  the  appearance 
of  the  Brooklyn  company  provided  for  a  vast  expansion  of 
the  Brooklyn  lines. 

Within  six  months  after  the  conferences  began  all 
parties  had  agreed  to  the  fundamentals  of  a  scheme  for 
rapid  transit  construction  and  operation.  Considering 
the  vastness  of  the  project  and  the  conflicting  interests 
which  were  reconciled  and  joined  in  it,  it  was  little  short 
of  wonderful  that  any  agreement  at  all  was  reached  and 
truly  remarkable  that  it  had  been  reached  in  such  a  short 
time.  The  result  was  mainly  attributable  to  William  R. 
Willcox  and  George  McAneny,  who  were  the  leaders  of 
the  City's  forces. 

On  June  5,  1911,  the  City's  conferees  sent  to  the 
Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  a  report — now 
known  as  the  Joint  Report.  This  report  recommended 
that,  under  contracts  which  should  contain  terms  satis- 
factory to  the  City,  certain  new  rapid  transit  lines  should 
be  built  and  owned  by  the  City,  with  contributions  toward 


TRANSIT  COMMITTEE  OF  BOARD  OF 
ESTIMATE  AND  APPORTIONMENT 

1.  George  McAneny,  President,  Board  of  Aldermen; 

2.  George  Cromwell,  Borough  President  of  Richmond; 

3.  Cyrus  C.  Miller,  Borough  President  of  the  Bronx. 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  229 

construction  cost  by  the  Interborougli  and  Brooklyn  com- 
panies, and  that  some  of  them  should  be  leased  for  opera- 
tion to  the  former  and  some  to  the  latter.  The  fact  that 
two  companies  were  .to  be  concerned  caused  the  project 
to  become  known  as  the  Dual  Plan,  and  in  a  short  time  it 
was  appropriately  named  the  Dual  System  of  Rapid 
Transit. 

In  substance  this  Joint  Report  provided  that  the 
Brooklyn  company  should  operate  the  Fourth  Avenue 
subway  in  Brooklyn,  then  under  construction  by  the  City, 
the  Centre  street  loop  subway  in  Manhattan  already  built 
by  the  City,  and  a  new  subway  running  from  lower  Man- 
hattan up  Broadway  to  about  Fifty-ninth  street,  with 
proper  connections  with  the  BrookljTi  lines,  and  should 
make  certain  extensions  of  its  elevated  roads  in  Brooklyn 
and  Queens,  the  whole  system  to  be  linked  together  and 
operated  under  contract  with  the  City  for  a  five  cent  fare. 

It  also  provided  that  the  Interborough  company 
should  operate  the  various  extensions  of  the  first  sub- 
way, to  be  built  jointly  by  the  City  and  the  company — 
each  contributing  half  the  cost,  but  the  ownership  to 
remain  in  the  City.  These  extensions  included  practically 
all  of  the  Tri-Borough  system  north  of  Forty-second 
street,  Manhattan,  a  line  down  Seventh  Avenue  from 
Times  Square,  a  new  tunnel  under  the  East  River  and 
the  extension  of  the  first  subw^ay  through  Eastern  Park- 
way, Brooklyn,  to  Buffalo  Avenue,  thence  by  elevated 
extension  through  East  98th  street  and  Livonia  Avenue 
to  New  Lots  Road,  with  a  branch  down  Nostrand  Avenue ; 
all  of  these  extensions  to  be  operated  under  contract  with 
the  City  as  a  part  of  the  first  subway  and  for  a  five  cent 
fare.  In  addition  it  was  provided  that  the  Interborough 
with  its  own  money  should  add  a  third  track  to  the  Sec- 
ond, Third  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  lines  and  build 
certain  extensions  of  those  lines;  also  that  the  company 
should  turn  over  to  the  City  the  Steinway  tunnel  and 
operate  it  as  part  of  the  subway. 


230  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TKANSIT 

The  report  laid  down  certain  terms  to  which  each  of 
the  companies  must  agree  if  the  City  were  to  undertake 
the  building  of  the  lines  proposed.  Among  them  were: 
that  the  rate  of  fare  on  each  company's  system,  including 
transfers,  must  be  five  cents;  that  the  term  of  lease  for 
the  City-owned  subway  lines  should  be  forty-nine  years ; 
that  the  City  have  the  right  of  recaption  at  any  time  after 
ten  years;  that  the  City  should  share  equally  with  the 
companies  in  the  surplus  profits  of  all  lines  owned  by  the 
City;  that  the  City  should  retain  the  right  of  supervision 
over  all  contracts  and  over  the  accounting  systems.  It 
was  also  proposed  that  the  existing  leases  of  the  Inter- 
borough  company  for  the  first  subway  should  be  *' lev- 
eled" so  as  to  expire  at  the  same  time  as  the  new"  leases. 
The  City  was  also  to  share  equally  with  the  Interborough 
company  in  the  net  profits  of  the  elevated  lines  in  excess 
of  the  average  net  profits  on  existing  lines  for  the  two 
years  from  July  1,  1909,  to  June  30,  1911. 

It  was  also  provided  that  a  ''preferential"  payment 
out  of  the  earnings  should  be  made  to  the  Brooklyn  com- 
pany to  represent  "its  net  profits  from  operation  of  the 
existing  lines  included  in  the  agreement"  as  of  the  year 
ending  June  30,  1911. 

Under  the  proposed  agreements  the  Joint  Eeport  esti- 
mated the  division  of  cost  as  follows : 

For  construction— By  the  City  $123,200,000;  by  the 
Interborough  $54,800,000;  by  the  Brooklyn  company 
$26,400,000— a  total  of  $204,400,000. 

For  equipment— By  the  Interborough  $21,000,000 ;  by 
the  Brooklyn  company  $24,000,000— a  total  of  $45,000,000. 
This  made  the  cost  of  the  entire  system  $249,400,000. 

The  Joint  Eeport  which  was  approved  by  the  Board  of 
Estimate  and  Apportionment,  provided  that,  if  either 
company  refused  to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  the  City, 
the  lines  allotted  to  it  should  be  offered  to  the  other  com- 
pany upon  the  same  terms.  This  provision  unexpectedly 
came  into  use,  for  the  Interborough  company  refused  to 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  231 

accept  the  terms  laid  down  in  the  Joint  Report  and  on 
July  21,  1911,  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment 
formally  notified  the  Public  Service  Commission  that  it 
would  approve  contracts  for  the  construction  of  the  new 
subways  provided  for  in  the  Joint  Report,  all  for  opera- 
tion by  the  Brooklyn  company,  which  had  signified  its 
willingness  to  take  the  lines  offered  to  the  Interborough 
comjDany  in  addition  to  its  own  allotment. 

This  led  to  the  immediate  beginning  of  construction. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Commission  had  received 
bids  on  October  27,  1910,  for  the  construction  of  certain 
sections  of  the  Lexington  Avenue  subway  in  Manhattan. 
Now  the  Commission  communicated  with  some  of  the 
lowest  bidders  on  such  sections  and  found  them  still  will- 
ing to  accept  the  contracts  on  the  figures  then  submitted. 
Accordingly  the  Commission  proceeded  to  execute  four 
contracts  with  the  Bradley  Contracting  Company,  the 
lowest  bidder  for  as  many  sections  of  the  Lexington  Av- 
enue line.  The  aw^ards  were  made  on  July  5,  1911,  just 
one  month  after  the  Joint  Report  had  been  submitted  to 
the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment.  They  were 
for  the  construction  of  a  four  track  subway  on  Sections 
6,  8,  10  and  11  of  Route  No.  5,  the  Broadway — Lexington 
Avenue  line,  covering  the  following  parts : 

Section  6,  from  26th  street  to  40th  street;  Section  8, 
from  53d  street  to  67th  street;  Section  10,  from  79th 
street  to  93d  street;  Section  11,  from  93d  street  to  106th 
street.  The  total  contract  prices  for  these  four  sections 
were  $13,388,965.55. 

The  four  contracts  were  approved  by  the  Board  of 
Estimate  and  Apportionment  on  July  21,  1911,  and  on 
July  31  ground  was  broken  at  Sixty-second  street  and 
Lexington  Avenue  with  appropriate  ceremonies  and  in 
the  presence  of  thousands  of  citizens.  The  first  shovel- 
full  of  earth  was  turned  by  William  R.  Willcox,  chairman 
of  the  Commission,  and  addresses  were  made  by  him, 
George  McAneny  and  others. 


232  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

As  fast  as  the  Public  Service  engineers  turned  out 
the  plans  the  Commission  awarded  construction  con- 
tracts for  other  sections  of  the  work,  on  the  understand- 
ing that  the  Brooklyn  company  was  to  be  the  operator. 
On  August  1  the  contract  for  Section  12  of  the  Lexington 
Avenue  subway  was  awarded  to  the  Oscar  Daniels  Com- 
pany for  $2,825,740.74;  on  October  10  the  contract  for 
Section  15  of  the  same  line  to  the  Hagerty-Drunmiond 
Company  for  $3,820,129.75;  on  October  31  the  contract 
for  Section  13  to  the  Bradley  Contracting  Company  for 
$4,071,416.50;  on  December  8  the  contract  for  Section  9 
to  the  Patrick  McGovern  Company  for  $1,961,997.  This 
placed  under  contract  all  of  the  Lexington  Avenue  line 
from  53d  street  to  157th  street,  except  the  tunnels  under 
the  Harlem  River  (Section  14)  which  were  let  in  May 
1912  to  Arthur  McMullen  and  Olaf  Hoff  for  $3,889,775.05. 

Three  of  the  Broadway  sections  of  the  same  line  were 
placed  under  contract  early  in  1912.  In  January  the 
Commission  awarded  the  contract  for  Section  3,  in 
Broadway  between  Howard  and  Bleecker  streets  to  the 
Underpinning  and  Foundation  Company  for  $2,295,- 
086.50 ;  the  contract  for  Section  2,  between  Murray  street 
and  Canal  street  to  the  Degnon  Contracting  Company 
for  $2,355,828.50,  and  in  March  the  contract  for  Section 
2A,  between  Canal  and  Howard  streets,  to  the  O'Rourke 
Engineering  Construction  Company  for  $912,351.60. 
Thus  in  nine  months  after  the  Interborough  had  with- 
drawn from  the  field  the  Commission  had  let  contracts 
aggregating  more  than  $35,000,000. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Interborough  company,  how- 
ever, was  not  permanent.  During  the  winter  of  1911  and 
1912  overtures  were  made  to  the  Commission  by  Samuel 
Pea,  then  Vice-President  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
Company,  for  a  resumption  of  negotiations  with  the  In- 
terborough company,  for  the  reason  that  the  Seventh 
Avenue  subway  if  built  would  tap  the  Pennsylvania  sta- 
tion at  33d  street  and  for  the  benefit  of  his  patrons  Mr. 


RAILROAD  PRESIDENTS  WHO  SIGNED  DUAL 

SYSTEM  CONTRACTS 
1.     Timothy  S.  Williams,  New  York  Municipal 
Railway  Corporation.      2.     Theodore  P.  ShontS, 
Interborough  Rapid  Transit  Company. 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  233 

Eea  wanted  that  line  to  connect  with  the  first  subway, 
instead  of  with  the  Brooklyn  lines.  Accordingly  con- 
ferences with  the  Interborough  company  were  resumed, 
and  on  February  27, 1912  it  submitted  a  new  offer,  which 
was  approved  by  the  Public  Service  Commission  and  the 
special  committee  of  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Appor- 
tionment. As  the  Brooklyn  company  was  willing  to  fore- 
go its  assumption  of  the  Interborough  lines  of  the  Dual 
System,  the  committee  on  May  22,  1912  submitted  to  the 
Board  of  Estimate  a  report  approving  the  last  Inter- 
borough offer.  This  report  gave  to  the  Interborough 
for  operation  the  lines  alloted  to  it  in  the  Joint  Report 
of  1911  upon  similar  but  somewhat  modified  terms.  The 
supplemental  report  was  adopted  by  the  Board  of  Esti- 
mate, which  notified  the  Commission  that  it  would  ap- 
prove contracts  with  the  two  companies  drawn  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  the  report. 

Meanwhile  the  Legislature  was  asked  to  amend  the 
Rapid  Transit  Act  so  as  to  permit  the  City  to  enter  into 
the  proposed  contracts,  or  rather  to  clear  up  certain  pro- 
visions which  left  doubt  as  to  the  powers  of  the  City. 
These  amendments  were  incorporated  in  the  Wagner 
Bill,  which  was  passed  by  the  1912  session  and  approved 
by  the  Governor. 

There  was  also  an  appeal  to  the  courts.  The  Inter- 
borough and  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  companies  had 
sought  the  aid  of  bankers  to  raise  the  large  amounts  of 
money  which  would  be  needed  to  finance  the  new  under- 
takings should  agreements  be  reached  with  the  City,  and 
the  bankers,  at  least  J.  P.  Morgan  and  Company  to  whom 
the  Interborough  had  applied,  insisted  that  there  should 
be  a  judicial  approval  of  the  proposed  contracts  before 
they  would  agree  to  finance  them.  Accordingly  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1912,  an  action  for  injunction  was  brought  by  the 
Admiral  Realty  Company  to  restrain  the  Public  Service 
Commission,  the  Board  of  Estimate  land  Apportionment 
and  the  two  transportation  companies  from  entering  into 


234  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TEAXSIT 

the  proposed  contracts.  Similar  actions  were  brought  by 
John  E.  Eyon  and  John  J.  Hopper,  taxpayers.  The  three 
actions  were  heard  together  and  progressed  as  one  case 
through  the  courts. 

The  defendants  demurred  to  the  complaints  and  the 
first  argument,  made  before  Supreme  Court  Justice  Abel 
E.  Blackmar  was  upon  the  demurrer.  The.chief  arguments 
were  made  by  Daniel  P.  Hays,  of  Hays,  Hershfield  and 
Wolff  for  the  Admiral  Realty  Company;  by  Clarence  J. 
Shearn  for  John  J.  Hopper;  by  Willard  N.  Baylis  for 
John  R.  Ryon;  by  George  S.  Coleman  for  the  Public  Serv- 
ice Commission;  by  Louis  H.  Hahlo,  Assistant  Corpora- 
tion Counsel,  for  the  City;  by  Richard  Reid  Rogers  for 
the  Interborough  company  and  by  Charles  A.  Collin  for 
the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company. 

All  the  complaints  alleged  that  the  proposed  contracts 
would  violate  the  constitution  of  the  State  of  Xew  York 
for  two  main  reasons : 

First — That  the  proposed  provisions  for  preferential 
payments  to  the  companies  out  of  the  earnings  of  a  rapid 
ti^ansit  railroad  owned  by  the  City  would  constitute  a 
loan  of  the  City's  credit  in  violation  of  that  part  of  Sec- 
tion 10  of  Article  VIII  of  the  constitution  reading : 

"No  county,  city,  town  or  village  shall  hereafter 
give  any  money  or  property,  or  loan  its  money  or 
credit  to  or  in  aid  of  any  individual,  association  or 
corporation,  or  become  directly  or  indirectly  the 
owner  of  stock  in,  or  bonds  of,  any  association  or 
corporation ;  nor  shall  any  county,  city,  town  or  vil- 
lage be  allowed  to  incur  any  indebtedness  except  for 
county,  city,  town  or  village  purposes.    *    *    *" 

Second — That  the  Rapid  Transit  Act,  by  virtue  of 
which  the  proposed  contracts  would  be  made,  is  a  local 
act  and  therefore  in  conflict  with  that  part  of  Section  18 
of  Article  III  of  the  constitution  which  says : 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  235 

''The  Legislature  shall  not  pass  a  private  or  local 
•^'^11  *  *  *  granting  to  any  corporation  or  indi- 
vidual the  right  to  lay  down  railroad  tracks    *    *    *  " 

In  the  arguments  and  briefs  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ants relied  largely  on  the  decision  of  Judge  Haight  in  the 
famous  case  of  the  Sun  Publishing  Company  against  the 
Mayor  of  New  York,  before  alluded  to,  brought  to  re- 
strain the  building  of  the  first  subway.  In  that  case  the 
court  held  that  the  constitutional  provision  invoked 
"should  be  construed  with  reference  to  the  evils  it  v/as 
intended  to  correct",  and  that  the  provision  "was  not 
intended  to  nor  does  it  prohibit  municipalities  from  con- 
structing their  own  roads  and  paying  therefor  when 
necessary  and  authorized  by  the  Legislature."  Other 
cases  also  were  cited.  The  Supreme  Court  sustained  this 
view  in  the  Admiral  Realty  and  allied  cases,  for  on  April 
3,  1912,  Judge  Blackmar  upheld  the  demurrer  and  held 
the  proposed  contracts  constitutional.  The  cases  were 
appealed,  but  the  decision  was  affirmed  both  by  the  Ap- 
pellate Division  and  by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  the  decision 
of  the  latter  being  handed  down  on  June  29,  1912. 

Within  the  next  seven  months  the  Public  Service  Com- 
mission did  a  monumental  piece  of  work  in  preparing  and 
getting  the  assent  of  the  two  companies  to  the  Dual  Sys- 
tem contracts.  This  work  was  done  mainly  by  the  law 
department  of  the  Commission,  and  the  formulating  and 
actual  drafting  of  the  important  agreements  was  the  work 
of  Assistant  Counsel  LeRoy  T.  Harkness. 

While  the  drafting  of  the  contracts  was  under  way  a 
political  change  in  the  State  government  occurred,  which 
later  had  a  bearing  on  the  Dual  System  contracts.  In  the 
election  of  that  year  (1912)  William  Sulzer,  Democrat, 
was  elected  Governor,  succeeding  John  A.  Dix.  Dix,  who 
was  elected  in  1910,  was  also  a  Democrat,  and  during  his 
term  of  office  the  terms  of  two  of  the  Public  Service  Com- 
missioners  expired — Edward  M.  Bassett  and  William 


236  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

McCarroll,  the  former  a  Democrat,  the  latter  a  Republi- 
can. Dix  appointed  Democrats  to  succeed  both,  J.  Ser- 
geant Cram  in  Bassett's  place  and  George  V.  S.  "Williams 
to  succeed  McCarroll.  Shortly  after  Sulzer  was  inaug- 
urated the  term  of  William  R.  Willcox,  Republican  and 
chairman  of  the  Commission  from  the  beginning,  expired, 
and  the  Governor  named  Edward  E.  McCall,  a  Democrat, 
and  a  Supreme  Court  judge,  to  succeed  him. 

Willcox,  who  had  done  so  much  to  bring  about  the 
Dual  System  agreement,  desired  to  complete  the  con- 
tracts and  execute  them  before  retiring  from  office.  In 
this  wholly  natural  ambition  he  had  the  cordial  support 
of  the  Commission  staff,  which  worked  night  and  day  to 
whip  the  contracts  into  final  shape  and  get  them  approved 
by  the  two  traction  companies.  Conferences  were  held 
morning,  noon  and  night,  sometimes  at  the  Commission 
offices,  sometimes  at  the  Chairman's  house  and  finally  at 
rooms  hired  for  the  purpose  in  the  Manhattan  Hotel  at 
42d  street  and  Madison  Avenue.  At  this  hotel  the  final 
touches  were  given,  the  proofs  from  the  printer  read  and 
passed  by  the  Commission  and  representatives  of  the 
companies. 

Meanwhile  a  storm  of  attack  and  public  criticism 
raged  about  the  heads  of  the  Commissioners.  Certain 
newspapers  denounced  the  contracts  as  vicious,  de- 
clared the  terms  unduly  favorable  to  the  compa- 
nies and  correspondingly  bad  for  the  City  and  urged 
on  the  Governor  the  appointment  in  Willcox 's  place  of  a 
man  who  would  upset  the  proposed  agreements.  And 
they  received  a  measure  of  support,  although  there  is 
little  question  that  popular  opinion  was  largely  in  favor 
of  the  contracts.  In  official  life  Milo  R.  Maltbie,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Commission,  and  John  Purroy  Mitchel,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  Aldermen  and  a  member  of  the 
Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment,  opposed  certain 
of  the  terms  and  finally  the  whole  contracts. 

It  was  in  such  an  atmosphere  that  Willcox  worked  dur- 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN"  ADOPTED  237 

ing  the  month  of  January,  1913,  to  get  the  contracts  ap- 
proved. In  spite  of  the  strong  opposition  he  felt  certain 
of  a  favorable  vote  both  in  the  Commission  and  in  the 
Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  if  he  could  once 
get  the  contracts  printed  in  a  form  that  would  be  accep- 
table to  all  parties  to  them.  And  after  all  it  was  a 
mechanical  obstacle  which  turned  the  scale.  The  final 
proofs  were  approved  at  the  Manhattan  Hotel  at  two 
o'clock  one  morning  in  January,  1913,  and  orders 
were  given  the  printer  to  go  ahead.  It  was  then  found 
that  the  press  capacity  of  the  printer  who  had  set  all  the 
type  was  so  limited  that  it  would  take  a  week  or  more  for 
him  to  turn  out  the  completed  copies.  A  printer  with  the 
largest  press  rooms  in  the  City  was  communicated  with 
by  telephone,  in  the  small  hours  of  the  morning,  and  it 
was  arranged  that  he  should  get  the  type  of  most  of  the 
contracts  from  the  first  printer  and  do  the  press  work. 
The  type  was  transferred  the  next  day,  and  the  presses 
began  humming,  but  it  was  too  late.  The  opposition, 
fearing  Willcox's  success,  got  out  an  injunction  to  pre- 
vent the  approval  of  the  contracts  by  the  Commission. 
John  J.  Hopper  brought  a  tax-payer's  action  to  re- 
strain the  Commission  from  approving  the  contracts,  on 
the  ground,  among  others,  that  they  involved  a  waste  of 
public  funds.  This  proceeding  effectually  tied  the  hands 
of  the  Commission  and  prevented  approval  of  the  con- 
tracts before  Willcox's  term  expired  on  February  1, 1913. 
On  February  3  following  Governor  Sulzer  appointed 
Edward  E.  McCall,  then  serving  as  a  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  in  the  First  District,  to  succeed  Willcox. 
Judge  McCall  did  not  wish  to  leave  the  bench,  but  yielded 
to  urging  and  accepted  the  new  appointment,  which  was 
immediately  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  While  the  Hopper 
case  was  pending  he  entered  upon  a  study  of  the  subway 
contracts,  and  in  a  few  weeks  after  his  appointment  the 
Court  dismissed  the  application  for  an  injunction,  leav- 
ing the  Commission  free  to  act.     Upon  the  request  of 


238  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Clarence  J.  Shearn,  attorney  for  Hopper,  the  Com- 
mission, which  under  Willcox  had  held  the  public 
hearings  required  by  the  statute  in  January,  called  addi- 
tional public  hearings,  which  were  held  at  the  City  Hall 
during  the  month  of  February,  and  at  which  all  opponents 
of  the  Dual  System  contracts  had  another  chance  to  be 
heard.  At  these  hearings  John  Purroy  Mitchel,  after- 
wards Mayor,  opposed  the  contracts  and  George  Mc- 
Aneny  defended  them. 

A  hitch  occurred  in  February  over  one  of  the  contracts 
— ^the  certificate  to  the  Manhattan  Eailway  Company 
granting  the  rights  to  build  and  operate  additional  tracks 
on  the  elevated  railroads  in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx 
owned  by  that  company  but  under  lease  for  999  years  to 
the  Interborough  company.  The  Manhattan  company 
was  controlled  by  George  J.  Gould,  the  son  of  Jay  Gould, 
and  he  and  his  board  of  directors  objected  to  the  terms 
of  the  certificate.  In  this  emergency  the  Commission 
drafted  a  new  certificate  made  out  to  the  Interborough 
company,  the  lessee,  conveying  the  identical  rights  in  the 
same  terms  to  which  the  Manhattan  company  objected. 
A  public  hearing  on  this  certificate  was  called  for  March 
15,  but  before  that  date  the  Manhattan  Company  and  the 
Interborough  Company  came  to  an  agreement,  by  which 
the  former  agreed  to  accept  the  certificate  and  the  latter 
to  increase  the  amount  allowed  the  Manhattan  Company 
under  the  999  year  lease  for  office  expenses  etc.  When 
the  hearing  was  held  this  inter-company  settlement  was 
announced,  and  the  Commission  took  no  further  action 
on  the  certificate  drafted  for  the  Interborough  Company. 
AVhile  this  certificate  rests  today  among  the  forgotten 
documents  of  the  Commission,  it  probably  was  a  potent 
factor  in  changing  the  Manhattan  Company's  attitude. 

Meanwhile  the  Commission  went  ahead  with  the  other 
contracts.  On  March  4,  1913,  the  day  President  Wilson 
was  inaugurated,  it  formally  adopted  the  two  operating 
contracts   and  the   several  certificates  and  transmitted 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  239 

them  to  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  for 
approval.    These  contracts  were: 

Operating  contract  with  Interborough  company,  pro- 
viding for  construction  by  the  City,  with  a  contribution 
from  the  company,  and  operation  by  the  company  of  the 
Lexington  Avenue,  Seventh  Avenue,  Eastern  Parkway 
and  other  subway  lines. 

Operating  contract  with  the  New  York  Municipal  Rail- 
way Corporation  a  new  company  formed  by  the  Brooklyn 
Rapid  Transit  interests  to  enter  into  the  Dual  System 
agreements,  for  the  construction  by  the  City,  with  a  con- 
tribution by  the  Company,  and  for  operation  by  the  com- 
pany of  the  Broadway,  the  Fourth  Avenue,  the  Canal 
Street,  the  Fourteenth  Street  and  the  Centre  Street  Loop 
subway  lines. 

Certificate  to  the  Interborough  company  granting 
rights  to  build  and  operate  extensions  of  the  Second, 
Third  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  lines. 

Certificate  to  the  New  York  Municipal  Railway  Cor- 
poration granting  rights  to  build  and  operate  elevated 
extensions  of  the  Jamaica  Avenue,  Liberty  Avenue  and 
Luthern  Cemetery  lines. 

Certificate  to  the  New  York  Municipal  Railway  Cor- 
poration granting  rights  to  build  and  operate  additional 
tracks  on  the  Fulton  Street,  Broadway  and  Myrtle  Avenue 
elevated  lines. 

Trackage  agreement  between  Interborough  and  New 
York  Municipal  companies  for  operation  of  trains  of 
latter  over  the  new  rapid  transit  lines  in  Queens  to  be 
leased  to  the  Interborough  company  by  the  City. 

Trackage  agreement  between  the  City  and  the  two 
companies  for  joint  use  of  such  lines  by  the  two  com- 
XJanies. 

The  Commission  was  divided  in  the  adoption  of  these 
instruments.  The  vote  on  the  two  operating  contracts 
and  on  the  trackage  agreements  was  three  to  two,  those 
in  the  affirmative  being  Chairman  Edward  E.  McCall, 


240  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TEAKSIT 

Commissioners  John  E.  Eustis  and  George  V.  S.  Williams; 
the  negative,  Commissioners  Milo  E.  Maltbie  and  J.  Ser- 
geant Cram.  On  the  certificates  for  extensions  and  third 
tracking  the  vote  was  four  to  one,  Commissioner  Milo  R. 
Maltbie  alone  voting  in  the  negative. 

After  the  hearing  on  March  15  the  Commission  form- 
ally adopted  the  certificate  to  the  Manhattan  Railway 
Company  for  the  third  tracking  privileges  by  a  vote  of 
three  to  one.  Commissioner  Milo  R.  Maltbie  casting  the 
negative  vote  and  Commissioner  J.  Sergeant  Cram  being 
absent.  On  the  same  day  it  was  transmitted  for  approval 
to  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment.  On  March 
18  the  Commission  sent  to  the  Board  of  Estimate  requisi- 
tions for  the  appropriations  needed  to  carry  out  the  con- 
tracts, namely:  For  the  Interborough  contract  $28,200,000 
in  addition  to  $35,135,637.84  previously  registered  on 
account  of  contracts  already  let;  and  for  the  New  York 
Municipal  contract  $60,000,000  in  addition  to  $40,501,991 
previously  registered  on  account  of  contracts  already 
awarded.  On  the  same  day  the  Board  of  Estimate  ap- 
proved the  contracts  and  granted  the  requisitions. 

On  the  next  day,  March  19,  1913,  the  Commission  met 
in  public  session  in  its  large  hearing  room  on  the  third 
floor  of  the  Tribune  building,  and  in  the  presence  of  many 
citizens,  including  members  of  the  Board  of  Estimate 
and  other  City  officials,  executed  the  contracts.  Theodore 
P.  Shouts,  president,  Frank  Hedley,  vice-president  and 
H.  M.  Fisher,  Secretary  of  the  Interborough  company 
signed  for  that  company;  D.  W.  McWilliams,  Secretary, 
and  E.  T.  Jeffery,  director,  for  the  Manhattan  Railway 
Company;  Timothy  S.  Williams,  president  and  H.  A. 
Bullock,  Secretary,  for  the  New  York  Municipal  Railway 
Corporation. 

For  the  City  the  contracts  were  signed  by  Edward  E. 
McCall,  Chairman  and  Travis  H.  Whitney,  Secretary  of 
the  Public  Service  Commission  for  the  First  District. 
Chairman  McCall  performed  a  graceful  act  by  requesting 


nvM 


^   ^    ^CAJ 


DUAL  SYSTEM  PLAN  ADOPTED  241 

William  R.  Willcox,  his  predecessor  in  the  chairmanship, 
to  attest  his  signature,  which  he  did,  so  that,  though  Mr. 
Willcox  could  not  sign  as  chairman,  his  name  nevertheless 
appeared  on  the  contracts  he  did  so  much  to  bring  about. 
The  same  compliment  was  paid  George  McAneny,  who  al- 
so attested  the  Chairman's  signature  on  the  same 
documents.  Each  company  then  submitted  to  the  Com- 
mission for  approval  a  mortgage  upon  all  its  property 
and  an  application  to  issue  bonds  under  it.  The  Inter- 
borough  mortgage  was  for  $300,000,000  and  its  proposed 
bond  issue  $160,957,000 ;  that  of  the  New  York  Municipal 
company  $100,000,000  and  its  proposed  bond  issue 
$40,000,000.  The  Commission  approved  both  mortgages 
and  both  bond  issues. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

Extent,  Importance  and  Cost  of  the  Dual  System  of 
Rapid  Transit. 

npO  appreciate  the  extent  and  importance  of  the  Dual 
System  one  must  know  the  limitations  of  the  exist- 
ing rapid  transit  lines  at  the  time  the  agreements  were 
made.  Outside  of  the  Hudson  tunnels,  or  McAdoo  tubes, 
the  rapid  transit  facilities  of  the  city  w^ere  divided  be- 
tween the  Interborough  Eapid  Transit  Company  and  the 
Brooklyn  Eapid  Transit  Company.  The  former  operated 
the  first  subway  in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx  with  a 
short  branch  to  BrookljTi  and  the  elevated  railroads  in 
Manhattan  and  the  Bronx;  the  latter  the  elevated  rail- 
roads in  Brooklyn  and  Queens  boroughs.  It  was  these 
two  companies  that  joined  the  City  in  the  Dual  System 
agreements,  and  those  agreements  provided  for  the  ampli- 
fication and  extension  of  the  lines  of  both. 

The  Interborough  company  controlled  and  operated 
73  miles  of  single  track  in  the  City  subway,  and  118  miles 
of  single  track  on  its  elevated  roads.  The  Dual  System 
provided  additional  City-owned  lines  to  the  extent  of 
149  miles  of  single  track  subway  and  elevated  railroad; 
elevated  railroad  extensions  of  ten  miles  of  single  track 
and  additional  tracks  on  such  roads  amounting  to  ten 
miles  more.  In  other  words  the  single  track  mileage  of 
the  Interborough  system  was  to  be  increased  from  191 
to  360  miles. 

At  the  same  time  the  Brooklyn  company  controlled 
and  operated  105  miles  of  single  track  on  its  elevated 
railroads.  The  Dual  System  added  to  this  110  miles  of 
single  track  in  new  City-owned  lines  and  35  miles  of 
single  track  extensions  of  the  elevated  roads,  together 
with  nearly  ten  miles  of  additional  tracks.  This  increased 
the  company's  single  track  mileage  from  105  to  260.  Tak- 
ing both  companies  together  the  total  single  track  mileage 


EXTENT  AND  COST   OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  243 

of  the  Dual  System  is  620,  against  a  prior  existing  mileage 
of  296. 

The  new  contracts,  therefore,  provided  for  more  than 
doubling  the  existing  rapid  transit  mileage — an  increase 
never  before  attained  or  even  contemplated.  In  the  past 
the  rapid  transit  system  had  been  a  slow,  natural  growth. 
First  came  the  elevated  railroads,  which  served  the  needs 
of  the  city  for  twenty  years ;  then  the  first  subway,  which 
with  the  elevated  roads  met  all  demands  after  a  fashion 
for  the  next  ten  years.  Then  came  the  Dual  System, 
which  promised  to  more  than  double  all  that  had  gone 
before  for  thirty  years  in  the  short  space  of  time  needed 
to  build  it,  estimated  at  five  years !  Even  now,  with  the 
Dual  System  approaching  completion,  there  are  com- 
paratively few"  w^ho  realize  the  extent  of  the  traffic  revolu- 
tion it  will  bring  about.  It  is  probable  that  it  will  cause 
a  great  shifting  in  the  tides  of  travel,  and  that  may  mean 
a  shifting  of  centers  of  importance,  with  resultant  effect 
on  real  estate  values. 

Single  track  mileage  is  taken  as  the  unit  of  compari- 
son here  because  it  is  the  true  test  of  a  railroad's  capac- 
ity. While  the  total  of  such  new  trackage  will  be  about 
324  miles,  the  actual  length  of  new  road  will  be  only  about 
90  miles.  This  is  because  some  of  the  new  lines  will  have 
six,  some  four,  some  three  and  some  two  tracks.  Of 
course  there  will  be  no  single  track  roads.  The  double 
track  line  is  the  smallest  unit  permissible  in  a  large  city, 
and  where  express  service  is  desired  three  or  four  tracks 
are  required. 

In  the  selection  of  routes  for  the  new  lines  the  aim 
was  to  provide  needed  extensions  for  existing  lines  and 
to  build  new  lines  into  sections  either  w^holly  without  or 
lacking  in  rapid  transit  faciities.  In  the  Interborough 
territory  the  City's  first  concern  was  to  provide  exten- 
sions for  its  ovm  subway.  This  subway  ran  the  length 
of  Manhattan  Island  in  zig-zag  fashion — from  the  Bat- 
tery up  the  East  Side  to  42d  street,  then  across  town  to 


244  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Broadway  and  up  the  West  Side  to  242d  street  with  a 
branch  out  Lenox  Avenue  and  other  streets  to  Bronx 
Park  at  180th  street.  It  was  decided  to  extend  the  East 
Side  line  to  the  north  and  the  West  Side  part  to  the  south 
so  as  to  make  two  subways  instead  of  one — a  complete 
line  up  and  down  the  East  Side  and  a  complete  line  up 
and  down  the  West  Side.  This  was  done  by  extending 
the  first  subway  from  42d  street  at  the  Grand  Central 
terminal  over  to  Lexington  Avenue  and  up  Lexington 
Avenue  to  the  Harlem  Eiver;  and  by  extending  it  from 
42d  street  at  Broadway  down  Seventh  Avenue  and  other 
streets  to  the  Battery.  These  additions  alone  mean  two 
complete,  four  track  subways  up  and  down  the  length  of 
Manhattan  Island — a  virtual  doubling  of  the  existing 
road. 

As  adopted  the  Lexington  Avenue  line  begins  in  Park 
Avenue  at  about  40th  street,  where  it  leaves  the  first  sub- 
way. It  runs  thence  under  private  property  (the  site  of 
the  old  Grand  Union  hotel)  and  diagonally  across  42d 
street  to  the  New  York  Central  property  at  the  northwest 
corner  of  Lexington  Avenue  and  Forty-second  street,  and 
under  that  property  to  Lexington  Avenue  at  about  43d 
street.  The  line  then  runs  up  Lexington  Avenue  to  the 
Harlem  River,  and  under  this  river  by  tunnels  to  a  point 
near  135th  street.  For  this  entire  stretch,  a  distance  of 
nearly  one  hundred  blocks,  it  is  a  four-track  road. 

At  135th  street  the  road  forks  into  two  branches,  each 
having  three  tracks.  The  one  to  the  West  runs  up  Mott 
and  River  Avenues  to  Jerome  Avenue  and  up  Jerome  Ave- 
nue to  Woodlawn  Road.  At  157th  street  and  River  Ave- 
nue the  underground  part  ends  and  the  line  continues  as 
an  elevated  road  up  Jerome  Avenue. 

The  branch  to  the  East  runs  through  138th  street  to 
Southern  Boulevard,  through  Southern  Boulevard  to 
Whitlock  Avenue  and  out  Westchester  Avenue  to  Pelham 
Bay  Park.    It  is  a  subway  to  Whitlock  Avenue,  where 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  245 

it  crosses  the  Bronx  River  by  bridge  and  continues  out 
AVestchester  Avenue  as  an  elevated  railroad. 

While  these  two  branches  provided  for  the  territory 
tributary  to  Jerome  Avenue  on  the  West  and  for  that  in 
the  extreme  East  of  Bronx  borough,  they  did  nothing  for 
the  intermediate  ground.  It  was  therefore  decided  to 
extend  the  Lenox  Avenue  branch  of  the  first  subway  from 
its  terminus  at  180th  street,  Bronx  Park,  through  private 
property  to  White  Plains  Road  and  up  White  Plains 
Road  to  241st  street,  near  the  northerly  city  boundary. 
This  is  an  elevated  railroad  with  three  tracks. 

These  improvements  w^ere  wisely  correlated  with  the 
improvements  of  the  company's  elevated  railroads  in  the 
Bronx,  for  which  the  contracts  provided.  Plans  were 
made  to  connect  the  new  lines  so  that  they  could  be 
operated  by  elevated  as  well  as  subway  trains.  The 
Sixth  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated  line  terminated  at  155th 
street  and  the  Harlem  River.  An  extension  was  provided 
over  the  Putnam  Division  bridge  across  the  Harlem 
River,  leased  from  the  New  York  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany by  the  Interborough  for  the  purpose,  through  East 
162d  street  by  a  tunnel  through  the  Sedgwick  Avenue  hill 
and  thence  as  an  elevated  road  to  a  junction  with  the 
Jerome  Avenue  line  at  162d  street.  This  will  permit 
elevated  trains  from  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Avenue  lines  to 
continue  over  the  new  line  in  Jerome  Avenue  to  its  ter- 
minus at  Woodlawn  Road. 

The  Third  Avenue  elevated  terminated  at  Fordham. 
It  was  decided  to  extend  it  northward  through  Webster 
Avenue  to  Gun  Hill  Road  and  through  Gun  Hill  Road 
to  a  junction  w^ith  the  new  line  in  White  Plains  Road,  so 
that  elevated  trains  from  the  Third  Avenue  line  may 
run  over  the  White  Plains  Road  line  to  its  terminus  at 
241st  street.  A  connection  was  also  provided  between  the 
Lenox  Avenue  branch  of  the  first  subway  and  the  new 
Jerome  Avenue  branch,  w^hich  will  permit  an  interchange 
of  trains  between  the  Lexington  Avenue  and  the  old  sub- 


246  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TEANSIT 

ways.  Another  connection  is  made  between  the  Third 
Avenue  elevated  line  and  the  Lenox  Avenue  branch  of 
the  first  subway  where  they  intersect  at  about  149th 
street. 

From  Times  Square,  at  Broadway  and  42d  street,  the 
first  subw^ay  as  it  comes  down  Broadway  was  extended 
into  Seventh  Avenue,  down  Seventh  Avenue  and  Seventh 
Avenue  Extension  to  Varick  street,  through  Varick  street 
to  West  Broadway  and  thence  through  Greenwich  street 
to  a  connection  with  the  first  subway  at  the  Battery. 
From  Times  Square  down  to  Park  Place  it  is  a  four 
track  line  entirely  under  ground.  At  Park  Place  two 
tracks  continue  over  the  route  named  to  the  Battery, 
while  two  others  diverge  and  run  under  Park  Place,  the 
XJ.  S.  Postoffice  and  Beekman  street  to  William  street, 
down  William  street  to  Old  Slip  and  thence  under  the 
East  River  by  tunnels  to  Clark  street,  Brooklyn,  and 
through  Clark  and  Fulton  streets  to  a  junction  with  the 
first  subway  near  Brooklyn  Borough  Hall. 

As  the  first  subway  has  two  tracks  entering  Brooklyn 
by  tunnels  this  will  give  the  Interborough  company  four 
tracks  to  that  borough — exactly  doubling  its  present 
facilities.  It  was  also  decided  to  extend  the  first  subway 
in  Brooklyn  from  its  terminus  at  Flatbush  and  Atlantic 
Avenues  out  Flatbush  Avenue  to  Prospect  Park  Plaza 
and  thence  into  Eastern  Park^vay  and  out  that  street  to 
Buffalo  Avenue  as  a  four  track,  underground  road;  and 
from  Buffalo  Avenue  as  a  three  track  elevated  road 
through  East  98th  street  and  Livonia  Avenue  to  New 
Lots  Avenue.  From  Eastern  Parkway  a  two  track  sub- 
way was  provided  under  Nostrand  Avenue  to  Flatbush 
Avenue. 

With  the  exception  of  the  elevated  extensions  referred 
to,  all  these  new  lines  were  built  and  will  be  o^^med  by 
the  City,  although  equipped  and  operated  by  the  Inter- 
borough company.    They  will  for  some  time  at  least  pro- 


EXTENT  AND   COST   OF   DUAL  SYSTEM  247 

vide  handsomely  for  the  rapid  transit  needs  of  Manhattan, 
the  Bronx  and  part  of  Brooklyn. 

It  was  deemed  necessary  also  to  provide  for  Queens 
Borough,  and  to  this  end  the  City  took  over  the  Steinway 
tunnel  from  the  Interborough  interests  and  planned  for 
its  extension  on  both  sides  of  the  East  River.  As  pre- 
viously stated  this  tunnel  is  a  two  track  underground  and 
under  river  railroad  running  from  Forty-second  street, 
Manhattan,  to  Long  Island  City.  Under  the  Dual  system 
it  is  extended  on  the  West  to  a  junction  with  the  first 
subway  at  Times  Square,  and  on  the  East  to  Queens- 
borough  bridge  plaza  in  Long  Island  City.  It  is  now 
known  as  the  Queensboro  Subway. 

From  Queensborough  bridge  Plaza  the  City  builds 
and  leases  to  the  Interborough  with  trackage  rights  to 
the  Brooklyn  company,  two  new  elevated  railroads,  one 
running  northward  through  Second  Avenue  to  Ditmars 
Avenue,  Astoria;  the  other  eastwardly  through  Queens 
Boulevard  and  Roosevelt  Avenue  to  Alburtis  Avenue, 
Corona.  Each  of  these  roads  will  have  three  tracks.  The 
Steinway  tunnel  extension  will  be  connected  with  them 
at  the  Plaza,  so  that  trains  from  it  may  operate  both  to 
Astoria  and  to  Corona.  The  company  is  also  given  the 
right  to  connect  with  them  its  Second  Avenue  elevated 
line  in  Manhattan,  by  an  extension  built  over  the  Queens- 
borough  bridge,  so  that  elevated  trains  also  may  run  to 
Astoria  and  Corona. 

The  company  also  got  the  right  to  complete  the  third 
tracks  for  express  service  on  its  Second,  Third  and  Ninth 
Avenue  elevated  lines. 

By  the  inclusion  of  the  New  York  Municipal  Railway 
Corporation,  generally  referred  to  as  the  Brooklyn  Com- 
pany, in  the  Dual  System  agreements  there  was  made 
possible  a  much  greater  expansion  of  rapid  transit 
facilities  in  Brooklyn  and  Queens  than  if  the  new  con- 
tracts had  been  confined  to  the  Interborough  company. 
Before  the  agreements  were  made  the  Brooklyn  elevated 


248  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

lines  terminated  on  the  Manhattan  side  of  the  Brooklyn 
and  Williamsburg  bridges.  Here  the  throngs  of  incom- 
ing passengers  from  all  parts  of  Brooklyn  and  Queens 
were  discharged  every  morning,  to  find  their  way  as 
best  they  could  to  their  places  of  business  in  Manhattan. 
The  '^bridge  crush"  had  become  notorious,  and  it  was 
resolved  to  end  it  once  for  all  in  the  Dual  System  ar- 
rangement. To  do  this  not  only  were  new  facilities  pro- 
vided for  the  Brooklyn  company  on  the  Brooklyn  side, 
but  a  distributing  system  in  Manhattan  was  planned  to 
serve  all  of  this  company's  lines  entering  the  borough 
by  bridges  or  tunnels.  This  is  the  Broadway  subway, 
a  four  track  line  destined  to  serve  the  business  part  of 
Manhattan  or  that  part  of  it  south  of  59th  street. 

The  Broadway  subway  begins  in  the  southern  part  of 
Manhattan  in  Whitehall  street,  where  the  tunnel  from 
Montague  street,  Brooklyn,  enters  the  borough.  It  runs 
thence  as  a  two  track  line  under  Whitehall  street  across 
town  to  Morris  street,  turning  thence  into  Trinity  Place 
and  continuing  up  Trinity  Place  and  Church  street  (these 
two  being  really  one  thoroughfare)  to  Vesey  street, 
where  it  turns  into  Broadway.  The  line  passes  under  a 
corner  of  Old  St.  Paul's  churchyard  in  the  rear  of  the 
church,  thence  into  Vesey  street  and  from  Vesey  street 
curves  under  the  old  Astor  House  property  and  into 
Broadway  just  south  of  the  IT.  S.  Postofifice  building. 
Here  the  line  changes  to  a  four  track  line,  and  continues 
under  Broadway  northward  to  42d  street.  Here  it 
descends  to  pass  under  the  first  subway  and  continues 
northward  under  Seventh  Avenue  to  59th  street,  where 
the  four  track  line  ends ;  two  tracks  curve  into  59th  street 
and  continue  to  Fifth  Avenue,  where  they  swing  into 
60th  street  and  extend  under  that  street  to  the  East  Eiver 
and  into  a  new  tunnel  to  be  built  to  Long  Island  City. 
Here  the  two  tracks  will  come  out  of  the  ground  and  join 
the  new  elevated  lines  on  the  Queensborough  Bridge 
Plaza. 


EXTENT  AND  COST   OF   DUAL  SYSTEM  249 

Four  other  City-o^^Tied  subways  were  leased  for  opera- 
tion to  the  Brooklyn  Company — the  Centre  Street  loop 
subway  and  the  Canal  Street  subway  in  Manhattan  and 
the  Fourth  Avenue  subway  in  Brooklyn  and  the  Eastern 
District  subway  in  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn.  AYhen  the 
Dual  System  agreements  were  made  the  Centre  Street 
and  Fourth  Avenue  subways  were  nearly  completed  and 
they  were  adjusted  to  the  Brooklyn  part  of  the  system. 

The  Centre  street  loop,  as  before  stated,  was  built  to 
connect  the  "Williamsburg,  Manhattan  and  Brooklyn 
bridges.  It  consists  of  a  four  track  underground  railroad 
extending  from  the  Manhattan  terminus  of  the  Brooklyn 
Bridge  northward  under  Centre  street  to  Delancey  street 
and  eastwardly  under  Delancey  street  to  the  Williams- 
burg Bridge,  with  a  two  track  spur  at  Canal  street  con- 
necting with  the  Manhattan  Bridge.  In  August  1913  the 
two  westerly  tracks  in  this  subway  were  placed  in  opera- 
tion in  connection  with  the  Broadway  elevated  railroad 
in  Brooklyn,  the  trains  from  which  now  run  through  the 
loop  subway  to  the  Chambers  street  station  in  the  base- 
ment of  the  new  Municipal  Building,  instead  of  stopping 
as  formerly  at  the  end  of  the  Williamsburg  bridge.  The 
tvvo  easterly  tracks  south  of  Canal  street  were  placed  in 
operation  in  June,  1915,  as  part  of  the  Fourth  Avenue 
subway,  and  the  two  easterly  tracks  north  of  Canal  street 
were  devoted  to  the  Williamsburg  Bridge  operation. 

The  Fourth  Avenue  subway  is  a  four  track  under- 
ground road  running  from  the  Brooklyn  end  of  the  Man- 
hattan Bridge  through  Flatbush  Avenue  Extension  to 
Fulton  street,  Ashland  Place  and  Fourth  Avenue  to 
86th  street,  near  Fort  Hamilton.  The  Dual  System  con- 
tracts provided  for  its  extension  through  38th  street  with 
two,  three-track  elevated  lines  to  Coney  Island,  one  run- 
ning from  38th  street  down  New  Utrecht  Avenue,  86th 
street  and  Stillwell  Avenue  and  the  other  from  38th 
street  down  Gravesend  Avenue  and  Shell  Road,  both 
terminating  at  a  common  terminal  at  Coney  Island.    It 


250  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

vv^as  further  provided  that  the  company  should  at  its  own 
expense  reconstruct  its  Sea  Beach  line  as  a  four  track 
railroad  and  connect  it  at  65th  street  with  the  Fourth 
Avenue  subway,  thus  providing  another  line  to  Coney 
Island.  From  Flatbush  Avenue  Extension,  or  from  Ful- 
ton street  near  the  Extension,  another  connection  was 
planned.  This  is  a  two  track  railroad  running  under 
Fulton  and  St.  Felix  streets  to  Flatbush  Avenue  and 
thence  under  Flatbush  Avenue  to  a  junction  with  the 
Brighton  Beach  railroad  at  Malbone  street.  A  further 
connection  with  Manhattan  was  provided  by  a  two  track 
underground  line  running  from  the  Fourth  Avenue  sub- 
way in  Flatbush  Avenue  Extension  just  west  of  De  Kalb 
Avenue  through  Willoughby  street  to  Montague  street 
and  down  Montague  street  to  and  under  the  East  Eiver 
to  Whitehall  street,  Manhattan  and  a  connection  with  the 
Broadway  subway. 

In  June,  1915,  the  Fourth  Avenue  subway  was  opened 
for  traffic  from  Manhattan  to  Coney  Island  by  the  Sea 
Beach  connection.  Two  tracks,  a  combination  of  local 
and  express  tracks,  were  used  for  the  first  operation  to 
Sixty-fifth  street  and  the  Sea  Beach  tracks  from  there  to 
Coney  Island.  For  this  service  the  two  easterly  tracks 
in  the  Centre  street  loop  south  of  Canal  street  are  used. 
Two  tracks  in  the  Fourth  Avenue  subway  after  crossing 
the  Manhattan  Bridge  descend  and  pass  under  the  Centre 
street  loop  and  run  under  Canal  street  to  a  junction  with 
the  new  Broadway  subway  in  Manhattan. 

Aside  from  the  Fourth  Avenue  system  just  described 
the  City  also  agreed  to  build  for  operation  by  the  Brook- 
lyn Company  a  new  subway  from  Manhattan  to  East 
New  York.  This  is  known  as  the  14th  Street — Eastern 
line.  It  begins  in  Fourteenth  street,  Manhattan,  at  Sixth 
Avenue,  runs  eastwardly  as  a  two  track,  underground 
road  through  14th  street  to  and  under  the  East  River  to 
North  Seventh  Street,  Brooklyn,  through  North  Seventh 
street  to  Metropolitan  Avenue,  to  Bushwick  Avenue,  to 


EXTENT  AND  COST   OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  251 

Johnson  Avenue,  where  it  becomes  an  elevated  railroad 
and  continues  over  the  Long  Island  Railroad  right  of 
way,  parallel  to  Wyckoff  Avenue,  and  thence  south- 
easterly to  a  junction  with  the  Broadway  elevated  rail- 
road in  East  New  York. 

All  the  above  lines  are  built  and  paid  for  by  the  City 
and  leased  to  the  Brooklyn  Company  for  operation,  ex- 
cept of  course  the  Sea  Beach  line,  which  is  a  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  company's  own  property.  In  addition,  the 
Dual  System  contracts  granted  to  the  company  the  rights 
to  make  extensions  of  and  additions  to  its  existing  ele- 
vated railroad  lines  as  follows : 

An  elevated  connection  between  the  Broadway  and 
Myrtle  Avenue  lines  and  an  extension  of  the  latter  to 
Lutheran  Cemetery. 

An  elevated  extension  of  the  Broadway  line  from 
its  terminus  out  Jamaica  Avenue  to  Grand  Avenue,  Ja- 
maica, in  Queens  Borough. 

An  elevated  extension  of  the  Fulton  street  line  from 
the  old  City  Line,  at  the  boundary  between  Brooklyn  and 
Queens,  out  Liberty  Avenue  to  Lefferts  Avenue,  Rich- 
mond Hill,  Queens  Borough. 

Also  to  build  and  operate  a  third  track  on  each  of  the 
Broadway,  Myrtle  Avenue  and  Fulton  street  elevated 
lines. 

All  of  such  improvements  are  to  be  made  at  the  com- 
pany's expense. 

The  completion  of  this  system  means  nothing  less  than 
a  revolution  in  Brooklyn-Manhattan  travel.  Heretofore, 
owing  to  track  limitations,  no  real  express  service  was 
possible  on  the  Brooklyn  elevated  roads.  The  third 
tracks  on  the  Fulton  street.  Myrtle  Avenue  and  Broad- 
way lines  permit  of  the  addition  of  express  trains.  This 
in  itself  will  greatly  lessen  existing  congestion.  The 
Fourth  Avenue  subway  and  its  connections  provide  am- 
ple means  of  access  to  the  Coney  Island  beaches — a  long 


252  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

felt  want.    The  Broadway  subway  in  Manhattan  gives  all 
lines  a  proper  and  convenient  outlet. 

Both  leases  with  the  companies  run  for  forty-nine 
years.  In  general  the  terms  are  the  same  in  each  con- 
tract; that  is  each  company  agrees  to  contribute  a  cer- 
tain amount  toward  the  cost  of  construction  of  the  City- 
owned  lines,  to  build  the  company-owned  lines  with  its 
own  funds  and  to  provide  the  necessary  equipment  for 
all  lines  at  its  own  expense,  although  title  to  the  equip- 
ment on  City-owned  lines  is  to  vest  in  the  City. 

Each  company  is  to  charge  only  five  cents  for  fare 
on  any  parts  of  its  system  and  is  to  give  free  transfers 
at  all  intersections,  but  no  transfers  will  be  given  be- 
tAveen  the  lines  of  one  company  and  those  of  another,  nor 
will  the  Interborough  company  be  required  to  transfer 
from  its  elevated  lines  to  the  City's  subway  lines  or  vice 
versa.  Each  company  is  to  share  equally  with  the  City 
the  surplus  profits  from  operation. 

In  the  Interborough  contract  provision  was  made  for 
the  synchronizing  of  its  leases,  that  is  to  bring  the  old 
and  new  leases  to  a  common  expiring  date.  Under  the 
old  leases  covering  the  first  subway  the  company  had 
until  1954  to  operate  the  Manhattan-Bronx  part  of  the 
line  and  till  1940  the  Brooklyn  extension,  with  the  privi- 
lege of  twenty-five  j'ears'  renewal  in  each  case.  These 
leases  the  company  naturally  regarded  as  very  valuable, 
for  it  was  making  about  $6,000,000  a  year  out  of  the  op- 
eration of  the  subway.  It  would  not  listen  to  any  cur- 
tailment of  the  life  of  the  leases  unless  the  City  would 
agree  to  compensate  it  for  the  profits  to  be  expected  in 
the  period  curtailed.  It  was  finally  agreed  that  a  pref- 
erential payment  equivalent  to  these  profits  should  be 
provided  for  in  the  new  lease,  that  the  company  should 
terminate  the  old  agreement  and  consent  to  a  new  lease 
for  old  and  new  lines  for  49  years.  The  amount  of  the 
preferential  agreed  upon  was  $6,335,000  a  year,  as  r^p- 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  ZOo 

resenting  the  average  annual  profits  under  the  old  leases 
for  the  two  years  ending  June  30,  1911. 

As  Mr.  Belmont  pointed  out  in  his  remarks  previously 
quoted,  the  first  suggestion  of  a  preferential  payment 
came  from  the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company.  It 
was  proposed  in  that  company's  offer  of  April  25,  1911, 
as  a  part  of  the  terms  of  operation.  These  terms  pro- 
vided for  the  pooling  of  all  receipts  from  both  city-owned 
and  company-owned  lines  and,  after  paying  out  of  them 
operating  expenses,  etc.,  the  payment  to  the  company 
of  ''an  amount  equivalent  to  the  net  earnings  of  the  ex- 
isting lines  operated  by  the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  sys- 
tem in  connection  with  the  proposed  new  lines,  as  of  the 
year  preceding  the  beginning  of  operation  under  the  pro- 
posed contract  with  the  City."  As  these  earnings  were 
increasing  every  year,  the  conferrees  for  the  City  felt 
that  the  present  earnings,  which  were  known,  would  be  a 
better  guide  than  future  earnings,  and  it  was  finally 
agreed  that  the  preferential  should  be  equivalent  to  the 
average  annual  net  profits  for  the  two  years  ended  June 
30,  1911.  And  thus  it  went  into  both  contracts.  In  the 
Brooklyn  company  contract  the  amount  of  the  preferen- 
tial payment  is  $3,500,000  a  year. 

The  first  deductions  from  the  pooled  receipts,  to  be 
made  even  in  advance  of  the  preferentials,  included:  To 
the  City  such  rentals  as  were  due  from  the  Interborough 
Company  for  the  first  subway;  taxes  and  governmental 
charges  of  all  kinds  against  each  company;  twelve  per 
cent,  of  the  revenue  for  maintenance  exclusive  of  depre- 
ciation; for  depreciation,  five  per  cent,  from  the  Inter- 
borough and  three  per  cent,  from  the  Brooklyn  Company. 
Then  come  the  preferential  payments,  and  after  them: 
six  per  cent,  on  the  company's  investment  for  construc- 
tion and  equipment,  out  of  which  an  amortization  fund 
must  be  set  aside;  to  the  City  by  the  Interborough  Com- 
pany an  amount  equal  to  8.76  per  cent,  on  the  City's  ex- 
penditures for  construction;  one  per  cent,  of  the  revenue 


254  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

to  be  paid  into  a  contingent  reserve  fund.  The  surplus 
remaining  is  to  be  divided  equally  by  the  City  and  com- 
pany. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  City  through  the  Commission 
should  preioare  and  award  in  the  manner  provided  by 
the  Eapid  Transit  Act  all  construction  contracts  on  City- 
owned  lines,  but  that  in  case  of  contracts  which  would 
be  paid  for  in  part  by  the  companies  a  draft  thereof 
should  be  submitted  to  the  company  affected  for  its  criti- 
cisms and  suggestions  before  it  was  finally  adopted  by 
the  Commission.  Such  contracts  also  were  to  include 
the  company  as  one  of  the  parties,  and  the  funds  applied 
for  such  purposes  by  the  company  should  be  disbursed 
by  it  direct  to  the  construction  contractor. 

The  Interborough  company  agreed  to  contribute 
$58,000,000  and  the  Brooklyn  company  $13,500,000  toward 
the  cost  of  construction  of  City-owned  lines,  and  in  addi- 
tion the  latter  agreed  to  bear  the  cost  of  building  the 
connection  between  the  Canal  street  subway  and  the 
Broadway  subway  to  connect  the  latter  with  the  Fourth 
Avenue  subway  in  Brooklyn,  which  was  estimated  at 
about  $500,000.  The  total  contribution,  therefore,  of  the 
Brooklyn  company  is  generally  placed  at  $14,000,000.  Of 
the  Interborough 's  contribution  it  was  agreed  that 
$3,000,000  was  to  be  allowed  the  company  for  the  transfer 
to  the  City  of  the  Steinway  tunnel. 

It  was  also  provided  that  the  Brooklyn  company  at  its 
own  expense  should  reconstruct  its  existing  lines  where 
necessary,  to  link  them  up  with  the  City-owned  lines,  so 
that  both  could  be  operated  together  as  parts  of  one 
system.  This  involved  the  reconstruction  of  the  com- 
pany's Brighton  Beach  line  between  Malbone  street  and 
Church  Avenue,  the  reconstruction  of  the  Sea  Beach  line 
as  a  four  track  road,  the  elevation  of  existing  tracks  and 
the  construction  of  additional  two  tracks  on  the  Brighton 
Beach  line  between  Neptune  Avenue  and  Coney  Island, 
the  construction  of  a  new  union  terminal  at  Coney  Island 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OP  DUAL  SYSTEM  255 

for  the  Brighton  Beach,  the  Sea  Beach,  the  New  Utrecht 
and  Gravesend  Avenues  lines  and  the  extension  of  sta- 
tion platforms  and  other  needed  alterations — all  under 
plans  to  be  approved  by  the  Commission. 

Heavy  security  was  demanded  of  both  companies. 
Each  was  required  to  deposit  with  the  Controller  of  the 
City  $1,000,000  in  approved  securities  and  also  to  file  a 
bond  in  the  sum  of  $1,000,000.  It  was  arranged  that  the 
special  deposit  should  be  returned  to  the  company  in 
instalments  as  its  contribution  to  the  cost  of  construction 
was  paid;  as  each  quarter  of  the  contribution  was  ex- 
pended a  quarter  of  the  deposit  was  to  be  returned. 

To  provide  for  a  settlement  of  disputes  between  the 
parties  to  each  contract  an  arbitration  court  was  created. 
Each  side  names  one  arbitrator  and  the  third  is  named 
by  the  Chief  Judge  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  or  in  his 
failure  to  act  by  any  of  the  Associate  Judges  of  the  same 
Court  in  the  order  of  their  seniority,  or  in  their  failure 
by  the  President  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce. 
Personal  claims  by  either  company  against  members  of 
the  Public  Service  Commission  or  of  the  Board  of  Esti- 
mate and  Apportionment  on  matters  connected  with  the 
contracts  are  barred. 

The  City  is  given  complete  control  over  expenditures 
by  the  companies  under  the  contracts.  The  companies 
agree  to  supervision  by  the  Public  Service  Commission 
and  to  provide  for  such  inspections  as  the  Commission 
may  wish  to  make.  They  must  keep  proper  accounts, 
permit  their  examination  and  submit  to  the  Commission 
for  approval  any  contract  or  mortgage  in  connection  with 
their  contributions  toward  the  cost  of  construction.  All 
contracts  affecting  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  the 
railroads  extending  for  more  than  one  year  or  involving 
more  than  $50,000  must  be  approved  by  the  Commission, 
which  may  also  prescribe  systems  of  accounting  and 
forms  of  vouchers  and  payrolls.  The  Commission  may 
object  to  any  item  of  expenditure  as  improper  and  the 


256  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

company  must  hold  the  same  in  a  suspense  account  until 
the  matter  is  adjusted,  or,  in  case  of  failure  to  agree, 
arbitrated. 

All  equii3ment  is  to  be  purchased  by  each  company  at 
its  own  expense,  but  title  to  that  on  City-owned  lines 
when  accepted  by  the  Commission  becomes  immediately 
vested  in  the  City.  All  equipment  must  be  of  the  best 
character  ''known  to  the  art  of  urban  railway  operation." 
At  the  proper  time  the  Commission  may  order  the  com- 
pany to  begin  providing  equipment,  which  shall  be  ready 
to  put  into  operation  any  part  of  the  road  as  soon  as 
comj)leted. 

January  1,  1917,  was  fixed  as  the  date  for  the  begin- 
ning of  ''initial"  operation  of  the  completed  system,  but 
provision  is  made  for  the  temporary  operation  of  such 
parts  of  the  lines  as  may  be  ready  before  the  whole  sys- 
tem is  finished.  Such  temporary  operation  is  to  be  con- 
ducted on  the  same  terms  as  are  provided  for  the  opera- 
tion of  future  extensions  of  the  Dual  System,  which  are 
slightly  different  from  the  terms  for  permanent  opera- 
tion. If  there  is  a  deficit  from  such  operation,  it  is  pro- 
vided that  the  company  may  deduct  the  amount  of  such 
deficit  from  the  revenue  before  making  any  payments  to 
the  City. 

There  are  special  provisions  in  the  contract  with  one 
company  which  do  not  appear  in  that  with  the  other. 
For  instance,  the  Brooklyn  company  is  permitted  for  ten 
years  to  purchase  its  power  instead  of  generating  it;  and 
in  the  Interborough  contract  there  is  a  provision  for  the 
"exchange  of  legs"  of  the  first  subway  if  at  any  time 
the  City  should  exercise  its  right  of  recapture,  so  that  it 
may  take  over  a  complete  operating  line  instead  of  a 
fragment  of  one  of  the  new  lines. 

So  much  for  the  contracts  for  City-owned  lines.  The 
rights  for  the  extensions  and  third  tracking  of  existing 
elevated  railroads  owned  by  private  companies  were  con- 
ferred in  separate  "certificates",  granted  under  other 


TWO  VIEWS  OF  DUAL  SYSTEM 
CONSTRUCTION 

1.    Deep  Cut  on  162nd  Street  Connection; 

2.    Reinforced  Concrete  Construction  in 

the  Bronx, 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OF   DUAL,  SYSTEM  257 

provisions  of  the  Rapid  Transit  Act.  The  companies 
were  given  franchises  for  such  improvements  to  run  for 
85  years,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  City  to  take  them 
over  at  any  time  after  ten  years  from  the  date  of  the  con- 
tract upon  proper  payments. 

A  third  tracking  certificate,  as  stated  above,  was 
granted  to  the  Manhattan  Railway  Company,  the  owner 
of  the  elevated  railroads  in  Manhattan  and  the  Bronx 
operated  by  the  Interborough  company  under  lease. 
Prior  to  this  time  the  company  had  in  use  a  third  track 
on  the  Ninth  Avenue  line  extending  from  Fourteenth  to 
116th  Street,  and  a  third  track  on  the  Third  Avenue  line 
extending  from  Forty-second  to  129th  street;  also  por- 
tions of  the  Second  Avenue  line  had  some  third  tracks. 
There  was  some  question  as  to  the  rights  for  either  one 
or  both  of  these  extra  tracks,  and  the  affirmation  or  con- 
firmation of  such  rights  was  one  of  the  considerations  in 
the  Dual  System  contracts.  The  latter  beyond  this  con- 
firmation granted  rights  for  a  third  track  on  the  Second 
Avenue  line  in  addition  to  those  on  the  Ninth  and  Third 
Avenue  lines,  which  were  expanded  to  extend  the  third 
tracks  from  the  Battery  to  155th  street  on  the  Ninth 
Avenue,  and  from  Pearl  street  to  145th  street  on  the 
Third  Avenue  line.  In  places  four  and  even  five  tracks 
were  authorized. 

During  the  negotiations  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
discussion  as  to  the  amount  of  compensation  the  City 
should  receive  for  the  grants  for  additional  tracks,  and 
more  as  to  the  method  by  which  it  should  be  determined. 
It  was  finally  decided  and  so  nominated  in  the  certificate 
that,  after  operation  began,  the  company  should  pay  to 
the  City  annuially  from  the  receipts  of  each  station  served 
by  the  additional  tracks  an  amount  equal  to  two  per  cent, 
of  the  excess  of  such  receipts  over  the  receipts  of  the  same 
station  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1911,  or  for  a  cor- 
responding portion  of  such  year.  These  payments  are 
to  continue  for  twenty-five  years,  when  the  rental  is  to  be 


258  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

readjusted  for  the  next  twenty  years  and  again  read- 
justed each  twenty  years  thereafter.  In  case  the  City 
and  the  company  cannot  agree  on  the  readjustment,  the 
matter  may  be  settled  by  arbitration  or  by  appeal  to  the 
courts.  In  no  case,  however,  is  the  readjusted  rental  to 
be  less  than  that  provided  for  the  first  twenty-five  years. 

Ten  years  after  operation  begins  the  City  is  author- 
ized to  purchase  and  take  over  the  additional  tracks  so 
installed,  but  not  for  purposes  of  railroad  operation.  This 
condition  was  deemed  advisable  because  the  City  has  no 
power  to  take  over  the  original  tracks  and  therefore  could 
not  operate  the  third  tracks  in  the  event  that  it  came  into 
possession  of  them.  The  recapture  provision,  therefore, 
is  valuable  only  in  that  it  will  save  the  City  from  con- 
demning and  paying  full  value  for  the  third  tracks  if  at 
any  time  it  decides  to  purchase  the  line  or  to  condemn 
the  original  tracks  and  remove  the  whole  structure  from 
the  streets.  "When  the  right  of  recapture  accrues,  namely 
ten  years  after  operation  begins,  the  City  must  pay  cost 
plus  15  per  cent,  for  the  property,  but  this  percentage  de- 
creases each  year  thereafter  until  at  the  end  of  85  years 
the  City  gets  the  property  without  any  payment  what- 
ever. 

The  certificate  for  additional  tracks  granted  to  the 
Brooklyn  company,  while  substantially  the  same,  differs 
in  some  particulars  from  that  granted  to  the  Manhattan 
company.  The  most  important  point  of  divergence  is  in 
the  terms  of  compensation  to  the  City.  Instead  of  a 
percentage  of  receipts,  or  excess  of  receipts  due  to  the 
new  tracks,  the  earnings  of  the  elevated  roads  upon  which 
additional  tracks  are  built  shall  be  pooled  with  the  re- 
ceipts of  the  subway  lines  operated  by  the  Brooklyn  com- 
pany and  payments  made  to  the  City  in  accordance  with 
the  operating  contracts  for  the  City-owned  lines.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  the  Brooklyn  elevated  roads  are  to 
be  operated  as  parts  of  the  City-owned  system,  while  the 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  250 

Manhattan  elevated  lines  are  to  be  operated  separately 
and  not  as  parts  of  the  subway  system. 

Three  Brooklyn  lines  are  covered  by  the  certificate 
for  additional  tracks,  namely,  the  Broadway,  the  Fulton 
Street  and  the  Myrtle  Avenue  lines.  The  right  on  the 
Broadway  line  extends  from  the  Williamsburg  bridge  to 
East  New  York;  on  the  Fulton  Street  line  from  the  Brook- 
lyn bridge  to  the  Queens  boundary;  and  on  the  Myrtle 
Avenue  line  from  Broadway  to  Wyckoff  Avenue.  As  in 
the  Manhattan  certificate  more  than  one  additional  track 
is  authorized  in  places.  The  grants  run  for  85  years  and 
the  property  may  be  purchased  and  taken  over  by  the 
City  at  any  time  after  ten  years  on  the  same  terms  as 
are  laid  down  in  the  Manhattan  certificate. 

Certificates  for  the  extensions  of  elevated  lines  are 
somewhat  different  in  their  terms.  Instead  of  a  per- 
centage of  excess  profits,  the  City  is  to  receive  as  rental 
for  the  extensions  of  the  Manhattan  elevated  railroads, 
operated  by  the  Interborough  company,  one  half  of  the 
excess  profits  over  the  average  net  profits  of  the  existing 
elevated  lines  for  the  years  1910  and  1911,  fixed  in  the 
certificate  at  $1,589,348,  from  which  there  is  previously 
deducted  the  rental  paid  under  the  additional  track  cer- 
tificate. The  other  terms  are  substantially  the  same  as 
those  in  the  third-tracking  certificate.  The  franchise 
runs  for  eighty-five  years,  but  the  City  has  the  right  to 
take  over  the  roads  at  any  time  after  ten  years  upon 
paying  cost  plus  15  per  cent.,  the  percentage  declining 
every  year  until  at  the  end  of  the  grant  the  property 
passes  to  the  City  without  any  payment. 

The  extensions  for  which  authorizations  are  granted 
by  the  certificate  to  the  Interborough  company  are:  The 
Webster  Avenue  Line,  the  Eighth  Avenue  and  162d 
Street  Connection,  the  Queensboro  Bridge  Line  and  the 
West  Farms  Subway  Connection.  The  Webster  Avenue 
Line  is  an  extension  of  the  Third  Avenue  elevated  road 
from  its  terminus  at  Fordham  northward  through  Web- 


260  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

ster  Avenue  to  Gun  Hill  Road  and  eastward  through  Gun 
Hill  Road  to  a  junction  with  the  elevated  extension  of  the 
Lenox  Avenue  branch  of  the  first  subway  in  White  Plains 
Road.  The  Eighth  Avenue  and  162d  Street  Connection 
is  an  extension  of  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Avenue  elevated 
lines  from  their  terminus  at  155th  Street  and  Eighth 
Avenue  over  the  Putnam  Division  Bridge  across  the 
Harlem  River  and  through  East  162d  street  to  a  junction 
with  the  Jerome  Avenue  elevated  extension  in  River 
Avenue  of  the  Lexington  Avenue  subway.  The  Queens- 
boro  Bridge  line  is  an  extension  of  the  Second  Avenue 
elevated  road  over  the  Queensboro  bridge  to  a  junction 
with  the  new  rapid  transit  lines  to  Astoria  and  Corona. 
The  "West  Farms  Subway  Connection  is  an  elevated  line 
joining  the  Third  Avenue  elevated  road  with  Lenox 
Avenue  branch  of  the  first  subway  and  running  from 
about  143d  street  through  Willis  and  Bergen  Avenues 
to  the  subway  line,  which  is  an  elevated  road  at  that  point. 

The  certificates  to  the  New  York  Municipal  Railway 
Corporation  for  elevated  extensions  in  Brooklyn  and 
Queens  are  substantially  similar  to  the  certificates  for  ad- 
ditional tracks  granted  to  that  company.  These  extensions 
are  to  be  made  a  part  of  the  whole  system,  and  the  City 
will  get  compensation  for  them  out  of  the  earnings  thereof 
in  the  manner  provided  in  the  main  operating  contract. 
That  is  the  receipts  of  all  lines  and  extensions  will  be 
pooled,  and  the  City  will  share  with  the  company  in  the 
surplus  profits  remaining  after  paying  operating  ex- 
penses and  other  charges  fixed  by  the  contract.  The 
grants  are  to  run  eighty-five  years,  with  the  same  pro- 
vision for  recapture  after  ten  years  as  are  embodied  in 
the  Interborough  certificates. 

The  extensions  covered  by  these  certificates  to  the 
Brooklyn  company  are:  The  Jamaica  Line  and  the  Lib- 
erty Avenue  Line.  The  Jamaica  Line  is  an  extension  of 
the  Broadway  elevated  road  from  its  terminus  near  Cres- 
cent street  out  Jamaica  Avenue  to  Grand  street,  Jamaica. 


EXTENT  AND  COST  OF  DUAL  SYSTEM  261 

The  Liberty  Avenue  Line  is  an  extension  of  the  Fulton 
street  elevated  road  from  its  terminus  at  the  Brooklyn- 
Queens  boundary  out  Liberty  Avenue  to  Lefferts  Avenue, 
Queens. 

At  the  time  the  Dual  System  contracts  were  signed  the 
total  cost  of  the  work,  including  construction  and  equip- 
ment, was  estimated  at  $330,000,000.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  World  War  this  estimate  might  have  been  approxi- 
mated in  the  result,  but  the  increase  in  prices  of  mate- 
rials, cost  of  labor,  etc.,  has  largely  augmented  the  figures. 
The  original  estimates  provided  for  an  investment  of 
$164,000,000  by  the  City  of  New  York,  $105,000,000  by  the 
Interborough  Eapid  Transit  Company  and  $61,000,000  by 
the  Brooklyn  company.  It  is  now  known  that  the  City 's 
expenditure  will  equal  or  exceed  $200,000,000  and  that  the 
investment  of  each  of  the  companies  will  be  much  heavier 
than  the  estimates,  so  that  the  entire,  ultimate  cost  of  the 
system  will  be  about  $400,000,000.  This  exceeds  the  cost 
of  the  Panama  Canal. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  Dual  System  contracts  opin- 
ion has  been  divided  as  to  their  merits — that  is,  whether 
they  were  a  good  or  a  bad  bargain  for  the  City.  They 
were  both.  They  were  good  in  the  enormous  increases 
of  rapid  transit  facilities  which  they  assured  at  a  time 
when  the  city  was  sorely  in  need  of  relief.  They  were  bad 
in  that  they  assured  the  operating  companies  a  continua- 
tion of  large  profits  and  placed  the  burden  of  carrying 
deficits  from  operation  upon  the  City,  besides  giving  the 
companies  first  call  on  the  revenues.  Time  alone  will 
show  whether  the  good  or  the  bad  predominates.  The 
primary  object  in  building  rapid  transit  railroads  is  to 
provide  quick  transportation  service  for  the  people; 
whether  the  operation  of  such  roads  will  bring  a  monetary 
return  to  the  City  is  secondary.  There  is  no  question  that 
the  Dual  System  will  fulfill  the  first ;  whether  the  second 
will  be  realized  only  the  future  can  tell.  Had  the  Dual 
System  negotiations  failed,  however,  the  plight  of  the 


262  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

city  would  have  been  serious,  for  the  building  of  new 
lines  would  have  been  delayed  and  the  burden  of  con- 
structing them  would  have  been  placed  wholly  on  the 
municipality,  the  resources  of  which  would  not  have  per- 
mitted such  a  large  addition  to  the  rapid  transit  system 
as  was  made  possible  by  the  co-operation  of  the  com- 
panies under  the  Dual  System  agreements. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

Decked  Eoadway  Method  of  Consteuction — Pboblems 
Met  in  the  Woek. 

tN  the  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  Brooklyn 
extension  of  the  subway  there  was  a  new  provision, 
born  of  the  experience  in  underground  work  gained  in 
the  building  of  the  first  sections,  for  the  carrying  on  of 
operations  without  unduly  disturbing  the  street  surface 
or  interfering  with  its  traffic.  In  prosecuting  the  first 
contracts  in  streets  where  the  subway  was  to  run  close 
to  the  surface,  the  contractor  tore  up  the  street  pavement 
and  began  excavation  just  as  he  would  for  a  gas  main 
or  a  sewer,  leaving  the  opening  in  the  street  a  gaping 
wound  in  the  surface  until  the  steel  structure  was  com- 
pleted, when  the  backfill  would  be  placed  and  the  pave- 
ment restored. 

As  large  areas  were  badly  obstructed  for  months 
at  a  time,  this  method  of  working  seriously  interfered 
with  traffic  and  also  greatly  injured  the  business  of  the 
tradesmen  having  stores  in  the  area  affected  by  making 
access  to  their  places  so  difficult  as  to  discourage  visitors. 
The  extreme  of  this  evil  was  felt  in  Forty-second  street 
between  Park  Avenue  and  Broadway.  Trade  in  the  shops 
along  the  street  fell  off  so  that  some  merchants  closed 
their  places  and  others  continued  with  reduced  profits. 
Complaints  poured  in  upon  the  Rapid  Transit  Commis- 
sion, which  wisely  decided  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  such 
interference  with  normal  conditions  if  its  engineers  could 
find  a  way. 

The  engineers  were  equal  to  the  emergency  and  de- 
vised what  has  since  become  known  as  the  ' '  decked  road- 
way" method  of  subway  construction.  It  was  first  tried 
in  building  the  extension  of  the  subway  down  Broadway 
from  City  Hall  to  South  Ferry,  and  it  was  so  successful 
that  it  was  embodied  in  all  future  specifications.     This 


264  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

method  consists  in  replacing  the  ordinary  street  pavement 
with  a  temporarj^  plank  roadway  strong  enough  to  sup- 
port the  usual  street  traffic  and  excavating  for  the  sub- 
way underneath  it.  As  depth  is  attained  in  the  excava- 
tion huge  timbers  properly  braced  are  erected  beneath 
the  decking,  which  is  kept  in  place  till  the  steel  frame 
of  the  subway  is  erected,  when  the  temporary  decking  is 
removed,  the  backfill  placed  and  the  street  pavement  re- 
stored. The  plan  had  two  merits,  first  the  business  of 
merchants  along  the  route  and  the  ordinary  street  traffic 
were  not  interfered  with,  or  if  so  only  to  a  bearable  de- 
gree, and,  second,  it  kept  the  work  of  construction  out  of 
sight  and  thereby  minimized  interference  from  the  out- 
side. Since  it  was  introduced  in  1902  more  than  twenty 
miles  of  subway  have  been  built  according  to  the  cut  and 
cover  method. 

This  method  of  work  involved  another  departure 
in  the  treatment  of  gas  pipes  encountered  in  the  route 
of  a  subway.  Covering  the  excavation  produced  a  con- 
fined space  between  the  bottom  of  the  cut  and  the  street 
decking,  so  it  was  feared  that,  should  a  gas  pipe  be  in- 
jured so  as  to  leak,  the  escaping  gas  would  mix  with  the 
air  in  the  cut  and  produce  that  highly  explosive  com- 
pound which  when  ignited  works  tremendous  damage. 
To  safeguard  the  work,  therefore,  the  '^by-passing" 
method  was  devised.  That  is,  the  service  pipes  were  re- 
moved from  the  mains  and  carried  around  the  cut  in  by- 
pass pipes  either  laid  close  to  the  curb  on  the  street  sur- 
face or  supported  on  trestles  above  the  sidewalks.  In 
either  case  the  gas  was  removed  from  the  cut  and  possible 
explosions  were  prevented. 

Only  the  engineers  and  contractors  actually  engaged 
in  the  work  could  tell  of  the  thousand  other  problems 
encountered  and  solved  during  the  construction  of  the 
subways.  Almost  every  section  had  its  own  peculiar 
obstacles.  For  instance,  in  tunneling  under  the  East 
River  the  contractor  had  to  combat  the  water  under  the 


COMPRESSED  AIR  TUNNEL  WORK 

1.  Tunnel  Heading  Filled  With  Mud  Following    a  "Blowout" 

2.  Erecting  Iron  Rings  of  Tun  nel;     3.    Surface  of  East  River 

at  Point   of  "Blowout." 


PROBLEMS  OF  SUBWAY  CONSTRUCTION        265 

river  bed  while  he  was  pushing  the  tubes  across.  The 
hydraulic  shield  and  compressed  air  were  invoked.  The 
shield  was  pressed  forward  a  few  feet  a  day,  the  work- 
men, or  "sand-hogs",  excavating  the  material  in  front 
of  it  and  installing  the  cast  iron  rings  of  the  tubes  under 
its  protection,  the  water  in  the  material  above  being 
driven  out  by  compressed  air  introduced  into  the  workings 
through  pipes  connected  with  compressors  on  the  surface. 

Two  of  the  most  remarkable  accidents  ever  recorded 
in  compressed  air  work  happened  during  the  construc- 
tion of  the  subway  tunnels  under  the  East  River,  and  the 
second,  although  eleven  years  later,  was  almost  a 
duplicate  of  the  first.  In  each  case  a  man  was  blown  out 
of  the  tunnel  by  the  force  of  the  air,  through  the  river 
bed  and  through  the  water  to  the  surface  and  yet  came 
out  alive. 

The  first  accident  occurred  in  1905  during  the  con- 
struction of  the  Battery-Joralemon  street  tunnel  of  the 
first  subway.  As  frequently  happens,  a  "blow-out"  took 
place.  That  is,  the  compressed  air  found  a  weak  spot  in 
the  roof  of  the  tunnel  and  began  escaping.  In  such  cases 
the  usual  treatment  is  for  the  men  in  the  tunnel  to  heave 
bags  of  sand  or  clay  into  the  vortex  and  thus  stop  the 
leak.  On  this  occasion  Dick  Creedon,  a  workman  em- 
ployed by  the  contractor,  attempted  to  plug  the  air  hole 
with  a  bag  of  sand.  The  pressure  of  the  air  was  so  strong, 
however,  that  the  ^'blow-out"  sucked  both  bag  and  man 
into  the  vortex  and  forced  them  through  thirty  feet  of 
sand  and  silt  up  into  the  waters  of  the  river.  On  reaching 
the  surface  Creedon  began  swimming  and  was  soon  picked 
up  by  a  boat,  apparently  none  the  worse  for  his  mar- 
vellous experience.  The  "blow-out"  was  repaired  by 
dumping  tons  of  sand  from  scows  immediately  over  the 
break. 

The  second  of  these  accidents  occurred  in  1916  in  the 
Whitehall-Montague  street  tunnel  of  the  Dual  System 
subways,  also  under  the  East  River.    A  "blow-out"  oc- 


266  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

curred  in  the  north  tube  a  short  distance  out  from  the 
Brooklyn  shore.  The  shield  had  just  been  shoved  ahead 
for  the  placing  behind  it  of  another  ring  of  the  tunnel 
tube.  Four  workmen  were  about  to  place  the  top 
*' breasting"  board  in  its  new  position  just  ahead  of  the 
shield,  when  there  was  a  rush  of  air  and  three  of  the  four 
disappeared.  They  were  sucked  into  the  vortex  and 
through  twelve  feet  of  sand  to  the  river  bottom.  One 
of  them,  Marshall  Mabey,  shot  up  through  the  water  and 
into  the  air  on  the  top  of  a  geyser  which  eye  witnesses 
thought  reached  a  height  of  forty  feet  above  the  surface. 
When  he  dropped  back  into  the  water  he  began  swim- 
ming and  was  soon  picked  up  by  a  boat  sent  out  from  the 
contractor's  dock.  He  was  practically  unhurt.  His  com- 
panions were  less  fortunate.  One  was  found  unconscious 
in  the  river  forty  minutes  after  Mabey  was  rescued,  but 
efforts  to  resuscitate  him  were  unavailing.  The  body  of 
the  other  was  not  recovered  until  the  next  day.  It  is 
supposed  they  were  struck  by  some  hard  substance  in 
their  passage  through  the  river  bottom  and  either  killed 
or  made  unconscious  and  then  drowned.  The  break  was 
repaired  by  placing  a  blanket  of  clay  in  the  river  bottom. 
All  of  Manhattan  Island  is  underlain  with  rock,  but 
it  is  closer  to  the  surface  in  the  northern  part  of  the  island 
than  elsewhere,  so  that  a  subway  running  close  to  the 
surface  of  the  streets  passes  through  soft  sand  in  the 
southern  part  and  through  solid  rock  in  the  northern  part 
of  the  island.  At  low  places,  too,  it  must  be  built  below 
water  line.  These  varying  conditions  produced  varying 
problems  and  taxed  the  ingenuity  of  the  engineers  to  meet 
them.  In  the  sand  district  the  sides  of  the  cut  had  to  be 
buttressed  with  stout  timber  sheeting  to  prevent  their 
falling  in,  while  in  the  rocky  section  great  stretches  of 
tunnel  were  built  with  the  walls  of  the  cut  unsupported 
except  by  the  solidity  of  the  rock  itself.  At  many  places, 
however,  the  rock  is  treacherous,  and  here  great  care  had 
to  be  exercised.    Whenever  such  rock  was  encountered 


PEOBLEMS   OF   SUBWAY   CONSTRUCTION  267 

the  prudent  contractor  made  assurance  doubly  sure  by 
buttressing  the  rock  walls  with  heavy  timber  braces. 
Natural  mistakes  were  made  on  occasion  in  ''diagnos- 
ing" the  character  of  the  rock,  and  in  such  cases  gravity 
caused  slides  of  varying  dimensions.  A  notable  instance 
was  the  slide  in  Park  Avenue  near  Thirty-seventh  street 
referred  to  in  a  previous  chapter. 

Along  Lafayette  street  near  Canal  street  the  subway 
passed  through  marshy  ground,  in  places  below  the  tide 
water  level.  Here  pumps  had  to  be  used  to  keep  the  ex- 
cavation clear  of  water  while  the  work  proceeded.  It 
was  also  difficult  to  get  a  foundation  of  sufficient  stability 
for  the  subway  structure.  Such  conditions  here  and  in 
other  parts  of  the  line  made  waterproofing  neces- 
sary, and  the  first  subway  was  liberally  swathed  in  a  coat 
of  asphalt  blankets  to  keep  it  dry.  The  waterproofing, 
it  was  found  after  the  subway  was  opened,  was  imper- 
vious to  air  as  well  as  water,  with  the  result  that  it  tended 
to  keep  the  heated  air,  generated  in  the  tubes  by  the  fric- 
tion of  wheels  and  machinery,  from  escaping.  In  the  later 
built  subways  this  result  was  avoided  by  reducing  the 
waterproofing. 

Perhaps  the  most  difficult  piece  of  work  in  the 
sand  district  during  the  construction  of  the  first  sub- 
way was  the  excavation  in  front  of  Trinity  church  in 
lower  Broadway  on  the  Brooklyn  extension.  This  exten- 
sion runs  down  Broadway  from  the  City  Hall  to  Bowling 
Green,  where  it  turns  eastward  and  runs  under  the  East 
Eiver  to  Brooklyn,  two  tracks,  however,  continuing  down 
Broadway  to  the  Battery.  It  was  found  that  the  founda- 
tion of  the  church  spire  was  built  on  siand  and  extended 
only  nine  feet  below  the  sidewalk  level.  As  the  subway 
was  to  be  twenty-four  feet  down,  it  was  feared  the  exca- 
vation in  the  street,  which  was  to  be  only  nine  feet  away 
from  the  spire  foundation,  would  undermine  it.  To  pre- 
vent this  the  work  was  done  in  three  pockets.    The  cen- 


268  FIFTY  TEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

tral  pocket  was  first  excavated  emd  in  it  was  placed  a 
mass  of  concrete  for  the  floor  and  sidewall  of  the  subway, 
the  sand  at  the  side  being  held  up  meanwhile  by  steel 
sheeting  which  was  left  in  place  after  the  work  was  fin- 
ished. The  pockets  on  either  side  of  the  central  one  were 
then  treated  in  the  same  way  in  succession.  After  the 
work  was  done  and  the  subway  wall  and  floor  were  built 
in  front  of  the  church  it  was  found  that  there  had  been 
no  settlement  of  the  spire. 

Another  interesting  piece  of  work  on  the  first  subway 
was  the  placing  of  the  bridge  over  the  Harlem  ship  canal 
near  the  old  Kings  Bridge,  on  the  Broadway  branch. 
The  City  already  had  a  single  deck  bridge  at  the  point, 
which  was  used  for  ordinary  highway  traffic.  To  accom- 
modate the  subway  trains  it  was  necessary  to  replace  this 
bridge  with  a  double-deck  structure  to  carry  ordinary 
traffic  on  the  lower  and  the  subway  trains  on  the  upper 
deck.  The  new  steel  bridge  was  assembled  in  sections  on 
false  work  resting  on  barges  anchored  nearby.  When  it 
Yv'as  ready  to  install,  similar  barges  bearing  cribbing  were 
floated  under  the  old  bridge  at  low  tide,  and  as  the  tide 
rose  the  old  structure  was  lifted  clear  of  its  anchorages 
and  floated  away,  when  the  new  bridge  was  floated  into 
the  vacant  place  and  lowered  into  position  as  the  tide 
receded.  The  old  bridge  was  floated  down  to  207th  street, 
where  it  is  now  doing  duty  as  a  highway  bridge.  On  sev- 
eral other  occasions  the  rise  land  fall  of  the  tide  were 
utilized  in  this  way  to  facilitate  engineering  operations. 

Considering  the  magnitude  of  the  work,  the  Dual 
System  subway  and  elevated  roads  have  been  built 
with  surprisingly  little  disturbance  of  normal  conditions. 
Thanks  to  the  cut  and  cover  method  of  construction, 
traffic  in  the  streets  under  which  the  new  tunnels  were 
built  has  gone  on  day  by  day  with  slight  inconven- 
ience to  merchants  along  the  routes.  Of  course,  no  such 
work  could  be  done  without  inconveniencing  somebody, 
but  the  inconvenience  has  been  trifling  compared  to  the 


PEOBLEMS  OF  SUBWAY  CONSTRUCTION        269 

trouble  caused  by  the  building  of  the  first  subway.  The 
work  was  also  remarkably  free  from  accidents. 

A  perfect  record  in  this  respect  was  spoiled  by  two 
of  the  worst  accidents  attending  the  Dual  System  con- 
struction, and  singularly  enough  both  occurred  in  the 
same  month  and  within  a  few  days  of  each  other.  Both 
were  due  to  the  collapse  of  the  temporary  street  decking, 
but  the  causes  were  different.  The  first  took  place  in  the 
Seventh  Avenue  subway  on  September  22,  1915,  and  the 
second  followed  in  the  Broadway  subway  on  Septem- 
ber 25. 

The  first  was  by  far  the  worse.  Just  before  eight 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  when  rush  hour  traffic  on  the 
street  surface  was  at  its  height,  a  blast  was  fired  in  the 
north  heading  of  the  excavation  in  Seventh  Avenue,  just 
south  of  Twenty-fifth  street.  From  that  point  south  to 
about  Twenty-third  street  the  avenue  was  decked  over  by 
planking  supported  by  an  elaborate  system  of  timbering. 
As  usual  the  two  tracks  of  the  surface  car  line,  with  their 
ties  and  concrete  bed,  were  also  supported  in  the  same 
way  so  that  trolley  car  operation  might  go  on  as  usual. 

It  is  supposed  that  rocks  dislodged  by  the  blast  were 
hurled  against  the  nearest  timbers  supporting  the  deck- 
ing and  with  such  force  as  to  knock  them  down.  In  fall- 
ing they  carried  with  them  the  supporting  timbers  to  the 
south  for  a  short  distance,  thus  leaving  a  stretch  of  the 
street  decking  and  heavy  car  track  bed  hanging  in  the 
air.  The  weight  of  the  decking  and  car  tracks  on  the 
over-hang  proved  too  much  for  the  remaining  supports, 
which  fell  in  quick  succession  and  the  whole  street  surface 
between  a  point  south  of  Twenty-fifth  street  and  a  point 
south  of  Twenty-fourth  street,  or  something  over  a 
block,  fell  to  the  bottom  of  the  cut,  a  distance  of  thirty 
feet. 

A  loaded  trolley  car  was  going  north  in  Seventh  Av- 
enue at  the  time.  As  the  tracks  sank  in  front  of  it  gravity 
forced  it  into  the  declivity  and  it  slid  to  the  bottom,  where 


270  FIFTY  YEABS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

it  landed  a  complete  wreck.  Some  of  the  passengers  were 
killed  and  others  injured.  Most  of  them  got  out  or  were 
helped  out  safe,  but  few  escaped  some  slight  injury. 
Police  and  firemen,  with  the  contractor's  men  did  heroic 
rescue  work,  but  in  spite  of  their  efforts  eight  persons 
were  killed.  The  injured  were  treated  in  an  improvised 
hospital  near  by  and  later  removed  to  homes  or  the 
hospitals.  They  numbered  thirty  or  more.  Within  two 
weeks  the  contractors  had  the  debris  removed  and  the 
steel  work  of  the  new  subway  in  place.  It  was  found  that 
the  collapse  of  the  decking  had  been  stopped  where  the 
steel  work  ended,  namely  just  north  of  Twenty-third 
street.  When  the  pavement  was  replaced  it  rested  on 
solid  steel. 

Panic  over  this  accident  had  scarcely  subsided  when 
the  second  collapse  took  place.  This  was  on  a  section  of 
the  new  subway  in  Broadway.  On  Saturday  evening, 
September  25,  at  about  seven  o'clock  about  seventy-five 
feet  of  the  temporary  street  decking  on  the  west  side  of 
Broadway  just  north  of  Thirty-eighth  street  sank  into 
the  excavation,  falling  about  thirty  feet.  Fortunately 
there  were  few  persons  on  the  street  at  the  time,  and 
only  one  was  killed.  There  was  a  taxicab  standing  at 
the  curb  when  the  pavement  caved  in,  and  it  fell  to  the 
bottom  of  the  cut,  la  distance  of  about  twenty-five  feet. 
The  chauffeur  had  left  it  a  moment  before  and  was  safe  on 
the  sidewalk  when  his  machine  went  down. 

The  timbering  on  the  east  side  of  the  street  held,  so 
that  only  the  decking  on  the  western  half  fell  in.  The 
two  trolley  tracks  hung  in  air  and  though  they  sagged 
badly  they  did  not  break  and  fall.  It  was  only  by  the 
quick  action  of  the  motorman  of  a  southbound  car  that 
a  repetition  of  the  trolley  accident  in  Seventh  Avenue 
was  averted.  He  saw  the  street  sink  ahead  of  him, 
quickly  applied  the  brakes  and  then  reversed  his  power, 
sending  the  car  backwards  from  the  very  brink  of  the 
yawning  pit.     The  New  York  Railways   Company  re- 


PROBLEMS  OF  SUBWAY  CONSTRUCTION        271 

warded  him  for  Ms  presence  of  mind,  which  no  doubt 
saved  the  passengers  from  injury  and  possible  death. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  a  slide  of  rock  from  the 
west  side  of  the  cut.  The  rock  in  this  section  is  known 
by  the  engineers  as  treacherous,  and  wherever  it  looked 
suspicious  extna  precautions  were  taken  to  brace  it. 
Here,  however,  there  was  a  hidden  seam  which  did  not 
reveal  itself  until  hundreds  of  tons  of  rock  moved  laterally 
into  the  cut,  knocking  dowTi  the  nearest  timbers  support- 
ing the  street  decking  and  causing  the  collapse.  The 
timbering  was  exactly  the  same  kind  as  that  used  in 
Seventh  Avenue^in  fact  the  same  contractors  who  had 
the  Seventh  Avenue  work  also  had  the  Broadway  con- 
tract. They  used  a  combination  of  steel  beams  and 
timbers  which  was  supposed  to  be  particularly  strong. 
Engineers  of  the  Public  Service  Commission,  however, 
held  that  any  timbering  would  have  given  way  if  sub- 
jected to  such  a  stnain  and  did  not  find  fault  with  the 
method  used. 

The  authorities  took  prompt  action.  The  Public  Serv- 
ice Commission  opened  an  office  at  the  scene  and  its  engi- 
neers at  once  began  the  work  of  repairing  the  damage. 
The  Mayor  appointed  a  committee  of  engineers  from  the 
various  City  departments  to  investigate  and  this  com- 
mittee examined  all  contracts  on  which  timbering  was 
used  to  support  the  street  decking  and  made  recommen- 
dations for  certain  minor  changes  to  strengthen  the 
same.  These  were  put  into  effect  by  the  engineers  of 
the  Public  Service  Commission,  which  also  appointed  a 
board  of  three  consulting  engineers  from  other  cities  to 
study  <and  report  on  the  work.  This  board  consisted  of 
Edmund  S.  Davis,  of  Boston,  Henry  H.  Quimby,  of  Phila- 
delphia and  D.  C.  Jackling,  of  San  Francisco.  Mr.  Jack- 
ling  could  not  serve  and  the  work  was  done  by  Messrs. 
Davis  and  Quimby,  who  made  a  report  in  October,  1915, 
which  in  general  approved  the  style  of  timbering  used, 
made  certain  recommendations  for  improvement  and  sug- 


272  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

gested  the  employment  of  an  engineer  skilled  in  mining 
timber  work  to  supervise  all  timbering.  The  Commis- 
sion acted  on  the  recommendations  and  added  a  mining 
engineer  to  its  staff  in  the  person  of  H.  G.  Moulton,  who 
served  throughout  the  remaining  period  of  construction. 

More  than  two  years  before  the  decking  accidents, 
namely  in  June  1913,  a  fatal  slide  of  rock  occurred  in 
the  Lexington  Avenue  subway  work  near  56th  street. 
At  this  point  the  lower  or  express  tunnel  passes  through 
rock,  and  as  it  was  known  to  be  treacherous  the  con- 
tractor installed  timbering  to  support  the  roof  and  sides 
of  the  tunnel.  One  night  a  large  portion  of  the  roof  gave 
reveal  itself  until  hundreds  of  tons  of  rock  moved  laterally 
way  and  the  enormous  weight  of  many  tons  of  rock 
thrown  suddenly  on  the  timbering  caused  it  to  fail. 
Eleven  workmen  were  caught  in  the  tunnel  and  buried  by 
the  cave-in.    All  were  dead  when  taken  out. 

There  were  several  other  accidents  due  to  slides  of 
rock,  but  none  of  great  proportions.  These  caused  some 
loss  of  life.  The  number  of  fatal  accidents  was  small 
considering  the  magnitude  of  the  work. 

In  closing  this  chapter  a  word  about  the  engineers  of 
the  Public  Service  Commission  seems  appropriate.  At 
the  height  of  construction  the  force  numbered  more  than 
2,000  employes.  Its  functions  were  many,  but  may  be 
summarized  under  the  following  classifications: 

Studying  traffic  and  population  trend  and  laying  out 
and  surveying  routes  for  rapid  transit  lines. 

Making  general  and  detail  plans  for  the  construction 
of  rapid  transit  roads  and  designs  for  elevated  struc- 
tures, subway  and  elevated  stations. 

Eeconstructing  sewers  interfered  with  by  rapid  tran- 
sit lines  and  making  plans  therefor. 

Inspecting  materials  entering  into  rapid  transit  con- 
struction. 

Supervising  actual  construction  of  subways,  elevated 
railroads  and  sewers,  including  passing  on  plans  sub- 
mitted by  contractors  or  operating  companies. 


PROBLEMS   OF   SUBWAY   CONSTRUCTION  273 

The  inspection  of  materials  was  thorough  and  exten- 
sive. Every  bit  of  sand  and  cement  used  for  the  concrete 
work,  every  ton  of  steel  placed  in  the  structures,  all 
bricks,  lumber  land  mortar  used  in  the  work,  all  marble 
or  other  stone  going  into  it,  all  tiling  for  stations,  plumb- 
ing and  station  fittings  of  every  description — all  had  to 
pass  the  scrutiny  of  these  engineers.  The  proper  inspec- 
tion of  lumber,  steel  and  cement  involved  the  dispatching 
of  competent  men  to  the  mills  and  other  producing  plants 
in  distant  states,  but  this  was  done  and  many  such  men 
maintained  for  years  in  out  of  town  places.  This  saved 
the  rejection  of  unfit  materials  after  they  had  been  de- 
livered on  the  ground,  resulting  in  economy  for  both  the 
city  and  the  contractor. 

During  the  greater  part  of  the  Dual  System  work  the 
engineering  staff  of  the  Commission  was  headed  by  the 
following  men: 

Chief  Engineer — Alfred  Craven,  followed  by  D.  L. 
Turner. 

Engineer  of  Subway  Construction — Robert  Ridgway. 

Deputy  Engineer  of  Subway  Construction — Daniel  L. 
Turner. 

Engineer  in  Charge  of  Designs — Sverre  Dahm. 

Electrical  Engineer  in  Charge  of  Equipment — Clifton 
W.  Wilder. 

Engineer  of  First  Division — J.  0.  Shipman. 

Engineer  of  Second  Division — J.  H.  Myers. 

Engineer  of  Third  Division — ^C.  V.  V.  Powers. 

Engineer  of  Sixth  Division — F.  C.  Noble,  followed  by 
George  S.  Rice. 

Engineer  of  Seventh  Division — F.  W.  Carpenter. 

Engineer  of  Sewer  Division — L.  D.  Fouquet. 

Engineer  of  Tunnel  Division — C.  M.  Holland. 

Engineer  of  Track  Division — R.  H.  Jacobs. 

General  Inspector  of  Material — George  L.  Lucas. 

Engineer  of  Station  Finish  Division — Jasper  T.  Kane. 

Engineer  of  Subsurface  Structures — Charles  N.  Green. 

Consulting  Mining  Engineer — H.  G.  Moulton. 

Consulting  Engineers — Gibbs  and  Hill  and  Alfred 
Noble. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
Rapid  Transit  in  Brooklyn. 

T3  APID  TRANSIT  development  in  Brookljm  naturally 
followed  the  successful  operation  of  the  elevated 
railroads  in  New  York,  although  several  years  elapsed 
before  the  growth  of  Brooklyn  reached  a  point  w^hich 
demanded  better  and  quicker  transportation  than  was 
■afforded  by  the  horse  car  lines.  These  had  multiplied 
with  great  rapidity  in  the  period  between  1850  and  1870, 
when  New  York's  first  elevated  railroad  began  practical 
operation.  But  by  that  time  Brooklyn  had  grown  to  be  a 
city  of  400,000  people,  and  the  demand  for  rapid  transit 
wia;s  already  insistent.  It  had  been  partially  supplied  by 
the  Long  Island  Railroad  and  other  steam  roads  leading 
to  Coney  Island,  but  aside  from  these  the  city  itself  had 
no  means  of  rapid  transit. 

The  first  project  of  note  was  that  of  the  Brooklyn 
Steam  Transit  Company,  chartered  in  May,  1870,  for  the 
purpose  of  building  an  elevated  railroad  from  the  East 
River  to  Flatbush.  The  charter  covered  both  under- 
ground and  elevated  construction,  allowed  two  or  more 
tracks  and  gave  wide  choice  of  a  route,  which  was  to  run 
from  Fulton  Ferry  to  the  southern  limits  of  Prospect 
Park  in  such  streets  as  might  be  found  most  convenient. 
It  permitted  the  use  of  steam  or  any  other  power  except 
horses.  The  company  was  to  provide  both  first  and  sec- 
ond class  cars,  but  in  the  city  limits  was  not  to  charge 
more  than  ten  cents  for  a  first  class  fare.  The  capital 
was  to  be  $3,000,000  with  power  to  increase  it  to  $7,000,- 
000,  land  the  right  to  extend  the  line  to  and  through  any 
towns  of  Kings  County  was  granted.  At  least  one  mile 
of  road  must  be  built  within  three  years. 

The  list  of  incorporators  included  the  names  of  many 
m.en  then  and  afterwards  famous  in  the  civic  life  of 
Brooklyn.    Among  them  were  Samuel  McLean,  Seymour 


RAPID  TRANSIT  IN  BROOKLYN  275 

L.  Husted,  Henry  E.  Pierrepont,  Alfred  S.  Barnes,  A.  A. 
Low,  Archibald  M.  Bliss,  Jacob  I.  Bergen,  Cyrus  P. 
Smith,  John  Lefferts,  Williiain  C.  Kingsley,  Simeon  B. 
Chittenden,  Benjamin  F.  Tracy  and  Alexander  B.  Powell. 

The  project,  however,  came  to  naught.  The  length  of 
the  proposed  road  was  more  than  five  miles,  and  its  esti- 
mated cost  more  than  $5,000,000.  Subscriptions  to  the 
capital  stock  came  in  slowly,  and  the  panic  of  1873  made 
the  financing  all  the  more  difficult.  In  that  year  it  was 
reported  in  the  press  that  only  $500,000  had  been  sub- 
scribed, and  after  many  ups  and  downs  the  company  went 
out  of  existence,  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  1879  deciding 
that  it  had  forfeited  its  charter  by  its  failure  to  build  in 
the  specified  time.  The  company  had  broken  ground  to 
begin  work  on  June  1,  1878. 

Meanwhile  the  company  destined  to  operate  the  first 
elevated  railroad  in  Brooklyn  was  organized.  This  was 
the  Brooklyn  Elevated  Railroad  Company,  which  was 
chartered  in  1874  with  $5,000,000  capital  to  build  a  ''si- 
lent, safety"  road  from  the  end  of  the  proposed  Brooklyn 
Bridge,  then  just  started,  to  Woodhaven  in  Queens, 
through  several  Brooklyn  streets  and  Fulton  Avenue, 
East  New  York.  It  was  also  to  have  a  branch  to  Fulton 
Ferry.  It  was  provided  in  the  charter  that  steam  loco- 
motives might  be  used  for  motive  power,  but  that  they 
should  not  emit  smoke  or  cinders  and  that  the  noise  of 
operation  should  be  lessened  by  suitable  devices.  The 
latter  provisions  seem  to  have  been  honored  mainly  in 
the  breiach. 

The  incorporators  included  Jacob  Cole,  Cornelius  B. 
Payne,  John  H.  Burtis,  Abraham  Lott,  B.  F.  Clayton, 
John  L.  Nostrand,  Job  Johnson,  Florian  Grosjean,  John 
Q.  Kellogg,  Joseph  F.  Bridges  and  other  well  known  citi- 
zens of  the  time.  Burtis  was  elected  president  and  Kel- 
logg secretary. 

Like  similar  projects  in  Manhattan  this  scheme  had 
its  ups  and  downs  and  its  tragedies.    Among  the  latter 


276  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

the  pitiful  story  of  Q.  Kirkup,  an  English  engineer  takes 
first  rank.  In  England  Kirkup  had  been  connected  with 
John  Stephenson,  the  father  of  railroading,  and  with  an 
only  daughter  had  come  to  this  country  with  some  money. 
In  March,  1875,  he  became  connected  with  the  Brooklyn 
Elevated  Eailroad  Company,  drew  its  plans,  solicited 
funds  and  devoted  his  whole  time  and  means  to  the  scheme 
for  two  years.  After  vainly  trying  to  put  the  company  on 
its  feet  he  died  in  extreme  poverty.  His  work,  his  honest 
life  and  his  sacrifices  have  earned  for  him  a  place  in  the 
history  of  rapid  transit. 

The  directors  quarreled  and  Burtis  resigned  as  presi- 
dent. Various  schemes  were  tried  to  raise  money.  A 
promoter  named  Whibeck  was  employed,  and  one  of 
his  methods  was  to  open  with  prayer  the  meetings 
he  got  up  to  stimulate  interest  in  the  enterprise.  In  May, 
1876,  Burtis  was  re-elected  president  and  the  company 
obtained  from  the  Common  Council  a  resolution  chang- 
ing its  route  so  as  to  pass  through  Willoughby  street. 
Gold  street,  DeKalb  avenue.  Grand  avenue,  Lexington 
avenue  and  Broadway.  This  caused  a  popular  outburst 
of  opposition,  and  an  agitation  ensued,  led  by  such  men 
as  the  Rev.  T.  DeWitt  Talmage,  which  resulted  in  the 
veto  of  the  grant  by  Mayor  Schroeder. 

It  was  then  decided  to  build  according  to  the  original 
route,  and  on  May  24,  1876,  ground  was  broken  lat  the 
corner  of  Reid  and  Lexington  avenues.  Mayor  Schroeder 
himself  turned  the  first  shovel-full  of  earth,  but  in  his 
address  justified  his  previous  action  in  vetoing  the  new 
route.  The  company's  workmen  then  dug  pits  and  in- 
stalled a  few  foundation  stones  for  pillars,  and  these 
stones  came  into  use  later  when  the  road  was  built.  Af- 
ter they  were  placed,  however,  no  more  work  was  done 
for  some  time. 

An  internal  fight  over  plans  ensued.  Kirkup  had 
drawn  plans  for  a  two-track  elevated  road,  substantially 
like  those  finally  adopted,  but  Nostrand  did  not  like  them 


RAPID  TRANSIT  IN  BROOKLYN  277 

and  submitted  a  set  of  his  own.  Another  director  became 
enamored  of  a  single  rail  device  and  urged  its  adoption. 
This  was  an  invention  of  General  Roy  Stone  and  had 
been  placed  in  trial  operation  over  a  gorge  in  Fairmount 
Park,  Philadelphia,  at  the  Centennial  Exposition  then  in 
progress.  It  was  described  as  "a  triangular  trestle  work 
like  the  letter  A,  with  one  rail  on  top,  over  which  engine 
and  cars  hung  like  a  saddle  on  a  horse's  back."  Nothing 
came  of  this  plan. 

It  is  a  singkr  thing,  however,  that  just  thirty  years 
later,  namely  in  1906,  an  English  engineer,  F.  B.  Behr, 
who  had  patented  the  same  idea,  was  demonstrating  the 
scheme  in  New  York  and  trying  to  get  the  Board  of  Rapid 
Transit  Railroad  Commissioners  to  give  him  a  franchise 
to  build  and  operate  a  mono-rail  line  on  substantially 
this  plan  from  the  heart  of  Brooklyn  to  Coney  Island. 
Behr  proposed  to  operate  it  by  electric  motors  and 
claimed  to  be  able  to  ^attain  a  speed  of  one  hundred  miles 
an  hour  with  perfect  safety  to  the  passengers.  He  failed 
in  his  efforts  to  get  a  franchise. 

In  1877  and  1878  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  project  lan- 
guished. Other  rapid  transit  schemes  attracted  public 
a:ttention.  Deacon  Richardson  negotiated  the  lease  of 
Atlantic  Avenue  to  the  Long  Island  Railroad  Company. 
In  June  1878  the  Brooklyn  Steam  Transit  Company,  pre- 
viously referred  to,  then  dominated  by  S.  B.  Chittenden, 
broke  ground  for  its  road  on  Atlantic  Avenue,  but  Deacon 
Richardson  caused  railroad  iron  to  be  piled  over  the 
excavations  and  hired  men  to  drive  off  the  other  com- 
pany's workers  if  they  dared  to  remove  it. 

The  style  and  form  of  the  first  elevated  road  in 
Brooklyn  were  settled  in  1878  by  a  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
mission appointed  on  the  petition  of  property  owners 
by  Mayor  Howell,  under  the  Act  of  1875.  This  commis- 
sion consisted  of  J.  W.  Adams,  N.  H.  Clement,  C.  J.  Low- 
rey,  J.  Y.  Culyer  and  Felix  Campbell.  Several  plans 
were  submitted  to  the  commission,  which  finally  decided 


278  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  EAPID  TRANSIT 

on  the  type  of  road  later  built  and  thus  sounded  the  death 
knell  of  the  "silent  safety"  and  "saddle-back"  devices. 
It  was  this  commission  which  organized  the  Kings  County 
Elevated  Railroad  Company,  which  was  later  to  put  into 
operation  Brooklyn's  second  elevated  railroad  system. 
Boston  capitalists  got  a  large  share  of  the  original  stock, 
>aind  for  some  time  there  was  continued  agitation  against 
"foreign"  capital  gobbling  up  the  Brooklyn  franchise. 

In  1879  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  Railroad  Company 
was  reorganized.  R.  B.  Floyd-Jones,  a  well  known  Long 
Islander,  acquired  control  and  brought  in  the  most  pic- 
turesque figure  in  Brooklyn's  rapid  transit  history, 
W.  Fontaine  Bruff.  Bruff  was  an  English  engineer,  who 
parted  his  hair  as  well  as  his  name  in  the  middle.  He  was 
one  of  the  early  types  of  the  breezy,  energetic  promoter, 
and  while  he  spent  money  lavishly  he  seems  to  have  had 
a  talent  for  gathering  it  in,  and  is  credited  with  infusing 
life  into  the  lainguishing  project  and  bringing  about  the 
road's  construction.  When  he  finally  got  the  work  started 
he  would  drive  to  it  each  morning  in  a  stylish  carriage, 
with  a  liveried  coachman.  He  brought  bankers  into  line 
and  for  a  time  funds  rolled  in  upon  him  at  the  rate  of 
$90,000  a  week.  He  w>as  elected  president  of  the  company 
in  January,  1879. 

In  the  meantime  the  Kings  County  Elevated  Railroad 
Company  became  active,  under  the  presidency  of  Judge 
H.  G.  Bond.  Unable  to  get  the  consents  of  property  own- 
ers in  the  required  number,  it  applied  to  the  courts  for  a 
commission  to  determine  the  necessity  of  the  road.  In 
March  1879  the  court  (appointed  J.  G.  Hewlett,  S.  B.  Bar- 
tow and  Thomas  E.  Silliman.  In  April  it  became  known 
that  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  had  let  a  contract  in  Febru- 
ary for  the  construction  of  its  line  to  Floyd-Jones.  Then 
ensued  a  fight  between  Bruff  for  the  Brooklyn  company 
and  Bond  for  the  Kings  County  company,  which  wanted 
a  fraiuchise  for  a  part  of  the  route  of  the  former.  In 
spite  of  opposition  Bruff  started  work  with  sixteen  men 


RAPID  TRANSIT  IX  BROOKLYN  279 

on  May  12  at  the  corner  of  Reid  and  Lexington  avenues. 
The  police,  who  had  announced  that  this  would  not  be  per- 
mitted, promptly  stopped  the  work  and  arrested  all 
hands.  Later  they  were  released  on  bail,  and  next  day 
Bruff  resumed  operations  with  another  gang.  They,  too, 
were  arrested,  and  work  then  was  suspended  pending 
the  action  of  the  courts.  Finally  the  defendants  were  dis- 
charged and  Bruff  was  permitted  to  resume  work. 

While  these  events  were  in  progress  the  Brooklyn 
aldermen  approved  the  franchise  of  the  Kings  County 
company.  The  act  aroused  a  storm  of  indignation  and 
Mayor  Howell  vetoed  the  grant  and  rebuked  the  alder- 
men, who  promptly  passed  it  over  his  veto.  The  fight 
for  the  franchise  was  then  taken  into  court.  Meantime 
Bruff  had  put  in  the  foundations  for  his  elevated  columns 
at  every  point  on  the  Brooklyn  company's  line  touched 
by  the  Kings  County  company's  franchise  or  had  erected 
scaffoldings  or  iron  work.  He  had  700  to  800  men  en- 
gaged. On  October  9,  1879,  the  Court  of  Appeals  decided 
against  the  Kings  County  company,  leaving  the  field  clear 
for  the  Brooklyn  Elevated. 

During  the  year  1880  materials  came  in  slowly,  con- 
struction work  lagged  and  a  fight  on  Bruff  began.  In 
October  the  directors  quarreled  and  many  resigned. 
Finally  on  the  application  of  one  director,  Edward  S. 
Keeler,  the  Supreme  Court  ended  Bruff 's  reign  by  ap- 
pointing Richard  G.  Phelps  as  receiver  for  the  company. 
His  appointment  was  /attacked  and  after  much  litigation 
he  was  ousted  and  John  B.  Lydecker  and  Samuel  M. 
Schaeffer  were  confirmed  as  receivers.  They  issued 
$2,500,000  in  receivers'  certificates  and  built  two  miles 
and  a  half  of  elevated  structure,  from  Hudson  avenue 
land  Prospect  street  to  Bedford  and  Lexington  avenues. 
Then  the  money  ran  out  and  work  stopped. 

From  that  time  to  1884  little  was  accomplished.  In 
1881  the  Common  Council  adopted  a  resolution  permit- 
ting the  Brooklyn  Elevated  company  to  change  its  route 


280  FIFTY  YEARS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

SO  as  to  include  Myrtle  avenue  and  part  of  Fulton  street 
in  its  franchise.  Mayor  Howell  vetoed  it  and  the  alder- 
men were  enjoined  from  passing  it  over  his  veto.  On  the 
last  day  of  the  year,  however,  they  did  so  in  the  face  of 
the  injunction  and  all  were  arrested.  After  a  hearing  in 
January,  1882,  they  were  sentenced  to  jail  for  from  ten 
to  thirty  days  each.  They  actually  were  incarcerated  for 
a  short  time,  but  were  released  on  legal  proceedings  pend- 
ing trial.  In  the  following  November  most  of  them  had 
to  go  to  jail  for  a  brief  period. 

In  1884  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  was  reorganized,  taken 
out  of  the  receivers'  hands  and  successfully  financed  to 
completion.  This  was  brought  about  principally  by 
Frederick  Uhlman,  who  acted  as  chairman  of  the  Bond- 
holders' Committee.  The  first  mortgage,  which  was  held 
by  the  Farmers'  Loan  and  Trust  Company,  was  fore- 
closed, and  on  May  12,  1884,  the  property  was  bought  in 
by  Uhlman  on  behalf  of  the  trustees  for  the  bondholders 
for  $100,000  in  excess  of  the  receivers'  certificates.  On 
May  29  articles  of  incorporation  were  filed  for  the  Brook- 
lyn Elevated  Railroad  Company,  with  the  following 
named  directors:  Frederick  Uhlman,  Alfred  J.  Pouch, 
Stephen  Pettus,  Elbert  Snedeker,  Hugo  Rothschilds,  Ed- 
ward Lauterbach,  Charles  J.  G.  Hall,  Abram  J.  Harden- 
berg,  Leonard  Lewisohn,  Adolph  Landenberg  and  Henry 
W.  Putnam.  On  June  1  Putnam  was  elected  president. 
Hall  vice-president,  Snedeker  treasurer  and  Pettus  secre- 
tary. 

Thereafter  everything  went  smoothly.  An  extension 
of  time  was  obtained  from  the  Legislature  and  work  all 
along  the  line  was  pushed.  The  first  rail  was  laid  in  Jan- 
uary, 1885,  and  on  May  13  following  the  first  five  miles 
of  road  was  placed  in  operation.  Mayor  Low,  then  Brook- 
lyn's  chief  magistrate,  participated  in  the  opening  cere- 
monies, and  the  people  hailed  the  first  rapid  transit  line 
with  great  enthusiasm. 

The  route  as  it  began  operation  was  from  York  and 


RAPID  TRANSIT  IN  BROOKLYN  281 

Washington  streets  along  York  to  Hudson  avenue,  along 
Hudson  to  Park  avenue,  along  Park  to  Grand  avenue, 
along  Grand  to  Lexington  avenue,  along  Lexington  to 
Broadway  and  along  Broadway  to  East  New  York. 
George  B.  Cornell  was  the  chief  engineer  who  finished 
the  road.  The  main  part  of  it  is  now  (1917)  operated  as 
the  Broadway  line  of  the  New  York  Consolidated  Rail- 
road Company,  of  the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company's 
system. 

Similar  vicissitudes  marked  the  career  of  the  Kings 
County  Elevated  Railroad  Company,  already  referred  to. 
It  was  organized  in  December,  1878,  about  a  year  after 
the  charter  was  granted.  Judge  Bond,  of  Brooklyn, 
above  mentioned,  formed  the  company  which  accepted 
the  franchise  and  took  up  the  work  of  getting  property 
owners'  consents.  Failing  to  obtain  the  required  number, 
the  company  appealed  to  the  court.  A  commission  to 
determine  was  appointed  and  reported  favorably,  but  the 
General  Term  refused  to  confirm  the  report  on  the  ground 
that  the  construction  of  the  road  would  destroy  private 
property.  Judge  Bond  became  discouraged  and  dropped 
the  project. 

A  combination  was  then  formed  by  General  James 
Jourdan  and  H.  J.  Davison,  of  Brooklyn,  and  William 
Foster  Jr.,  of  New  York,  which  attempted  to  resuscitate 
the  scheme.  They  made  another  effort  to  get  consents  but 
failed,  although  they  met  with  more  encouragement  than 
their  predecessors.  They  obtained  the  appointment  of 
another  commission  by  the  court,  and  again  the  commis- 
sion made  a  favorable  report.  Judge  Gilbert,  of  General 
Term,  confirmed  the  report  but  left  his  decision  sealed 
and  sailed  for  Europe  before  its  consideration  was  taken 
up  formally  by  the  court.  Judges  Barnard  and  Dykman 
gave  judgment  that  the  decision  was  incompetent  and 
that  Judge  Gilbert  would  not  have  rendered  it  had  he 
known  all  the  facts.     After  this  defeat  William  Foster 


282  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

Jr.  became  discouraged  and  withdrew  from  the  enter- 
prise. 

Davison  and  Jourdan,  having  faith  in  the  project, 
formed  a  new  combination,  which  after  many  ups  and 
downs  resulted  in  the  company  which  built  the  road.  It 
was  involved  in  continuous  litigation,  which  it  fought 
successfully  to  the  Court  of  Appeals.  The  directors  of 
this  company  were  Edward  A.  Abbott,  James  0.  Sheldon, 
Henry  J.  Davison,  Wendell  Goodwin,  Henry  J.  Robinson, 
Plarvey  Farrington,  James  Jourdan  and  William  A.  Read. 
Jourdan  was  president. 

The  contract  for  construction  was  given  to  the  Phoenix 
Bridge  company,  which  built  the  road  from  Nostrand 
avenue  through  Fulton  street  to  the  Bridge  and  Fulton 
Ferry.  This  part  of  the  line  was  placed  in  operation  April 
24,  1888.  Ground  had  been  broken  at  the  corner  of  Ful- 
ton street  and  Red  Hook  Lane  in  the  fall  of  1885.  The 
line  is  now  a  part  of  the  Fulton  street  elevated  road  op- 
erated by  the  New  York  Consolidated  Railroad  Company. 

Another  pioneer  project  in  rapid  transit  in  Brooklyn 
was  the  Union  Elevated  Railroad  Company.  This  was 
organized  in  1886  to  build  certain  lines,  which  as  soon  as 
constructed  were  leased  to  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  Com- 
pany to  operate.  The  first  line  opened  was  the  Hudson 
avenue  branch,  running  from  the  Long  Island  Railroad 
station  through  Flatbush  and  Hudson  avenues  and  con- 
necting with  the  line  of  the  Brooklyn  Elevated  from  Park 
Avenue  to  the  Fulton  Ferry.  By  1890  the  Union  had  con- 
structed eleven  miles  of  elevated  road,  all  operated  by 
the  Brooklyn  Elevated.  In  the  same  year  the  two  com- 
panies were  consolidated  under  the  name  of  the  Brooklyn 
Union  Elevated  Railroad  Company.  The  combined  capi- 
tal was  $13,000,000  and  the  total  length  of  the  combined 
roads  was  eighteen  miles. 

Within  a  few  years  all  the  various  elevated  companies 
were  acquired  by  the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company, 
which  also  absorbed  most  of  the  surface  car  companies  of 


RAPID  TRANSIT  IN  BROOKLYN  283 

Brooklyn.  The  same  interests  control  them  today.  As 
told  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  Brooklyn  Eapid  Transit 
Company  joined  the  City  of  New  York  in  the  Dual  System 
agreements  of  1913  and  organized  the  New  York  Muni- 
cipal Railway  Corporation  to  enter  into  the  contract  with 
the  City.  In  preparation  for  this  step  the  elevated  rail- 
road companies  were  merged  under  the  name  of  the  New 
York  Consolidated  Railroad  Company,  which  operates 
the  old  lines  together  with  the  new  lines  leased  to  the 
New  York  Municipal  Railway  Corporation. 

Aside  from  the  projects  mentioned  Brooklyn  like  New 
York  was  filled  with  rapid  transit  schemes  during  the 
period  of  organization  and  construction.  Many  never 
got  beyond  the  paper  stage,  while  others  flourished  for  a 
time  only  to  fail  in  the  end.  Among  the  unusual  ones  was 
the  Gravity  Railroad.  This  was  projected  in  1888  by  an 
engineer  named  Henning.  His  plan  was  to  connect 
Brooklyn  with  New  York  by  two  tunnels  under  the  East 
River,  starting  from  each  side  at  the  surface  of  the 
ground  and  descending  to  and  under  the  river  at  a  grade 
sufficient  to  carry  the  cars  from  one  side  to  the  other  by 
the  force  of  gravity  alone.  In  1890  the  East  River  Tun- 
nel Company  was  incorporated  to  build  the  tunnels  and 
to  operate  them  partly  by  Henning 's  gravity  system  and 
partly  by  cable  power.  The  scheme  was  never  carried 
out.  Henning  calculated  that  he  could  shoot  his  trains 
under  the  river  in  one  minute  and  a  half. 


CHAPTER  XX 

The  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Tunnels  under  the  Hud- 
son ElVEE. 

p  LANS  for  bridging  over  or  tunnelling  under  the  Hud- 
son River  were  formed  about  the  middle  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century,  but  it  was  not  until  1873  that  they 
took  definite  shape.  In  that  year  the  Hudson  River  Tun- 
nel Company  was  incorporated  to  build  a  tunnel  under 
the  Hudson  to  connect  New  York  City  with  the  railroads 
terminating  at  Jersey  City,  New  Jersey.  Its  president 
was  De  Witt  C.  Haskin,  a  man  of  bold  and  determined 
character  whose  project  for  boring  a  highway  under  the 
mighty  river  was  far  ahead  of  his  times.  He  failed,  but 
his  idea  lived  and  was  carried  out  a  third  of  a  century 
later  by  men  who  then  could  command  the  skill  and  expe- 
rience lacking  in  Haskin 's  day. 

It  was  in  November,  1874,  that  Haskin 's  company  be- 
gan work.  His  plan  contemplated  a  tunnel  26  feet  wide  by 
24  feet  high  to  accommodate  two  tracks.  The  tunnel  was 
to  have  an  iron  shell,  with  a  lining  of  brick  masonry  three 
feet  thick.  The  first  work  was  to  sink  a  shaft  on  the 
New  Jersey  side  about  100  feet  from  the  river  at  the 
foot  of  Fifteenth  street,  Jersey  City.  This  shaft  had 
been  sunk  to  a  depth  of  twenty  feet,  when  the  Delaware, 
Lackawanna  and  Western  Railroad  Company  started 
injunction  proceedings.  This  and  other  litigation 
stopped  the  work  for  five  years.  It  was  resumed  in  1879, 
when  the  shaft  was  completed  to  a  depth  of  60  feet  and 
from  the  bottom  a  heading  for  the  tunnel  was  started. 
Compressed  air  was  used  to  support  the  roof  and  keep 
out  the  water,  but  without  the  shield  now  so  universally 
used. 

The  engineers  in  charge  of  the  work  were  Spielman 
and  Brush,  and  they  changed  the  plans  to  provide  for 
two  tunnels  instead  of  one,  each  to  be  of  elliptical  shape 


HUDSON  AND  MANHATTAN  TUNNELS  285 

and  to  carry  one  track,  and  to  be  18  feet  high  and  16  feet 
wide.  In  July,  1880,  the  North  tunnel  had  been  driven 
280  feet  and  the  South  tunnel  15  feet,  when  a  bad  *' blow- 
out" of  air  occurred,  letting  the  river  water  into  the 
works  and  drowning  about  twenty  men.  It  took  six 
months  to  sink  a  pneumatic  caisson  alongside  and  regain 
entry  into  the  tunnel.  Before  the  accident  the  tunnel 
had  been  allowed  to  get  both  out  of  grade  and  out  of 
alignment,  and  some  of  the  brick  lining  had  cracked. 

In  May,  1881,  General  William  Sooy  Smith  took 
charge  as  chief  engineer,  but  remained  only  one  year. 
During  that  time  work  was  resumed  and  a  caisson  was 
sunk  on  the  New  York  side  at  the  foot  of  Morton  street. 
The  work  continued  with  varying  fortune  until  Novem- 
ber, 1882,  when  it  was  stopped  for  lack  of  funds.  At 
that  time  the  North  tunnel  from  New  Jersey  had  been 
driven  1,542  feet,  the  South  tunnel  570  feet  and  the  North 
tunnel  from  New  York  74  feet.  In  December  of  that 
year  Trenor  W.  Park,  who  had  suceeded  Haskin  as  presi- 
dent of  the  company,  died  at  sea  and  was  succeeded  by 
C.  G.  Francklyn. 

Additional  funds  were  obtained  and  the  work  was 
resumed  in  April,  1883,  at  the  New  York  end,  but  in 
August  the  money  gave  out  and  operations  again  were 
suspended.  The  suspension  lasted  until  April,  1887, 
when  work  was  resumed  on  the  New  Jersey  side,  but  was 
again  suspended  in  September,  when  the  Jersey  North 
tunnel  was  out  1,840  feet  from  the  shaft. 

In  1889  bonds  were  floated  in  England  and  work  was 
once  more  resumed,  this  time  with  S.  Pearson  and  Sons, 
of  London,  as  contractors,  and  William  R.  Hutton  as 
engineer.  By  the  end  of  the  year  the  North  tunnel  from 
Jersey  City  had  been  driven  2,000  feet  from  the  shaft, 
although  a  bad  "blow-out"  marked  the  progress  of  the 
work.  At  this  point  the  contractors  introduced  the  use 
of  the  tunnel  shield,  which  was  installed  in  1890,  and 
thereafter  the  work  was  pursued  by  this  method.    A  year 


286  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

later  the  North  tunnel  reached  a  point  3,700  feet  out, 
which  was  about  700  feet  across  the  New  York  State 
line.  In  August,  1891,  however,  another  financial  crisis 
arose,  following  the  great  Baring  failure,  and  the  com- 
pany found  it  impossible  to  procure  funds.  Accordingly 
work  was  again  suspended,  with  the  North  tunnel  bored 
to  a  point  3,900  feet  out.  In  1892  the  contractors,  S. 
Pearson  and  Sons,  filed  a  lien  for  $20,000  on  the  tunnel. 
The  British  company  failed  to  advance  the  needed  money 
and  the  work  was  practically  abandoned  for  ten  years. 

In  the  meantime,  namely  in  1899,  the  tunnel  was  sold 
under  foreclosure  and  purchased  by  Stetson,  Jennings 
and  Eussell,  a  New  York  law  firm,  acting  for  the  bond- 
holders. In  1902  the  project  was  revived  by  the  New 
York  and  Jersey  Railroad  company,  organized  by  Will- 
iam G.  McAdoo,  a  New  York  Lawyer,  who  subsequently 
became  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  President  Wilson's 
cabinet.  This  company  acquired  the  old  company's  rights 
and  resumed  work  in  1902,  with  Charles  M.  Jacobs  as 
chief  engineer.  It  applied  at  once  to  the  Board  of  Rapid 
Transit  Railroad  Commissioners  for  a  perpetual  franchise 
under  the  New  York  rapid  transit  act  for  tunnel  rights 
from  Morton  street,  Manhattan,  to  the  New  Jersey  State 
boundary  under  the  Hudson  River,  there  to  connect  with 
the  partially  built  tunnel  from  Jersey  City.  The  franchise 
was  granted  by  the  Board  on  July  10,  1902,  but  was  not 
approved  by  the  Board  of  Aldermen  and  the  Mayor  until 
the  following  December. 

As  the  tunnel  was  to  run  southward  on  the  New  Jer- 
sey side  to  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  terminal  in  Jer- 
sey City,  it  was  decided  to  get  a  franchise  for  an  addi- 
tional tunnel  under  the  river  from  that  point  to  lower 
Manhattan.  For  this  purpose  a  new  company,  known  as 
the  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Railroad  company,  was  or- 
ganized in  1903.  The  new  company  applied  to  the 
Board  for  another  perpetual  franchise  for  two  more 
tubes,  to  run  from  a  point  between  Liberty  and  Fulton 


MODERN  STEEL  CAR  TRAINS  OPERATED   IN 
NEW  YORK   SUBWAYS 

1.    Train  of  Interborough  Rapid  Transit 
Company;     2.    Train  of  New  York  Con- 
solidated Railroad  Company. 


HUDSON  AND  MANHATTAN  TUNNELS  287 

streets,  Manhattan,  under  the  Hudson  River  to  the  State 
line,  there  to  connect  with  similar  tubes  to  be  built  out 
from  Jersey  City.  This  was  granted  by  the  Board  on 
November  24  and  approved  by  the  Aldermen  and  the 
Mayor  late  in  December,  1903. 

Meanwhile  the  work  was  proceeding  rapidly  under 
the  management  of  Mr.  Jacobs.  In  March,  1904,  the 
North  tunnel  was  ''holed  through"  and  in  September, 
1905,  the  South  tunnel  headings  were  joined.  In  the 
same  month  work  was  begun  on  the  downtown  tunnel. 

On  March  2,  1904,  the  New  York  and  Jersey  Railroad 
Company  made  further  application  to  the  Board  for  an 
extension  of  its  tunnel  route  from  the  Manhattan  ter- 
minus at  Greenwich  street  and  West  Tenth  street  to 
Sixth  Avenue  and  thence  northward  under  Sixth  Avenue 
to  Thirty-third  street,  and  for  a  perpetual  franchise 
therefor.  This  was  denied  by  the  Board,  which  was  un- 
willing to  grant  perpetual  rights  in  such  a  case,  involv- 
ing one  of  the  principal  north  and  south  avenues  of  New 
York  City.  On  May  5,  1904,  the  company  made  applica- 
tion for  a  "limited  term"  franchise  for  the  Sixth  Av- 
enue line,  but  on  May  24  withdrew  it  and  substituted  one 
for  an  extension  from  Christopher  and  Greenwich  streets 
easterly  under  Christopher  and  Ninth  streets  to  Third 
avenue.  Property  owners  in  Sixth  avenue  objected 
to  the  abandonment  of  the  proposed  extension 
under  that  thoroughfare  to  Thirty-third  street, 
and  the  Board  finally  agreed  to  offer  the  company  a 
franchise  for  it  subject  to  recaption  by  the  City  in  twen- 
ty-five years,  and  a  franchise  in  perpetuity  for  the  Ninth 
street  extension  as  far  as  Fourth  avenue.  The  company 
was  willing  and  accordingly  the  Board  granted  the  fran- 
chise for  both  extensions  on  these  conditions  on  Decem- 
ber 22,  1904. 

The  franchise  provided  for  the  extension  of  the  two- 
track  subway  from  the  previous  terminal  at  Greenwich, 
West  Tenth  and  Christopher  streets  easterly  under  Chris- 


288  FIFTY  YEAES  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

topher  street  to  Sixth  Avenue,  whence  two  tracks  should 
proceed  northward  under  Sixth  avenue  to  Thirty-third 
street  and  two  tracks  eastwardly  under  Ninth  street  to 
Fourth  avenue.  Stations  Avere  located  in  Christopher 
street  between  Greenwich  and  Hudson  streets;  Chris- 
topher street  and  Sixth  avenue;  in  Sixth  avenue  at  Four- 
teenth, Eighteenth,  Twenty-third,  Twenty-eighth  and 
Thirty-third  streets. 

As  rental  it  was  provided  that  the  company  should 
pay  to  the  City  annually  fifty  cents  per  foot  for  each 
linear  foot  of  single  track  railroad  for  ten  years  after 
beginning  operation  and  one  dollar  per  foot  thereafter 
until  the  rental  under  the  original  franchise  of  1902 
should  become  subject  to  readjustment.  A  further  pay- 
ment of  $9,000  per  annum  was  provided  for,  such  amount 
being  equivalent  to  three  per  cent,  of  $300,000,  the  esti- 
mated annual  gross  earnings  of  the  extensions.  This 
payment  was  to  be  made  for  ten  years,  after  which  the 
amount  of  it  was  to  be  five  per  cent,  of  the  gross  earn- 
ings of  the  extensions.  All  payments  were  to  be  read- 
justed at  the  end  of  each  twenty-five  years. 

This  certificate  was  approved  by  the  Board  of  Alder- 
men in  February,  1905,  with  a  slight  modification  allow- 
ing the  granting  of  permits  for  street  openings  by  the 
City  officials.  Having  failed  to  get  the  consents  of  prop- 
erty owners,  the  company  applied  to  the  Appellate  Divi- 
sion of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  confirmed  the  favorable 
report  of  its  commissioners  on  June  14,  1905.  On  the 
following  day  the  company  began  construction  of  the 
Sixth  Avenue  extension. 

The  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Railroad  company,  which 
held  the  franchise  for  the  down-town  tunnels  of  the  line, 
also  failed  in  obtaining  property  owners'  consents  and 
applied  to  the  court.  Commissioners  were  appointed  and 
reported  favorably,  and  the  Appellate  Division  confirmed 
their  report  on  June  14, 1905.  Construction  work  on  this 
line  began  September  5,  1905. 


HUDSON"  AND  MANHATTAN  TUNNELS  289 

On  December  1,  1906,  the  various  companies  of  this 
system,  including  the  New  Jersey  and  New  York  corpora- 
tions, were  consolidated  with  the  Hudson  and  Manhattan 
Railroad  Company,  which  thenceforward  conducted  the 
management  and  operation  of  the  new  lines.  Work  was 
pushed  forward  without  undue  delay  and  operation  of 
the  ** Hudson  Tubes",  as  the  line  came  to  be  called,  was 
begun  on  February  25,  1908,  more  than  thirty-three  years 
after  the  work  had  been  started  by  Haskin.  The  motive 
power  is  electricity  generated  in  a  plant  in  Jersey  City 
and  supplied  by  the  third  rail  method. 

At  the  Manhattan  terminal  of  the  downtown  tubes 
the  Hudson  Terminal  building  was  erected,  with  the  sta- 
tion in  the  basement.  This  building,  a  22  story  *' sky- 
scraper", was  erected  by  the  Hudson  Companies,  a  sepa- 
rate corporation  formed  in  1905  to  handle  the  construc- 
tion and  real  estate  operations  for  the  Hudson  and  Man- 
hattan Railroad  company.  The  financing  was  done  by 
the  banking  firm  of  Harvey  Fisk  and  Sons,  Messrs.  Pliny 
Fisk  and  William  M.  Bamum  of  that  house  having  been 
closely  connected  with  the  enterprise.  The  total  cost  of 
the  system  and  its  equipment  was  about  $70,000,000. 
Mr.  McAdoo  remained  president  of  the  Hudson  and  Man- 
hattan Railroad  company  until  he  went  into  the  cabinet 
in  1913,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  Wilbur  C.  Fisk.  Mr. 
Jacobs  remained  chief  engineer  to  the  end  and  was  as- 
sisted by  J.  Vipond  Davies  as  deputy  chief  engineer. 

In  1909  the  Hudson  and  Manhattan  Railroad  company 
applied  to  and  received  from  the  Public  Service  Com- 
mission for  the  First  District  a  franchise  for  an  extension 
of  the  tunnel  from  its  present  terminus  at  Sixth  Avenue 
and  Thirty-third  street  northward  under  Sixth  Avenue 
and  curving  under  Bryant  Park  to  Forty-second  street 
and  the  Grand  Central  station  of  the  New  York  Central 
system.  Owing  to  unfavorable  financial  conditions  this 
extension  has  not  yet  been  built. 

The  system  as  it  operates  today  is  a  great  addition 


290  FIFTY  YEAKS  OF  RAPID  TRANSIT 

to  the  transportation  facilities  of  New  York  City.  It  car- 
ries about  70,000,000  passengers  a  year  and  the  traffic 
is  steadily  growing.  Many  of  these  are  commuters  who 
live  in  New  Jersey  and  do  business  in  New  York,  for- 
merly dependent  on  the  ferry  boats.  In  1912  the  com- 
pany connected  its  lines  with  the  Pennsylvania  Eailroad 
and  now  operates  through  trains  from  New  York  City  to 
Manhattan  Transfer  and  Newark.  Incoming  passengers 
on  the  Pennsylvania  may  change  to  Hudson  and  Man- 
hattan trains  at  the  Transfer  and  continue  their  journey 
through  the  tubes  to  downtown  Manhattan  without  extra 
charge.  On  the  Jersey  side  the  tubes  connect  directly 
with  the  Erie  and  Lackawanna  railroad  terminals. 

All  steel  equipment  is  used  in  the  tunnels,  the  cars 
having  center  side  doors  and  steel  uprights  as  well  as 
straps  for  standing  passengers.  The  closing  of  the  last 
door  gives  the  electric  signal  to  the  motorman  to  start 
the  train. 

On  February  25,  1915,  the  road  had  been  in  operation 
seven  years.  In  that  time  it  had  carried  329,357,277  pas-. 
sengers  without  the  loss  of  one  life.  Operated  to  its  full 
capacity,  it  is  estimated  that  it  can  carry  220,000,000  pas- 
sengers a  year,  so  that  the  present  traffic  is  about  one- 
third  of  the  maximum. 

The  tunnels  lie  at  an  average  depth  below  the  bed  of 
the  Hudson  Eiver  of  25  feet,  although  the  deepest  point 
in  them  is  101  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  water.  The 
total  weight  of  the  iron  rings  used  in  their  construction 
is  111,000  tons,  and  925,000  barrels  of  cement  were  used 
in  the  concrete  work. 

The  company  is  now  operating  about  eight  miles  of 
road,  of  which  a  little  more  than  three  miles  lie  in  New 
York  and  a  little  less  than  five  in  New  Jersey.  The  total 
length  of  single  track  is  more  than  eighteen  miles.  It  has 
226  steel  passenger  cars  each  forty-eight  feet  long  and 
capable  of  seating  forty-four  persons.    The  capital  stock 


HUDSON  AND  MANHATTAN  TUNNELS  291 

is  about  $45,000,000  and  the  outstanding  bond  issues  ag- 
gregate about  $76,000,000. 

The  Hudson  Terminal  buildings  are  among  the  mam- 
moth office  buildings  of  the  world.  They  have  twenty- 
two  floors  above  and  four  floors  below  the  street  level. 
They  contain  4,500  rooms  and  877,900  square  feet  of 
rentable  area.  The  gross  revenues  from  the  buildings  in 
1914,  including  rentals,  were  $1,723,671.73. 


There  is  more  than  has  been  told  in  the  story  of  New 
York's  rapid  transit  undertakings,  but  to  present  it  all 
the  limits  of  a  single  volume  would  be  exceeded.  For 
instance,  the  evolution  of  the  rapid  transit  car,  from  the 
flimsy  wooden  boxes  used  on  the  first  elevated  railroads 
to  the  ponderous  and  expensive  all-steel,  electric  cars  op- 
erated in  the  subways  of  today,  is  in  itself  an  interesting 
story  of  the  scientific  and  mechanical  progress  of  the  last 
half  century.  The  adaptation  of  electricity  to  traction 
purposes,  too,  and  the  recounting  of  the  many  and  rapid 
advances  in  this  branch  of  electrical  engineering  would 
in  itself  provide  material  for  a  volume.  But  these  and 
other  phases  of  rapid  transit  development  were  purposely 
omitted  in  order  to  present  in  sufficient  fullness  the  narra- 
tive of  invention,  legislation,  construction,  negotiation, 
private  ownership  and  public  ownership  during  Fifty 
Years  of  Rapid  Transit,  set  forth  in  the  preceding  pages. 


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